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Introduction 
After socialist rule came to an end in the 1990s the Successor States of the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) adopted new consti-
tutions based on the rule of law, constitutional supremacy and democratic rule. 
Ever since they have gone or are still going through profound economic, po-
litical and legal changes. After having achieved independence it has, to this 
day, been the main topic on the political agendas of the Successor States to 
achieve a speedy integration into the European Union. Besides economic 
transformations, this presents them with the challenge of comprehensive re-
forms implementing the principles of liberty, democracy and the respect for 
human rights.  
The new constitutions and the therein prescribed principles and rules, human 
rights and liberties of individuals constitute formal and substantive limits to 
the state authorities and bodies vested with state power. A strong constitutional 
adjudication and the broad accessibility to the constitutional courts play a fun-
damental role for the enforcement of these guarantees and the consolidation 
of the constitutions in the Successor States. The constitutional courts are 
vested with comprehensive powers to monitor acts and actions of the state 
authorities with respect to their compatibility with the constitutions. So as to 
enforce the constitutional order they are empowered to invalidate state acts for 
being inconsistent with the latter. These review powers comprise acts of an 
individual and concrete nature adopted by the judicial and executive powers 
as well as laws and other acts of legislation.  
The broad accessibility of the constitutional courts of the Successor States has 
been accomplished by several means which entitle individual persons to re-
quest the constitutional courts to review state acts with respect to their com-
patibility with the constitutions. The most noteworthy of these access rights is 
the entitlement of natural and legal persons to file complaints against laws and 
other acts of legislation without having to demonstrate a legal interest. With 
the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Kosovo, whose 
constitutions are to a great extent influenced by the Western model, all other 
Successor States provide for popular complaints as means of individual access 
to their constitutional courts.  
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Due to their particular nature such popular complaints fundamentally differ 
from other legal remedies in public and constitutional law proceedings. Be-
cause they can be filed without a personal concern and legal interest, popular 
complaints allow practically unrestricted individual access to constitutional 
courts. As remedies for the initiation of judicial review proceedings they serve 
the enforcement of the abstract constitutional order against the legislative au-
thorities. As individual access rights they, at the same time, entail features of 
legal remedies for the protection of subjective rights.  
Because unlimited access of individuals to constitutional courts predomi-
nantly faces resistance, popular complaints are rather uncommon in a Euro-
pean perspective. They can be found only in single states or at the subnational 
level. Also the European Commission of Democracy through Law (generally 
known as Venice Commission) regularly advises against introducing popular 
complaints.1 
The practically unlimited access of individuals to the constitutional courts in 
the Successor States of the SFRY raises the question as to the actual function 
and significance of popular complaints as individual access rights.  
Detailed studies on access of individuals to constitutional courts are rare. In 
light of that the Venice Commission commissioned the publication of two sig-
nificant studies providing a comprehensive overview over the different means 
of individual access in the member states of the European Council: «Der 
Zugang des Einzelnen zur Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit im Europäischen 
Raum»2 and «Study on Individual Access to Constitutional Courts»3. Numer-
ous studies can be found with respect to the individual or constitutional com-
plaint as classic remedy for human rights protection and as most spread means 
of direct individual access to constitutional courts. Detailed studies exist for 
instance in relation to the German Verfassungsbeschwerde but also in the in-
dividual Successor States considered. In contrast hereto, there seem to be 
                                              
1  The Venice Commission is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional mat-
ters. Established in 1990, the Commission has contributed to a significant extent to the 
adoption of European constitutional standards in the fields of democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law in the Successor States of the former SFRY and all post-communist 
and -socialist states after transition. For more information see 
<www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation&lang=EN> (last accessed 
September 2018). 
2  Venice Commission Document CDL-JU(2001)22. 
3  Venice Commission Document CDL-AD(2010)039rev. 
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hardly any in-depth studies on popular complaints as access rights of individ-
uals to constitutional courts. A reason for this could be the fact that, with a few 
exceptions on the national and subnational level, these access rights are rather 
uncommon in European systems. The Bavarian popular complaint, for exam-
ple, is analyzed in a number of doctoral theses and the meanwhile abolished 
popular complaint in Hungary has been subject of a couple of academic pub-
lications as well. 
To the knowledge of the author there are, however, no detailed procedural or 
comparative studies about the popular complaints in the Successor States of 
the former SFRY. Also in domestic legal doctrine these means of direct indi-
vidual access find attention mostly in a general way in relation to the initiation 
of judicial review proceedings or to the heavy workload of the constitutional 
courts. 
The present study aims at providing an answer to the above raised question 
about the function and significance of popular complaints in a procedural and 
practical aspect. Besides, the overall research question relates to the actual 
institutional significance of these complaints for the enforcement of the con-
stitutional orders and for the consolidation of the new constitutions in the Suc-
cessor States. In this respect the popular complaints in the Republics of Croa-
tia, Slovenia and Macedonia are examined in a comparative manner. In ac-
cordance with their procedural arrangements these three complaints represent 
three different models which developed in the Successor States after transi-
tion. With respect to the procedural requirements the popular complaint in 
Slovenia stands for the most restricted form. The Croatian complaint is as-
sessed in place of the popular complaints provided in Serbia and Montenegro, 
because of the comparability of the respective procedural arrangements. The 
choice of the popular complaint as provided in Macedonia as third model is 
finally justified by the limited protection offered by the constitutional com-
plaint, allowing direct access to the constitutional court in parallel with the 
popular complaint. 
In Chapter 1 the bases for the study on the popular complaints in Croatia, Slo-
venia and Macedonia are laid. In order to narrow down and to classify the 
object of investigation, the study in a first step describes the types and function 
of access rights of individuals in general and the popular complaints for the 
initiation of judicial review proceedings in particular. By comparison to con-
stitutional complaints, special focus will be laid on the analysis of the protec-
tive function of popular complaints. To show the origin of the popular com-
plaints in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia, a historical review will be given 
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with regard to the function of the popular complaint under the political ideol-
ogy of socialist rule.  
In order to provide a basis for the assessment of the institutional role and sig-
nificance of the popular complaints under current law, Chapter 2 presents the 
Constitutional Courts of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia from an institu-
tional aspect. Essential are especially the comprehensive powers of the Courts 
and the access systems, which allow their broad accessibility to so-called au-
thorized applicants and to individuals. 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed analysis of the three popular complaints consid-
ered from a procedural point of view by investigating the relevant constitu-
tional and legal bases and the pertinent case-law of the Constitutional Courts. 
Two relevant aspects with respect to the procedural arrangements of these 
remedies are investigated in this part of the study: the procedural requirements 
for the submittal of popular complaints and the procedural rights of applicants 
in judicial review proceedings and procedural measures allowing concrete im-
provements of their personal legal positions. The comparative conclusion re-
veals existing similarities and differences between these three popular com-
plaints. 
In Chapter 4 the study assesses the relevance of the popular complaints in 
Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia in a practical aspect, taking into account the 
available statistical data on the activity of the Courts from 2002 up to and 
including the year 2015. This data reveals the practical significance of popular 
complaints in quantitative and in qualitative terms. On the one hand, these 
complaints are analyzed in relation to the broad circle of authorized applicants. 
Thereafter, their practical significance is established from the perspective of 
individuals who are also entitled to directly access the Constitutional Courts 
by filing constitutional complaints. In a second part the impact of popular 
complaints on the enforcement of the Constitutions in the three states consid-
ered is analyzed on the basis of the comprehensive case-law of the three 
Courts over the twenty-five years since transition. In this part of the study the 
comparative conclusion shows furthermore whether the procedural differ-
ences of the three complaints have an impact on their practical significance. 
In Chapter 5 all previous aspects and findings are combined in order to draw 
conclusions on the role of these complaints and their institutional significance 
for the enforcement of the Constitutions and human rights in the three states 
considered. At this point, the relevant current political and legal circumstances 
are taken into consideration. Thereafter, a brief look will be taken on previous 
Introduction 
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and current attempts to restrict individual access by means of the popular com-
plaints. This allows giving an outlook on the future of these remedies in the 
three states considered. 
The main outcomes and findings of the study will be summarized in the Con-
cluding Observations. These finally provide an answer to the over-all research 
question mentioned above: whether the popular complaints as a means of in-
dividual access to the Constitutional Courts must be regarded to be of an im-
portant institutional significance in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia.  
 
Zurich, October 2018 ANA THOONEN-TORNIC 
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Chapter 1: Access by filing popular complaints  
I. Access of individuals to constitutional courts 
The competence to open and to conduct judicial proceedings at one’s own 
discretion is principally foreign to the judiciary. As courts can only initiate 
procedures upon valid applications filed by authorized applicants, their acces-
sibility is a necessary condition for performing their judicial tasks. The same 
applies to systems of constitutional adjudication.1 As a rule, the responsible 
courts review the compatibility of state acts with the constitutions only upon 
and within the scope of requests of authorized applicants. From the perspec-
tive of the courts their accessibility is a precondition for their power to enforce 
the constitutions against unconstitutional state acts. For authorized applicants 
the entitlement to access judicial proceedings is a means to subject certain 
state acts to constitutional review. The restriction of the review activities to 
the scope of requests is a method to limit the powers of the constitutional 
courts. It moreover constitutes a precondition for their self-restraint in review-
ing acts enacted by the legislative powers.2 
In Europe the tradition of individual access to constitutional adjudication can 
be traced back to the 19th century. While the German Constitution of 1849 – 
even though it never entered into force – provided for such access, the Swiss 
Federal Constitution of 1874 introduced a legal remedy that entitled individ-
uals to appeal to the Federal Court against state acts or cantonal laws and reg-
ulations which violated their rights and liberties (staatsrechtliche 
Beschwerde).3 In the German Bundesland Bavaria means of individual access 
were introduced in 1919. 
The horrifying experiences with the two World Wars increased human rights 
consciousness and the awareness of the necessity of adequate remedies to pre-
vent and to sanction governmental arbitrariness and disregard of the funda-
mental rights. Concurrently with the establishment of constitutional courts the 
                                              
1  BÖCKENFÖRDE, 11; BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 233. 
2  See for many HÄBERLE, 12 f.; SADURSKI, 109 ff. 
3  Art. 113 para. 1 n. 3 Federal Constitution of 1874. 
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post-war period in Europe is characterized by their opening to individual per-
sons and the spread of individual access rights to constitutional adjudication.4 
Playing the leading role, the German Federal Republic introduced the consti-
tutional complaint in 1951.5 The German model was adopted by the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1963 and thereafter spread 
throughout most of post-war Europe. With the exception of the Netherlands, 
today all European states with constitutional courts or tribunals provide for at 
the least one means of individual access. Finally, in France the right of indi-
viduals to access the Conseil Constitutionnel was introduced with the consti-
tutional revision in 20086 while Turkey introduced the constitutional com-
plaint with the comprehensive constitutional reform adopted in 2010.7 
1. Definition 
Following the judicature of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
civil and in criminal law matters, individual access to courts can be generally 
defined as entitlement of individual persons to bring violations of their rights 
before a court by commencing an action and with the purpose of having the 
rights concerned determined by that court.8 In accordance with its practice, 
individual access in civil and in criminal law matters constitutes an autono-
mous and indispensable component of the right to court as guaranteed by art. 6 
para. 1 ECHR9 and is closely related with the realization of the rule of law.10 
In the understanding of the ECtHR, individual access is conditional upon a 
legitimate interest in the proceedings and therefore requires a direct concern 
of the applicant. 
                                              
4  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 47. 
5  Initially provided only by art. 90 ff. Constitutional Court Law of 1951, the complaint was 
included into art. 93 para. 1 n. 4a Basic Law of 1949 only in 1969. Detailed studies of the 
German Verfassungsbeschwerde are provided by KLUTH, 53 ff.; KORINEK, passim; 
SEIBERT, passim; ZUCK, passim.  
6  Art. 61 para. 1 Constitution of 1958. For more details see FABBRINI, 1302 ff. 
7  Art. 148 Constitution of 1995 and art. 45 para. 1 Constitutional Court Law of 2011. 
8  Judgment Golder vs. UK, 4451/70, A 18 (1975), §§ 26 and 32. 
9  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 Novem-
ber 1950 as amended by Protocol no. 14 on 1 June 2010.  
10  Golder vs. UK, §§ 34, 35 and 36. For more references to the pertinent jurisdiction see 
WIEDERIN, 310 ff. 
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In the present study individual access is understood as the right of individual 
persons to file complaints or initiatives to constitutional courts.11 As constitu-
tional courts the study refers to particular judicial institutions such as courts, 
tribunals or councils which are placed outside the ordinary court system and 
have exclusive jurisdiction to review normative acts and other specific acts or 
actions of state authorities or bodies vested with state powers with respect to 
their compatibility with the constitution.12 The circle of state acts and actions 
that can be subject to such appeals depends on the review powers of the con-
stitutional courts and on the specific procedural requirements, which might or 
might not prescribe a direct concern of applicants. Accordingly, individual ac-
cess can be granted against acts and actions of state bodies that are addressed 
directly to individuals and determine their legal position and rights, against 
omissions of state bodies to act or against laws and other normative acts of a 
general nature. The accessibility of constitutional courts to individuals entails 
the right of individual persons to request the initiation of proceedings in which 
these state acts are reviewed as to their compatibility with the constitution and 
eliminated for violating the constitutional rules or principles.  
Individual access can be granted by means of legal remedies such as com-
plaints or requests that oblige a constitutional court to open review proceed-
ings. Access can also be granted in form of a right to suggest or petition the 
initiation of proceedings while leaving the final decision to the discretion of 
the court. The present study only considers remedies with binding effect as 
individual access rights. This applies to binding requests and complaints but 
also to suggestions or petitions which have a procedural effect because they 
oblige the court to justify their rejection.13  
As constituent elements of a constitutional system, remedies and means that 
allow individuals to access constitutional courts have their basis in constitu-
tions or constitutional laws.14 This constitutional nature mirrors their supreme 
institutional significance in contrast to rights of appeal to the ordinary or ad-
ministrative judiciary that are merely guaranteed by law. Nevertheless, there 
is no uniform view as to whether the access to constitutional courts is to be 
                                              
11  See as well BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 191 f.; HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/ 
PACZOLAY, n. 21.  
12  The different systems of judicial review will be described on pp. 17 ff. 
13  Compare BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 217, who only considers remedies as access 
rights which automatically trigger proceedings or oblige the courts to initiate them.  
14  E.g. GROTE, fn. 201. 
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considered as constitutional right. While PFERSMANN, for instance, acknowl-
edges these access rights as fundamental rights,15 the Constitutional Court of 
Slovenia rejects their nature as a constitutional right.16 
2. Typology of individual access rights 
The means allowing individual access to constitutional adjudication can be 
divided into two groups; those allowing indirect individual access (A) and 
those enabling individuals to directly access constitutional courts (B and C). 
The typology of the present study adopts the classification applied by the Ven-
ice Commission.17 
A. Indirect individual access 
Indirect individual access is granted by remedies which allow individuals to 
challenge the constitutionality of state acts through the action of so-called «in-
termediary bodies».18 Appeals are filed to an intermediary body that requests 
the constitutional court to open proceedings. Typically, such intermediary bod-
ies are state organs or public institutions such as ordinary courts, public pros-
ecutors or the ombudspersons.19 In accordance with the definition above, an 
appeal is regarded as indirect individual access right only if an intermediary 
body is obliged to refer the issue to the constitutional court or to justify the 
rejection in a formal ruling. 
Indirect individual access constitutes a widespread mechanism for the protec-
tion of human rights. Two prevalent forms of indirect individual access to con-
stitutional courts will be described in the following. 
a) Objections of unconstitutionality 
In systems of concentrated constitutional adjudication20 ordinary courts, that 
have doubts on the constitutionality of a legal provision they have to apply in 
a concrete case, halt the proceedings and refer to the constitutional court by 
                                              
15  PFERSMANN, Prolégomène, 77. 
16  Ruling U-I-71/1994 of 6 October 1994, OdlUS III, 109. 
17  See HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, nn. 54, 56 ff. 
18  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 21. 
19  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, nn. 56 ff., 63 ff., 72 f. 
20  See below pp. 19 f. 
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preliminary requests. The latter reviews the respective provision as to its com-
patibility with the constitution. On the other hand, also participants to court 
proceedings can draw attention to inconsistencies of applicable normative pro-
visions by raising so-called objections or exceptions of unconstitutionality.21 
The ordinary courts, which are requested to refer the question of constitution-
ality to the constitutional court, function as intermediary bodies for the apply-
ing participant. 
While such objections are normally not binding for the ordinary courts22 they 
have a binding nature in a few states. In Romania, for instance, a plea of a 
party obligates a judge to halt the proceedings and to submit a preliminary 
request to the constitutional court.23 In Italy and since 2008 in France, on the 
other hand, the eccezione di costituzionalità or questione di legittimità cos-
tituzionale and the question préjudicielle de constitutionalité oblige the judges 
to assess and to justify refusals to request the initiation of review proceedings 
before the constitutional courts.24  
b) Indirect access through ombudspersons 
Another common form of indirect access is the right to request the ombud-
sperson as intermediary body to bring state acts that interfere with human 
rights before the constitutional court.25 National ombudsperson offices can be 
found in almost all contemporary constitutional systems. With the breakdown 
of the totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, ombudspersons became insepa-
rably linked with the rule of law, democracy and the protection of the ECHR.26 
In Eastern European states they were introduced as advocates of people's 
rights and liberties and are commonly referred to as human rights defenders 
or as people's attorney.27  
Only in a number of states including Austria, Liechtenstein and Portugal the 
ombudspersons are vested with the competence to access constitutional judi-
ciary.28 Generally, ombudspersons are authorized to this effect if they establish 
                                              
21  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 58. 
22  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 217; HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 57. 
23  See BRUNNER, Festschrift Stern, 1055. Similar institutions can be found in Serbia and 
Montenegro. 
24  For further examples see HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 58. 
25  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, nn. 64 ff.  
26  ARNOLD, ZöR 2006, 9; KUCSKO-STADLMAYER, 2 f. 
27  ARNOLD, ZöR 2006, 9; BRUNNER, ZaöRV 1993, 845 f. 
28  Detailed in HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, nn. 63 ff., 106. 
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violations in concrete legal cases they are dealing with. Their contribution to 
human rights protection can be compensatory or supplementary.29 The author-
ity to request the initiation of proceedings for the benefit of an individual ap-
plicant has a compensatory protective effect if the latter is not entitled to ac-
cess the constitutional court. If individuals are entitled to file complaints them-
selves, requests of ombudspersons in the name of an applicant can be 
acknowledged as supplementary protection. Less widespread is the entitle-
ment of ombudspersons to refer to the constitutional courts with regard to laws 
and other normative acts that affect human rights and liberties.30  
B. Direct individual access 
Direct individual access is granted if individual persons are entitled to directly 
appeal to the constitutional courts and to request the initiation of review pro-
ceedings without having to involve an intermediary party.31 Direct access to 
constitutional courts can be granted against a variety of state acts comprising 
acts and actions of state bodies or their failure to act as well as against laws 
and other normative acts. 
Besides electoral complaints (a), constitutional complaints as most common 
form of direct individual access in Europe will be presented in the following, 
based on the German model as prototype (b). The actual function of constitu-
tional complaints and popular complaints as further remedies allowing direct 
individual access to constitutional courts will be analyzed in more detail by 
way of comparison in the following paragraphs (II and III). 
a) Electoral complaints 
In a number of states, where the constitutional courts are empowered to assess 
the compliance of popular votes and elections, of referendum questions or of 
related decisions with the constitutional and legal standards, individuals are 
granted direct access by means of electoral complaints.32 In Germany eligible 
citizens are entitled to file complaints against decisions on the validity of elec-
tions of the legislative bodies.33 The Hungarian Constitutional Court, as other 
                                              
29  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 64. 
30  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 67. 
31  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 21. 
32  BRUNNER, ZaöRV 1993, 865. 
33  Art. 41 para. 2 Basic Law of 1949 and § 48 Constitutional Court Law of 1951. 
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example, reviews parliamentary resolutions ordering or dismissing a referen-
dum upon petitions that can be filed by anybody.34 
b) Constitutional complaints 
aa) Definition and main characteristics 
Constitutional or individual complaints35 or «fundamental rights com-
plaints»36 can be defined as procedural instruments that entitle individuals to 
challenge acts and activities of state organs or bodies vested with state powers 
before the constitutional courts for violating their constitutional rights. By 
submitting a complaint, an individual person activates a special procedure in 
which the court assesses the contested state act. If it finds that the allegations 
of violation are justified, it eliminates the contested state act and returns the 
case to the responsible authority for reconsideration. Constitutional com-
plaints can be considered as classic and most common legal remedies for the 
protection of human rights and liberties. They offer an additional protection 
to the protection of constitutional rights and liberties by the ordinary courts. 
The scope of rights, whose protection can be achieved by means of constitu-
tional complaints, varies from state to state. The scope can be either predefined 
by an explicit reference by the constitution as is the case in Germany37 and 
Spain38 or restricted to specific constitutional rights and liberties as in Albania, 
where complaints can be filed only for the protection of the right to due pro-
cess of law.39 In Austria, the general reference to constitutional rights and lib-
erties leaves a margin of discretion to the Constitutional Court.40 
Despite the procedural differences on a country to country base, the distinctive 
element for constitutional complaints is their strictly personal nature.41 Com-
plaints are only admissible if applicants demonstrate an own legal interest in 
                                              
34  Section 33 para 1 Constitutional Court Law of 2011. 
35  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 54. 
36  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 206. 
37  Art. 93 para. 1 n. 4a Basic Law of 1949. 
38  Art. 53 para. 2 Constitution of 1978. 
39  Art. 131 lit. f Constitution of 1998. 
40  Art. 144 Constitution of 1945. 
41  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 6. For a detailed analysis in relation to the German 
constitutional complaint see EPPING, n. 162, nn. 173 ff.; VON PACZENSKY, 36 f. 
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bringing proceedings before the constitutional courts. Legal interest as an ac-
cess requirement in general and as requirement for filing constitutional com-
plaints in particular will be analysed more thoroughly further below.42 
As a consequence of legal interest as admissibility requirement, constitutional 
complaints can be defined as legal remedies against state acts which directly 
interfere with the complainants' rights and liberties. This applies to acts passed 
in application of laws and which based thereon regulate the rights and obliga-
tions of specific or a determinable circle of persons (so-called «individual 
acts»).43 In Spain for instance complaints can be filed against court judgments 
or decisions44 while in the Czech Republic also individual acts or actions of 
administrative authorities can be appealed against before the constitutional 
court.45 Exceptionally, constitutional complaints can also be filed against laws 
and other acts of legislation. In Germany, for instance, they can be filed against 
laws, if their application leads to violations of rights and liberties of individu-
als.46 In Austria constitutional complaints can be filed against laws and regu-
lations that directly interfere with the applicants’ rights and liberties.47 This 
kind of constitutional complaint has recently been introduced in Hungary as 
well.48  
bb) Extraordinary nature 
Constitutional complaints are extraordinary remedies. This is due to the insti-
tutional separation of constitutional adjudication from the judiciary.49 The first 
feature of this extraordinary character is their subsidiary nature as remedy 
against human rights violations. Constitutional courts can only be referred to 
at last instances if the judiciary fails to provide sufficient protection of the 
constitutional rights and liberties. Before appealing to the constitutional court, 
complainants must have sought protection before the administrative and judi-
cial instances by exhausting all available legal remedies.50  
                                              
42  See below pp. 12 f. 
43  E.g. HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, nn. 79 and 95. 
44  Art. 53 para. 2 Constitution of 1978. 
45  Art. 87 para. 1 lit. d Constitution of 1993. 
46  Art. 90 para. 1 Constitutional Court Law of 1951. 
47  Art. 139 para. 1 Constitution of 1945. 
48  Art. 26 para. 2 lit. a Constitutional Court Law of 2011. 
49  ZUCK, n. 24. 
50  ARNOLD, ZöR 2006, 14; EPPING, n. 179; SEIBERT, 493 f., 502; ZUCK, nn. 34 ff. 
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The second feature of the extraordinary nature is the lack of a suspensive ef-
fect of constitutional complaints. Accordingly, the enforceability of the dis-
puted state acts is not prevented by the submittal of complaints. Finally, the 
restricted scope of jurisdiction of the constitutional courts can be considered 
as third feature of the extraordinary nature. The review is principally limited 
to the assessment of rights violations and excludes the evaluation of facts or 
of the rightful application of laws in general.51 Both in new democracies and 
established constitutional systems, this delimitation from the competences of 
the judiciary causes difficulties to the constitutional courts.52 
3. Positive effects for human rights enforcement 
Today, most states with a system of concentrated constitutional adjudication 
entitle individuals to demand judicial protection by the constitutional courts. 
Numerous European states comprising Albania, Austria, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Germany and Spain introduced both means of indirect access and 
such which enable individuals to directly access the constitutional courts. 
Only a few European states, such as Bulgaria, Italy and Lithuania provide for 
only indirect individual access.53 The positive effects of granting individuals 
access to constitutional courts has been acknowledged both with regard to 
means allowing indirect access and to direct access rights. 
The interposition of an intermediary body for applications to constitutional 
courts entails several positive effects. Firstly, it has a filtering effect and pre-
vents the constitutional courts from being flooded with appeals.54 The Venice 
Commission endorses the introduction of indirect access rights for an im-
proved quality of applications and for enhancing the chances of success of 
applications. In order to keep the access path to judicial protection as short as 
possible, the Commission recommends that any judge be authorized to refer 
preliminary questions to the constitutional court.55 It also endorses the access 
of ombudspersons in general and their entitlement to request the initiation of 
review proceedings on behalf of the individuals, as because of their expertise 
                                              
51  SADURSKI, 7; ZUCK, n. 24. 
52  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 214 f. 
53  See overview in HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, table 1.1.1., 61 ff. 
54  E.g. RÜLKE, 159. 
55  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, nn. 61 f. 
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and professionality their submittals are usually of a better quality and enhance 
the chances of success.56 
At the same time however, the protection of the applicant's rights is dependent 
on the capacity and willingness of the intermediary party to forward the re-
quest to the constitutional courts.57 As indirect access rights do not allow for 
an autonomous activation of the constitutional courts by the individuals, they 
are of a smaller significance for human rights protection than means allowing 
individuals to directly refer to the constitutional courts. 
From among the means allowing individuals to directly access the constitu-
tional courts, constitutional complaints are of a fundamental value as legal 
remedies for the protection of constitutional rights against state authorities. 
The direct linkage created between the individual person and the constitutional 
courts as supreme guardians of the constitutions and the constitutional rights 
significantly strengthens the legal protection against the state authorities. In 
legal doctrine this remedy is considered to be of an «outstanding importance» 
for human rights protection58 and seen as «completion» of the principle of 
constitutionality.59 In order to most comprehensively protect human rights and 
as most efficient way to relief the ECtHR, the Venice Commission endorses 
the introduction of constitutional complaints that can be filed both against vi-
olations by the judiciary and the administration.60  
Considering the advantages and disadvantages, the Venice Commission rec-
ommends a combination of means of direct individual access with indirect 
access rights.61 The leverage effect of broad individual access to constitutional 
adjudication for human rights and liberties is undisputed. The more open con-
stitutional courts, the more intensive is the protection of these rights. Firstly, 
as additional and subsidiary protective means, individual access rights consid-
erably extend the protection offered by the administrative judiciary against 
conducts and acts of the state authorities. Furthermore, they contribute to the 
                                              
56  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/ PACZOLAY, nn. 69 f. See also Opinion on the possible re-
form of the Ombudsman institution in Kazakhstan, Venice Commission Document CDL-
AD(2007)020, n. 14. 
57  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 3. 
58  BRUNNER, Festschrift Stern, 1041. 
59  KLUTH, 54 f. 
60  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, nn. 79 f. 
61  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, nn. 3, 108. 
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detection of rights violating state acts and to their elimination from the consti-
tutional order.62 And finally, individual access entails a strong protective effect 
for human rights and liberties. Decisions to eliminate rights violating acts not 
only protect the personal rights of the applicants, but also – due to their finality 
and general enforceability – at the same time enforce these rights as constitu-
tional guarantees in a general interest.63 This is why individual access to con-
stitutional adjudication is broadly considered as maximum protection of con-
stitutional rights and liberties64 and as most efficient measure to prevent an 
overburdening of the ECtHR.65 
Therefore, it can be concluded that states who offer broad individual access to 
constitutional courts strive for a comprehensive and strong protection of hu-
man rights.  
4. Restrictions of individual access 
Despite the values of granting individual persons access to constitutional 
courts, their accessibility also entails serious adverse effects. Being flooded 
with inadmissible, unsubstantiated or abusive requests, several constitutional 
courts suffer from a work overload and from an ever growing backlog of pend-
ing cases. This not only harms their functionality and authority, but also entails 
serious negative impacts on an effective rights protection and on the duration 
of the proceedings.66 Today, many states and particularly the new democracies 
in Eastern Europe experience difficulties in finding an equilibrium between 
an improved protection of constitutional rights and the prevention of their con-
stitutional courts from being flooded.67  
In practice different organizational measures are taken to enhance efficiency 
of courts in handling the amount of submittals. This comprises for instance 
the engagement of chambers or panels of judges with different cases or tasks, 
the introduction of accelerated or summary proceedings or the joinder of sim-
ilar applications.68  
                                              
62  STONE SWEET, 141. 
63  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 53. 
64  E.g. BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 202 f.; MARKOVIĆ, 62. 
65  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 109. 
66  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 214; HARUTYUNYAN/MAVČIČ, chapter V.A. 
67  GROTE, 58. 
68  FAVOREU, 55. See also HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 11. 
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In order to decrease the number of submittals, their admissibility is addition-
ally restricted by different procedural requirements for opening proceedings. 
These requirements or «filters»69 will be described in the following. So as to 
provide a base for the subsequent analysis of the popular complaints in Croa-
tia, Slovenia and Macedonia from a procedural point of view, the following 
illustration only covers those requirements which are relevant as hurdles for 
individual access to constitutional courts.  
A. Legitimate interest in bringing proceedings 
Besides the capacity to act as generally valid criterion for legal acts and for 
individual access to courts, individual access to constitutional courts can be 
restricted to applicants with a proven individual interest in bringing proceed-
ings before the constitutional courts.  
As a general principle of modern legal orders, the existence of a proven legal 
interest in bringing proceedings is a fundamental prerequisite for judicial pro-
tection on the national level and for individual access to international tribunals 
or courts.70 According to a statement of the ECtHR issued in its first decision 
after the introduction of a legitimate interest as new admissibility criterion for 
individual complaints by Protocol no. 14 on 1 June 2010, the restriction of 
individual access to persons with a proven legal interest realizes the principle 
de minimis non curat praetor and is a measure of procedural economy.71  
If a proven legal interest is introduced as access requirement, the right of in-
dividuals to access constitutional courts is reserved to persons with a particular 
grievance and with a legitimate interest in the review and the invalidation of 
particular state acts. A particular grievance is given if the applicant demon-
strates that he or she is affected more than any other person by the state act 
contested for being unconstitutional.72  
Essentially, this implies that applicants prove that they are personally, directly 
and currently affected by the contested state act. They succeed in doing so if 
they substantiate that state acts or actions or the omission of a state authority 
                                              
69  See title II.1. in HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 110. 
70  SLADIČ, 24. For an overview in relation to international tribunals see VAN AAKEN, 21 f., 
23, 25 ff. 
71  See e.g. decision Korolev vs. Russia of 1 July 2010, 25551/05, pp. 3 f. where the ECtHR 
rejected an individual complaint as inadmissible because the amount in dispute was less 
than one Euro and therewith of minimal significance for the applicant’s legal position. 
72  E.g. AUER/MALINVERNI/HOTTELIER vol. 1, n. 2100. 
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to act directly interferes with their personal rights and legal position. The di-
rect effect must be given without any further implementation by administra-
tive or judicial authorities.73 This is the case if the contested rule or prohibition 
is directed to the applicant as addressee. A legal interest moreover requires 
that alleged rights violations still exist at the moment a complaint is filed. Fi-
nally, applicants succeed in demonstrating a legal interest if they substantiate 
that the final decision by which the constitutional court eliminates the con-
tested state act leads to an effective and not just a hypothetical or theoretical 
improvement of their personal legal positions.74 
If introduced in relation to proceedings of constitutional adjudication, legal 
interest can have two functions.75 It can serve as mere admissibility require-
ment for individual access among other procedural requirements to access 
constitutional courts. Its function can also be farther-reaching and essential for 
what is called the «procedural legitimacy». The required particular connection 
to the contested provision and the need for legal protection is required for the 
capacity of the applicant to be heard in court and for their status as party to the 
proceedings. This procedural legitimacy or the right to be heard in court is 
what is referred to as Prozessführungsbefugnis in German while in English 
terminology it is referred to as standing or locus standi.76 
Eventually, what is essential for the introduction of legal interest as personal 
access requirement is that this measure excludes unrestricted individual access 
by so called actio popularis or popular complaints and therewith prevents the 
constitutional courts from ever-increasing caseloads. For detailed legal de-
scriptions and analyses reference is made to the relevant comprehensive liter-
ature.77  
                                              
73  E.g. HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 80; SCHENKE, n. 510. 
74  EPPING, n. 182. 
75  See e.g. SLADIČ, 23 ff., 45 ff. 
76  E.g. VAN DIJK, 18, 27. 
77  In relation to legal interest in German administrative procedural law see e.g. SCHENKE, 
nn. 485 ff., 557 ff. With respect to proceedings before the Federal Court of Switzerland 
see AUER/MALINVERNI/HOTTELIER vol. 1, nn. 2094 ff.  
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B. Formal or objective requirements for access 
Additionally to the proven legal interest in bringing proceedings as a personal 
quality of applicants, the filing of complaints and requests to constitutional 
courts is also restricted by formal or objective access requirements.78  
Besides the requirement to exhaust existing legal remedies before the judici-
ary, the limited jurisdiction of constitutional courts constitutes a frequent rea-
son for the rejection of submittals in practice. Furthermore, all states make the 
admissibility of appeals contingent on the fulfilment of requirements regard-
ing their form, language and signature. Another effective access hurdle is the 
obligation to substantiate the alleged inconsistency of state acts with the con-
stitutions. Also temporal restrictions of the access entitlement and the forfei-
ture of the right to submit complaints or requests to the constitutional courts 
after the expiry of a certain time limit constitute common procedural require-
ments. The imposition of a financial burden finally keeps individuals from 
making use of their access rights in an abusive way or without due diligence. 
This is achieved by prescribing a mandatory legal representation, by the obli-
gation to pay court fees or taxes or by the possibility of the courts to impose 
penalty fees or fees to reimburse expenses for proceedings initiated upon friv-
olous submittals. 
C. Qualitative requirements for access 
Requirements with respect to the quality of appeals constitute another com-
mon means to restrict the access of individuals to constitutional courts. 
Courts can be empowered to accept for consideration only such submittals 
with a prospect of success or such that are significant for the objective consti-
tutional order or for the protection of the personal legal position of the com-
plainants. In Germany for instance, the qualitative criteria for the selection of 
applications by the Constitutional Courts are prescribed by law.79 The writ of 
certiorari on the other hand, entitles the Supreme Court of the United States 
to establish own criteria and to reject applications based on its own discretion 
and without any justification.80  
                                              
78  See for many BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 210 f.; VAN DIJK, 13 ff.; HARUTYUNYAN/ 
NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 7. 
79  § 93a para. 2 lit. a and b Constitutional Court Law of 1951. 
80  Rule 10 Rules of the Supreme Court in the version of 12 January 2010. 
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Qualitative requirements constitute effective means to filter out potentially 
unsuccessful submittals or to exclude complaints that are too trivial to be de-
cided by the constitutional courts. Yet, the assessment of their fulfilment nec-
essarily entails a certain margin of appreciation, which is also considered to 
involve risks.81 Besides an inconsistent or arbitrary application, such criteria 
can namely also serve as pretexts to the constitutional courts to avoid decisions 
on politically delicate cases. 
 
II. Individual access by popular complaints 
1. Actio popularis in Roman law 
Both as term and as remedy, popular complaints or popular actions82 originate 
from the actio popularis in Roman law. In its initial meaning, it constituted a 
claim right (actio) that could be lodged to an elected magistrate (praetor). The 
entitlement to file such a claim was not conditional upon the fulfilment of any 
requirements. Rather, the circle of applicants was indefinite and unrestricted 
and encompassed any male Roman citizen (quivis ex populo).83 Its most sig-
nificant role, the actio popularis played in Roman criminal law.84 The incen-
tive to submit an actio was the payment of punitive damages by a person 
charged for having committed a crime.85  
The motivation for the submittal of an actio popularis has constituted a con-
tentious issue in legal doctrine already for a long time. According to an older 
opinion it served as appeal for victims of criminal acts and for their personal 
advantages.86 A majority of scholars denies such an interpretation. Their view 
is based on the argument that the term popularis not only implies the entitle-
ment of every citizen, but also insinuates an altruistic or selfless incentive of 
applicants. Moreover, the lack of requirements of a personal or direct affection 
                                              
81  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 215 f.; VAN DIJK, 14. 
82  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 229; HALFMEIER, 199 ff. 
83  HALFMEIER, 35; MOMMSEN, 378 f.  
84  HALFMEIER, 29; LJUBIĆ, Ustavnopravna priroda prijedloga, 8. 
85  LJUBIĆ, Ustavnopravna priroda prijedloga, 8. 
86  CARL GEORG BRUNS, see reference in MOMMSEN, 376 n. 2 and VAN DIJK, 19, fn. 36. 
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as a victim of the invoked crime is considered as indication that the actio con-
stituted a means to protect public welfare and to enforce the law in a general 
interest of the public.87 Accordingly, fines levied by Roman criminal law pri-
marily constituted financial remedies of the public for criminal offences suf-
fered and served only secondarily for the applicants themselves.88 They were 
an expression for the engagement of civil society for the compliance with the 
legal order as common or collective good.89  
2. As access rights to constitutional courts 
A. Distinctive features  
If introduced as legal means allowing individuals to directly access to consti-
tutional courts, the special features of popular complaints entail particular 
characteristics that distinguish them from other means of individual access. 
a) Lack of admissibility requirements 
Apart from the capacity to act and to take legal action, access is in principle 
not restricted by any further personal requirement. As per definition, the sub-
mittal of popular complaints does in particular not require a legal interest of 
the complainants.90 They do not need to demonstrate a violation of their per-
sonal rights nor do they need to be personally, directly or indirectly affected 
by a contested act. Consequently, popular complaints can be filed for the pro-
tection of rights and interests of a third party or for the enforcement of the 
legal order in a public interest of society. In fact,  
«the very idea of standing is inappropriate to an actio popularis because the 
individual who is launching such an action is seen as "a trustee of the public 
good" rather than as someone with a particular grievance […]».91  
Given the principally unrestricted entitlement to file popular complaints, ac-
cess is granted to the broadest circle of applicants possible. Besides individual 
persons these complaints can in fact be filed by all legal subjects including 
                                              
87  MOMMSEN, 376. This view is shared in more recent literature, see for instance Black's 
Law Dictionary, 29 f.; HALFMEIER, 36 f.; LJUBIĆ, Ustavno-pravna priroda prijedloga, 8. 
88  MOMMSEN, 378 ff. 
89  For more details on the Roman actio popularis see HALFMEIER, 29 ff. and 43 ff. 
90  See for many BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 229; HALFMEIER, 199 f. 
91  (Punctuation added). SADURSKI, 6. 
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state organs, public corporations and other public institutions. It even allows 
the submittal of collective appeals by associations without legal personality 
on behalf of the interest of its members or of the public interests. As a rule, 
the admissibility of popular complaints is not contingent on the fulfilment of 
formal or procedural requirements either.92 The entitlement to file complaints 
is not restricted in time but granted at any time during the legal validity of a 
challenged act. They can be filed without having to exhaust all procedural 
means before the administration and judiciary. Furthermore, their submittal is 
neither conditional on the payment of court fees or taxes. Yet, the ideal of an 
absolutely unrestricted access does not correspond to reality. In practice, also 
popular complaints must meet requirements regarding form, content and sub-
stantiation.  
b) Legal remedy against acts of legislation 
As most significant consequence of the missing requirement to demonstrate a 
legal interest and personal concern, popular complaints can be filed against 
state acts which regulate legal relations in a general manner, without touching 
upon personal legal positions and rights.93 In principle this includes formal 
laws enacted in legislative proceedings as well as other acts of legislation such 
as administrative regulations and decrees enacted based on local legislative 
autonomy and other general acts as part of the positive legal order of a given 
state.94 If introduced, popular complaints consequently entitle individuals to 
request the constitutional courts to initiate judicial review proceedings against 
acts of legislation. 
B. Judicial review by constitutional courts 
The following paragraph aims at pointing out the most relevant features of 
judicial review as central form of constitutional adjudication.95 This allows 
defining the object of investigation of this study, which is restricted to the ac-
cessibility of constitutional courts in general and by means of popular com-
plaints in particular in concentrated systems of judicial review. 
                                              
92  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 229. 
93  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 229; HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 74. 
94  Collective agreements in public enterprises are perceived as parts of the domestic positive 
legal order in Macedonia, see MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 245. 
95  AUER/MALINVERNI/HOTTELIER vol. I, n. 1887. 
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a) Conceptual basis 
The idea of reviewing acts of the legislative authorities and of eliminating 
them for being inconsistent with the constitution can be traced back to 1803 
to the landmark judgment Marbury vs. Madison of the US Supreme Court. 
With a few exceptions96 this decision is considered as origin of judicial review 
and to have paved the way for its global spread as fourth state power.97  
As law at stake the Judiciary Act was passed by the Congress in 1801 during 
the last days of power of President John Adams. The Act was considered to 
have been rushed through as a legal fortress against the anti-federalist attitude 
of Adams' successor Thomas Jefferson. In assessing the Act, Chief Justice 
John Marshall found that it violated fundamental constitutional values. Em-
phasizing that acts that are incompatible with the Constitution have to be in-
validated, he declared the Act to be null and void. This decision was revolu-
tionary since Judge Marshall could not base the Supreme Court's power to 
review and to invalidate unconstitutional laws on any explicit authorization 
by the Constitution or by law. Instead, he justified its decision by invoking the 
supremacy of the Constitution and the authority of the Supreme Court to guard 
the compliance of all state branches with the constitutional order.98 
Still today, the undisputed superiority of the Constitution entails that it is bind-
ing to all state bodies including Congress as democratically legitimized legis-
lative authority.99 
b) Definition 
Judicial review means the power to control the compliance of state acts with 
the constitution and with higher-ranking laws. While the term «judicial re-
view» is common in English or American jurisprudence,100 European legal 
doctrine refers to «constitutional review» or «constitutional control». This 
complies with German term Verfassungskontrolle, the French term contrôle 
de constitutionnalité or the Spanish term control de constitucionalidad. In a 
broader sense, it comprises the control over all types of state acts including 
                                              
96  E.g. GINSBURG, 91 ff. As to KLEIN, 91 f. judicial review was already known under colo-
nial rule by the Privy Council of Great Britain. 
97  For a detailed description see BEATTY, 3 f.; CAPPELLETTI, 26 ff.  
98  See BEATTY, 3; STEFFANI, 374 f. 
99  Detailed with respect to the legal tradition of the USA in BEATTY, 1 f.; KOOPMANS, 37. 
100  E.g. Black's Law Dictionary, 864; STONE SWEET, 21. 
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normative acts, acts and actions of an individual and concrete nature of ad-
ministrative bodies and decisions and judgments of the judiciary.101  
This study applies a more narrow understanding of judicial review. Accord-
ingly, judicial review is understood as power to review acts of legislation and 
to invalidate these general acts in case of their inconsistency with the consti-
tution. This complies with the respective German term Normenkontrolle or 
contrôle des normes in French.  
aa) Judicial review in concentrated review systems 
The present study on individual access relates to judicial review in concen-
trated or centralized review systems, where the competence to review laws 
and other acts of legislation is reserved to a tribunal that is institutionally and 
functionally separated and independent from the judiciary.102 The German 
Federal Constitutional Court serves as a role model. It was founded on the 
basis of the ideals developed by Austrian scholar HANS KELSEN of a concen-
trated review power according to the Austrian Constitutional Court.103 Owing 
to the raised human rights awareness after World War II, it has moreover been 
established on the basis of an extended understanding as supreme guardian of 
human rights and liberties.104 Given the spread of such «concentrated» or 
«centralized review» throughout most of Europe, this form of constitutional 
adjudication is also known as «continental European system».105  
As a principle administrative and ordinary courts are excluded from reviewing 
laws with respect to their compatibility with the constitution and obliged to 
refer to the constitutional court for a final and binding decision on the validity 
of a law or its cancellation.106 Their competences are restricted to the review 
of decisions and state acts of an individual and concrete legal nature. Besides, 
the judiciary is empowered to review sublegislative acts as to their compati-
bility with the laws. This system and the European legal culture are signifi-
                                              
101  AUER/MALINVERNI/HOTTELIER vol. I, n. 1886. See also Black's Law Dictionary, 864. 
102  KELSEN, Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 54 f. 
103  KELSEN, Hüter der Verfassung, 19, 36 f.; IBID., Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 37 f. 
104  BRUNNER, Festschrift Stern, 1043; GROTE, 7 f.; NUSSBERGER, 535 f. 
105  E.g. ARNOLD, JOR 2002, 21 f.; EPSTEIN/KNIGHT/SHVETSOVA, 120 f.; STONE SWEET, 32 ff. 
AUER, n. 38, refers to a collective authorship. 
106  ARNOLD, ZöR 2006, 11; BRUNNER, ZaöRV 1993, 847; GARLICKI, 46. 
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cantly influenced by the Rousseauean concept of unquestionable popular sov-
ereignty, which was incompatible with the accountability of parliaments and 
their subjection to a control by ordinary courts.107 
In systems of concentrated constitutional review, laws are reviewed in ab-
stracto. Their compatibility with the constitution is assessed without any rela-
tion to a concrete litigation and the review relates to the textual dimension of 
a provision.108 Acts of legislation or legal provisions that are incompatible 
with the constitution are sanctioned by being invalidated. The decisions of the 
constitutional courts have the same general abstract effect as the abrogated 
laws or act of legislation themselves (erga omnes effect). 
bb) Distinction from diffuse and political review systems 
The present study on individual access does not include access to judicial re-
view proceedings in «diffuse» or «decentralized» systems.109 Here, all courts 
of civil, criminal and administrative law are empowered to assess the compat-
ibility of laws and acts of legislation with the constitution. The question of 
compatibility arises as a preliminary question in a concrete legal dispute upon 
which it is to be applied.110 If a court considers a relevant legal provision as 
incompatible with the constitution, it will not apply it to the concrete case. The 
legal effect of the decision on incompatibility is limited to the concrete litiga-
tion (inter partes effect). Judicial review in diffuse systems is therefore re-
ferred to as «concrete» judicial review. Diffuse systems are common to Anglo-
Saxon countries and can be found in the Scandinavian states and in Estonia as 
only Eastern European example. The accessibility of these courts depends on 
the pertinent procedural rules for applying to civil, criminal and administrative 
courts.111 
Also systems of political review are excluded from the present study on indi-
vidual access. In these systems, the power to review laws and other acts of 
legislation is reserved to the political authorities. Only a few European states 
                                              
107  See e.g. SCHUBARTH, 39, 41; For further details see FABBRINI, 1300 ff.; GIACOMETTI, 9 ff.; 
HABERMAS, 295 f. 
108  SADURSKI, 5. 
109  For a detailed description see AUER, nn. 30 ff.; CAPPELLETTI, 47 ff.; FAVOREU, 40 ff.; 
GINSBURG, 40 f.; STONE SWEET, 32 ff. 
110  AUER, n. 51; STONE SWEET, 32 f. 
111  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 197 f. 
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comprising the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and with respect to interna-
tional treaties and federal laws Switzerland, provide for such a system of po-
litical control.112 
c) Accessibility of judicial review proceedings 
aa) Power to act at the own discretion  
Only very few constitutional courts are authorized to initiate review proceed-
ings on their own initiative (ex officio or proprio motu). Depending on their 
strength and the institutional significance of judicial review, the right to act at 
the own discretion can be awarded to a different extent. 
Constitutional courts are frequently vested with a partial ex officio power. 
This is the case, if they are requested to assess the compliance of a judgment 
or a decision with the constitution and the law and in the same proceedings 
they incidentally review the relevant legal basis as to its compatibility with the 
constitution. Some constitutional courts exceed demands or allegations of re-
ceived requests by reviewing contested laws with regard to other aspects of 
constitutionality or by reviewing other laws that are substantially connected 
with the ones contested. The power to continue review proceedings after the 
withdrawal of requests of authorized applicants can be considered as another 
form of partial ex officio power.  
The most extensive form is the entitlement of constitutional courts to initiate 
review proceedings against laws without any previous request. Such an un-
limited discretion in initiating review proceedings is rare and predominantly 
rejected.113 Only a part of Successor States of the SFRY, namely Serbia, Mon-
tenegro, Croatia or Macedonia grant such a strong power and institutional po-
sition to their constitutional courts.114 
                                              
112  Art. 120 Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 2002; art. 189 para. 4 and 
190 Swiss Constitution of 1999. For more details with respect to judicial review in Swit-
zerland see AUER/MALINVERNI/HOTTELIER vol  I, nn. 1920 ff., 1937 ff., 1952 ff. With re-
spect to the UK review model see KOOPMANS, 20 ff. 
113  See Comments on the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Croatia, Venice Commission Document CDL(2000)97, 5. For arguments of supporters 
see MARKOVIĆ, fn. 88; PINTARIĆ, 405; STEINBERGER, 16. 
114  BRUNNER, ZaöRV 1993, 846; HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 75. 
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bb) Authorized applicants  
The decision which applicants to authorize to request a constitutional court to 
review acts of legislation entails an essential political aspect. It is, on the one 
hand, significant for the strength and position granted to the constitutional 
courts.115 On the other hand, it is an indicator for the nature and the protective 
function conceded to judicial review.116 
In accordance to KELSEN'S perception, the abstract review of laws and other 
legislative acts is primarily aimed at the enforcement of the normative superi-
ority of the constitution.117 Based on the concept of mutual control and mod-
eration of state powers, the supreme political organs including the central gov-
ernmental bodies, individual members of government and the judiciary can be 
entitled to request the initiation of review proceedings against acts of legisla-
tion in all systems of centralized judicial review.118 Following the idea to pro-
tect parliamentary minorities or just as an additional political tool for the op-
position, also individual members of parliament or parliamentary fractions or 
groups can be authorized to this effect.119  
In states with a vertical division of administrative and regulatory powers, the 
local political and executive organs are usually authorized to request the initi-
ation of review proceedings against laws or other acts of legislation which 
violate their constitutionally granted autonomy to regulate issues of local con-
cern.120  
The circle of applicants authorized to request the initiation of judicial review 
proceedings can also comprise other public institutions, such as the ombud-
spersons or the public prosecutor's office.121 Their authorization is generally 
restricted to the enforcement of matters of public interest within their compe-
tences. As is the case in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia, the ombudspersons 
are even entitled to do so if they consider a law as incompatible with human 
                                              
115  KNEIP, 98. 
116  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 202 f.; KELSEN, Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 74. 
117  Detailed KELSEN, Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 78 ff. 
118  E.g. STEINBERGER, 14. 
119  BRUNNER, ZaöRV 1993, 845; SADURSKI, 93 ff. 
120  For more details see STEINBERGER, 15, 25 ff., 33. 
121  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 72. 
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rights and liberties without any relation to a concrete case they are dealing 
with.122  
Representing particular social interests such as environmental protection, the 
promotion of humanitarian law, or economic interests including consumer 
protection or trade and employment, also citizens' associations and social or-
ganizations like trade unions can be authorized to request the initiation of re-
view proceedings against laws or other acts of legislation.123 
cc) Access of individuals  
Finally, also individual persons can be entitled to request the constitutional 
courts to review laws or acts of legislation with respect to their compatibility 
with the constitution.  
The German constitutional complaint, for instance, can also be filed by appli-
cants who consider their personal rights and liberties violated by an individual 
act that was adopted on the basis of an allegedly unconstitutional law or other 
act of legislation.124 Not the individual act but its normative basis is object of 
complaint and reviewed with regard to its compatibility with the constitution. 
These complaints are referred to as «normative constitutional complaints».125 
Such complaints are also known to Belgium, Poland or Luxembourg. Yet, 
given their subsidiary nature, according to which applicants must exhaust all 
legal remedies against individual acts before referring to the constitutional 
court, the practical relevance of such complaints is rather low.126 In Austria, 
on the other hand, applicants are entitled to request the initiation of review 
proceedings against violations of their personal rights and liberties by laws or 
regulations, that, without having been applied by decision or ruling, have a 
direct effect on their legal positions.127 In this respect, one can find terms like 
«subjective constitutional review» or «individual constitutional review».128 
                                              
122  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 67. The authorization of ombudspersons in 
these three states will be analyzed more thoroughly in Chapter 2, pp. 78 f. 
123  ARNOLD, ZöR 2006, 8; BRUNNER, ZaöRV 1993, 845 f.; KAUČIČ/PAVLIN/BARDUTZKY, 
34 f. 
124  See above at p. 8. 
125  E.g. ARNOLD, ZöR 2006, 14; HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 77. For more 
details see BRUNNER, Festschrift Stern, 1052 ff. 
126  EPPING, n. 175; KLUTH, 79, 113. 
127  See above at p. 8. 
128  HARUTYUNYAN/MAVČIČ, chapter V.A.; OMEJEC, O potrebnim promjenama, 58.  
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Eventually, individuals can be entitled to contest laws or other acts of legisla-
tion without having to demonstrate a personal concern and legal interest. The 
classification and function of such popular complaints requires a more thor-
ough examination. As subject-matter of the present study, these remedies will 
be analysed in detail in the following. 
C. Binding nature  
As means allowing individuals to directly access the constitutional courts, the 
submittal of popular complaints can have a binding effect. As has been shown, 
a binding nature is given if a constitutional court is obliged to initiate review 
proceedings against a challenged act of legislation. 
Practical considerations and the inherent risk of overburdening the courts 
speak for a non-binding nature of popular complaints.129 Individuals are ac-
cordingly entitled to give an impulse for the review of acts of legislation, while 
the decision to open review proceedings is reserved to the discretion of the 
constitutional court. Such complaints are referred to as «suggestions»,130 «in-
citements»,131 or «proposals»132. Popular complaints have no procedural sig-
nificance in systems with an unlimited discretion of the constitutional court to 
take them into consideration and to initiate review proceedings. In such cases, 
they are nothing more than encouragements.133  
Yet and in accordance with the definition of individual access rights provided 
above, even suggestions have a binding effect, if a constitutional court is 
obliged to justify rejections.134 For this purpose, there are special formalized 
proceedings which are terminated by a formal ruling whether or not to take 
received complaints into consideration and to review the contested provisions 
with respect to the alleged unconstitutionalities. Having such a procedural ef-
fect, even mere suggestions or proposals can be regarded as legal means al-
lowing direct individual access to constitutional courts.135 
                                              
129  With respect to former Czechoslovakia see MARKOVIĆ, 80. 
130  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 75. 
131  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 233. 
132  The Croatian proposal will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 3, pp. 107 ff. 
133  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 75. 
134  See above p. 3. 
135  See also BRUNNER, Festschrift Stern, 1056; IBID., Zugang des Einzelnen, 233 f. 
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D. Practical relevance as means of individual access 
Unlike constitutional complaints, popular complaints are far less common as 
remedies allowing individual access to constitutional courts. Finding their 
most extensive practical significance in Latin America and some African 
states, they constitute rather an exception than a standard in Europe.136 In 
Western Europe, Malta appears to be the only state providing an actio popu-
laris against acts of legislation.137 Yet, given that human rights and liberties 
are explicitly excluded from the protection, its practical significance as indi-
vidual access right to the Constitutional Court is rather low.138 On the sub-
national level, the actio popularis exists in the German Land of Bavaria. Be-
cause it can only be filed against violations of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights by county laws or decrees, this legal remedy does not have a consider-
able practical significance either.139  
As individual access right to constitutional courts, the popular complaint is 
more common in Eastern European states. It has been introduced together with 
the establishment of the Constitutional Courts in Georgia in 1996140 and in 
Hungary after the transition in 1990. The Hungarian complaint was seen as 
prototype for the unrestricted actio popularis141 until it was abolished with the 
enactment of the new Constitution in 2011. Finally, popular complaints can be 
found in the Successor States of the former SFRY. The practically unlimited 
accessibility of their Constitutional Courts can be considered as feature distin-
guishing these states from other constitutional systems in Eastern Europe. 
With the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, whose constitu-
tions are considerably influenced by the Western community of states,142 all 
other Successor States reintroduced this means of direct individual access to 
                                              
136  BRUNNER, Festschrift Stern, 1042. See also Opinion on three legal questions arising in 
the process of drafting the New Constitution of Hungary, Venice Commission Document 
CDL-AD(2011)001, nn. 57 f. 
137  Art. 116 Constitution of 1964.  
138  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 229.  
139  Art. 98 sentence 4 Constitution of 1946 and art. 55 Constitutional Court Law of 1990. For 
a detailed analysis of the Bavarian popular complaint see BOHN, passim. 
140  Art. 39 para. 1 lit. a Constitutional Court Law. See BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 230; 
HARTUYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PAZCOLAY, n. 74. 
141  ARNOLD, JOR 2002, 26; BRUNNER, Festschrift Stern, 1056 f.; BRUNNER/SÓLYOM, 35 f. 
142  E.g. BRUNNER, Festschrift Stern, 1056 f.; IBID., Zugang des Einzelnen, 233 f.  
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Constitutional Courts after their independence from the SFRY.143 The popular 
complaints in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia will be analysed in Chapter 3.  
 
III. Protective function of direct complaints 
Their particular nature fundamentally differentiates popular complaints from 
other legal remedies in constitutional law proceedings. As individual access 
rights they show features of legal remedies for the protection of the rights and 
liberties of the applicants. As remedies for the initiation of judicial review pro-
ceedings they, at the same time, serve as means to enforce the constitutional 
order against the legislative authorities in an abstract way and with a legal 
effect which exceeds the subjective interests of the applicants (erga omnes 
effect).144 This raises questions about the protective function of popular com-
plaints. 
This function will be analysed in the following. To this end, popular com-
plaints will be compared to constitutional complaints as alternative means al-
lowing individuals to directly access to constitutional courts. The main differ-
ence, the legal interest as admissibility requirement of the appeals, has an es-
sential impact on the protective function of these two types of complaints. 
1. Constitutional complaints 
Generally speaking, constitutional complaints enable individuals to achieve 
protection against any act by the state and public authorities that violates their 
own constitutionally guaranteed rights. As has been shown, these complaints 
are of a strictly personal nature because their admissibility requires a legal 
interest of applicants in bringing proceedings before the constitutional 
courts.145 
                                              
143  After the separation of the former State Union of Serbia Montenegro in 2006, the new 
constitutional bases for popular complaints can be found in art. 168 para. 2 Serbian Con-
stitution of 2006 and in art. 150 para. 1 Constitution of Montenegro of 2007. 
144     See explanation above p. 20.  
145  See in this respect above at pp. 7 f. 
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In light of that, constitutional complaints constitute classic remedies for hu-
man rights protection. They extend the rights protection offered by the ordi-
nary and administrative judiciary to the constitutional court and to acts and 
actions of the state authorities. Complaints considered as justified result in the 
invalidation of the contested rights violating act, while the Constitutional court 
returns the issue to the responsible authority for reconsideration. The legal 
effect of the court’s decision is consequently limited to the litigation at stake 
and enforces the personal rights of applicants against responsible authorities 
(inter partes effect).  
This leads to the conclusion that the function of constitutional complaints is 
the protection of the own individual rights and liberties of the complainant.146 
In other words, their function can be described as Individualrechts-schutz or 
as «subjective protection of rights». 
The same can be said with respect to the normative constitutional complaints 
as provided in Austria and in Germany. Even though they result in an abstract 
review of the respective laws or acts of legislation, applicants are required to 
demonstrate a personal legal interest in bringing these review proceedings.147 
Given that they are submitted for the protection of the subjective rights of the 
applicants, judicial review serves the protection of the applicant's individual 
rights. However, it is worth mentioning that a further-reaching protective ef-
fect has been recognized with respect to the German constitutional complaint. 
If these complaints are filed against unconstitutional laws and other acts of 
legislation constituting the basis for rights violating acts or actions, they are 
acknowledged to enforce the constitutional guarantees in a general interest as 
well.148 The German Federal Constitutional Court namely recognized a paral-
lel «objective protection» by means of these complaints, considering the con-
stitutionally guaranteed rights and liberties as an objective system of values 
(objektive Wertordnung).149 
                                              
146  Instead of many BRUNNER, Festschrift Stern, 1045 f.; HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/ 
PACZOLAY, n. 81; KLUTH, 77. 
147  See above at pp. 8 and 23 f. 
148  HÄBERLE, 14 f. KLUTH, 77 considers the protection of the objective constitutional order 
as mere reflex of the German constitutional complaint. 
149  Decision Lüth of 15 January 1958, BVerfGE 7/198, nn. 27 and 30. 
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2. Popular complaints 
A. Protection of collective or public goods  
According to a widespread view, popular complaints exclusively or primarily 
serve the protection of the constitutional order in a general interest.150 This 
view is based on the objective of judicial review to enforce the abstract con-
stitutional order against the legislative authorities. It is also based on the ab-
sence of the requirement of a legal interest and a personal concern.  
With the entirety of people or a society as beneficiary of popular complaints, 
the function of popular complaints can be described as «objective protection». 
Complaints are filed with the motivation to enforce the constitution and the 
constitutional guarantees against the legislator and the political powers as pub-
lic or collective goods.151 The good at stake is the general coherence of acts of 
legislation with the constitution and the constitutional principles such as the 
rule of law, the separation of powers or the welfare state. As to a more recent 
view, the circle of recognized public or collective goods moreover comprises 
environmental issues, issues related to consumer protection and, especially, to 
human rights and liberties.152 
According to this view the motivation of applicants to submit popular com-
plaints is primarily altruistic. The incentive to achieve subjective rights pro-
tection is acknowledged at most as side effect.153 Rather than seeking their 
own benefit, applicants become active as members of a social or political com-
munity and act as representatives of the public or common interest.154  
The recognition of goods or interests that are socially relevant and exceed the 
subjective interests of individuals even comprises civil law matters, where the 
submittal of legal remedies without proof of a personal concern and legal in-
terest is principally alien. The perception of legal remedies and means that 
allow collective redress can be found in private law relations as well.155 In 
Germany open access by means of popular complaints or collective appeals 
                                              
150  E.g. ARNOLD, ZöR 2006, 8; JELLINEK, 67 f.; MASING, 68 f., 93 ff., 119 f. Other opinion 
LJUBIĆ, Karakter prijedloga, 800 f. 
151  HALFMEIER, 46 f.; JELLINEK, 72 f.; SADURSKI, 6. A detailed distinction between public, 
individual and collective interests is provided by JELLINEK, 109 ff. and VAN DIJK, 29 f. 
152  VAN AAKEN, 45. 
153  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 229. 
154  VAN DIJK, 202 f.; HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 74. 
155  VAN DIJK, 10; HALFMEIER, 16 ff., 199. 
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through social associations has been introduced in several sectors of private 
law. Anybody is, for instance, entitled to claim the revocation of the validity 
of patents based on patent law or to claim the elimination of registered brands 
according to the law on trademarks. Popular appeals moreover play a signifi-
cant role in consumer protection legislation.156  
The perception of popular complaints as remedies filed out of exclusively or 
primarily altruistic motives holds true with respect to the complaint provided 
in Malta. Established to serve public interests, allegations about violations of 
human rights and liberties are explicitly excluded: 
 «[a] right of action for a declaration that any law is invalid on any grounds 
other than inconsistency with the provisions of art. 33 to 45 of this Constitu-
tion shall appertain to all persons without distinction and a person bringing 
such an action shall not be required to show any personal interest in support 
of his action.»157  
However, such an explicit exclusion appears to be exceptional and not com-
mon to other systems of constitutional adjudication with popular complaints 
as means of direct individual access. At this point, it is worth mentioning that 
the fact that therewith individuals fulfil a police-like function158 and a consti-
tutional task that is reserved to the state authorities is very controversial.159  
B. Remedy for individual rights protection 
In fact, the absence of a required legal interest does not preclude the filing of 
these remedies out of personal motives. In other words, even if they do not 
have to demonstrate a personal concern, individuals can file popular com-
plaints with the incentive to reach the invalidation of acts of legislation for 
their own legal benefit. This is recognized by the Venice Commission as well, 
who holds that the motivation of individuals to initiate review proceedings is 
exclusively or at least primarily focussed on the protection of human rights.160 
In the opinion of some scholars the prospect of a personal benefit is even in-
dispensable for the willingness to file complaints and to bear the costs and 
other burdens related to judicial access.161 The improvement of the subjective 
                                              
156  For a detailed analysis see HALFMEIER, 51 ff. 
157  (Italics added). Art. 116 Constitution of 1964. 
158  HALFMEIER, 276. 
159  See ARNOLD, ZöR 2006, 8; JELLINEK, 72; LOPEZ GUERRA, 25 f.; MASING, 68 f. 
160  HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 24. 
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position is not merely a side effect but the main incentive for the submittal of 
complaints. This incentive can be of a legal nature, if a law or other general 
act is considered to, even just hypothetically, negatively interfere with the own 
rights and liberties.162 Furthermore, the incentive to contest an act of legisla-
tion can also be of a non-legal nature, namely if a legal provision is considered 
to be detrimental for religious, ethical, moral, political, economic or another 
factual reason. 
This shows that, depending on given procedural arrangements, popular com-
plaints can also be considered as remedies for individual rights protection. The 
two factors described in the following support this view even more. 
a) Prospect of concrete legal benefits 
Abstract judicial review proceedings can be combined with particular proce-
dural measures, which provide applicants with concrete legal benefits.  
aa) Suspension of applicability of contested legal provisions 
A common measure is the right of applicants to request the provisional non-
applicability of a contested law or other general act for the duration of the 
review proceedings. In Germany for instance, applicants filing constitutional 
complaints are entitled to request the Federal Constitutional Court to suspend 
the application of legal provisions, which create an imminent risk of grave and 
irreparable harm to them.163  
The necessity to order the temporary suspension of a contested legal provision 
is a consequence of the missing suspensive effect of constitutional court pro-
ceedings. Accordingly, the initiation of review proceedings does not hamper 
the applicability and execution of contested state acts. Hence, also contested 
legal provisions remain applicable and enforceable by the administrative and 
judicial bodies. With the temporary suspension of their applicability, rights 
violations resulting from the execution of potentially unconstitutional legal 
provisions can be prevented before the final decision of the constitutional 
court.  
Such measures are a necessary requirement for an effective protection of rights 
and liberties. From the perspective of petitioners, the temporary suspension 
significantly facilitates the protection of their individual rights from concrete 
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violations. If they succeed in substantiating a threat of grave and irreparable 
consequences, they can anticipate violations by preventing the passing of 
forthcoming decisions and acts or the execution of individual acts that would 
violate their rights. Consequently, this precautionary measure has a significant 
rights-protecting effect.164 
bb) Appeals for reconsideration 
Another means combining abstract review proceedings with a prospect of con-
crete personal benefits for the applicants is the right to request the reconsider-
ation of final decisions and individual acts which had been adopted in appli-
cation of laws subsequently annulled for being unconstitutional. Such appeals 
for reconsideration can be found in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia and will 
be described in detail in Chapter 3. 
As a consequence of the principle of legal certainty, final individual acts and 
decisions merely become contestable even if the constitutional courts annul 
their legal bases with a retroactive effect.165 With the introduction of appeals 
for reconsideration applicants have a remedy against violations they already 
suffered based on such final decisions. Even after a final ruling, they can, on 
the basis of successful complaints that led to the annulment of legal provi-
sions, request the responsible court or state authority to reopen proceedings in 
which they had adopted the respective ruling. If violations suffered cannot be 
remedied anymore by a change of individual acts or decisions, indemnity of 
the applicants can be achieved by providing a subsidiary appeal for reparation 
or compensation.  
b) Substitute to missing alternative ways of individual access 
Another decisive factor supporting the view on the significance of popular 
complaints as means of individual rights protection is the absence of alterna-
tive means of protection. Besides alternative possibilities to directly access 
constitutional courts, this moreover relates to the scope of protection offered 
by these alternatives. The possibility to file constitutional complaints as clas-
sic remedies for individual rights protection and the extent of protection of-
fered play a significant role in this regard. 
                                              
164  See e.g. KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 65.1. with respect to Croatia. 
165  For a differentiation between the German Nichtigkeitslehre and the Austrian Vernichtbar-
keitslehre see KELSEN, Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 44 ff. 
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Popular complaints can be considered to serve as substitute for the protection 
of subjective rights if individuals are not entitled to file constitutional com-
plaints. Illustrative is the access system to constitutional judiciary in the for-
mer SFRY, which will be described more thoroughly in the following para-
graph. On the other hand, popular complaints can have a supplementary or 
compensatory function for individual rights protection in systems, where they 
offer a broader or easier access in comparison to constitutional complaints. 
Until its abolition in 2011, the practical significance of the Hungarian popular 
complaint, for instance, completely superseded the normative constitutional 
complaint as remedy for human rights protection.166 
C. Correlation between the underlying interests  
The strict categorization of the protective purpose of popular complaints is put 
into perspective by a widespread perception in constitutional doctrine and 
practice. Instead, popular complaints are perceived as remedies that enforce 
the constitutional order both as a common good and in a subjective interest of 
the applicant.167  
Illustrative for this view are human rights and liberties, whose perception and 
institutional function has changed considerably in the course of time. By rec-
ognizing an extended protective effect of human rights protection, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court considerably contributed to today's understand-
ing of rights and liberties. As common goods their protection in an individual 
case at the same time enforces these guarantees in an objective sense, namely 
as constitutional obligations or constraints to the state authorities.168 The same 
has been recognized by the Bavarian Constitutional Court that states that the 
Bavarian popular complaint protects the constitutional rights and liberties as 
institutions in a public interest.169  
This view complies with the perception of a «collective» or «mixed good char-
acter» of human rights and liberties in international law.170 It also complies 
with the practice of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), who accentuated the 
significance of individual complaints for the protection of the Convention 
                                              
166  BRUNNER/SÓLYOM, 34 f.; KELEMEN, 70; Venice Commission Document CDL-
AD(2011)001, n. 61. 
167  ERRASS, 1365 ff., esp. 1368 recognizes this fact also with respect to administrative law. 
168  See above p. 27. 
169  Decision VerfGHE 33/1of 14 March 1972, n. 7. See BOHN, 76 and 97 ff. 
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rights as common goods in its famous decision van Gend en Loos vs. Nether-
lands:  
«The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an 
effective supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted […] to the dil-
igence of the Commission and of the Member States.»171 
VAN DIJK recognizes a correlation also in the reverse case. Accordingly, even 
if the primary incentive for the submittal of a complaint is the enforcement of 
these guarantees as common goods in a public or collective interest, the pro-
tection has an impact on the subjective position of the applicants as well.172  
The correlation of subjective and public interests is ascertained also with re-
spect to other constitutional guarantees. It is attributed to the role of the indi-
vidual person as a member of a political society that jointly adopted the con-
stitution as generally binding normative order. Just as the constitutional prin-
ciples and guarantees are considered to reflect the public or general interest of 
the society, all legal guarantees reflect interests of the individual persons 
which can be of a legal, religious, moral or other factual nature.173 Conse-
quently, there is both a public interest of society and a subjective interest of 
the individual member of this society in the adherence of the political powers 
with these constitutional guarantees.  
To sum up this view, popular complaints filed for the personal benefit protect 
the respective rights and liberties as public or common goods, while com-
plaints filed for the protection of a common good, at the same time, improve 
the personal legal position of the applicants.174 
D. Conclusion on the protective function 
The strict categorization of popular complaints as remedies for the protection 
of constitutional guarantees as common or public goods or as means for indi-
vidual rights protection is considered as redundant.175 Whether or not popular 
                                              
171  (Punctuation added). Judgment van Gend en Loos vs. Netherlands, case no. C-26/62, ECJ 
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complaints are filed as remedies for the protection of the subjective rights de-
pends on the procedural arrangement. Furthermore, it depends to a great extent 
on the prospect of a personal legal benefit for applicants from the elimination 
of a contested act of legislation. Either way popular complaints can be consid-
ered to be of an essential significance for the enforcement of constitutions 
against legislative authorities. Their strong protective effect is recognized both 
for the protection of human rights and liberties176 and for the enforcement of 
the rule of law and the principle of constitutionality in general.177 
The following presents the practice of the ECtHR on the applicability of the 
ECHR standards to constitutional complaints and to popular complaints, if 
they are introduced as means of individual access to constitutional courts.  
3. Relevant judicial practice of the ECtHR 
Already in 1975 the ECtHR ascertained that the right of access to courts is an 
autonomous and indispensable component of the right to court as guaranteed 
by art. 6 para. 1 ECHR.178 In accordance with the scope of the Convention, 
this guarantee is restricted to cases of civil law claims and to criminal law 
proceedings. The ECtHR consequently neither derives an obligation from the 
Convention to establish a constitutional court nor to introduce its accessibility 
to individuals.179 Rather, the decision on how to comply with the obligation to 
provide for effective domestic protection of the Convention rights and to 
choose the institutions and legal remedies is left to the discretion of the mem-
ber states.180 
A. Standards relating to effective and accessible remedies  
According to art. 6 para. 1 and art. 13 ECHR signatory states must provide 
legal remedies for the protection of the Convention rights before the last do-
mestic instance of appeal which are effective, sufficient and accessible.181 
These qualities are indispensable for the fulfilment of the requirements laid 
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down in art. 35 para. 1 ECHR. This rule obliges applicants to exhaust availa-
ble domestic remedies which allow them to obtain redress for the violations 
alleged. Such domestic remedies must provide an adequate filter to preserve 
the ECtHR from an overload of complaints and guarantee an effective protec-
tion of the Convention rights by the responsible domestic authority.182 In con-
sistent practice the ECtHR acknowledges the effectiveness of access rights if 
they are available and sufficient to «obtain redress for the breaches alleged», 
their existence is «sufficiently certain, in practice as well as in theory» and if 
these remedies can be submitted «to the appropriate domestic body, at least in 
substance and in compliance with the formal requirements laid down in do-
mestic law».183  
In establishing whether domestic remedies constitute effective remedies, 
which must be exhausted based on art. 35 para. 1 ECHR, the ECtHR takes 
into consideration the concrete circumstances of each individual case.184 In the 
first place, it takes into account the existence of other remedies for individual 
rights protection and their context in the domestic legal systems. Furthermore, 
it considers the personal circumstances of applicants and whether they did 
everything that can be reasonably expected to exhaust these domestic reme-
dies. 
At the same time the ECtHR acknowledges that the right to an effective rem-
edy is not absolute and can be restricted within the limits prescribed by the 
Convention.185 Restrictions must be evident, predictable and prescribed by a 
clear and explicit legal basis.186 While individual access must be granted on a 
fair and equal basis, the restrictions must pursue a legitimate aim that is in 
proportion to the limitation of the access rights.187 The efficacy of access rights 
may neither be compromised by the legislator when regulating requirements 
for the access to the responsible domestic instance, nor by the latter by apply-
ing a restrictive interpretation. Incompatible with the Convention standards 
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are requirements which entail invincible hurdles and undermine the access 
right. Examples are an excessive formalism in applying the requirements, a 
high financial burden or unreasonable temporal restrictions.188  
a) Applicability to constitutional complaints  
As has been shown, member states are not obliged to introduce constitutional 
adjudication or constitutional complaints based on the ECHR. In those states 
where provided, the ECtHR frequently considers these remedies as last do-
mestic instruments which must be exhausted before it accepts individual com-
plaints for consideration.189 It for instance confirmed the applicability with 
respect to the German constitutional complaint and the Spanish amparo.190 
Only if the institutional and procedural arrangements of constitutional com-
plaints comply with the procedural guarantees and the Convention standards, 
can they be regarded as effective and accessible remedies. This is certainly 
true for complaints raised against final state acts that regulate the rights and 
liberties of the complainants in a concrete and immediate manner and there-
fore directly interfere with the Convention rights.  
b) Applicability to legal remedies against acts of legislation 
A more differentiated look must be taken with respect to remedies that can be 
filed directly against acts of legislation. Because the entitlement to submit in-
dividual complaints to the ECtHR requires a concrete and personal impair-
ment and according to consistent practice of the ECtHR does not constitute an 
actio popularis, a right to appeal against laws or other general acts can only 
be derived from the ECHR under particular conditions.191 
The ECtHR recognizes that in some cases the convention rights can also be 
impaired directly by a legal provision and in the absence of an individual act 
passed in application of the latter. Such a direct concern requires a «victim 
status» of the applicant who, on the basis of a legal provision, is  
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«required either to modify his conduct or risks being prosecuted or if he is 
a member of a class of people who risk being directly affected by the leg-
islation».192  
In judgment Aksu vs. Turkey, the Court for instance acknowledged a victim 
status of the applicant, who as a member of the Roma community felt directly 
impaired by allegedly degrading provisions.193 The Court applies a restrictive 
interpretation of the victim status and does not consider a merely hypothetic 
violation as sufficient. In certain cases it also acknowledged a victim status of 
the applicants if there is a potential threat of a violation and a real risk for its 
occurrence in a not too distant future.194 In any case, the victim status and the 
violation must still persist at the time of review of the contested normative act 
by the Court.195 
If a direct concern and victim status are given, the ECtHR requires the exist-
ence of an effective and accessible legal remedy which enables the persons 
concerned to directly contest such normative acts. In judgment Tănase vs. 
Moldova it established the lack of an effective remedy because the applicant 
was not entitled to directly contest a law that interfered with his legal position, 
but could only access the constitutional court by requesting the ombudsperson 
to file a request for the initiation of review proceedings.196 If, conversely, the 
ECtHR does not consider an applicant to be directly affected by a contested 
legislative act, it will reject the complaint as actio popularis.197  
B. Standards relating to fair judicial proceedings 
Pursuant to art. 6 para. 1 ECHR the signatory states have to ensure an effective 
protection of Convention rights by guaranteeing fair judicial proceedings be-
fore the domestic judiciary.198 Fair judicial proceedings comprise several as-
pects including the right to apply to judicial instances, to achieve judicial pro-
tection and the speedy conclusion of these proceedings. Another crucial aspect 
for an effective protection is the fairness of these trials.  
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Accordingly the ECtHR acknowledges the adversarial nature of proceedings 
as indispensable procedural guarantee.199 Adversarial or adversary proceed-
ings ensure the participation of applicants and enable them to exert influence 
on the decision-making with respect to the protection of their rights and liber-
ties. This requires their full information and knowledge about objections, 
statements or evidences presented by counterparties or persons consulted. In 
addition, applicants must be duly summoned and invited to give their com-
ments and statements.200 These procedural standards can be fulfilled by grant-
ing applicants the status of parties to the proceedings and therewith vesting 
them with the constitutionally guaranteed procedural rights or by granting 
them specific participatory rights. 
Another indispensable guarantee for fair trials is the publicity of the proceed-
ings. For this purpose courts or judges schedule public hearings to which they 
invite and grant access to the interested public. Therewith, they ensure public 
scrutiny which protects the applicants against arbitrary decisions and guaran-
tees an accurate establishment of relevant facts.201 Public hearings are espe-
cially significant in first instance proceedings, in which evidence is taken and 
in which the facts relevant for the passing of the final decision are investigated. 
In principle they are moreover significant before instances of appeal that pro-
vide for oral proceedings.202 
Under certain conditions both the Venice Commission and the ECtHR recog-
nize the applicability of Convention standards for fair trial in proceedings be-
fore constitutional courts which are initiated upon complaints by individual 
persons.203 The nature and the protective purpose of these proceedings are es-
sential in this regard.204  
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a) Applicability to constitutional complaint proceedings 
The analysis of the pertinent jurisdiction reveals that the ECtHR in principle 
acknowledges the applicability of the standards for fair trials to constitutional 
complaint proceedings.205 The ECtHR hence frequently accuses member 
states for violating the right to a speedy trial, because of the unreasonably long 
judicial processes which are the result of the subsidiary nature of these com-
plaints.206  
b) Applicability to judicial review proceedings 
Because of their principle function to ensure the abstract compliance of laws 
and other legislative acts with the constitution, the constitutional courts as a 
rule investigate the relevant points of law and the facts of the case themselves 
(inquisitorial principle). Authorized applicants, on the other hand, neither ex-
ert influence nor impact on the continuation of the proceedings by withdraw-
ing their requests.207 The individual justice model upon which the Convention 
is based does therefore in principle not apply to judicial review proceedings. 
However, such an undifferentiated approach does not reflect the actual func-
tions of review proceedings in the individual states. While, for instance, con-
stitutional complaint proceedings are of a non-adversarial nature in Ger-
many,208 the abstract review of acts of legislation is conducted in adversarial 
proceedings and with the formal participation of applicants in Austria.209 With 
Malta as only exception, the small number of states who introduced popular 
complaints as means of individual access to their constitutional courts per-
ceives abstract judicial review either explicitly or implicitly as procedures that 
serve the purpose of individual rights protection. 
By taking into consideration the procedural particularities of each constitu-
tional court, the ECtHR consequently ascertains in each individual case 
whether these remedies must be exhausted in accordance to art. 35 ECHR.210 
It accordingly rejected the applicability of the standards for fair trial for the 
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review proceedings before the Lithuanian Constitutional Court, because these 
proceedings 
«cannot be regarded as a remedy within the meaning of [...] the Convention 
as the Constitutional Court cannot afford redress for a violation of the rights 
of an individual, but may only examine the compatibility of a law with the 
Constitution» and because «a constitutional action was not accessible to the 
applicant personally or directly.»211  
The ECtHR considered the Lithuanian proceedings to be established exclu-
sively for the enforcement of the objective constitutional order. 
On the other hand, it acknowledges the applicability of the Convention stand-
ards to such review proceedings that – explicitly or implicitly – also serve the 
purpose of individual rights protection and that are closely connected with 
proceedings comprised by the scope of the Convention. This requires that the 
review of a law or act of legislation is closely related to concrete civil or crim-
inal law proceedings in which an applicant is involved. In other words, the 
decisions on the constitutionality of reviewed laws must be directly decisive 
for the outcome of the respective civil or criminal law cases.212 Then the ap-
plicability of the Convention standards to the review proceedings is an indis-
pensable requirement for the effective protection of the convention rights.213 
The ECtHR for instance established a violation of the Convention by the Span-
ish Constitutional Court for its failure to invite the applicants to participate in 
the review proceedings in which it assessed the legally prescribed expropria-
tion of assets that was decisive for their civil law claims.214  
The jurisdiction of the ECtHR also shows a differentiated practice with respect 
to the required publicity of judicial review proceedings. While the assessment 
of constitutional courts is normally restricted to points of law and the applica-
ble constitutional provisions, the courts of lower instances investigate the facts 
and evidences. Considering the publicity of proceedings before the lower in-
stances as sufficient, the ECtHR therefore in principle denies an obligation of 
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constitutional courts to schedule public hearings.215 Vice versa, in cases where 
the constitutional courts investigate facts or evidences in order to pass a deci-
sion, the publicity of proceedings must be guaranteed. Accordingly, the EC-
tHR ascertained violations of this obligation by the Czech Constitutional 
Court who was asked to assess an allegedly incorrect interpretation or an in-
sufficient establishment of facts but failed to schedule a public hearing,216 and 
for basing its findings on new evidence without giving the applicants an op-
portunity to give their statement.217  
 
IV. The popular complaint in the SFRY 
The official Marxist-Leninist doctrine in the understanding of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics USSR had been based on the idea of absolute in-
consistency of any type of extra-parliamentary supervision over the assembly 
as supreme representative of the working people. It furthermore had been con-
sidered as absolutely incompatible with Stalinist ideology of total political 
control exercised by the communist party. In fact, constitutional adjudication 
was rejected as a bourgeois institution.218 
After the break of Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito with Stalin and the ex-
clusion of the SFRY from the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) 
on 28 June 1948, Yugoslavia followed its own socialist ideology based on self-
management and decentralized socialism (so-called Titoism). The ideological 
emphasis was laid on the sovereignty of the working class and the working 
people and aimed at the liberation of society from exploitation and at its eman-
cipation through self-management.219 At the same time and in contrast to the 
USSR and other socialist systems, Yugoslav political ideology saw no contra-
diction between judicial review and socialist rule.220  
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In 1963 the SFRY introduced constitutional judiciary as the first communist 
state, followed by Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1982).221 On the basis 
of the model of KELSEN222 the Federal Constitutional Court of the SFRY was 
established with the enactment of the Federal Constitution in 1963223. The sys-
tem of Yugoslav constitutional adjudication moreover comprised the Consti-
tutional Courts of the six Socialist Republics and was extended by the newly 
established Constitutional Courts of the Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina 
and Kosovo with the enactment of the second Federal Constitution in 1974.224  
1. Judicial review and the SFRY 
To explain the logic of establishing a system of constitutional adjudication and 
the opening of constitutional courts to individual access, it is necessary to out-
line the guiding political principles in the SFRY in a first step. 
A. The Yugoslav socialist system of self-management 
The major political objectives of the SFRY – liberation of any form of exploi-
tation and social emancipation – were to be achieved by self-management. As 
the fundamental principle of Yugoslav socialism, the entire political system 
and all spheres of economic and social life were designed based on self-man-
agement.225 The vast number of self-governing bodies comprised federal enti-
ties and the self-managing socio-economic organizations and political bodies. 
The SFRY consisted of the Federation, the six federal Socialist Republics (SR) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slove-
nia and as of 1974, the two Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvo-
dina.226 The existence and autonomy of the Republics were guaranteed by the 
Federal Constitution and of the provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina by the Fed-
eral Constitution and the 1974 Constitution of the SR of Serbia.227 Despite the 
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regulatory autonomy of the Republics and Provinces, their constitutions and 
laws were predetermined by Federal Law both in form and in substance.228 
Actual legislative autonomy was only granted with respect to their internal 
governmental organization. The constitutional documents in the SFRY were 
consequently practically identical in content and form.229 By shifting im-
portant competences from the Federation to the republic and provincial level, 
the 1974 Constitution reinforced the factual sovereignty of the Socialist Re-
publics and the Provinces. This decentralization had been a result of increasing 
claims for more autonomy.230  
Self-management also constituted the structural basis of the economic system 
of the SFRY. The working people united to organizations of free associated 
labour in form of enterprises and to other interest groups such as labour or 
social organizations or unions in the field of education, culture and health.231 
Within the framework of the Federal Social Plan, these associations enacted 
their own statutes and regulated their internal organization, development, the 
use of means of production, the products and services offered and their inter-
nal and external relations and financial means.232 The workers were involved 
in the decision-making through means of direct participation and the election 
of representatives.233 With the enactment of the 1974 Constitution, special 
courts and an attorney for the defence of self-management rights of the work-
ing people had been introduced.234 
Finally, the principle of self-management also extended to the political field. 
State power was accordingly executed by all members of society, comprising 
citizens as political and the working people as economic subjects.235 The elec-
torate was represented in assemblies on each socio-political level, starting 
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from the communities as lowest to the Provinces, the Republics and the Fed-
eration as supreme administrative level.236 The leading political institutions, 
the League of Communists (Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, SKJ), the central 
interest groups of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (So-
cijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije) and the unions were represented 
in each of these assemblies as well.237 Direct elections were provided only at 
the lowest level in neighbourhoods or voter meetings.238 Direct participation 
was realized through plebiscites that could be scheduled by the assemblies of 
the different socio-political levels.239  
B. The principles of constitutionality and legality 
The principles of constitutionality and legality were not unknown in socialist 
systems. The Federal Yugoslav Constitution recognized their fundamental 
value for the socialist system by dedicating them own constitutional chap-
ters.240 In accordance to the political ideology these principles fulfilled a dou-
ble purpose. 
a) Legal principles 
On the one hand, the principles of constitutionality and legality ensured the 
uniformity of the legal system of the SFRY. The Yugoslav legal system com-
prised the state-made Constitutions and laws on the federal, republic, provin-
cial and on the community level, as well as the statutes and other general acts 
passed by the numerous socio-economic organizations.241 The consistency of 
the legal order required the compatibility of all normative acts with the Federal 
Constitution and laws. 
b) Political principles 
Based on socialist ideology these principles fulfilled a political purpose as 
well. Firstly, the compliance of the normative order with the Constitution and 
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the laws ensured the emancipation and liberation of society as ultimate polit-
ical objective on every self-regulating level.242 Secondly, the consistency of 
the entire legal system was indispensable for the functioning of the Yugoslav 
socialist system in general and for the operability of the internal market in the 
sectors of trade, economy, banking, credits and taxes in particular.243 Incon-
sistencies of the decentralized normative order could jeopardize the political 
and economic stability and lead to long-lasting social disadvantages. The prin-
ciples of constitutionality and legality played an integrative role and guaran-
teed the unity and cohesion of the SFRY and the advancement of the socialist 
system.244 In contrast to a liberal perception, these principles even imposed 
obligations to the individual citizens and working people.245 The only body 
not subject to these principles was the SKJ, that had unlimited discretion in 
determining the social agenda and in ensuring the development and progress 
of the socialist system.246  
Based on this, it seems that the principles of constitutionality and legality pri-
marily served a political purpose in the SFRY. Their guarantee as positive and 
constitutional law was a way of ensuring their legal enforceability.247 
C. Indispensability of judicial review  
The ideological tension between parliamentary supremacy and judicial review 
had been issue of theoretical and ideological discussions among Yugoslav con-
stitutional scholars as well.248 There was however general agreement that the 
establishment of constitutional judiciary was indispensable for the enforce-
ment of constitutionality and legality. Only a few scholars justified judicial 
review by purely legal arguments, considering it as necessary to ensure the 
consistency of the constitutional and legal order from the perspective of the 
rule of law.249 Pursuant to the prevailing legal opinion at this time, the estab-
lishment of constitutional adjudication in the Yugoslav socialist system was 
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considered as prerequisite of stability and functionality and was therefore jus-
tified based on political considerations.250  
The majority of Yugoslav constitutional scholars endorsed both the introduc-
tion of a constitutional court and its power to review legislative acts. They 
recognized that mechanisms of political self-control had failed to guarantee 
the stability of the socialist system. Besides, the power to review laws and 
other acts of legislation could not be conceded to the ordinary judiciary.251 
Because of the far-reaching autonomy of the Socialist Republics and Prov-
inces, it could neither be conferred to any federal political or judicial organ.252 
Only the Federal Constitutional Court, whose composition mirrored the multi-
nationality of the Federation, could be considered as legitimate to resolve con-
flicts between the numerous political entities. With the Constitution of 1974 a 
new rule of equal representation of all entities on the federal level was intro-
duced. Accordingly, each Republic sent two and each Province one repre-
sentative to the Federal Constitutional Court.253 
2. Constitutional adjudication in the SFRY 
A. The system of judicial review 
The decentralized normative structure of the SFRY faced a relatively devel-
oped system of protection of the constitutionality and legality. It encompassed 
the ordinary and administrative courts, internal controlling systems of the leg-
islature and the administration, as well as the special courts and advocates for 
the protection of self-management.254 The main competence to review the 
compliance of the normative system was awarded to the constitutional courts.  
                                              
250  FIRA, 334; MRATOVIĆ/FILIPOVIĆ/SOKOL, 100 f.; BECKMANN-PETEY, 162 with further cita-
tions in fn. 687. 
251  ĐORĐEVIĆ, Ustavno pravo, 746 n. 2. MARKOVIĆ, 128. 
252  DIMITRIJEVIĆ, 173. 
253  Art. 381 Cst. SFRY 1974. 
254  FIRA, 316. 
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a) Legal bases 
Besides in constitutional provisions255 the organization and the procedures of 
the Federal Constitutional Court were regulated by the Law on the Constitu-
tional Court of the SFRY of 21 December 1963256 and its Rules of Procedure 
of 22 May 1964.257 These were replaced by the Rules of Procedure of 27 De-
cember 1974.258 With the enactment of the 1974 Constitution, the CCL was 
abolished and the legal provisions included into the Constitution.259 The pro-
visions regarding the republic and provincial Constitutional Courts could be 
found in the respective Constitutions, Constitutional Courts Laws and the 
Rules of Procedure.260 As a consequence of the normative supremacy of the 
federal law, all provisions concerning constitutional adjudication and review 
corresponded to those prescribed in the Federal Constitution and the respec-
tive Rules to a great extent.261 Accordingly, only the latter will be taken into 
consideration in the present study, since the focus is laid on the Federal Con-
stitutional Court.  
b) Federal structure 
The federal structure of the SFRY mirrored the distribution of the review com-
petences between the Constitutional Courts of the different federal entities. 
Jurisdictional disputes between the federal units were decided by the Federal 
Constitutional Court, while conflicts within the Socialist Republics or the Au-
tonomous Provinces remained in the jurisdiction of the Courts of the respec-
tive entities. The same division of jurisdiction applied to the system of judicial 
review. The Federal Court controlled the compliance with the Federal Consti-
tution and laws, while the Constitutional Courts of the Republics and Prov-
inces controlled the adherence with their own constitutional and legal or-
ders.262 The 1974 Constitution additionally conferred the power to review sub-
                                              
255  Art. 241 ff. Cst. SFRY 1963 and art. 375 ff. Cst. SFRY 1974. 
256  Službeni list SFRJ 52/1963 (CCL SFRY). 
257  Službeni list SFRJ 26/1964. 
258  Službeni list SFRJ 66/1974 (RoP SFRY). 
259  See hereto BLAGOJEVIĆ, 146 f.; FIRA, 336. 
260  With Croatia as example, the legal bases after the federal constitutional reform comprised 
the Constitution of 1974, Narodne Novine Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske (Official 
Gazette SR Croatia 9/74, NN SR Croatia), the Statute of the Constitutional Court, NN SR 
Croatia 22/83 and the Rules of Procedure, NN SR Croatia 29/83. 
261  See HÖCKER-WEYAND, 79 f. 
262  Art. 248 para. 1 Cst. SFRY 1963 and art. 389 Cst. SFRY 1974. 
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legislative acts of the federal organs to the Courts of the Republics and Prov-
inces.263  
As a consequence of the far-reaching autonomy of the Socialist Republics and 
Autonomous Provinces, their Constitutional Courts were institutionally and 
functionally independent from the Federal Court. Their decisions could ac-
cordingly neither be appealed against nor reviewed by the latter.264 The inde-
pendence of these Courts moreover implied that they were not subject to any 
hierarchical supervision by the Federal Court.265  
c) Subjection to the communist party system 
As a consequence of the decentralized normative powers, the range of acts 
which could be reviewed by the Federal Constitutional Court was very broad. 
It comprised all normative acts enacted by state organs – laws, regulations and 
other general acts passed on the federal, republic, provincial and community 
level – but also the general acts passed by the numerous self-managing enti-
ties.266 The review competence even comprised working contracts or regula-
tions on pension and social insurances concluded between the organizations 
of associated work and the individual workers. The decisive factor according 
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Court and to the prevailing opinion in consti-
tutional doctrine was the normative nature of an act.267 
On the other hand, the Federal Court refused to review constitutional amend-
ments and constitutional laws, considering them as exclusively political ques-
tions reserved to the constitution-making powers.268 This applied to the Con-
stitutions of the Socialist Republics and Provinces as well. While they could 
be reviewed by the Federal Assembly, the Federal Court could only give its 
opinion to the latter, either upon request or upon its own initiative. In accord-
ance hereto, the Constitutional Court of the SR Serbia gave its opinion to the 
                                              
263  See Expert explanations Cst. SFRY 1974, 550; LAPENNA, 227. 
264  FIRA, 337; DIMITRIJEVIĆ, 174; SCHWEISSGUTH, 199. See however MRATOVIĆ/FILIPOVIĆ/ 
SOKOL, 516; ŠINKOVEC/TRATAR, 169. 
265  BECKMANN-PETEY, 236; BLAGOJEVIĆ, 78; ĐORĐEVIĆ, Ustavno pravo, 748. 
266  Art. 241 paras. 1–3 Cst. SFRY 1963 and art. 375 paras. 1–4 Cst. SFRY 1974. 
267  ĐORĐEVIĆ, Ustavno pravo, 758. As to MARKOVIĆ, 138 this excluded mere recommenda-
tions, declarations and resolutions. 
268  E.g. BLAGOJEVIĆ, 89 f.; ĐORĐEVIĆ, ustavno pravo 754 f.; MARKOVIĆ, 131 f. 
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compatibility of the constitutional laws of the Autonomous Provinces to the 
Republic's Assembly.269 
The Constitutional Courts of the SFRY lacked the core power of their western 
counterparts: the authority to invalidate unconstitutional laws. As a conse-
quence of the supremacy of parliament in Yugoslav socialist ideology, the 
Courts were not empowered to directly invalidate laws passed by the assem-
blies, neither on the federal nor on the republic and provincial levels.270 Un-
constitutional laws only lost their legal validity by force of the Constitutions 
if the responsible assembly refrained from eliminating the detected unconsti-
tutionality within one year.271  
Given that the superiority of the assemblies was not undermined, this solution 
constituted a way of making constitutional review compatible with the com-
munist party system. Although principally approved, the lack of the power of 
the Constitutional Courts to invalidate unconstitutional laws also met with 
criticism because of the risk that laws declared unconstitutional remained ap-
plicable during the waiting period.272 
B. Political function of constitutional adjudication  
Because of its particular institutional position, constitutional adjudication 
played a significantly different function in the SFRY than in liberal continental 
European systems. Although there was no distinct difference with respect to 
the constitutional foundations and guarantees, both the composition and role 
of the Yugoslav constitutional courts were in fact dominated by political con-
siderations.  
On the one hand, the independence of the Constitutional Courts in the SFRY 
was merely hypothetical. In fact, the constitutional foundation did not prevent 
the political elites, and particularly the SKJ, from extending or reducing their 
competences based on political motivations.273 While this implied an actual 
lack of institutional independence, a personal independence of the judges was 
                                              
269  DIMITRIJEVIĆ, 176; MRATOVIĆ/FILIPOVIĆ/ SOKOL, 512; STJEPANOVIĆ, 58. 
270  As to MRATOVIĆ/FILIPOVIĆ/SOKOL, 103 this also prevented the occurrence of legal gaps 
which would have destabilized the system. 
271  The term of six months as provided by art. 245 para. 1 and 2 and 246 para. 1 and 2 Cst. 
SFRY 1963 was extended to a maximum of twelve months, see art. 384 para. 2 Cst. SFRY 
1974. 
272  MRATOVIĆ/FILIPOVIĆ/SOKOL, 515; SOKOL, Položaj ustavnih sudova, 153 f. 
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not realized either. Given the absence of eligibility criteria, political motiva-
tions and an affiliation to the leading SKJ dominated the nominations of the 
judges.274  
On the other hand, the competences of the Constitutional Courts were deter-
mining for their role in the Yugoslav constitutional system. So as to supervise 
the normative activities and to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution, the 
Yugoslav Courts were vested with the power to initiate review proceedings at 
their own discretion.275 The Courts were moreover assigned powers of a non-
judicial nature. These included their competence to permanently monitor the 
legislative processes, to make suggestions regarding the enactment or amend-
ment of normative acts and to report problems and shortcomings, such as legal 
loopholes and omissions to legislate to the Assembly.276 With their constitu-
tionally prescribed obligation to contribute to and promote social progress and 
development, the Constitutional Courts were obliged to align their decisions 
with the political program. Therefore, they were perceived as guarantors for 
the development and the progress of the socialist system rather than as guard-
ians of the constitutional order and values.277 Because of the predominantly 
political function, judicial review was an integral component of the Yugoslav 
political system.278 
3. Accessibility of the Yugoslav Constitutional Courts  
A. Broad accessibility 
The Yugoslav Constitutional Courts were considerably more accessible than 
their counterparts in Western Europe.279 With the exception of the administra-
tive and executive bodies, principally all state organs of all federal entities 
were entitled to request the initiation of review proceedings before the Federal 
Court. Moreover, all self-managing entities, labour organizations and other 
                                              
274  E.g. DJURIŠIĆ, 185; MRATOVIĆ/FILIPOVIĆ/SOKOL, 511; SCHWEISSGUTH, 208, 217 f. 
275  Art. 249 para. 2 Cst. SFRY 1963 and art. 387 para. 2 Cst. SFRY 1974. Detailed with re-
spect to the ex officio powers in MARKOVIĆ, 80 f., 146 ff. 
276  Art. 242 Cst. SFRY 1963 and art. 376 f. Cst. SFRY 1974. 
277  BLAGOJEVIĆ, 117; MRATOVIĆ/FILIPOVIĆ/SOKOL, 512. 
278  See to this effect BLAGOJEVIĆ, 30 f.; ĐORĐEVIĆ, Ustavno pravo, 747, 772; FIRA, 335. 
279  See the long lists of authorized applicants in art. 249 para. 1 Cst. SFRY 1963 and art. 387 
para. 1 Cst. SFRY 1974. For a detailed analysis see MARKOVIĆ, 127 ff., 155 ff.  
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socio-economic associations could file requests for the protection of their 
rights to self-management. 
B. Individual access to Yugoslav Constitutional Courts 
Over and above, the Yugoslav Constitutional Courts were accessible to indi-
vidual persons. As has been shown, these Courts were established as guaran-
tors of the constitutional order in a general interest of society and as promoters 
of the socialist system. Seen in this context their accessibility to individuals 
gives rise to the question as to the scope and function of individual access.  
Both Federal Constitutions contained extensive catalogues containing human 
rights and liberties known in Western states and numerous rights related to 
ethnic affiliation and minorities.280 Given the strict hierarchy of the Yugoslav 
normative system, the same rights and liberties were guaranteed on the level 
of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces. As only subject of international 
law, the Federation, who acquired full membership in the United Nations in 
October 1945, ratified the UN Covenants in June 1971 and several interna-
tional human rights treaties. 
At the same time, socialist ideology rejected the concept of individualism 
based on the primacy of individuals over society and a free individual sphere 
for personal development. This concept was considered to have paved the way 
for capitalism and economic dominance of the bourgeoisie. In accordance to 
Marxist ideology, human rights had a social function and aimed at liberating 
society from exploitation and submission.281 This resulted in the equalization 
of individual and collective goods and interests of society, which was decisive 
for the legal status of individual persons. As integral parts of society, they were 
directly addressed by the socialist Constitutions. In contrast to liberal systems, 
the legal status of individuals was therefore directly limited by the rights and 
liberties of others and by the constitutional obligations to solidarity and to 
strive for the welfare of society.282  
                                              
280  Art. 32–70 Cst. SFRY 1963 and art. 153–203 Cst. SFRY 1974. 
281  Detailed to the Marxist conception of rights KLENNER, 793 ff. and PETEV, 28 ff. 
282  Art. 32 para. 2, 59 f. and art. 62 Cst SFRY 1963 and art. 153, 173 and 195 ff. Cst. SFRY 
1974. For more information, see ĐORĐEVIĆ, Ustavno pravo, 129 ff., 198 f., 362 ff.; FIRA, 
275; HÖCKER-WEYAND, 82; LUCHTERHAND, 40 f.; Expert explanations Cst. SFRY 1974, 
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a) Judicial protection and collective responsibility 
The Yugoslav Constitutions provided for a comprehensive system of control 
and protection of the constitutional rights and liberties and of self-manage-
ment. It involved the state organs and bearers of public powers as well as all 
self-managing units in the political and economic field.283 Besides this system 
of social control,284 special institutions such as the public prosecutor and the 
social attorney for self-management were established with the primary task to 
protect the constitutional guarantees.285 Finally, the collective responsibility 
for the protection of the Yugoslav constitutional guarantees required the active 
involvement of the individual persons as well. 
The judicial protection of the constitutionally guaranteed rights comprised the 
ordinary and specialized judiciaries such as military courts, criminal courts, 
commercial courts and, in particular, the courts of self-management on every 
administrative level.286 The latter were specialized tribunals whose function 
was confined to the resolution of disputes arising on the socio-economic field 
and in self-managing relations. Due to the far-reaching autonomy rights of the 
organizations of associated work and other socio-economic associations, such 
issues were extracted from the jurisdiction of the ordinary judiciary.287  
The judiciary offered comprehensive protection of the constitutional rights 
and the rights to self-management against decisions and acts of an individual 
and concrete nature.288 In 1965, the Law on Administrative Disputes was en-
acted and contained a general clause for the jurisdiction of the administrative 
judiciary for violations of constitutional rights and liberties by individual 
acts.289 Therewith, all court decisions and any individual or factual act of ad-
ministrative authorities of the state and social organizations, the presidency 
and any other executive organ were subject to the control by the supreme 
courts of the different federal entities.290 At the same time, the Constitutional 
                                              
283  See General provisions VIII Cst. SFRY 1963 and IV Cst. SFRY 1974. 
284  More detailed in ĐORĐEVIĆ, Ustavno pravo, 257 ff. 
285  Detailed in Expert explanations Cst. SFRY 1974, 253 ff. 
286  Art. 132 Cst. SFRY 1963 and art. 221 ff. Cst. SFRY 1974. 
287  Detailed hereto FIRA, 329 f. 
288  Art. 68 Cst. SFRY 1963 and art. 180 Cst. SFRY 1974. 
289  Art. 68 para. 1 Law on Administrative Disputes of 10 April 1965, Službeni list SFRJ, 
no. 21/1965, amended on 24 December 1976 and published in Službeni list SFRJ, 
no. 4/1977. 
290  DIMITRIJEVIĆ, 189; DJURIŠIĆ, 187; ĐORĐEVIĆ, Ustavno pravo, 747; LUCHTERHANDT, 48. 
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Courts were excluded from reviewing non legislative acts and were restricted 
to the review of laws and other acts of the legislative authorities.291  
b) Absence of means of indirect individual access  
Individuals in the SFRY did not have a possibility to indirectly access the Con-
stitutional Courts by involving intermediary bodies. Accordingly, no refer-
ences can be found in the Constitutions or the respective laws to a right to 
raise objections against the constitutionality of an applicable law in judicial 
proceedings and to therewith oblige the responsible courts to request the re-
view of this act before the Federal Constitutional Court. Rather, it can be as-
sumed that the courts were free to act at their own discretion.292 In view of the 
definition provided above, objections raised in this respect therefore cannot 
be considered as means of indirect individual access.  
The same applies to the social attorney as intermediary body. Introduced by 
the Constitution of 1974, the social attorney was established as legal repre-
sentative for the protection of the rights and interests of the workers and their 
associations. He was entitled to submit requests to the Federal Constitutional 
Court to initiate review proceedings against acts of legislation and any state 
act which violated the rights of the working class and social ownership.293 
However, both the systematic placement of the constitutional basis and word-
ing indicate that the social attorney was not responsible for the protection of 
the subjective rights of the individuals, but rather only of the collective rights 
of social collectivities and organizations. In this regard, the social attorney 
cannot be considered as an intermediary body for indirect individual access in 
accordance to the definition above either. 
c) Elimination of the constitutional complaint  
Together with the establishment of the Constitutional Courts in 1963, consti-
tutional complaints had been introduced as remedies for direct individual ac-
cess on all federal levels.294 In accordance to the Western European model, 
individuals were entitled to directly appeal to the Constitutional Courts against 
individual state acts or factual actions which violated their constitutional rights 
                                              
291  ĐORĐEVIĆ, Ustavno pravo, 747. 
292  See to this effect also DIMITRIJEVIĆ, 179 and MARKOVIĆ, 88. 
293  Art. 387 para. 1 no. 7 Cst. SFRY 1974. 
294  For the federal complaint see art. 241 para. 2 Cst. SFRY 1963 and art. 36 CCL SFRY. 
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and liberties. Corresponding to the federal structure of the Yugoslav constitu-
tional judiciary, the Federal Court decided on alleged violations by individual 
acts of federal bodies, while the Courts of the Socialist Republics and Prov-
inces decided on infringements by acts of the organs within their own juris-
diction. 
The entitlement to file complaints required a personal concern of the appli-
cants and a legal interest in reviewing contested individual acts or decisions.295 
Violations of the rights and liberties listed in Chapter III could be claimed by 
any individual person. Because of their social nature, violations of the self-
managing rights and the other guarantees on the socio-economic sphere listed 
in Chapter II could only be invoked by the organizations of associated work. 
In these cases, constitutional complaints had a collective character and were 
filed for the benefit of the social collectivity.296 Constitutional complaints had 
to be submitted within three months and in a form compatible with the formal 
requirements prescribed.297  
As its counterparts in Western Europe, also the Yugoslav constitutional com-
plaint had a subsidiary nature. Complaints were namely admissible only if «no 
other judicial protection is guaranteed».298 With the adoption of the general 
clause for the jurisdiction of the administrative judiciary for violations of con-
stitutional rights and liberties by individual acts in 1965, jurisdiction with re-
spect to individual rights protection was however entirely transferred to the 
Supreme Courts.299 In practice, the Federal Constitutional Court interpreted 
the subsidiarity clause and the general clause so rigidly that it rejected all con-
stitutional complaints by referring to the jurisdiction of the administrative ju-
diciary.300  
The entitlement of individuals to file constitutional complaints thus never 
gained any practical relevance in the SFRY. With the enactment of the 1974 
Constitution this legal remedy was consequently eliminated on the federal and 
thereafter on the level of the Republics and Provinces. Only the Constitution 
                                              
295  Art. 37 para. 1 CCL SFRY. 
296  DIMITRIJEVIĆ, 190; MARČIĆ, 95; SCHULTZ, 35. 
297  Art. 38 ff. CCL SFRY. 
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of the SR of Croatia still formally provided for this remedy.301 As the compre-
hensive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for individual rights protection pre-
vented the complaint from reaching practical impact also here, it was abol-
ished in 1989 as well.302 Consequently, individuals did – in practice since 1963 
and by law since 1974 – not have any legal remedy to contest individual state 
acts before the Constitutional Courts for violating their constitutional rights.  
4. The right of initiative 
Given the absence of indirect access rights and the abolition of the constitu-
tional complaint in 1974, the right of initiative constituted the only means al-
lowing individual access to the Constitutional Courts. Introduced in 1963, it 
entitled individuals to trigger the initiation of review proceedings against laws 
and other general acts irrespectively of their application to a concrete case.303 
In accordance with the broad scope of normative acts subject to judicial re-
view, initiatives could be filed against laws, regulations and other general acts 
on federal, republic and the provincial level as well as all general acts passed 
by the self-governing entities and associations. The initiative was provided on 
the federal level and in the Socialist Republics and Autonomous Provinces.304 
Its features are described in the following. 
A. Unrestricted accessibility 
The right of initiative was not restricted by any personal admissibility criteria 
nor did it require the fulfilment of procedural requirements. Applicants could 
submit initiatives against laws or other general acts irrespectively of a personal 
legal interest or a direct concern. Besides, their entitlement to do so was nei-
ther limited in time nor by any financial burden. Finally, the Constitutional 
Courts even accepted anonymously filed initiatives.305 
                                              
301  Art. 412 no. 6 Cst. SR Croatia 1974. 
302  Amendment LI no. 1 Cst. SR Croatia 1974, BECKMANN-PETEY, 236 f.; ĐORĐEVIĆ, 
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B. Binding effect 
As has been shown, proceedings of judicial review could be initiated upon 
requests filed by state organs and public organizations and upon the submittal 
of initiatives. As main difference, initiatives did not automatically trigger the 
opening of review proceedings nor did they oblige the Constitutional Courts 
to do so. Rather, they constituted a form of information or indication about a 
detected unconstitutionality or unlawfulness. The Courts decided whether or 
not to take initiatives into consideration and to review the disputed acts of 
legislation. If they considered the allegations as founded, they opened the re-
view proceedings based on their power to act ex officio.306 
Nevertheless, the discretion of the Yugoslav Courts in accepting initiatives for 
consideration was not completely unrestricted. Initiatives had a procedural ef-
fect in as far as the Constitutional Courts were obliged to justify their rulings 
and to state the reasons for rejection. They accordingly had to assess whether 
or not the allegations gave rise to justified doubts as to the compatibility of 
disputed provisions with the Constitutions and the laws. Decisions on admis-
sion or rejection were adopted in preliminary proceedings and by formal rul-
ings.307 The rulings on the opening of the main review proceedings indicated 
the existence of incompatibilities.308 Hence, in practice, the initiative had a 
corresponding procedural effect as requests filed by authorized applicants. In 
contemporary doctrine it is designated as «de facto actio popularis» or as 
binding popular complaint.309 Yet other authors deny its nature as popular 
complaint.310 
C. Protective function 
a) Protection of the objective constitutional order 
The actual protective function of the initiative becomes apparent by the word-
ing in art. 205 para. 3 Cst. SFRY 1974:  
                                              
306  E.g. BLAGOJEVIĆ, 79 f.; DIMITRIJEVIĆ, 180. 
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«It is the right and the obligation of the working people and the citizens to 
take initiative for the protection of the constitutionality and legality» (Italics 
added). 
The decentralization of legislative and regulatory authority required a super-
vision mechanism that comprised the broadest possible circle of applicants for 
the detection and elimination of legal inconsistencies. The collective respon-
sibility included individual persons as well. Their active involvement in the 
detection of such inconsistencies and potential threats to the socialist system 
complied with their constitutionally prescribed responsibility and solidarity 
towards socialist society.311 As members of the social and political community, 
individuals were obliged to file initiatives against incompatible laws and other 
general acts.312 Besides, the initiative was also seen as a means of democratic 
participation.313 Therewith, the individual citizen was involved in the circle of 
guarantors of the functioning of the socialist system, along with the Constitu-
tional Courts, the state organs and the entities of self-management.  
This indicates that the right of initiative had not been introduced as remedy 
for individual rights protection.314 Considering the elimination of the consti-
tutional complaint and the transfer of the jurisdiction on human rights protec-
tion to the Supreme Courts, individual access in principle appears to have pri-
marily served the protection of the objective constitutional order. Yet, the 
adoption of the criteria for recognizing a subjective protective function of pop-
ular complaints as specified above,315 paints a different picture. 
b) Combination with personal benefits for the applicants 
Notwithstanding their primarily altruistic function, particular procedural 
measures allowed applicants to gain personal advantages by submitting initi-
atives to the Constitutional Courts and requesting them to review a law or act 
of legislation. This enabled them to indirectly achieve the enforcement of their 
individual rights and to improve their personal legal status.316 The prospect of 
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313  BLAGOJEVIĆ, 79; ĐORĐEVIĆ, Ustavno pravo, 346; MARKOVIĆ, 80, 163 ff. 
314  See also HARTWIG, 543; HÖCKER-WEYAND, 80; LUCHTERHANDT, 48. 
315  See above pp. 29 ff. 
316  ĐORĐEVIĆ, Ustavno pravo, 747. 
Chapter 1: Access by filing popular complaints 
58 
 
personal benefits was considered as incentive to take legal action on behalf of 
society.317 
aa) Suspension of enforcement of individual acts 
So as to prevent the occurrence of irreparable negative consequences for the 
applicants, the Constitutional Courts could suspend the enforcement of indi-
vidual acts passed in application of reviewed laws or acts of legislation for the 
duration of review proceedings.318 This allowed applicants to achieve the pre-
vention of the execution of potential rights violating acts already before the 
adoption of a final decision. 
However, such provisional measures entailed a limited protective effect. 
Firstly, they could only be ordered against concrete acts of application, but not 
against the general applicability of an unconstitutional law or general act.319 
Besides, the non-applicability of individual acts could not be ordered during 
the one year period conceded to the Assemblies to eliminate established legal 
inconsistencies. During this period, laws declared unconstitutional and acts 
passed in their application remained enforceable.  
bb) Appeals for reconsideration or compensation 
Besides, applicants who already suffered a violation of their rights because of 
the adoption of unconstitutional laws or general acts were entitled to claim the 
reconsideration of final decisions adopted on the basis of unconstitutional 
laws or general acts.320 This provided a form of indirect protection of the per-
sonal rights against the authorities or courts responsible for the adoption of 
these acts. The entitlement to request reparation required the abrogation of the 
normative basis of these decisions. But rather than being restricted to the ap-
plicant, it could be claimed by any other individual who suffered violations 
from the application of the respective law or other general act.321  
However, appeals for reconsideration or compensation did not have any sig-
nificance in practice.322 Without any possibility of extension, appeals could 
only be submitted within six months from the elimination of the legal basis 
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and only if the respective decision was adopted within one year after the adop-
tion of the final individual act. 
c) Substitute for missing alternatives of individual access 
In practice, the activity of Yugoslav constitutional adjudication was to a great 
extent caused by the large number of initiatives filed. According to available 
sources, 75 to 80 percent of all review proceedings before the Constitutional 
Courts were initiated upon initiatives filed by individuals, labour associations 
and other self-governing entities.323 In contrast to individuals and the self-
managing entities, the state organs remained inactive in requesting the initia-
tion of judicial review proceedings.324  
Even though the Yugoslav initiative was primarily introduced for altruistic 
purposes, it nevertheless served as means for individual rights protection.325 
According to available information, initiatives were predominantly filed by 
individuals, namely the working people, public employees, invalids and pen-
sioners.326 These applicants principally alleged violations of socio-economic 
rights and the rights related to economic self-management.327 Indicative in this 
respect is also that initiatives were primarily filed against acts of a lower leg-
islative rank including statutes and other general acts enacted in communities 
and the self-managing working organizations.328 
One potential cause for their actual significance as means of individual rights 
protection in practice is the equation of the subjective and objective interests 
with respect to the protection of the constitutional guarantees.329 On the other 
hand, given their small significance, the procedural means providing appli-
cants with personal benefits do not seem to have had any significant impact in 
this respect. The fact that initiatives were in practice filed by applicants seek-
ing to improve their own legal position and to protect their personal rights can 
                                              
323  BLAGOJEVIĆ, 84. See also references in HÖCKER-WEYAND, 81. 
324  See MARKOVIĆ, 160. 
325  The same conclusion can be found in HÖCKER-WEYAND, 81 ff. 
325  BLAGOJEVIĆ, 84. 
326  For the practical significance of initiatives see MARKOVIĆ, 158 ff.  
327  HÖCKER-WEYAND, 82. For more references see BECKMANN-PETEY, 229. 
328  BLAGOJEVIĆ, 84. 
329  See to that effect Expert explanations Cst. SFRY 1974, 351 ff. 
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rather be attributed to the fact that these remedies constituted the only means 
for individuals to access the Yugoslav Constitutional Courts.330  
This influenced the practical significance of the Federal Constitutional Court. 
Concentrating its review activity on the large number of acts enacted by or-
ganizations on the socio-economic level, its decisions finally hardly had any 
political impact.331 It was accordingly criticized for hiding behind questions 
of secondary importance for the system.332 In contrast to their intended func-
tion based on socialist ideology, the Constitutional Courts did therefore in fact 
not reach any substantial significance as promoters of the socialist system but 
rather as guardians of constitutional rights.333  
 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
In a first part of this Chapter the different means of granting individuals access 
to constitutional courts are presented on the basis of practical examples in Eu-
ropean states. It is shown that the broader accessibility of constitutional courts 
to individuals, the stronger the effect on the enforcement of constitutional 
guarantees. Today, there is widespread agreement that the accessibility of con-
stitutional courts to individual persons considerably extended the protection 
offered by the judiciary. Owing to the final and generally binding legal force 
of judgments of constitutional courts, the protective effect reached by the ab-
rogation of rights violating state acts of a legal or factual nature is considerably 
more extensive. The rights and liberties guaranteed by the constitutions are 
enforced against the state authorities as subjective rights of the individual ap-
plicant and as objective constitutional institutions in a public interest. In post-
war Europe, the introduction of individual access rights can thus be regarded 
as key factor towards an effective rights protection and for the strengthening 
of the legal positions of individual persons against the state. Therewith, indi-
viduals were not only endowed with additional remedies and an extended ju-
dicial protection of their rights and liberties, but also with the possibility to 
                                              
330  The same conclusion can be found in LUCHTERHANDT, 48. 
331  E.g. DJURIŠIĆ, 184, 186 ff.; HÖCKER-WEYAND, 81. 
332  BLAGOJEVIĆ, 120 ff.; SMERDEL, Kuda ide Ustavni sud Jugoslavije?, 159 f. 
333  MARKOVIĆ, 160 f. To this effect see also BAČIĆ PETAR, 395; SMERDEL/SOKOL, 177. This 
view is not shared by MRATOVIĆ/FILIPOVIĆ/SOKOL, 104. 
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achieve protection by the constitutional courts as supreme guardians of the 
constitutional rights and liberties. 
In most states the access of individuals to constitutional courts is restricted. 
As a rule, the entitlement requires a personal impairment by a state act and the 
demonstration of an own legal interest. Besides, it is restricted by more or less 
stringent requirements as to the form of applications. In Europe unrestricted 
access of individuals based on the model of the Roman actio popularis can 
only be found in very few states. In a second part, this Chapter provides a 
definition and classifies popular complaints as means which entitle individuals 
to request constitutional courts to review the compliance of laws and other 
acts of legislation with the constitution. 
A third part of Chapter 1 reveals that popular complaints have potential to 
contribute to the enforcement of constitutional supremacy and the rule of law 
to a considerable extent. It is shown that – depending of their particular fea-
tures and the arrangement of the review proceedings – these complaints serve 
as remedies for the protection of the constitutional order and the constitution-
ally guaranteed rights and liberties both as common goods and as subjective 
rights. This view is substantiated by reference to the pertinent jurisdiction of 
the ECtHR, who under certain conditions acknowledges the applicability of 
the ECHR standards to judicial review proceedings. 
In a final part, the right of initiative in the SFRY is analysed. Established as 
popular complaint in 1963, it constituted one of the first examples of unre-
stricted individual access to constitutional adjudication. At the same time, it is 
the predecessor of the complaints in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia as main 
objects of investigation of the present study. As consequence of the Yugoslav 
system of self-management the authority to legislate was to a certain extent 
even granted to enterprises or labour unions. Both the Yugoslav Constitutional 
Courts and the initiative as means allowing individuals to directly access these 
courts were intended as mechanisms to ensure the enforcement of the socialist 
principles and guarantees throughout this comprehensive legal order of the 
SFRY. The transfer of jurisdiction on individual rights protection to the Su-
preme Courts and the elimination of constitutional complaints reinforced the 
function of individual access and the initiative in particular as means of pro-
tection of the socialist order in an objective sense. However, this could not 
prevent that, as only access rights to constitutional adjudication, initiatives 
were in practice filed by applicants searching for protection of their individual 
rights and liberties. 
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It is important to note at this point that, in fact, the Yugoslav Constitution and 
the laws served as instruments for the enforcement of the socialist program 
and policy in accordance with the political discretion of the SKJ. In light of 
this, constitutional adjudication in general and judicial review in particular 
could only be compatible with the supremacy of the SKJ if they served as 
instruments of the political powers. Consequently, constitutional courts were 
considered to be both functionally and institutionally dependent of and subject 
to the supervision of the SKJ.334  
To sum up, the first Chapter presents the institutional fundamentals of indi-
vidual access to constitutional courts in general and of popular complaints, if 
introduced as means of individual access, in particular. As a general conclu-
sion on unlimited individual access it can be said that, although controversial, 
it has potential as a strong means both for the enforcement of the constitution-
ality and for the protection of individual rights and liberties against the politi-
cal powers.  
                                              
334  For more details see ŠIMONOVIĆ, 284 ff. and MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 202 f. 
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Chapter 2: Constitutional adjudication in 
Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia 
I. Transition to constitutionalism 
After the increased efforts of the SKJ to reinforce centralism by the third con-
stitutional reform in 1989,335 Slovenia and Croatia, who strived for further de-
centralization and the establishment of a con-federal system within the SFRY, 
accentuated their intention to abolish socialist rule and to secede from the 
SFRY by adopting new Constitutions.336 Attempting to prevent these transfor-
mation efforts, the federal forces requested the Federal Constitutional Court 
to review the compatibility of these Constitutions with the federal law. This 
effort failed because the Federal Court rejected its competence to review the 
Constitutions of the Republics.337 Slovenia and Croatia finally declared their 
independence from the SFRY on 25 June 1991 and Macedonia on 25 Septem-
ber 1991.338 On 29 November 1991 the Arbitration Commission of the Peace 
Conference on Yugoslavia (Badinter Arbitration Commission) proclaimed the 
dissolution of the SFRY on behalf of the international community. 
The fall of socialist rule at the end of the 1980s brought comprehensive polit-
ical, economic and legal changes to the Successor States of SFRY. With the 
enactment of new Constitutions these states broke with the systems marked 
by power concentration, injustice and arbitrariness under the pretext of dem-
ocratic legitimization of the socialist elites as representatives of the people.339 
While explicitly renunciating from authoritarian rule and concentrated state 
power, the Constitutions are influenced to a great extent by constitutional 
standards common to the European community of states. Accordingly also 
                                              
335  The amendments were published in Službeni list SFRJ, no. 70/1988. 
336  Amendments LXIV–LXXV Constitution of the SR Croatia, NN no. 31/90 and Amend-
ments XCI–XCV Constitution of the SR Slovenia, Uradni list 32/1989. 
337  With respect to Slovenia see ŠINKOVEC/TRATAR, 170. See also above at Chapter 1, p. 48. 
338  More details to the independence processes can be found for Croatia in SMERDEL, Ustavno 
uređenje Europske Hrvatske, 245 f.; for Slovenia in KRISTAN, ZaöRV 1991, 324 ff.; and 
for Macedonia in SCHRAMEYER, 411 ff. and WILLEMSEN, 967 ff. 
339  ISMAYR, 14; KRISTAN, ZaöRV 1993, 322. A detailed analysis of the transformation in East-
ern Europe can be found e.g. in HARTWIG, 449 ff. and ROGGEMANN, passim.  
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most reforms conducted since were oriented towards the fulfilment of the re-
quirements for accession to the EU.340 The transformation endeavours com-
prised the enforcement of human rights and liberties, democracy, equality, jus-
tice and the rule of law as basic values of the Union.341 The Constitutions fi-
nally strictly emphasize their normative superiority and binding legal effect 
over all state organs. 
As independent state Croatia enacted its new Constitution on 22 December 
1990.342 Besides a large number of amendments, the Constitution has been 
subject to comprehensive reforms in 1997, 2000, 2001, 2010 and in 2014.343 
The frequent constitutional amendments can be seen as consequence of the 
unsteady political developments following the independence and transition 
and in relation to the adoption of international treaties and the fulfilment of 
the European legal and democratic standards.344 The latest amendment was 
the consequence of the constitutional referendum of December 2013, in which 
Croatian citizens adopted the definition of marriage as «[u]nion between a 
woman and a man». New proceedings of constitutional reform on the govern-
mental and administrative structure have been initiated upon a respective pro-
posal of a group of deputies, submitted on 10 July 2013.345 
                                              
340  ROGGEMANN, 72. 
341  Art. 2 and 6 and art. 49 Treaty of the European Union, consolidated version of 13 Decem-
ber 2007. The access conditions were moreover concretized by the Copenhagen Criteria 
of 1993 and the Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans of 16 June 2003. 
342  Constitution of 22 December 1990, Narodne Novine (Official Gazette, NN) 56/90, 
135/97, 113/00, 28/01, 76/10, 85/10, 5/14. Because of unconstitutional numerical changes 
with the amendment of 2010, NN 85/10, the Constitutional Court established in its notice 
U-X-1435/2011, n. 14 of 23 March 2011, NN 37/11 that it will continue using the version 
published in NN 76/10 respectively 5/14. In accordance with legal doctrine and the pre-
dominant constitutional and political practice, the present study will nevertheless apply 
the version published in NN 85/10 respectively 5/14 (hereinafter Cst. Croatia).  
343  The English translation of the consolidated text of the Constitution as referred to in this 
study can be found on <www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=2405> (last accessed September 
2018). 
344  SMERDEL, Ustavno uređenje Europske Hrvatske, 267. More details to the different re-
forms can be found e.g. in BAČIĆ PETAR, 371 ff.; SMERDEL, Parlamentarni sustav, 99 ff.; 
IBID., Ustav nakon ustavnih promjena 2010. godine, 3 
345  In October 2013, the National Assembly approved of the suggested reforms,  
NN 131/13 and adopted a respective draft in December 2013, NN 150/13. 
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About one year after Croatia, Macedonia346 adopted its Constitution on 17 No-
vember 1991.347 The Constitution has been subject to seven constitutional re-
forms and 32 amendments.348 The most comprehensive reform took place in 
2001 in the aftermath of the Peace Agreement of Ohrid which, after seven 
months of ethnic violence, improved the civil and minority rights of the ethnic 
Albanians. Noteworthy is the judicial reform adopted in 2005 which aimed at 
increasing the efficiency and at enforcing the independence of the judiciary 
from political influences as demand of the accession negotiations with the 
EU.349 A new initiative for comprehensive constitutional reforms relating to 
issues of financial politics, the Judicial Council and to the Constitutional 
Court, was launched in July 2014 by the Macedonian Government.  
Slovenia adopted its Constitution on 23 December 1991.350 Besides a number 
of amendments the new Constitution has been subject to six comprehensive 
reforms to the present day.351 With the reforms of 7 March 2003, Slovenia 
included provisions which were indispensable for its accession to the EU in 
2004. Therewith it allowed the partial transfer of sovereignty to international 
organizations by implementing the European extradition agreement and by fa-
cilitating the acquisition of real estate by foreign nationals.  
It is important to note at this point that with the enactment of the new Consti-
tutions legislation adopted under socialist rule lost its legitimacy in as far as it 
                                              
346  Ever since its independence from the SFRY, Macedonia has been involved in a political 
dispute with Greece with respect to its name. Based on a bilateral agreement, these two 
states agreed on an interim designation as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) as official name in international relations and in relation to the main interna-
tional organizations and the EU. For a detailed overview see ČOBANOV, 28 f.; 
SCHRAMEYER, 411 ff. Nevertheless, several states have recognized Macedonia as Repub-
lic of Macedonia in their bilateral relations.  
347  Constitution of 17 November 1991, Služben vesnik (Official Gazette) 52/91. The English 
translation of the valid Constitution is published on the website of the Constitutional 
Court <http://ustavensud.mk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Constitutuon.pdf> (last ac-
cessed September 2018). 
348  See Služben vesnik 1/92, revised versions 31/98, 91/01, 84/03, 107/05, 3/09. The consol-
idated and valid version is published in Služben vesnik 49/11 of 12 April 2011 (hereinafter 
Cst. Macedonia). 
349  SCHRAMEYER, 417. 
350  The English translation of the valid Constitution is published on website of the Constitu-
tional Court <www.us-rs.si/en/> (last accessed September 2018). 
351  Constitution of 28 December 1991, Uradni list (Official Gazette) 33/91, revised versions 
42/97, 66/00, 24/03, 69/04, 68/06, including the last amendments of 24 May 2013, Uradni 
list 47/13 (hereinafter Cst. Slovenia). 
Chapter 2: Constitutional adjudication in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia 
66 
 
was incompatible with the new constitutional values. Yet, laws and regulations 
did not lose their legal effect by force of law but continued to be valid in order 
to avoid legal gaps. Together with the new Constitutions the constitution-mak-
ers enacted transitional regulations which determined a transitional period for 
these acts to be adapted.352 After the expiry of the set terms for adaptation, the 
respective laws or regulations became subject to constitutional review.353 
 
II. The Constitutional Courts  
With their transition Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia retained their Constitu-
tional Courts and the system of concentrated constitutional judiciary. The 
strong constitutional position of these Courts is mirrored by their nature as 
constitutional institutions. 
The Croatian Constitutional Court is perceived as organ sui generis and as 
fourth state power with the particular function to control and to protect the 
constitutional order and guarantees.354 The Court confirms that it is neither 
located within the classic separation of powers system nor hierarchically su-
perior to the state powers.355 The same constitutional position is conceded to 
the Constitutional Court of Macedonia.356 Accordingly, also the Macedonian 
Court is described as state organ sui generis that is neither superior nor subor-
dinate to the other state powers.357  
The Slovene Constitutional Court, on the other hand, is described as 
                                              
352  See Croatian Constitutional Act on Implementation of the Constitution of 1992, NN 
27/92; Constitutional Act on Implementing the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia 
of 1991, Uradni list 33/91; Constitutional Law on the Implementation of the Macedonian 
Constitution of 1991, Služben vesnik 52/91. 
353  For Croatia see CRNIĆ, Vladavina Ustava, 20; PEŠUT, 36. With respect to Macedonia, see 
ČOBANOV, 208, 255 ff. 
354  E.g. BAČIĆ PETAR, 385; CRNIĆ, Vladavina Ustava, 3; SMERDEL/SOKOL, 176. 
355  E.g. ruling U-I-143/1995 of 14 February 1995, NN 11/95. 
356  E.g. KLIMOVSKI/DESKOSKA/KARAKAMIŠEVA, 505; KRAČINSKI, 478 f.; SKARIĆ, 587. 
ČOBANOV, 143 considers the Court as part of the separation of powers. 
357  MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 229 f.  
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«highest body of the judicial power for the protection of constitutionality 
and legality and the human rights and liberties».358  
The Court itself equalizes its function to enforce the rule of law with the judi-
ciary and holds that, as supreme instance of judicial power, it counteracts and 
prevents abuses or concentration of power.359 It qualifies failures to implement 
its judgments as violation of the constitutionally prescribed separation of pow-
ers.360 While in a functional perspective the Constitutional Court appears as 
part of the judiciary, its autonomy and independence are however explicitly 
prescribed by art. 1 para. 2 CCA. From an institutional perspective it is thus 
separated from the judicial power.361  
Despite the tradition of constitutional adjudication and review their functional 
transformation constituted a major challenge for the Courts in Croatia, Slove-
nia and Macedonia. A detailed comparative portrayal of the three Constitu-
tional Courts exceeds the scope of this study. Yet, in order to demonstrate their 
comparability from an institutional and functional perspective, the legal 
frameworks and the main powers of these Courts are presented in the follow-
ing. 
1. Legal framework362 
A. Constitutional Court of Croatia 
The basic constitutional provisions for the establishment and the powers of 
the Croatian Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) can be 
found in Chapter V. In art. 132 para. 1 the Constitution refers to the Constitu-
tional Law on the Constitutional Court with respect to regulations regarding 
                                              
358  Art. 1 para. 1 CCA Slovenia. 
359  Annual Report 2011, 38; MAVČIČ, Slovenian constitutional review, 26, 33, 88.  
360  Decision U-I-114/1996 of 7 December 1995, n. 9 of Uradni list 8/96, OdlUS IV, 120. 
From its more recent practice see decision U-I-114/2011 of 9 June 2011, n. 13, Uradni list 
47/11, OdlUS XIX, 23.  
361  See for more details CERAR, 363 ff. 
362  English translations of the relevant legal framework can be found on the websites of the 
Constitutional Courts. 
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the proceedings, elections and the mandate of the judges.363 The internal or-
ganization is regulated in the Court's Rules of Procedure passed in 1994.364 
Art. 34 CCL Croatia finally prescribes the subsidiary application of the gen-
eral procedural rules relevant for the judiciary. 
B. Constitutional Court of Slovenia 
Besides the constitutional basis in Chapter VIII the procedural and organiza-
tional provisions for the Slovenian Constitutional Court (Ustavno sodišče Re-
publike Slovenije) are regulated by the Constitutional Court Act.365 Based on 
the legislator's entitlement to vest the Court with more powers based on 
art. 160 indent 11 more relevant provisions can be found in other laws.366 The 
Rules of Procedure367 and other Rules368 adopted by the Constitutional Court 
contain regulations on its internal organization and work. 
C. Constitutional Court of Macedonia 
The constitutional provisions on the Macedonian Constitutional Court 
(Ustaven sud na Republika Makedonija) can be found in Chapter IV. The Con-
stitutional Court enacted its Rules of Procedures directly based on art. 113.369 
There is no law or legislative act regulating the proceedings before the Mace-
donian Court.  
                                              
363  Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of 21 March 1991, NN 13/91. After amend-
ments in 1999, the new Constitutional Act in its consolidated and today valid version is 
published in NN 49/02 (hereinafter CCL Croatia). Despite the prescribed adaptation 
within one year by the transitory regulations of the Constitutional Amendment Act, 
NN 121/10, the CCL has not yet been adapted to the Constitution of 2010. 
364  Rules of Procedure of 4 March 1994, NN 29/94, revised versions NN 181/03, 16/06, 
30/08, 123/09, 63/10, 121/10 (hereinafter RoP Croatia). 
365  Constitutional Court Act of 18 March 1994, Uradni list 15/94. The valid version is pub-
lished in Uradni list 51/07 and the consolidated versions in 64/07 and 109/12 (hereinafter 
CCA Slovenia). 
366  E.g. art. 8 and 50 Law on the National Assembly of 10 September 1992, Uradni list 44/92, 
100/05 or art. 5.č, 5.d, 21 Law on Referendum and the Popular Initiative of  
8 March 1994, Uradni list 15/94, 26/07. 
367  Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court, Uradni list 86/07, 54/10, 56/11 (hereinaf-
ter RoP Slovenia).  
368  Rules of Internal Organization and Administration of the Constitutional Court of 2003, 
Uradni list 93/03, consolidated version of 56/11. 
369  Rules of Procedure of 7 October 1992, Služben vesnik 70/92 (hereinafter RoP Macedo-
nia). 
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At this point it is to be noted that the therewith granted broad regulatory au-
tonomy to the Constitutional Court is widely discussed.370 Proponents of the 
status quo emphasize the independence from the political and legislative au-
thorities.371 Opponents, on the other hand, criticize the exclusion of the possi-
bility of the legislator to regulate the powers of the Constitutional Court.372 A 
first attempt of the Government at amending art. 113 Constitution on the oc-
casion of the comprehensive judicial reform failed because the draft amend-
ment was not adopted by the National Assembly in the final vote on 7 Decem-
ber 2005. A new governmental proposal in this respect has been approved by 
the Assembly on 23 January 2015. 
2. Powers of the Constitutional Courts 
A. Basic powers 
The broad range of powers to review a comprehensive scope of state acts con-
stitutes a common feature of the three Courts. Their extensive jurisdiction 
shows their strong institutional position and authority.373 It furthermore illus-
trates the significance of constitutional review for the enforcement and pro-
tection of the rule of law and of constitutionality and legality as fundamental 
principles of the new constitutional orders. 
Instead of providing general clauses the Constitutions exhaustively enumerate 
the powers of the Constitutional Courts. While in Croatia and Macedonia these 
                                              
370  E.g. KRISTAN, OER 1993, 32; TRAJKOVSKA-HRISTOVSKA, Access to Constitutional Jus-
tice, 10; TRENESKA-DESKOSKA, Constitutional Court, 16 f. 
371  MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 227. See also SHASIVARI, 59; SKARIĆ, 686.  
372  KRČINSKI, 480, 485; KRISTAN, OER 1993, 32; SKARIĆ, 687; TRAJKOVSKA-HRISTOVSKA, 
Control of Constitutionality, 13; TRAJKOVSKA-HRISTOVSKA, Access to Constitutional Jus-
tice, 11 ff.; TRENESKA-DESKOSKA, Constitutional Court, 16 f. 
373  For Croatia see CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 4; For Slovenia see TESTEN, Komen-
tar Ustave art. 160, nn. 1 ff. 
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competence catalogues can be expanded only by way of constitutional amend-
ments,374 the Slovene legislator is authorized to extend the competences of the 
Constitutional Court by law.375  
a) Judicial review of laws and other general acts 
The competence catalogues start with the power of the Constitutional Courts 
to review the compliance of laws and other acts of legislation with the consti-
tution.376 This review power constitutes the main activity and the most im-
portant function of the three Courts.377 In contrast to their subordination under 
socialist rule their position was considerably strengthened by the introduced 
power to invalidate unconstitutional laws. Today, the significance of this com-
petence is expressed by the great number of legislative acts subject to consti-
tutional review, the broad circle of applicants authorized to request the initia-
tion of proceedings and by the power of the Courts to review acts of legislation 
at their own discretion. A thorough analysis of the review competence will 
follow in this and the following Chapter 3 in relation to the accessibility of the 
Courts in general and the popular complaint in particular. 
b) Protection of constitutional rights and liberties 
The protection of constitutional rights and liberties is another central function 
of the Constitutional Courts. All three states reintroduced constitutional com-
plaints as means of direct individual access and therewith entitled individuals 
to complain against state acts that directly interfere with their legal position.378 
A thorough analysis of this power will follow below in relation to the accessi-
bility of the Constitutional Courts.  
                                              
374  Art. 129 indent 10 Cst. Croatia. The Croatian Constitutional Court abolished several laws 
introducing new competences e.g. by decision U-I-177/2002 of 20 April 2006,  
NN 58/06. The relevant legal base for Macedonia is art. 110 indent 8 Cst. The Macedo-
nian Court confirmed this fact in U.br.195/2005 of 21 December 2005. All decisions and 
rulings of the Macedonian Constitutional Court cited in this study are published on the 
Court's website on <http://ustavensud.mk/?page_id=5228&lang=en>. 
375  Art. 160 indent 11 Cst. Slovenia. 
376  Art. 129 indents 1–3 Cst. Croatia; art. 160 para. 1 indents 1–5 Cst. Slovenia; art. 110 in-
dents 1 and 2 Cst. Macedonia.  
377  E.g. BRUNNER, Festschrift Stern, 1046. 
378  Art. 129 indent 4 Cst. Croatia; art. 160 para. 1 indent 6 Cst. Slovenia; art. 110 indent 3 
Cst. Macedonia.  
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c) Resolutions of jurisdictional conflicts 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Courts are entitled to resolve conflicts of com-
petences arising between the state powers and to determine by final decision 
the authority responsible to decide in a specific matter. The Croatian Court is 
merely empowered to decide on disputes arising between the three branches 
of state power i.e. the legislative, the executive and the judiciary.379 In addition 
to such horizontal disputes the Slovenian and Macedonian Courts also decide 
on jurisdictional conflicts on the vertical level between authorities of the state 
and the entities of local self-government.380  
d) Decisions on the impeachment of supreme state officials 
The Constitutional Courts are empowered to decide on the accountability of 
high state officials and their impeachment for violations of the Constitution in 
the conduct of their functions. These proceedings are initiated upon requests 
of the National Assemblies. The Croatian and the Macedonian Courts decide 
on the accountability of the Presidents of the Republic.381 The Slovene Court 
is additionally empowered to control actions and the conduct of the prime 
minister and of each individual minister.382  
e) Review of programs and statutes of political parties 
The power to review programs and statutes of political parties constitutes a 
competence common to constitutional courts in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, 
also the Constitutional Courts of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia are entitled 
to control statutes and political programs of parties with respect to their com-
pliance with the constitutional values and principles of democracy and the rule 
of law.383 They are empowered to prohibit political programs or activities or 
even to ban a political party that aims at the subversion of the constitutional 
order, the disregard of principles and values, or which calls for violence and 
incites racial hatred.384  
                                              
379  Art. 129 indent 6 Cst. Croatia. 
380  Art. 160 para. 1 indents 7–9 Cst. Slovenia; art. 110 indents 4 and 5 Cst. Macedonia. 
381  Art. 105 para. 3 and 129 indent 7 Cst. Croatia; art. 87 para. 3 and art. 110 indent 6 Cst. 
Macedonia. 
382  Art. 109 and 119 Cst. Slovenia and art. 63 ff. CCA Slovenia. 
383  Art. 6 para. 4 and 129 indent 8 Cst. Croatia; art. 160 indent 10 Cst. Slovenia; art. 110 
indent 7 Cst. Macedonia. 
384  With respect to Macedonia see ČOBANOV, 258 ff.; SKARIĆ, 699. 
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f) Decisions in electoral disputes 
The Constitutional Courts of Croatia and Slovenia are both vested with powers 
to decide in electoral disputes. As supreme electoral court, the Croatian Court 
reviews popular referendums and elections and resolves electoral disputes 
which do not pertain to the jurisdiction of the judiciary.385 Its Slovene coun-
terpart decides on electoral appeals against decisions of the National Assem-
bly on the confirmation of elections of candidates and on decisions of the As-
sembly to schedule popular referendums.386 In contrast, the power to decide 
on electoral disputes in Macedonia is reserved to the Electoral Commission 
and the regular judiciary.387 
B. Particular competences of the Constitutional Courts 
As a result of the constitutional reform in 2000, the competences of the Croa-
tian Constitutional Court were extended to a considerable extent. It accord-
ingly decides on the President's immunity, hears the solemn oath, determines 
the temporary assumption of the presidential office by the speaker of parlia-
ment and the termination of the presidential mandate.388 Furthermore, it de-
cides on appeals of judges against their removal from office, on disciplinary 
sanctions and on complaints of candidates in judicial elections.389 Noteworthy 
is the reintroduction of the competence provided under socialist rule to moni-
tor the implementation of the constitutionality and legality by the state powers, 
to supervise the execution of the Constitution and the laws and to notify the 
responsible legislative authorities about detected inconsistencies.390 Since 
Croatia’s accession to the EU, the Constitutional Court is additionally empow-
ered by art. 145 Constitution to monitor the implementation of the European 
acquis communautaire. 
Also the Slovene Court has been vested with additional competences. The 
most significant is its power to review the compatibility of international trea-
ties with the Constitution before their ratification and to issue a legally binding 
                                              
385  Art. 129 indent 9 Cst. Croatia. 
386  Art. 82 para. 3 Cst. Slovenia. 
387  The Macedonian Court accordingly annulled a provision in the Referendum Act provid-
ing such a competence, see decision U.br.195/2005 of 21 December 2005, n. 5. 
388  Art. 97 para. 2 and art. 106 para. 2 and 3 Cst. Croatia. 
389  Art. 123 para. 3 and 4 Cst. Croatia. 
390  Art. 129 indent 5 and art. 130 Cst. Croatia. See above at Chapter 1, p. 50. 
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opinion in this respect.391 By using this power the Constitutional Court exerted 
considerable influence on politics when it considered the Association Agree-
ment with the EU to be inconsistent with the former Constitution and there-
with prevented its ratification.392 Consequently, the Court adopts a rigid prac-
tice in reviewing treaties prior to their ratification.393 Furthermore, the legis-
lator empowered the Constitutional Court to issue declaratory decisions on 
legal loopholes and to oblige the responsible legislative bodies to fill these 
gaps within a certain period of time.394 Finally, the Court itself established its 
own power to issue binding interpretations of laws in order to prevent differ-
ences in application.395 
In addition to the basic powers listed above, the Macedonian Constitutional 
Court is vested with the competence to confirm the reasons of cessation of the 
presidential office, to determine the waiver of immunity of the President of 
the Republic and to approve his or her detention.396  
 
III. Accessibility of the Constitutional Courts 
Their broad accessibility is another common feature of the Constitutional 
Courts of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia and a further manifestation of their 
central institutional significance. In all three states this broad accessibility is 
particularly pronounced with regard to judicial review proceedings. Another 
common feature is the accessibility to individual persons. In order to analyse 
the popular complaints in light of these particularities, the following will out-
line the circle of applicants authorized to request the Constitutional Courts to 
                                              
391  Art. 160 para. 2 Cst. Slovenia. 
392  Opinion Rm-1/1997 of 5 June 1997, Uradni list 40/97 and OdlUS VI, 86. Based on the 
so-called Spanish Compromise, the National Assembly amended the respective constitu-
tional provision and thereby enabled the ratification of the Association Agreement. With 
respect to bilateral treaties, see opinions Rm-1/2009 of 18 March 2010, Uradni list 27/10 
and OdlUS XIX, 12 (English translation available) and opinion Rm-1/2002 of 19 Novem-
ber 2003, Uradni list 118/03 and OdlUS XII, 89 (English translation available). 
393  For a detailed description see e.g. NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 160, nn. 49 f. and 55; 
ŠKRK, 76 ff.; TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, nn. 57 ff. 
394  Art. 48 para. 1 CCA Slovenia. 
395  Detailed in TESTEN, Tehnike ustavnosodnega odločanja, 238 f. 
396  Art. 82 paras. 2 and 3 Cst. Macedonia.  
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review laws and other acts of legislation. In a second step the different reme-
dies allowing individual access to these Courts will be illustrated. 
1. Initiation of judicial review proceedings  
A. Power to act at their own discretion 
As legacy from the SFRY the Constitutional Courts are empowered to initiate 
review proceedings against laws and other general acts without being re-
quested to do so by authorized applicants. While this ex officio power is ex-
tensive in Croatia and Macedonia, the Slovenian Court is much more con-
strained in this regard.  
In art. art. 38 para. 2 CCL the Croatian Constitution states that 
«[t]he Constitutional Court itself may decide to institute proceedings to re-
view the constitutionality of the law and to review the constitutionality and 
legality of other regulations.» 
In practice the Court interprets this competence broadly. It reviews other legal 
provisions than those challenged if it finds reasons to doubt their compatibility 
with the Constitution.397 It also refers to this competence when it initiates in-
cidental review proceedings in relation to constitutional complaints.398 Finally, 
the Constitutional Court invokes this legal basis when initiating proceedings 
without being requested to do so by appeal or in connection to constitutional 
complaint proceedings.399 Yet, the Court adopts a rather restrained approach 
in using its ex officio power against the legislative authorities. 
The Macedonian Constitutional Court is vested with a similarly broad ex of-
ficio power. While no respective basis can be found in the Constitution it was 
the Court itself who, by making use of its regulatory authority, introduced its 
competence to act at its own discretion. Art. 14 RoP accordingly prescribes 
that  
                                              
397  E.g. decision U-I-4113/2008 et al. of 12 August 2014, n. 54, NN 102/14; decision U-I-
2414/2011 of 7 November 2012, n. 6, NN 126/12 (English translation available). 
398  CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 155. 
399  E.g. decision U-I-5735/2014 et al. of 12 August 2014, NN 103/14; decision U-I-
5991/2012 of 23 January 2013, NN 13/13 (English translation available). 
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«[t]he Constitutional Court may itself initiate proceedings for assessing the 
constitutionality of law or the constitutionality and legality of a regulation 
or other common act.»  
The same provision empowers it to extend the assessment to provisions or 
other legislative acts that are not contested by an application. So far however, 
it principally restricted its activity to the requests and initiatives received.400 It 
initiated review proceedings on its own initiative in only one single case 
against a legal provision that introduced its power to decide on electoral dis-
putes.401  
Contrary to its Croatian and Macedonian counterparts and its predecessor un-
der socialist rule, the Slovene Constitutional Court has no power to initiate or 
to conduct review proceedings at its own discretion. The Court confirmed this 
lack of competence itself.402 By initiating incidental review proceedings, the 
Slovene Court is to a certain extent authorized to act on its own initiative as 
well.403 But in practice also the Slovene Court adopts a restrained approach in 
exercising this power, restricting it to cases where the assessment of the legal 
basis is indispensable for deciding on the constitutional complaint.404 Besides, 
the Constitutional Court is entitled to deviate from submitted applications and 
to review legal provisions which have not been contested.405 This competence 
is however restricted to provisions that are mutually related and to cases where 
the extension of the review is necessary to resolve the case.406 
B. Authorized applicants 
In principle the Constitutions list the applicants authorized to request the ini-
tiation of judicial review proceedings against laws and other acts of legisla-
tion. Pursuant to art. 132 para. 1 Croatian Constitution, the circle of authorized 
applicants is determined by art. 35 ff. CCL.  
In Slovenia, art. 162 para. 2 Constitution delegates the competence to deter-
mine who may require the initiation of proceedings before the Constitutional 
                                              
400  TRAJKOVSKA-HRISTOVSKA, Access to Constitutional Justice, 12; TRENESKA-DESKOSKA, 
Constitutional Court, 30. 
401  Decision U.br.195/2005 of 21 December 2005. 
402  Ruling U-I-169/2008 of 22 October 2009, n. 2 and fn. 1, not published. 
403  Art 161 para. 2 Cst. Slovenia and art. 59 para. 2 CCA Slovenia. 
404  E.g. ruling U-I-83/2011 and Up-938/2010 of 8 November 2012, n. 19, Uradni list 95/12. 
405  Art. 30 CCA Slovenia. 
406 For more details see KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 158 f. 
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Court to the legislator. With respect to judicial review proceedings, these ap-
plicants are enumerated in art. 23, 23a and 24 CCA. As will be shown in the 
following, the legislator extended the circle of applicants to a considerable 
extent.407 
On the other hand, neither the Macedonian Constitution nor the legislator de-
termine the circle of authorized applicants. What is more, not even the Rules 
of Procedure contain any explicit provisions to this effect. Only art. 12 RoP, 
as to which «anyone» is entitled to petition the initiation of review proceed-
ings, serves as general clause of the Court's comprehensive accessibility in 
review proceedings.408 
a) Supreme political organs 
As common to concentrated systems of judicial review, the three state powers 
are included in the circle of authorized applicants. 
In Croatia the President of the Republic is entitled to submit requests if he or 
she deems that a proclaimed law is not in conformity with the Constitution. 
The entitlement of the Croatian Government is restricted to normative acts of 
a sub-legislative nature. Finally, also a group of one fifth of members or an 
individual committee of the National Assembly is entitled to request the initi-
ation of review proceedings before the Croatian Constitutional Court. 
In contrast to its Croatian counterpart, the President of Slovenia has no power 
to request the initiation of review proceedings before the Constitutional Court. 
A governmental proposal for constitutional reform suggesting the introduction 
of a respective entitlement409 has not been adopted by the National Assembly. 
The entitlement of the Slovene Government on the other hand, is not limited 
to normative acts of a sub-legislative nature. Also here, the review of laws can 
be requested by parliamentary groups comprising one third of deputies and, 
additionally, by the second chamber, the National Council. Moreover, the Slo-
vene National Assembly as entirety is entitled to request the initiation of re-
view proceedings against acts of a sub-legislative nature which it did not adopt 
itself. 
                                              
407  TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 162, n. 20; KAUČIČ/PAVLIN/BARDUTZKY, 33. 
408  For a detailed description of this general clause see ČOBANOV, 202 ff.  
409  Proposal of the Government of 2009 for the constitutional amendment of art. 160, 161 
and 162 of 2009, 15 f. 
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Also in Macedonia the supreme organs of state can be considered as author-
ized applicants. In several rulings the Constitutional Court rejected initiatives 
filed by different organs of state power on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction 
to review the contested acts of legislation, and not because of the lack of au-
thority of these organs to request the initiation of review proceedings.410  
b) Judiciary 
As consequence of the concentrated review system the right of courts to re-
quest the Constitutional Courts to initiate review proceedings is restricted to 
laws and other acts of legislation which they apply in concrete judicial pro-
ceedings. 
In Croatia this authority was restricted to the Supreme Court and has been 
extended to all courts with the reform in 2002.411 Consequently, every court 
doubting about the constitutionality of an applicable law is obliged to halt the 
proceedings and to request the Constitutional Court to review the respective 
provision. With regard to unconstitutional sub-legislative acts, art. 37 para. 2 
CCL entitles courts to refuse to apply these provisions and to base their deci-
sions directly on the pertinent legal basis.  
The Slovene Constitutional Court adopts a rigid interpretation in this respect 
and requires that the contested law must be directly decisive for the decision 
in the concrete legal dispute at stake.412 Besides, also here the courts are em-
powered to refuse to apply unconstitutional sub-legislative acts and to base 
their decisions directly on the respective legal basis.413 
The situation in Macedonia is less clear. It is argued that an authorization of 
courts to request the initiation of review proceedings can be based on the gen-
eral clause in art. 12 RoP.414 According to another opinion art. 18 Law on 
Courts is considered as legal basis for concrete judicial review.415 Yet, both 
views are incompatible with art. 110 indent 8 Constitution, which reserves the 
                                              
410  E.g. ruling U.br.29/2014 of 2 April 2014; ruling U.br.24/2009 of 30 January 2013; ruling 
U.br.176/2012 of 23 January 2013; ruling U.br.190/2012 of 19 December 2012. 
411  See CRNIĆ, Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske, fn. 6. 
412  E.g. ruling U-I-189/2013 of 18 September 2013, nn. 5 f., not published; ruling U-I-
41/2013 of 21 March 2013, n. 3, Uradni list 29/13 and 89/13. 
413  TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 156, nn. 2 and 3. 
414  TRENESKA-DESKOSKA, Constitutional Court, 16 f.  
415  SKARIĆ, 696; ČOBANOV, 240. 
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power to determine the competences of the Constitutional Court to the consti-
tution-makers.416 Finally, not even the Constitutional Court itself provides a 
satisfying solution. While the pertinent case-law shows that it accepts for con-
sideration initiatives submitted by courts,417 its rulings do not reveal whether 
these submittals were filed in connection with pending legal proceedings or in 
abstracto.418 
c) Ombudspersons and other public institutions 
In all three states the ombudspersons are entitled to request the initiation of 
judicial review proceedings before the Constitutional Courts. In Slovenia and 
Macedonia the circle of authorized applicants is extended to other public in-
stitutions as well. 
In Croatia different ombudsperson offices have been established on the basis 
of the Constitution.419 The Croatian ombudsperson is awarded relatively wide 
powers with respect to legislation.420 It is authorized to suggest legal changes 
related to the protection of human rights and to the implementation of inter-
national treaties. Based on art. 6 para. 2 Law on the People's attorney the om-
budsperson is moreover entitled to request the Constitutional Court to review 
laws or regulations with respect to their compatibility with the constitutional 
rights and liberties without any relation to a concrete practical case.  
The office of the Slovenian ombudsperson is established in art. 159 Constitu-
tion and concretized by the Ombudsman Act.421 Also the Slovene ombudsper-
son is granted relatively wide powers to control acts of authorities on the state 
and the local level and to issue binding recommendations, opinions and critics. 
It can submit initiatives to the legislative bodies for amending laws and other 
general acts and request the implementation of international treaties. With the 
reform of the CCA in 2007 the ombudsperson has been entitled to request the 
                                              
416  See also KRAČINSKI, 481 f. 
417  E.g. ruling U.br.115/2013 of 25 September 2013. 
418  See also ČOBANOV, 243 with further references to older rulings in fn. 1206. 
419  Art. 93 Cst. Croatia and Law on the People's attorney of 1 October 1992, NN 60/92, cur-
rent version of 29 June 2012, NN 76/12. The office of the Ombudsperson on Gender 
Equality and the Children's Right Ombudsperson are regulated by separate laws. 
420  PINTARIĆ, 404. 
421  Ombudsman Act of 20 December 1993, Uradni list 71/93, 109/12. 
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initiation of abstract review proceedings against legal provisions which inter-
fere with human rights.422 With the same reform the Slovenian legislator more-
over entitled the Information Commissioner, the Bank of Slovenia, the Court 
of Audit and the State Attorney General to request the initiation of review pro-
ceedings in relation to a concrete legal dispute. Furthermore, the Constitu-
tional Court accepts requests submitted by other public institutions that are 
not specifically listed, but have an equivalent legal position.423 
The ombudsperson office of Macedonia was introduced only in 2003.424 It is 
entitled to submit initiatives for the evaluation of the constitutionality and le-
gality of laws and other regulations irrespectively thereof whether this ques-
tion arises in relation to a concrete legal case or not.425 The general clause for 
the right to petition the initiation of review proceedings in art. 12 RoP indi-
cates that there is no limitation as to the circle of applicants authorized in this 
respect either. 
d) Organs of local and regional self-administration 
Representative bodies of the local and regional entities of self-administration 
are entitled to request the Constitutional Courts to review laws and other acts 
of legislation that interfere with their constitutionally guaranteed regulatory 
autonomy. 
In Croatia local and regional self-administration with respect to affairs of local 
concern is guaranteed as fundamental constitutional principle in art. 4 and as 
constitutional right of citizens in art. 133. The representative bodies of these 
entities are entitled to request the initiation of review proceedings. 
Local self-government is also guaranteed by the Slovene Constitution in art. 9 
and 138 ff. The representative organs of local communities are entitled to re-
quest the review of laws and other acts of legislation that contradict with their 
                                              
422  See NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 162, n. 16; TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 162, n. 9. 
423  For a detailed description see TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 162, nn. 10 f; 
KAUČIČ/PAVLIN/BARDUTZKY, 35. See for many ruling U-I-224/96 of 22 May 1997, 
nn. 8 ff., Uradni list 36/97 and OdlUS VI, 65. 
424  Ombudsperson Law of 1 October 2003, Služben vesnik 60/03. 
425  Art. 30 para. 2 Ombudsperson Law. See also ruling U.br.58/2002 of 19 June 2002. 
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regulatory autonomy.426 The relevant practice of the Court however reveals a 
rigid interpretation of the admissibility requirements for such requests.427 
Also the Macedonian Constitution guarantees local self-government as funda-
mental constitutional value in art. 8 indent 9 and as constitutional right of the 
citizens in art. 114. The mayors and communal councils are entitled to request 
the initiation of review proceedings.428 
e) National trade unions and organizations of social interest 
The authorization of trade unions to request the initiation of judicial review 
proceedings can be considered as a particularity of the Slovene system of con-
stitutional adjudication. Yet, the pertinent case-law of the Constitutional Court 
reveals a rigid interpretation in this regard.429 This primarily applies to the 
quality of authorized trade unions.430 Furthermore, the Court recognizes their 
entitlement only with respect to legal provisions which regulate the conditions 
of labour, the legal position of employees or their social rights431 but not with 
respect to general allegations or to cuts of pensions or annual allowances.432 
In contrast to Slovenia neither Croatian trade unions nor any other organiza-
tions of social interest are authorized to request the initiation of judicial review 
proceedings before the Croatian Constitutional Court. 
On the basis of the general clause in art. 12 RoP the circle of social organiza-
tions as authorized applicants before the Macedonian Constitutional Court is 
in principle unlimited. 
                                              
426  Art. 91 Law on Local Self-Administration of 21 December 1993, Uradni list 94/07, 76/08, 
79/09. 
427  See e.g. ruling U-I-303/2002 of 25 September 2002, n. 4, OdlUS XI, 194. 
428  Art. 87 Law on Local Self-Administration of 29 January 2002, Služben vesnik 5/02. 
429  See also TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 162, n. 19. 
430  It for instance rejects requests filed by trade unions of public employees see ruling U-I-
152/2013 of 13 June 2013, n. 3, not published. See for many also decision U-I-101/1995 
of 8 January 1998, n. 2, Uradni list RS 13/98 and OdlUS VII, 2 (English translation avail-
able). 
431  E.g. ruling U-I-163/2010 of 10 November 2011, n. 4, not published.  
432  See for many ruling U-I-300/2013 of 5 March 2015, n. 5, not published; decision U-I-
65/2008 of 25 September 2008, n. 6, Uradni list 96/08 and OdlUS XVII, 49. 
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2. Individual access to the Constitutional Courts 
With their transition Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia reintroduced the broad 
accessibility of their Constitutional Courts to individuals. While most Euro-
pean systems limit individual access to constitutional complaints, one can es-
tablish a number of means allowing indirect and direct individual access in the 
three states considered. In an international perspective a comparably broad 
accessibility of constitutional adjudication to individual persons is difficult to 
find. The means of individual access provided in the three states considered 
will be presented in the following. Thereby, the parallelism of direct individual 
access to constitutional adjudication by popular complaints and by constitu-
tional complaints deserves particular attention. While the procedural aspects 
of the popular complaints will be described in detail in the following Chapter, 
this part of the study presents the procedural arrangements of the constitu-
tional complaints. 
A. Individual access to the Croatian Constitutional Court 
a) Means of indirect individual access 
aa) Objection of unconstitutionality 
While all Croatian courts must refer to the Constitutional Court if they doubt 
the constitutionality of legal provisions which they apply in litigations, indi-
viduals who participate in these proceedings can in principle raise objections 
against the constitutionality of these provisions as well. Given that there is no 
provision prescribing a binding effect of such objections, the courts are in 
principle not obliged to refer to the Court upon such objections.433 However, 
the constitutional obligation of the judiciary to comply with and to judge on 
the basis of the Constitution implies a committal effect of such objections. 
Accordingly, the courts are obliged to establish whether objections made are 
justified. This is also supported by claims of the former President of the Con-
stitutional Court who requires the introduction of a provision which explicitly 
prescribes the binding effect of such objections.434 
                                              
433  KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 25. 
434  See OMEJEC, O potrebnim promjenama, 100. 
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bb) Appeals to the ombudsperson 
As has been shown in the previous paragraph the ombudsperson is authorized 
to request the Constitutional Court to review laws and other general acts with 
respect to their compatibility with the constitutionally guaranteed rights and 
liberties. The impetus to file such a request can be given by an individual per-
son who calls the ombudsperson's attention to a respective incompatibility of 
an act of legislation. If the ombudsperson refers to the Constitutional Court 
upon such an appeal, it functions as intermediary body allowing individuals 
to indirectly access the Constitutional Court.435  
On the other hand, the ombudsperson is not entitled to submit constitutional 
complaints against individual acts of administrative organs or against court 
decisions. The personal nature of this remedy prevents the ombudsperson to 
refer to the Constitutional Court on behalf of someone else. Only the individ-
ual or legal person concerned is entitled to access the Court after exhausting 
all available remedies before the ordinary judiciary. The requirement of a per-
sonal and direct legal concern for the admissibility of constitutional com-
plaints is described hereinafter.436 
b) Means of direct individual access 
aa) Right to request the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts 
Direct individual access to the Croatian Constitutional Court is also provided 
in cases of jurisdictional conflicts. Art. 81 f. CCL accordingly entitles individ-
ual persons to request the initiation of proceedings in order to resolve jurisdic-
tional conflicts between the legislative, the executive and the judicial 
branches.437 Applicants must prove that they are directly concerned and have 
a legal interest in the resolution of the conflict between the state bodies. Such 
a concern is normally given if applicants are parties to judicial or administra-
tive proceedings and if their rights are interfered with because of a dispute 
regarding the jurisdiction of these authorities. Requests must be submitted 
within 30 days from the day of knowledge about such a dispute.  
As a means of direct individual access the right to request the resolution of 
jurisdictional conflicts only plays a small practical role as requests filed are 
                                              
435  See also KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 25. 
436  See below p. 94. 
437  See also KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 28. 
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mostly rejected as inadmissible. As example, applicants often fail to demon-
strate the existence of a jurisdictional dispute.438 
bb) Absence of electoral complaints  
In 2013 the Constitutional Court was requested to assess the constitutionality 
of the popular referendum on the adoption of a constitutional provision defin-
ing marriage as a lifelong union between a man and a woman. The requests 
were filed by individuals and societal associations but were rejected by the 
Court for the lack of a right to file electoral complaints.439 Therewith the Con-
stitutional Court confirmed its position which it expressed in an earlier ruling 
where it rejected a proposal against the referendum question on the accession 
of Croatia to the EU. It clarified that the entitlement to file electoral complaints 
is reserved to political parties, candidates standing for election or to groups of 
citizens comprising at least 100 persons entitled to vote and not smaller than 
five percent of the voters of the constituency in which elections are held.440  
c) Direct access by constitutional complaints 
After it had been abolished in 1989 the constitutional complaint was reintro-
duced with art.129 para. 4 Constitution in 1991. Accordingly  
«[e]veryone may lodge a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional 
Court if he deems that the individual act of a state body, a body of local and 
regional self-government, or a legal person with public authority, which de-
cided about his/her rights and obligations, or about suspicion or accusation 
for a criminal act, has violated his/her human rights or fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution, or his/her right to local and regional self-
government guaranteed by the Constitution.»441  
                                              
438  E.g. ruling U-IV-4408/2010 of 2 December 2014, n. 5, not published; ruling U-IV-
2820/2007 of 16 February 2010, n. 5, NN 28/10; ruling U-IV-383/2004 of 25 February 
2004, n. 5, NN 27/04. 
439  Rulings U-VIIR-5328/2013 of 14 November 2013 and U-VIIR-5520/2013 of 28 Novem-
ber 2013, not published. 
440  Rulings U-VII-72/2012 et al. of 16 January 2012, NN 11/12. 
441  Art. 62 para. 1 CCL Croatia. With respect to the terminology see CRNIĆ, Komentar 
Ustavnog zakona, 161; KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, fn. 80. 
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Despite its constitutional basis, the Constitutional Court states that the consti-
tutional complaint does not constitute a constitutional right of the individu-
als.442 In permanent practice it defines it as institution sui generis and as «[a] 
particular constitutional instrument for the protection of the constitutional 
rights in individual cases.»443 
aa) Objects of complaint  
Constitutional complaints can be filed against individual acts that directly in-
terfere with the rights and liberties of the applicants. Laws and other acts of a 
general nature are excluded as objects of complaint.  
The relevant provisions do not specify which individual acts can be contested. 
Rather, the respective criteria have been developed by the Constitutional 
Court. It accordingly requires such an act to directly interfere with the legal 
position of the persons addressed by regulating their rights, liberties or duties, 
or containing suspicions or criminal charges.444 Initially, the Court did not ac-
cept for consideration complaints that were filed against the conduct or factual 
actions of state and public bodies.445 Because this prevented complaints filed 
against conditions in Croatian prisons, Croatia was condemned by several 
judgments of the ECtHR for violating the prohibition of torture and of inhu-
mane and degrading treatment and the right to an effective legal remedy.446 In 
accordance to the current practice of the Constitutional Court complaints can 
be filed against any decision, individual act or action which directly impacts 
on the legal position of the applicants. Accordingly, it rejects complaints 
against rulings on the admissibility of appeals.447 
bb) Scope of protection 
Constitutional complaints can be filed for the protection of the constitutionally 
guaranteed human rights and fundamental liberties and for the protection of 
                                              
442  See LJUBIĆ, Ustavnosudska zaštita, 2. In its study, the author offers a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the Croatian constitutional complaint. 
443  See for many ruling U-III-6382/2010 of 12 May 2011, n. 5, NN 63/11. 
444  For a detailed analysis of the extensive relevant case-law see CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog 
zakona, 171 ff.; KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 58.1. 
445  KRAPAC, Pretpostavke za pokretanje i vođenje, 180. 
446  See e.g. judgments Pilčić vs. Croatia, 33138/06, 12 January 2008, §§ 30 and 33 ff.; Štitić 
vs. Croatia, 29660/03, 8 November 2007, § 28.  
447  E.g. ruling U-III-7119/2014 of 8 December 2014, n. 3, not published.  
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the right to local and regional self-government.448 As consequence of an overly 
broad interpretation in the beginning years of its activity the Constitutional 
Court was heavily overburdened.449 Furthermore, it did not succeed in clearly 
delimiting its own jurisdiction from the judiciary.450  
In 2000 the Constitutional Court restricted the interpretation of constitutional 
rights to the human rights and liberties guaranteed in Chapter III.451 During 
the following years it restricted the scope of protected rights even further. To-
day, it acknowledges violations of the fundamental constitutional guarantees 
such as the principle of proportionality, the right to equality or the rule of law 
only in relation to the violation of another constitutional guarantee.452 In rela-
tion to social and economic rights or the right to property and of ownership, it 
invokes the wide discretion of the legislator in implementing these guarantees 
and, consequently, to the jurisdiction of the judiciary.453 
cc) Personal requirements for access 
Primarily only applicants with the capacity to act can file constitutional com-
plaints.454 Additionally, the entitlement is predicated on a personal legal inter-
est of applicants in bringing proceedings before the Constitutional Court.  
In the first place this restricts access to applicants who are entitled to the rights 
or liberties they claim to be violated. Legal persons can only claim violation 
of rights they are entitled to in accordance with their legal nature. The circle 
of applicants comprises entities of local and regional self-government against 
violation of their autonomy rights. In analogy to the rules in civil and admin-
istrative procedures, it moreover comprises associations or citizen groups 
without legal subjectivity if their entitlement is justified by the legal subject 
                                              
448  For a detailed analysis of communal complaints see KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim 
sudom, n. 69. 
449  E.g. BAČIĆ PETAR, 417 f.; KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 52.3. 
450  For a detailed discussion in this regard see KRAPAC, Pretpostavke za pokretanje i vođenje, 
191 ff. 
451  Decision U-III-1125/1999 et al. of 13 March 2000, n. 17, NN 38/00. For a detailed de-
scription of this change of practice see e.g. BELAJEC, 100 f., 102 ff. 
452  See for many decision U-III-3846/2012 of 10 September 2013, n. 9, NN 120/13; decision 
U-III-1458/2013 of 6 May 2013, n. 6, NN 58/13.  
453  E.g. ruling U-III-6382/2010 of 12 May 2011, n. 5, NN 63/11; decision U-IIIB-1373/2009 
of 7 July 2009, n. 8, NN 88/09 (English translation available). For a presentation of the 
case-law see KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, nn. 39.4 and 62.6. 
454  Detailed in KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 56.2. 
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at stake. The Constitutional Court for instance confirmed a violation of the 
right to remedy of a group of tenants of a residential building who were not 
given the possibility to participate before the administrative court.455 Given 
their lack of capacity to hold constitutional rights state organs or bodies are 
excluded from filing constitutional complaints.456 Yet, it is claimed that also 
these bodies can file constitutional complaints if they conduct a commercial 
activity as economic subjects and are affected to the same extent as persons of 
private law.457  
To prove their legal interest applicants must demonstrate a personal and direct 
concern, either for being personally addressed by an individual administrative 
act or as a party to proceedings in which a contested decision has been 
adopted.458 Accordingly, constitutional complaints can only be submitted for 
the protection of the personal rights and not on behalf of a third person or in a 
general interest. Legal representatives acting in the name and on behalf of cli-
ents must present explicit authorizations for the actions they undertake.459 The 
Constitutional Court consequently rejected a complaint filed by minority or-
ganizations for the protection of the rights of members of the minority 
group.460 
The strictly personal nature of constitutional complaints is finally evident in 
art. 79 CCL. This provision obliges the Constitutional Court to end the pro-
ceedings if complaints are withdrawn and to terminate them if the complainant 
dies or a legal person is dissolved. It accordingly refuses to continue proceed-
ings on behalf of legal successors unless they demonstrate a personal legal 
interest in bringing the proceedings.461 
dd) Formal requirements for access 
Also the Croatian constitutional complaint is provided as a subsidiary means 
of judicial protection. Applicants are obliged to exhaust all available legal 
remedies before they file complaints to the Constitutional Court. An appeal 
                                              
455  Decision U-III-771/1994 of 3 April 1995, NN 26/95. 
456  E.g. ruling U-III-4845/2004 of 3 October 2006, n. 4, NN 114/06. 
457  CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 169 with further references in fn. 124. 
458  KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 60. 
459  Art. 24 CCL Croatia. 
460  Decisions U-I-1029/2007 and U-I-1030/2007 of 7 April 2010, nn. 5 f., NN 47/10. 
461  See for more details CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 164 f., 298, 300 f.  
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must accordingly be rejected by final decision of the Supreme Court as su-
preme judicial instance.462 The subsidiarity requires the exhaustion of all 
available remedies at due diligence, at due date and in compliance with the 
formal and substantial conditions. Applicants must have brought the substan-
tial issues and relevant facts to the attention of the lower courts, so as to enable 
them to provide judicial protection of the alleged violations.463 With the adop-
tion of the CCL in 2002 the Croatian constitution-makers introduced two types 
of constitutional complaints which can be filed prior to the exhaustion of avail-
able legal remedies in exceptional cases.464 Not least as a consequence of its 
severe overload and the excessive number of complaints received, the Consti-
tutional Court adopts a rigid interpretation of the subsidiarity principle.465 Be-
cause it rejected a complaint even though proceedings before the Administra-
tive Court had been erroneously discontinued, the ECtHR blamed the Consti-
tutional Court’s practice for violating the right to access to court.466 
Furthermore, art. 64 CCL prescribes a relatively short term for the submittal 
of complaints. While these must be filed within 30 days from the day a final 
individual act has been received, late submissions can exceptionally be al-
lowed on the basis of justified grounds. Health reasons are for instance not 
recognized as justified grounds.467 Because the Constitutional Court rejected 
a complaint based on an erroneous calculation of time, the ECtHR condemned 
Croatia also in this regard.468 
The submittal of constitutional complaints does not involve any financial bur-
den for applicants. Because the proceedings before the Croatian Constitutional 
Court are as a principle free of charge and do not require the representation by 
attorneys of law, the submittal of complaints is neither contingent on the pay-
ment of court fees nor on additional costs for legal representation. On the basis 
                                              
462  E.g. ruling U-III-2085/2011 of 10 July 2014, n. 7, NN 97/14. 
463  See LJUBIĆ, Ustavnosudska zaštita, 1. For a detailed description of the subsidiarity prin-
ciple see KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, nn. 53 f. 
464  For more details hereto see CRNIĆ, Uloga Ustavnog suda u zaštiti temeljnih prava, 5 f.; 
KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, nn. 67 f.; LJUBIĆ, Ustavnosudska zaštita, 4 ff. 
465  LJUBIĆ, Ustavnosudska zaštita, 8. See e.g. notification U-X-835/2005 of 24 March 2005, 
n. 3, NN 30/05 (English translation available).  
466  Judgment Peruško vs. Croatia, § 56. 
467  Ruling U-III-2230/2014 of 10 June 2014, n. 4, not published.  
468  Čamovski vs. Croatia, 38280/10, 23 October 2012, §§ 38 ff., 43. 
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of art. 80 CCL and as a financial deterrence from misuses and malicious sub-
mittals, the Court is entitled to order unsuccessful complainants to reimburse 
intentionally caused expenses. 
Finally, the CCL prescribes requirements as to the form and substance of con-
stitutional complaints. Based on art. 17 f. complaints must be written and filed 
in official Croatian language and Latin script. As to art. 65 para. 1 they must 
contain the complete identification of the complainant, the contested individ-
ual act, the rights deemed to be violated, as well as evidence of the exhaustion 
of remedies and of the submittal of the complaint in due time. So as to facili-
tate the compliance with the formal procedural requirements, the Court pub-
lished a template with detailed instructions in Croatian language on its web-
site.469  
As a measure to decrease its workload the Constitutional Court adopted a rigid 
approach with respect to the substantiation of constitutional complaints.470 
Complainants must accordingly substantiate that their rights have been vio-
lated either through the conduct of lower courts or instances in the proceedings 
or through the adoption of arbitrary interpretations.471 While this restrictive 
practice did not diminish the amount of complaints submitted, the President 
of the Constitutional Court nevertheless considered that it helped to reduce the 
number of cases pending before the Court.472 
B. Individual access to the Slovene Constitutional Court 
a) Means of indirect individual access 
aa) Objection of unconstitutionality 
Also the Slovene courts, who doubt about the constitutionality of laws which 
they apply in litigations, are obliged by art. 156 Constitution to halt ongoing 
proceedings and to request the initiation of review proceedings before the 
Constitutional Court.  
                                              
469 <Www.usud.hr/sites/default/files/dokumenti/OBRAZAC_USTAVNE_TUZBE.pdf> 
(last accessed September 2018). 
470 See detailed description of the practice at MARKOVIĆ/TRGOVAC, 1 ff. 
471 E.g. ruling U-III-1398/2009 of 30 November 2009, nn. 4 ff., NN 158/09; ruling U-III-
1747/2009 of 10 November 2009, n. 6, NN 139/09. 
472  See OMEJEC, Promjene u postupanju, 1 f. 
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In accordance with the regulations in Croatia there are no constitutional or 
legal provisions prescribing a committal nature of objections raised by parties 
to these proceedings which oblige the courts to proceed in this way.473 Initially, 
the Constitutional Court rejected a respective obligation of the courts.474 In 
order to ease the own workload and to reinforce the awareness of its subsidiary 
role in protecting the Constitution and the laws, it significantly changed its 
practice in 2007. It emphasized that judges are not free to decide whether or 
not to consider substantiated arguments and to ascertain allegations about the 
inconsistency of laws with the Constitution. This obligation to take notice of 
justified arguments of a party and to assess its justification is derived from the 
constitutional guarantees of judicial protection.475 
On the basis of the definition above objections are thus to be considered as 
means of indirect individual access to the Constitutional Court of Slovenia. 
bb) Appeals to the ombudsperson  
As has been shown, the Slovene ombudsperson is entitled to request the initi-
ation of review proceedings against laws or regulations that are incompatible 
with human rights and liberties. Respective requests can be submitted on the 
own initiative or upon an according hint or appeal by an individual person. 
Acting on behalf of the latter the ombudsperson can be considered as interme-
diary body allowing indirect individual access the Constitutional Court.  
The Slovene ombudsperson moreover allows indirect individual access by fil-
ing constitutional complaints against decisions or individual acts of the judi-
ciary and the administration on behalf of a person concerned.476 The constitu-
tional complaint accordingly constitutes a legal remedy enabling individuals 
to directly access the Constitutional Court and, at the same time, to achieve 
protection of their rights by way of an indirect access through the ombudsper-
son.477 
                                              
473  MAVČIČ, Slovenian constitutional review, 68; TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 156, n. 6. 
474  E.g. ruling Up-70/96 of 22 May 1996, n. 4, OdlUS V, 197. 
475  Ruling U-I-275/2006 and Up-811/2007 of 29 May 2008, n. 12, Uradni list 62/2008, Od-
lUS XVII, 21. 
476  Art. 50 para. 2 CCA Slovenia. 
477  See also HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 70. 
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cc) Indirect access through national representative trade unions 
It has been shown that in Slovenia national representative trade unions are 
listed among the authorized applicants in judicial review proceedings.478 Alt-
hough acting in their own name when filing requests, their entitlement to ac-
cess the Constitutional Court does not serve the protection of their own legal 
position and rights. In emphasis of the social state principle these unions are 
entitled to act as legal representatives of the employees of individual activities 
or professions. The Court clearly restricts their authorization to contest acts of 
legislation on behalf of and in the interest of employees and for the protection 
of their employment status and social position.  
From the perspective of employees, who are represented by national trade un-
ions, the latter can be considered as intermediary bodies allowing them to in-
directly access to the Constitutional Court. 
b) Means of direct individual access 
In sentence 2, art. 162 para. 2 Constitution determines that 
«[a]nybody who demonstrates legal interest may request the initiation of 
proceedings before the Constitutional Court.»  
This constitutional provision can be interpreted in two ways. It can be under-
stood as intention of the constitution-makers to guarantee access for everyone 
with a legal interest on a constitutional basis. Conversely, it can be interpreted 
as constitutionally declared restriction of the accessibility of the Constitutional 
Court to individuals who seek protection of their own rights and liberties.479 
Already in the first years of its activity the Constitutional Court passed a fun-
damental judgment, which can be considered as leading case with respect to 
individual access. It accordingly stated that 
«[i]n all cases, in which proceedings are initiated by individuals according 
to the CCA, their entitlement is tied to the protection of their rights».480  
It emphasized this general requirement for individual access by explicitly enu-
merating the single individual access rights to which this applies, namely the 
initiative pursuant to art. 24 CCA, the constitutional complaint, petitions in 
                                              
478  See above at pp. 79 f.. 
479  The legal interest as requirement for the admissibility of petitions will be looked at thor-
oughly in the following Chapter, pp. 142 ff. 
480  Ruling Mp-1/1996 of 12 December 1996, n. 7, OdlUS V, 213.  
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jurisdictional disputes and petitions to review acts and actions of political par-
ties. 
aa) Right to request the resolution of jurisdictional disputes 
Pursuant to art. 61 para. 3 CCA individual persons are entitled to file petitions 
to the Constitutional Court requesting it to resolve jurisdictional disputes. The 
entitlement comprises disputes between state organs on a horizontal and on a 
vertical level, both if one and the same competence is claimed by two or more 
organs or bodies (positive disputes) or if no state organ or body acknowledges 
its responsibility in a certain field (negative disputes).481  
The right to file petitions requires the fulfilment of procedural requirements. 
Firstly, the petitioner must demonstrate the existence of a jurisdictional dis-
pute.482 In practice the Court frequently rejects petitions for not meeting this 
requirement.483 Furthermore, only applicants who are involved in proceedings 
in which a dispute arose are entitled to file petition.484 This finally complies 
with the leading case stated above, as to which direct individual access to the 
Constitutional Court is reserved to the protection of own rights. If a jurisdic-
tional dispute and the entitlement of the applicant are given petitions must be 
filed within 90 days from the day on which the disputes arose. 
bb) Petition to review acts and activities of political parties 
Unlike in Croatia, where only state authorities are empowered to request the 
Constitutional Court to control the compatibility of statutes and programs of 
political parties with the Constitution, the Slovene legislator extended the cir-
cle of applicants to individual citizens. Based on art. 68 para. 1 CCA  
«[a]nyone may lodge a petition […] to review the unconstitutionality of the 
acts and activities of political parties.» (Punctuation added) 
Its accessibility in this respect and its role as guardian of the constitutional 
rights and liberties put the Constitutional Court in a difficult position. In de-
ciding whether or not to initiate proceedings and to prohibit acts of political 
parties, it must at the same time take into consideration the serious interference 
                                              
481  E.g. ruling P-17/2011 of 7 June 2012, n. 2, not published. 
482  NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 58. 
483  See ruling P-15/2009 of 16 December 2012, n. 2, not published; ruling P-17/2011 of 
7 June 2012, n. 4, not published; ruling P-2/2011 of 6 July 2011, n. 2, not published. 
484  Ruling P-18/2011 of 15 June 2012, n. 3, not published. 
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with the rights of the political parties. In permanent practice it therefore adopts 
a very restrained approach in accepting requests to review acts of political 
parties. It accepts such petitions only with respect to a limited circle of acts 
while setting high requirements to the substantiation and to the entitlement to 
file them.485 Besides, it requires a high level of tolerance of activities and acts 
of political parties and emphasizes that mere denials or contradictions to con-
stitutional values do not suffice. Rather, petitioners must demonstrate that with 
the contested acts or actions a party aims at destroying or disrupting the con-
stitutional order and that it threatens the fundamental values of a free demo-
cratic society.486  
With respect to the right to file petitions and to the necessity of a personal 
legal interest there are different views in legal doctrine and practice. As to one 
opinion every citizen in a democratic society has an interest in the compliance 
of behaviours and actions of political parties with the constitution, irrespec-
tively of a personal affection.487 Others hold that the legislator did not intend 
to allow unrestricted access to an activity of the Constitutional Court that in-
terferes with constitutional rights of political parties.488 The Court confirms 
this view and requests a direct and concrete legal interest and the demonstra-
tion of an improvement of the own legal position by the abrogation or prohi-
bition of the act or the party itself.489 Therefore, the Constitutional Court fre-
quently rejects petitions filed against political parties.490 
cc) No individual access to proceedings on electoral disputes 
Neither the Constitution nor the CCA entitle individuals to request the Court 
to review decisions of the National Assembly in relation to the scheduling of 
popular referendums. Pursuant to art. 5č para. 2 Referendum Law, the entitle-
ment is restricted to the submitter of a referendum request. The same applies 
                                              
485  E.g. ruling Ps-1/2012 of 8 November 2012, n. 3, not published; ruling U-I-184/1997 of 
10 February 2000, n. 2, OdlUS IX, 22. 
486  Decision Up-301/1996 of 15 January 1998, n. 15, Uradni list 13/98 and OdlUS VII, 98 
(English translation available). 
487  See dissenting decision of judge MATEVŽ KRIVIC to ruling Mp-1/1996 of 12 December 
1996, n. 5, above at fn. 480. See also KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 5; MAVČIČ, Slovenian con-
stitutional review, 64. 
488  TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, nn. 47 f. 
489  See ruling Ps-1/2003 of 1 April 2004, n. 3, not published; ruling Ps-1/2000 of 15 June 
2000, n. 2, OdlUS IX, 166. 
490  See TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 42. 
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to electoral appeals against decisions of the National Assembly on the confir-
mation of elections of candidates, where pursuant to art. 69 CCA, the entitle-
ment is restricted to the candidates standing for election.  
The Constitutional Court confirms its limited accessibility in electoral dis-
putes and requires a legal interest of the applicants and a prospect to improve 
the personal legal position.491 In the above cited leading case on direct indi-
vidual access it accordingly rejected complaints of candidates from the social-
ist party who contested the confirmation of the mandates of another party by 
the Assembly.492 For the same reason it rejected a complaint of a candidate 
who was not elected as deputy and could not demonstrate that his legal posi-
tion would be improved by the decision of the Constitutional Court.493 
c) Direct access by means of constitutional complaints 
After its abolition in 1974 the Slovene constitutional complaint was reintro-
duced in art. 160 para. 1 indent 6 Constitution in 1991. Accordingly 
«[t]he Constitutional Court decides on constitutional complaints stemming 
from the violation of human rights and fundamental liberties by individual 
acts».  
In absence of regulations of the conditions and procedures, this legal remedy 
remained inoperable until the adoption of the CCA in 1994. Despite its con-
stitutional basis, the constitutional complaint is not regarded as constitutional 
right. Instead, and in accordance to its Croatian counterpart, the Slovene com-
plaint is defined as legal remedy sui generis and as procedural right which 
entitles individuals to request the protection of rights and liberties from viola-
tions by the state.494  
aa) Objects of complaint 
According to art. 50 para. 1 CCA constitutional complaints can be submitted 
against individual acts adopted by the state authorities, local community au-
                                              
491  Ruling Mp-1/2007 of 17 January 2008, n. 10, Uradni list 15/08 and OdlUS XVII, 4.  
492  Ruling Mp-1/1996, nn. 5 ff., above at fn. 480.  
493  Ruling Mp-3/2007 of 21 February 2008, nn. 2 f., not published. 
494  NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 59; TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 27. 
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thorities and by other organs vested with public powers. Therewith, the legis-
lator explicitly excluded laws and other acts of legislation from the scope of 
acts that can be contested by this means. 
Besides, it is generally recognized that only acts of an authoritative nature can 
be contested by constitutional complaints.495 Complaints can thus be filed 
against decisions of judicial organs or against individual acts or actions of ad-
ministrative authorities which have a direct legal effect on the applicants’ 
rights and legal position.  
bb) Scope of protection 
Constitutional complaints can be filed against individual acts which violate 
human rights and liberties. With the intention to clearly delimit its function 
from the judiciary, the Constitutional Court already adopted a narrow inter-
pretation from the beginning.496 It only accepts for consideration complaints 
filed against violations of rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Unlike its Croatian counterpart, the Slovene Court from the outset acknowl-
edged only those constitutional guarantees as protected which directly regu-
late the legal positions of individuals. It considers violations of general guar-
antees such as the right to equality only in relation to other constitutional rights 
and liberties.497 The Constitutional Court moreover acknowledges a wide mar-
gin of discretion of the legislator in regulating other fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees. It for instance recognizes social rights only to the extent 
guaranteed by law and therefore accepts constitutional complaints only if vi-
olations of these rights are alleged in connection with violations of other con-
stitutional rights.498  
cc) Personal requirements for access 
Besides the capacity to act, the entitlement to file constitutional complaints is 
restricted to applicants with a legal interest in the review and invalidation of 
the contested state act. The Court accordingly requires a personal interest and 
                                              
495  See ruling U-I-271/2013 and Up-907/2013 of 19 December 2013, n. 3, not published. 
496  For an overview see NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 65. 
497  See for many decision Up-2597/2007 of 4 October 2007, n. 3, Uradni list 94/07; OdlUS 
XVI, 108; ruling Up-13/1992 of 15 February 1995, n. 6 f., not published. 
498  KRESAL, Komentar Ustave art. 2, n. 11. 
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that the complainant is directly affected in his or her legal position by a con-
tested state act.499 This excludes submittals in a general interest and in the 
name of other persons without a special authorization to act on their behalf. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court requires that the legal interest is current 
and that violations still exist at the time of the submittal of a complaint.500 
Finally, applicants need to demonstrate that their legal position can be im-
proved by the invalidation of the contested act.501  
The legal interest as requirement for individual access to the Constitutional 
Court of Slovenia will be analysed thoroughly further below in relation to the 
initiative which can be filed against laws and other acts of legislation.502 
dd) Formal requirements for access 
As indicated by art. 51 para. 1 CCA also the Slovene constitutional complaint 
was reintroduced as a subsidiary legal remedy for the protection of constitu-
tional rights and liberties. Only applicants who did not achieve protection of 
their rights before the judiciary are entitled to access the Constitutional Court 
as last domestic instance. If alleged violations are manifestly obvious and if 
the exhaustion of remedies entails the risk of irreparable consequence for ap-
plicants, the Court can exceptionally accept them for consideration before.503  
In permanent practice the Constitutional Court assesses the exhaustion of legal 
remedies from a formal and from a substantial aspect. In a formal aspect all 
available legal remedies for the protection of human rights and all procedural 
means allowing effective protection must be exhausted. The Court for instance 
rejected complaints of applicants who failed to use their right to plea for court 
orders to temporarily suspend the application of contested individual acts, or 
their right as opposing party to object to the admissibility of an appeal.504 With 
respect to the substantial or material aspect of exhaustion the Court requires 
that all allegations about violations of constitutional rights are raised already 
                                              
499  See for many ruling Up-765/2005 of 31 January 2007, n. 2, OdlUS XVI, 59.  
500  E.g. decision Up-970/2006 of 11 September 2007, n. 8, Uradni list 87/07 and OdlUS XVI, 
103; decision Up-527/2001 of 13 October 2004, n. 12, Uradni list 117/04 and OdlUS XIII, 
87. 
501  See e.g. ruling Up-1840/2007 of 15 January 2009, n. 4, not published. 
502  See below at Chapter 3, pp. 142 ff. 
503  For more details see e.g. MAVČIČ, Zakon o Ustavnem sodišču, 326 ff. 
504  Ruling Up-364/2009 of 19 May 2009, n. 4, not published; ruling Up-61/1994 of 1 De-
cember 1994, explanation in para. B, OdlUS III, 129. 
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before the responsible courts.505 It justifies its rigid approach with the consti-
tutional responsibility of courts to protect rights and liberties and the consti-
tutional and legal order.506 In several instances its restrictive interpretation re-
sulted in condemnations of Slovenia by the ECtHR for violating the rights to 
an effective remedy and to trial within reasonable time.507 The ECtHR for in-
stance sentenced Slovenia for the insufficiency of the complaint as legal rem-
edy against the precarious conditions of detention in Ljubljana prison.508 
In contrast to the relatively short time limit provided in Croatia, constitutional 
complaints in Slovenia can be filed within 60 days from the day of passing the 
contested final individual act. In well-founded cases the Constitutional Court 
may exceptionally accept late submissions as well.509 The submittal of consti-
tutional complaints does not involve any financial burden. Their admissibility 
is therefore not contingent on the payment of court fees or on a mandatory 
legal representation. Although the proceedings before the Constitutional Court 
are free of charge, it can impose all procedural costs on one party, who is con-
sidered to have caused them by its conduct.510 With the comprehensive reform 
in 2007 the legislator introduced the possibility to fine participants for filing 
abusive, frivolous or vexatious complaints or for their failure to exercise their 
access rights with due diligence.511 The Court can also fine attorneys at law 
whose submittals do not comply with the formal requirements.  
Art. 53 CCA lists the requirements regarding the form and content of consti-
tutional complaints. Complaints must accordingly be submitted in writing and 
present the documents relevant for the decision. They must fully identify the 
complainant and clearly indicate the contested individual act, the authority 
responsible for its issuing, the rights and liberties deemed violated, the reasons 
of the alleged violations and evidence for compliance with the time limit. By 
publishing templates in Slovenian language on its homepage, the Constitu-
                                              
505  E.g. ruling U-I-54/2006 of 27 May 2009, n. 4, Uradni list 47/09 and OdlUS XVIII, 25. 
506  E.g. ruling U-I-304/2011 of 10 January 2013, n. 3, not published; decision Up-33/2005 
of 6 March 2008, n. 12, Uradni list 40/08 and OdlUS XVII, 25. 
507  See judgments Lukenda vs. Slovenia, 23032/02, 2005-X, § 65 and Belinger vs. Slovenia, 
42320/98, 2 October 2001 (friendly settlement), n. 2. 
508  Judgment Mandić and Jović vs. Slovenia, 5774/10 and 5985/10, 20 October 2011, 
§§ 118 f. 
509  Art. 52 para. 3 CCA Slovenia. 
510  Art. 34 para. 2 CCA Slovenia. E.g. decision U-I-61/2011 of 6 July 2011, n. 8, Uradni list 
60/11 and decision U-I-220/2010 of 6 July 2011, n. 8, Uradni list 60/11. 
511 Art. 34a CCA Slovenia. MAVČIČ, Slovenian constitutional review, 103 f. 
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tional Court considerably facilitated the submittal of constitutional com-
plaints.512 The alleged violations of the rights and liberties must be substanti-
ated by relevant argumentation and evidence. Just as its Croatian counterpart 
also the Slovene Constitutional Court endeavours to delimit its jurisdiction 
from the judiciary. Consequently, it emphasizes in permanent practice that it 
is not competent to assess issues which are of no constitutional relevance and 
which do not concern violations of the constitutionally guaranteed rights and 
liberties.513 
ee) Qualitative requirements for access 
In contrast to its Croatian counterpart, the Slovene Constitutional Court is en-
titled to reject constitutional complaints which are of a minor significance for 
the protection of constitutional rights and liberties.514  
Constitutional complaints are not admissible if the alleged violations do not 
have serious consequences for the complainants and do not severely violate 
their rights and liberties. On the basis of the explicit enumeration in the law, 
the Constitutional Court therefore rejects complaints which are substantiated 
with mere monetary interests of low value and mere small-claims disputes,515 
complaints against decisions on court fees,516 in trespass to property disputes 
and against decisions issued in misdemeanour proceedings.517  
In the absence of a legal concretization of the seriousness of violations, the 
pertinent case-law reveals that the Constitutional Court requires a certain in-
tensity of the alleged violations. It for instance recognized the exclusion of 
complainants from accessing courts of appeal as intensive interference with 
the right to judicial protection while it rejected a complaint against the dismis-
sal of a revision request by the Supreme Court.518 As intensive interference 
with the right to family life of an imprisoned complainant, the Court moreover 
                                              
512   <Http://www.us-rs.si/vloge/vsebina-in-obrazci/> (last accessed September 2018). 
513  E.g. decision Up-49/2005 of 23 March 2006, n. 4, Uradni list 35/06 and OdlUS XV, 4; 
ruling Up-16/1994 of 11 October 1995, n. 7, OdlUS IV, 178. 
514  Art. 55a and 55b para. 2 CCA Slovenia. For more details see NERAD, Komentar Ustave 
art. 160, nn. 76 f.  
515  E.g. ruling Up-3055/2007 of 6 June 2008, n. 4, Uradni list 56/08. 
516  E.g. ruling Up-996/2009 and U-I-207/2009 of 7 October 2009, n. 3, Uradni list 86/09. 
517  E.g. ruling Up-792/2007 of 9 April 2009, nn. 4 f., OdlUS XVIII 72. 
518  See for many decision U-I-277/2009 and Up-1333/2009 et al. of 14 June 2011, n. 13, 
Uradni list 58/11. 
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recognized an order that introduced particular requirements for visits by his 
family.519 
At the same time, the legislator entitled the Constitutional Court to exception-
ally take into consideration complaints against less serious violations, if they 
raise questions of a particular value and significance for the constitutional or-
der. In interpreting this provision the Court considers as such decisions with a 
«precedent nature from the viewpoint of human rights protection stand-
ards».520 A precedent value is recognized if a decision contributes to the pre-
vious jurisdiction and to the development of the constitutional law.521 So far, 
the Court acknowledged this criterion as fulfilled with respect to decisions in 
the field of criminal and misdemeanour proceedings.522 However, the amount 
of rejections for not relating to questions of a constitutional significance indi-
cates a rigid interpretation of the Court in this respect.523 
C. Individual access to the Macedonian Constitutional 
Court 
a) Means of indirect individual access 
aa) Objection of unconstitutionality 
Also Macedonian courts are obliged to refer to the Constitutional Court if they 
have to apply laws which they consider to be unconstitutional. Neither the 
Constitution nor the Rules of Procedure prescribe the committal nature of ob-
jections raised against the constitutionality of applicable laws by participants 
to court proceedings. Opponents of a committal nature refer to the parallel 
existence of the unrestricted access right of individuals on the basis of art. 12 
RoP.524 Supporters, on the other hand, derive a respective obligation of the 
                                              
519  Decision Up-1618/2008 of 2 April 2009, n. 3, Uradni list 35/09 and OdlUS XVIII, 70. 
This decision contains dissenting opinions of several judges, who did not consider such 
visiting rules as serious violation of the complainant's rights. 
520  E.g. ruling Up-792/2007 of 9 April 2009, n. 5, OdlUS XVIII, 72. 
521  See dissenting opinion of judge JAN ZOBEC and others in decision Up-1619/2008 of 
2 April 2009, n. 4, Uradni list 35/09 and OdlUS XVIII, 70. 
522  Decision U-I-219/2012 and Up-834/2012 of 19 December 2012, n. 6, Uradni list 15/13; 
decision Up-1544/2010 of 21 June 2012, n. 4, Uradni list 53/12. 
523  See for many ruling U-I-282/2013 and Up 925/2013 of 12 March 2015, n. 20, not pub-
lished; ruling Up-792/2007 of 9 April 2009, n  6, OdlUS XVIII, 72. 
524  ČOBANOV, 246. 
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courts from the rule of law as fundamental value of the constitutional order.525 
A reference can also be made to paragraph 1 of art. 18 Law on Courts, which 
states that  
«[t]he court shall submit an initiative for the initiation of review proceedings 
on the constitutional compliance of a law when its compatibility with the 
Constitution is questioned […].» (Italics and punctuation added) 
In light of this, Macedonian courts can be considered as intermediary bodies 
and objections made to the courts as means allowing individuals to indirectly 
access to the Constitutional Court. 
bb) Appeals to the ombudsperson 
As has been shown, the ombudsperson of Macedonia is empowered to request 
the initiation of judicial review proceedings. If the request to the Constitu-
tional Court has been provoked by an appeal of an individual person seeking 
for protection of his or her constitutional rights, the ombudsperson can be con-
sidered to act as intermediary body of the individual concerned. At the same 
time there is no possibility of indirect individual access provided against indi-
vidual state acts deemed to violate the rights and liberties of individual per-
sons. Like its Croatian counterpart, the Macedonian ombudsperson cannot 
submit constitutional complaints on behalf of another person. The entitlement 
to file constitutional complaints is consequently restricted to individuals 
whose rights are directly affected by contested individual acts or decisions. 
b) Means of direct individual access 
aa) Right to request the resolution of jurisdictional disputes 
By use of its regulatory autonomy the Macedonian Constitutional Court intro-
duced a broad accessibility to proceedings on jurisdictional disputes. It also 
entitled individuals to request the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction be-
tween different state powers. According to art. 62 para. 1 RoP 
«[a] motion may be submitted by anyone who due to the acceptance or re-
fusal of the competence of separate organs cannot realise his or her right».  
The entitlement applies to a wide range of disputes. It applies to conflicts be-
tween state organs on a horizontal level and between different levels of state 
                                              
525  KLIMOVSKI/DESKOSKA/KARAKAMIŠEVA, 199. 
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administration526 and conflicts where two or more authorities claim the same 
power or reject their responsibility to take an action or adopt an act.527 On the 
other hand, only applicants with a legal interest in the resolution of a conflict 
are entitled to apply to the Court. The Constitutional Court accordingly re-
quires that a petitioner is personally affected by a jurisdictional dispute which 
prevents him or her from exercising his or her rights.528  
bb) Petition to review acts and actions of political parties 
Art. 110 indent 7 Constitution empowers the Constitutional Court to review 
programs and statutes of political parties and associations of citizens. Its case-
law reveals that the Constitutional Court assesses the compatibility of political 
programs and statutes with the constitution in the same manner as laws and 
other general acts.529  
In analogy to art. 12 RoP individuals are entitled to file initiative for the initi-
ation of respective proceedings without having to demonstrate a legal interest. 
Just as in Slovenia individuals are accordingly granted an additional means to 
directly access the Macedonian Constitutional Court.530  
As a consequence of this unrestricted access programs and statutes of ethnic 
minority parties such as the Albanian party are frequently contested based on 
allegations that they aim at overthrowing the constitutional order and incite 
ethnic and religious hatred.531 Individuals also frequently contest statutes of 
citizens' associations such as the Statute of the Red Cross532 and other associ-
ations.533 With reference to the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of associ-
ation the Macedonian Constitutional Court adopts a restrictive practice in ac-
cepting petitions to review political statutes and programs. Yet, with a contro-
versial decision, the Constitutional Court abrogated the program of the citizen 
                                              
526  Ruling U.br.137/2005 of 7 December 2005, n. 4; ruling U.br.98/1999 of 22 September 
1999, n. 2. 
527  E.g. decision U.br.125/2009 of 16 December 2009, n. 5; decision U.br.143/2008 of 
15 October 2008, n. 5. 
528  See e.g. decision U.br.125/2009 of 16 December 2009, n. 5, above at fn. 527 and ruling 
U.br.252/1992 of 16 December 1992, n. 3. 
529  ČOBANOV, 260 accordingly speaks of «constitutional review in the broad sense». 
530  See also ČOBANOV, 263 f. 
531  E.g. rulings U.br.75/2004 of 21 December 2005; U.br.16/2004 of 19 May 2004 and ruling 
U.br.215/1997 of 8 April 1998.  
532  Ruling U.br.128/2012 of 26 September 2009; ruling U.br.46/2003 of 30 June 2004. 
533  E.g. ruling U.br.131/2009 of 4 November 2009; ruling U.br.38/2004 of 14 July 2004. 
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association «Radko», which aimed at strengthening Bulgarian identity, con-
sidering it as incitement to destruction of the Macedonian constitutional order 
and as propaganda for national and religious hatred and intolerance.534 The 
association was dissolved as a result of this decision. Called upon to decide in 
this matter, the ECtHR sentenced Macedonia for violating the Convention be-
cause of the failure of the Constitutional Court to sufficiently justify this de-
cision.535 
c) Direct access by means of constitutional complaint  
In 1991 also Macedonia reintroduced the constitutional complaint as means 
of direct individual access to the Constitutional Court. In art. 50 para. 1 the 
Constitution guarantees a general accessibility of the Constitutional Court for 
the protection of the constitutional rights and liberties. Accordingly art. 51 
RoP states that 
«[a]ny citizen considering that an individual act or action has infringed his 
or her right or freedom […] may lodge an application for protection by the 
Constitutional Court […].» (Punctuation added)  
Neither in Macedonian practice nor doctrine did the author succeed in finding 
an answer to the question whether or not the constitutional complaint is guar-
anteed as constitutional right. 
aa) Objects of complaint 
The Constitutional Court determined that constitutional complaints can be 
submitted against individual acts and actions. It considers as such acts and 
activities of administrative organs or bodies vested with public powers and 
decisions of courts at any instance.536 The Court accepts a direct effect if these 
acts determine the rights and obligations of specific or determinable individ-
uals in a legally binding and final manner.537 Therewith, it explicitly excluded 
laws and other acts of a general nature.  
                                              
534  Ruling U.br.168/2000 of 17 January 2001, n. 6. 
535  Judgment Association of citizens Radko and Paunkovski vs. FYROM, 74651/01, 15 Jan-
uary 2009, §§ 68–78. 
536  See Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia, 15 and ruling U.br.93/1996 of 19 
June 1996, n. 4. 
537  E.g. ruling U.br.83/2013 of 11 September 2013, n. 4; ruling U.br.203/2011 of 21 March 
2012, n. 5; ruling U.br.168/1997 of 17 September 1997, n. 4. 
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bb) Limited scope of protection 
The limited protective scope is a special characteristic of the Macedonian con-
stitutional complaint.538 In art. 110 indent 3 the Constitution determines that 
the Constitutional Court protects the freedoms and rights related to the free-
dom of conviction, conscience, thought and public expression of thought, po-
litical association and activity and the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of sex, race, religion or national, social or political affiliation. The 
constitution-makers therewith not only explicitly ruled out the protection of 
the fundamental constitutional principles and of rights and liberties guaranteed 
by law. The Macedonian Constitutional Court is even precluded from protect-
ing fundamental rights to human dignity, to life, to physical and mental integ-
rity, to liberty and from all other rights and liberties enumerated in the rights 
catalogue in Chapter II of the Constitution. In fact, the Constitutional Court 
rejects its competence to protect rights such as the presumption of innocence, 
the right to fair trial or the right to work by referring to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the judiciary.539 Such rejections are frequent in the Court's practice.540  
Several attempts at explaining the reasons of this limited protective scope can 
be found. Some authors invoke the will of the constitution-makers to restrict 
the role of the Constitutional Court to the protection of the objective legal 
order and to allow constitutional complaints only for the protection of such 
guarantees which are inalienable for the central position of citizens in the state 
and for popular sovereignty.541 According to the predominant opinion in doc-
trine however, the restricted protection offered by constitutional adjudication 
is incompatible with the function of constitutional rights.542 Although the Con-
                                              
538  For a detailed analysis see KLIMOVSKI/DESKOSKA/KARAKAMIŠEVA, 511; MUKOSKA-
ČINGO, 251 f. 
539  See for many ruling U.br.109/2013 of 13 November 2013, n. 4; ruling U.br.84/2015 of 23 
December 2015, n. 4; ruling U.br.26/2015 of 9 December 2015, n. 4. 
540  E.g. ruling U.br.161/2015 of 18 March 2015, n. 6; ruling U.br.79/2013 of 10 December 
2014, n. 4; ruling U.br.90/2014 of 25 November 2014, n. 4.  
541  See MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 253 f. 
542  E.g. KARAKAMIŠEVA, 14; TRENESKA-DESKOSKA, Constitutional Court, 29. 
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stitutional Court itself criticized that it cannot guarantee a more efficient pro-
tection543 critics also concern the Court itself for not using its regulatory au-
tonomy to extend the protective scope of the constitutional complaint.544 Fi-
nally, the limited scope of protection is considered to contravene the interna-
tional obligations of Macedonia based on ratified international treaties.545  
In June 2014 the Government took up these demands and submitted a proposal 
to extend the scope of protection. Together with seven other proposed draft-
amendments the extension of the scope of protection of the constitutional 
complaint has been confirmed by the National Assembly on 23 January 
2015.546 
cc) Personal requirements for access 
While the Rules of Procedure entitle «any citizen» to submit constitutional 
complaints, they do not contain any concretization of the entitlement. The re-
stricted entitlement to citizens constitutes another particularity of the Mace-
donian complaint. The Court adopts a broad interpretation and accepts com-
plaints filed by individuals of other nationalities as well.547 However, it limits 
the circle of authorized applicants to natural persons and excludes legal per-
sons and other legal subjects.548 In consistent practice the Court rejects com-
plaints submitted by legal persons, irrespectively thereof whether they claim 
the violation of one of the liberties protected by constitutional complaints.549 
Furthermore, the entitlement to file constitutional complaints is predicated on 
a legal interest and restricted to applicants who are directly addressed and per-
sonally affected by contested individual acts. Consequently, the Constitutional 
Court rejects as inadmissible complaints filed for the benefit and the protec-
tion of rights of a third person or the general public and accepts complaints 
                                              
543  See e.g. the explanations of its competences on <http://ustavensud.mk/?page_id 
=5224&lang=en> (last accessed September 2018). 
544  Discussion with Professor RENATA TRENESKA-DESKOSKA at the Law Faculty of the Uni-
versity of Skopje on 4 April 2014. See also TRAJKOVSKA-HRISTOVSKA, Procedure for 
Protection of Human Rights, 9 ff. 
545  MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 254 f. 
546  The proposals adopted by the National Assembly are published in Macedonian on the 
website of the Assembly <www.sobranie.mk> (last accessed September 2018). 
547  MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 252; SKARIĆ, 350 f. 
548  Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia, 23 f.  
549  E.g. ruling U.br.25/2015 of 8 April 2015, n. 3; ruling U.br.2/2015 of 18 February 2015, 
n. 3; ruling U.br.138/2013 of 26 February 2014, n. 6. 
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filed by legal representatives only if they are submitted together with an ex-
plicit authorization of persons concerned.550 Access is further restricted to 
complainants who demonstrate a current legal interest. The Court accordingly 
rejects complaints against possible or against already remedied interfer-
ences.551  
dd) Formal requirements for access 
The protection offered by the Macedonian Constitutional Court is subsidi-
ary.552 The Court accordingly rejects complaints which are not filed against 
final court decisions.553 In contrast to its counterparts in Croatia and Slovenia, 
the Macedonian Constitutional Court adopts a less restrictive interpretation of 
its subsidiarity. It does not require the exhaustion of all available ordinary and 
extraordinary legal remedies. Rather it considers as sufficient the exhaustion 
of appeal procedures and of available ordinary remedies of appeal.554 The rel-
evant case-law however neither reveals whether the exhaustion applies to a 
substantial aspect as well nor whether the Constitutional Court exceptionally 
accepts complaints for consideration already before.555 
The entitlement to submit constitutional complaints is moreover restricted in 
time. The respective time limit is prescribed by art. 51 RoP and consists of a 
«relative and subjective» term of two months after the notification about a 
final individual act and an «absolute and objective term» of five years, which 
starts to run on the day on which applicants become aware of negative effects 
of an individual act. Because of the rigid application of the subjective deadline 
the Court frequently rejects complaints for not being submitted in time.556  
                                              
550  E.g. ruling U.br.65/2013 of 6 November 2013, n. 4; ruling U.br.89/2013 of 25 September 
2013, n. 4. 
551  See e.g. ruling U.br.55/2002 of 19 March 2003, n. 4. See also ČOBANOV, 310. 
552  SKARIĆ, 697; TRENESKA-DESKOSKA, Constitutional Court, 25. 
553  E.g. ruling U.br.75/2015 of 7 October 2015, n. 4; ruling U.br.1/2015 of 27 May 2015, 
n. 4; ruling U.br.193/2012 of 19 December 2012, nn. 4 f. 
554  See National Report of the Macedonian Constitutional Court submitted on the occasion 
of the XIInd Conference of the European Constitutional Courts, 9, retrievable over 
<http://www.confcoconsteu.org/reports/rep-xii/Macedonia-EN.pdf> (last accessed Sep-
tember 2018). See also SPIROVSKI, 8. 
555  See to that effect also ČOBANOV, 312 f. 
556  Eg. ruling U.br.110/2014 of 11 February 2015, n. 5; ruling U.br.163/1998 of 7 October 
1998, n. 4. 
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As to the absence of court fees or a mandatory legal representation, the sub-
mittal of constitutional complaints does not involve any financial burden for 
applicants. Complainants bear their own expenses. In contrast to Croatia and 
Slovenia, there is no provision empowering the Constitutional Court to sanc-
tion abusive submittals with penalty fees. 
By analogy to the requirements for the submittal of initiatives against laws, 
constitutional complaints must be filed in written form and in two copies.557 
Complaints can be submitted in Macedonian and Cyrillic script and since the 
constitutional reform in 2001 also in Albanian language.558 With respect to the 
content of complaints, the Rules of Procedure require the full identification of 
the complainant, the clear indication of the contested individual act, the rights 
deemed violated and evidence substantiating the allegations and enabling the 
Court to decide. In contrast to its counterparts in Croatia and Slovenia, the 
Macedonian Court did not publish a template for constitutional complaints on 
its website, but allows the correction of incomplete submittals within a prede-
termined term of maximum 30 days. 
The requirement of substantiation probably constitutes the highest hurdle to 
overcome. The analysis of the pertinent case-law indicates that the Constitu-
tional Court sets high demands as to the substantiation of alleged violations. 
It requires that applicants demonstrate that alleged violations occurred by the 
adoption of a contested individual act or in the conduct of the proceedings in 
which it was passed.559 In practice the Court moreover rejects a vast number 
of insufficiently substantiated allegations of discrimination by emphasizing 
that it is no instance of appeal.560 
 
                                              
557  Art. 68 in combination with art. 15 para. 1 RoP Macedonia. 
558  See art. 7 para. 2 Cst. Maceodnia. 
559  See for many ruling U.br.65/2015 of 18 November 2015, n. 5; ruling U.br.88/2012 of 
10 October 2012, n. 4. For more details see ČOBANOV, 313 f.  
560  E.g. ruling U.br.108/2013 of 18 February 2015, n. 4; ruling U.br.89/2013 of 9 July 2014, 
n. 4; ruling U.br.99/2013 of 5 February 2014, n. 4. 
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IV. Conclusion  
After their transition Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia retained their Consti-
tutional Courts established under socialist rule and strengthened them institu-
tionally to a considerable extent. The new Constitutions not only guaranteed 
their absolute functional, personal and institutional independence, but moreo-
ver vested these Courts with more competences. The introduction of the power 
to eliminate unconstitutional laws can be considered as most noticeable reform 
in this respect.  
The second part of the Chapter shows the broad accessibility of the Constitu-
tional Courts. A wide circle of state organs, public institutions and organiza-
tions of social interest is authorized to request the initiation of review proceed-
ings against legislative acts. Given their power to initiate these proceedings at 
their own discretion, these Courts have been vested with a very strong consti-
tutional position and role. Based on these institutional premises, they are pro-
vided with the possibility to adopt a bold approach in enforcing the constitu-
tional orders against the legislative and the political powers.  
Furthermore, the three Constitutional Courts are characterized by their open-
ness to the wider public. It is shown that several legal remedies and procedural 
instruments allow individuals to indirectly and directly access to these Courts. 
With such a mixed system of access individuals are not only offered alterna-
tive ways to achieve protection by the supreme guardians of the Constitutions. 
They can also combine the advantages of these access means. By inducing the 
ombudspersons or the regular courts to refer to the Constitutional Courts, they 
achieve a higher quality and increase the chances of success of their appeals. 
At the same time they are entitled to directly access the Courts. 
Legal remedies which can be filed directly to the Constitutional Courts are of 
a much higher practical importance. The above shows that individuals in Cro-
atia, Slovenia and Macedonia have at their disposal alternative means of direct 
access. The parallel existence of constitutional and of popular complaints dis-
tinguishes these states from most other systems of concentrated constitutional 
adjudication. Besides, individuals are entitled to directly access the Constitu-
tional Courts in cases of jurisdictional conflicts and, with the exception of 
Croatia, by contesting statutes and programs of political parties. This offers a 
comprehensive protection of the constitutionally guaranteed rights and liber-
ties against the state authorities. It can be seen as expression of the effort to 
provide strong systems of rights protection and as way to ensure the enforce-
ment of the constitutional order against arbitrary state actions and violations 
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in a general interest. In a comparative perspective the broad accessibility of 
these Courts remains the exception and a particular feature of the three suc-
cessor states considered. 
This Chapter described the systems of constitutional adjudication in general 
and the accessibility of the Constitutional Courts of Croatia, Slovenia and 
Macedonia in particular. In the following Chapter, the popular complaints will 
be thoroughly analysed in a procedural aspect and with respect to the position 
of petitioners in proceedings of judicial review. 
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Chapter 3: Popular complaints in Croatia, 
Slovenia and Macedonia  
I. Croatian right to propose the initiation of review 
proceedings 
1. Introductory remarks 
In Croatia the filing of popular complaint constitutes one of three possible 
ways to initiate abstract review proceedings, besides requests of authorized 
applicants and besides initiations by the Court on its own initiative. This ac-
cess right was reintroduced in 1991. Pusuant to art. 38 para. 1 CCL 
«[e]verybody has the right to propose the institution of proceedings to re-
view the constitutionality of the law and the legality and constitutionality 
of other regulations.» 
Literally translated from the Croatian term prijedlog, this access right entitles 
to «propose» or «suggest» the initiation of review proceedings against laws or 
other general acts. In contrast to requests filed by authorized applicants, this 
indicates a non-committal nature which neither results in the initiation of re-
view proceedings nor obliges the Court to do so. Yet, the legal nature of the 
Croatian proposal is controversial. According to one opinion, the proposal 
cannot be considered as committal legal remedy and therefore neither as actio 
popularis.561 Art. 44 CCL determines that requests are «initial acts» and open 
proceedings on the day of their submittal, while review proceedings upon filed 
proposals are initiated only on the day the Constitutional Court accepts them 
for consideration by formal ruling. Therefore, the Croatian proposal is seen as 
information about the existence of potentially unconstitutional provisions.562 
According to the prevailing domestic view and in international perception, the 
proposal is referred to as actio popularis.563 Although subject to a preliminary 
                                              
561  LJUBIĆ, Ustavnopravna priroda prijedloga, 7 f. 
562  LJUBIĆ, Ustavnopravna priroda prijedloga, 8; LJUBIĆ, Karakter prijedloga, 797, 801. 
563  E.g. OMEJEC, O potrebnim promjenama, 55 f.; KRAPAC, Pretpostavke za pokretanje i 
vođenje, 172; CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 77. See also HARUTYUNYAN/ 
NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 74; Venice Commission Document CDL-AD(2008)030, 
n. 51. 
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assessment, both decisions and rulings of the Constitutional Court must state 
reasons and the legal foundations.564 This formalization and the obligation to 
justify rejections or dismissals oblige the Court to take into consideration 
every complaint and proposal.565 This view is confirmed by the Court’s prac-
tice which shows an equivalent approach in assessing proposals and requests. 
Without first passing a ruling, the Court as a rule assesses both the procedural 
requirements and the substantial justification in the same proceedings.566 Fur-
thermore, it accepts both requests and proposals for consideration if it deems 
that the allegations raise doubt about the constitutionality or legality of a con-
tested act.567  
Consequently, the Croatian proposal proves to be more than a mere non-com-
mittal suggestion of individuals. It can be considered as a legal remedy which 
obliges the Constitutional Court to assess its admissibility. Thus, the Croatian 
proposal is henceforth referred to as popular complaint. 
2. Admissibility requirements 
Pursuant to art. 41 ff. CCL the admissibility of a proposal is ascertained in a 
preliminary stage by an appointed judge-rapporteur. By ruling, the Court ei-
ther rejects proposals for not meeting the requirements for admissibility or, 
otherwise, accepts them for consideration and opens the requested review pro-
ceedings. If a request of an authorized applicant with identical allegations of 
unconstitutionality is submitted at the same time, the Court skips this prelim-
inary stage and directly assesses a proposal on the merits.568  
Even though the pertinent procedural rules do not indicate any substantial as-
sessment of proposals at this preliminary stage, the Constitutional Court in 
practice only opens review proceedings if petitioners succeed in raising doubts 
                                              
564 Art. 27 para. 3, 28 paras. 1 and 4 and art. 46 para. 2 CCL Croatia. 
565  SMERDEL/SOKOL, 188; SMERDEL, Ustavno uređenje Europske Hrvatske, 436. 
566  See e.g. ARLOVIĆ, 34. 
567  This is also acknowledged by LJUBIĆ, Ustavnopravna priroda prijedloga, 7; IBID., Karak-
ter prijedloga, 797 f. 
568  E.g. decision U-II-1414/2003 of 28 September 2004, n. 4, NN 141/04 (English translation 
available); decision U-I-3824/2003 et al. of 28 April 2004, n. 4, NN 55/04 (English trans-
lation available). 
Chapter 3: Popular complaints in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia 
110 
 
about the constitutionality of contested provisions. Consequently, also the fail-
ure to substantiate allegations constitutes a failure to comply with the proce-
dural requirements and a reason for rejection of proposals. 
A. Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court 
At first, the Constitutional Court assesses whether it is competent to review 
the contested legislative acts in accordance with the proposals or requests re-
ceived. Art. 129 para. 1 indents 1–3 Constitution determine which acts of leg-
islation can be reviewed with respect to their constitutionality and legality. In 
its twenty-five years long practice, the Constitutional Court developed a gen-
erous approach and acknowledges its competence to review a comprehensive 
scope of legislative acts. Also only single provisions of laws or regulations 
can be reviewed with respect to their constitutionality or legality.569 If the Con-
stitutional Court does not consider itself competent, it either rejects a proposal 
or request as inadmissible or for its lack of competence. 
a) Benchmarks for judicial review 
The Constitution constitutes the primary benchmark for judicial review. Pre-
dominantly, allegations raised concern the non-compliance of laws or other 
acts of legislation with the constitutionally prescribed proceedings for legisla-
tion, with basic constitutional principles and, especially, with constitutionally 
guaranteed rights and liberties or local and regional self-government. 
The Croatian constitutional order comprises constitutional laws. These have a 
basis in the Constitution, regulate specific questions of constitutional im-
portance and are adopted in procedures provided for constitutional amend-
ments. While so far this applies only to the CCL, pending attempts at reform 
suggest the extension of the constitutional force to other laws. One can also 
find several other laws titled as constitutional laws, without having been en-
acted in proceedings for constitution-making. Despite their denomination, 
these acts do not fulfil the requirements and therefore cannot serve as bench-
marks for formal laws. In this context the Constitutional Court speaks of a 
falsa nominatio.570 Because of the not negligible number of such laws and the 
                                              
569  Art. 55 para. 1 CCL Croatia. 
570  See for many decision U-I-1029/2007 et al. of 7 April 2010, n. 9, NN 47/10. For more 
details with respect to the falsa nominatio practice see e.g. BAČIĆ, Komentar Ustava, 228; 
CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 86. 
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amount of submittals requesting the Constitutional Court to review the com-
patibility of laws with these acts, the Court notified the National Assembly 
about the unconstitutional practice in this regard.571 For now, the Constitution 
and the CCL constitute the only constitutional benchmarks for the review of 
legislative acts.  
Laws constitute benchmarks for the review of sub-legislative acts such as gov-
ernmental or executive acts or regulations. The legal order in Croatia com-
prises formal laws which constitute acts of a general and abstract nature en-
acted by the National Assembly as legislative authority and in proceedings 
prescribed for legislation.572 While ordinary laws are passed by a simple ma-
jority of representatives,573 «organic laws» are adopted by the absolute major-
ity of votes because they regulate specific issues of constitutional relevance, 
comprising rights and liberties, the electoral system, the powers of govern-
mental bodies and local and regional self-administration.574 In reviewing acts 
of legislation the Constitutional Court does not differentiate between ordinary 
and organic laws. It considers both as subordinated to the Constitution and as 
benchmarks for sub-legislative acts and rejects its competence to review the 
compliance between ordinary and organic laws.575  
Based on art. 141 Constitution, as to which ratified international treaties con-
stitute part of the domestic legal order with legal force above the laws, the 
Constitutional Court moreover acknowledges its power to review laws and 
other acts of legislation with respect to their compatibility with international 
law.576 Vice versa it rejects to review the compatibility of domestic laws with 
not ratified international treaties. It accordingly refused to review the compat-
ibility of a law with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
before Croatia's accession to the EU on 1 July 2013.577 With the accession to 
the EU the laws and the acquis communautaire of the EU became legally bind-
ing and applicable and constitute benchmarks for the Croatian Constitutional 
                                              
571  Notification U-X-838/2012 of 15 February 2012, n. 12, NN 20/11 (English translation 
available). 
572  BAČIĆ, Komentar Ustava, 227. 
573  Art. 82 para. 1 Cst. Croatia. 
574  Art. 83 Cst. Croatia. 
575  See e.g. ruling U-I-2720/2007 of 19 November 2008, n. 7, NN 138/08 (English translation 
available). 
576  Decision U-I-745/1999 of 8 November 2000, n. 7, NN 112/00 (English translation avail-
able). 
577  Ruling U-I-5600/2012 of 23 April 2013, n. 9, NN 58/13. 
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Court in constitutional review proceedings.578 As to the knowledge of the au-
thor, there is finally no practice of the Court with respect to the applicability 
of general principles of international law as benchmarks for legislative acts. 
In this regard different views can be found in Croatian legal theory. Their ap-
plicability is justified with a teleological interpretation of the Constitution. As 
to another opinion it is considered as indispensable to introduce an explicit 
reference by constitutional revision.579 
b) Objects of judicial review 
aa) Constitutional law  
In consistent practice the Constitutional Court declines to review the Consti-
tution or individual constitutional provisions by invoking the supreme binding 
nature and the exclusive competence of the constitution-makers.580 After ini-
tial refusal, the Constitutional Court acknowledges its competence to review 
the formal compatibility of constitutional laws with the Constitution. Accord-
ingly it assesses the compliance of the adoption of provisions with the consti-
tutionally prescribed rules for constitutional reform,581 while rejecting numer-
ous proposals to review the substantial compliance of the CCL with the Con-
stitution.582 
Its newer practice however indicates that it does not anymore categorically 
exclude its power to review the compatibility of constitutional amendments 
with the fundamental constitutional principles.583 The Court hence acknowl-
edged its competence to review the content of a referendum question on the 
introduction of the constitutional definition of marriage as community be-
tween a man and a woman.584 
                                              
578  Art 152 in combination with art. 145 Cst. Croatia. 
579  Compare BAČIĆ, Ustavno pravo, 520 with OMEJEC, O potrebnim promjenama, 137. 
580  See e.g. decision U-I-729/2001 of 6 June 2001, n. 12, NN 55/01. CRNIĆ, Komentar 
Ustavnog zakona, 85.  
581  Ruling U-I-1631/2000 of 28 March 2001, n. 3, NN 27/01. 
582  E.g. ruling U-I-453/2015 of 17 February 2015, not published; ruling U-I-699/2000 of 
14 June 2000, n. 3, not published, with references to the older practice. 
583  Ruling U-I-1523/2011 of 12 August 2014, n. 5, NN 101/14; ruling U-VIIR-164/2014 of 
13 January 2014, n. 10, NN 15/14.  
584  Communication SuS-1/2013 of 14 November 2013, n. 5, NN 138/13. For a detailed anal-
ysis of the constitutional significance of this communication see GARDAŠEVIĆ, 85 ff. 
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bb) International treaties  
Despite their direct legal effect and classification as supra-legislative acts, the 
Constitutional Court rejects its competence to review ratified international 
treaties with respect to their content.585 It justifies this position with the exclu-
sive power of political forces to ascertain the compatibility of treaties with the 
Constitution and to determine their ratification. As domestic acts the Consti-
tutional Court, on the other hand, accepts to review laws adopted for the rati-
fication of international treaties. In order to not amount to an indirect substan-
tial assessment of the content of international treaties, it reviews laws of rati-
fication only with respect to the compliance of their adoption with the consti-
tutionally prescribed proceedings for ratification.586 
cc) Formal laws 
Formal laws constitute the primary subject-matter of constitutional review. In 
accordance to the definition above, formal laws comprise all acts of a general 
and abstract legal nature enacted by the National Assembly in proceedings 
prescribed for legislation. Adopting a broad interpretation, the Constitutional 
Court also considers other general acts of the National Assembly as formal 
laws such as so-called authoritative or authentic interpretations.587 
Under certain conditions the Constitutional Court moreover considers as laws 
general acts enacted by the executive organs based on delegated legislative 
authority. This applies to emergency laws enacted by the Croatian President 
on the basis of art. 101 Constitution.588 Also governmental decrees adopted on 
the basis of a legislative delegation are acknowledged as acts of law which 
can only be reviewed with regard to their constitutionality.589 
                                              
585  See e.g. ruling U-I-6454/2015 of 15 December 2015, n. 4, not published; ruling U-I-
825/2001 of 14 January 2004, n. 4, NN 16/04 (English translation available). 
586  E.g. rulings U-I-6738/2010 and U-I-5705/2010 of 11 June 2013, n. 4, not published; rul-
ing U-I-64462/2009 of 7 July 2010, nn. 4 ff., NN 91/10. 
587  E.g. ruling U-I-2488/2004 of 14 November 2007, n. 5, NN 133/07; decision U-II-
1362/2005 of 12 October 2005, NN 125/05 (English translation available).  
588  See e.g. ruling U-I-179/1991 of 24 June 1992, NN 49/92. For more details in this regard 
see BAČIĆ PETAR, 413 f.; PEŠUT, 31 ff. 
589  BAČIĆ, Komentar Ustava, 191; CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 92. ARLOVIĆ, 27 f. 
however qualifies these decrees as «other regulations». 
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dd) Other regulations 
The Croatian Constitutional Court moreover reviews other regulations with 
respect to their compatibility with the Constitution and the laws. After its com-
prehensive jurisdiction under socialist rule, the Constitutional Court defined 
regulations as sub-legislative general normative acts adopted by authorized 
governmental bodies.590 This broad understanding of general acts for instance 
comprises decisions of legislative bodies to call a referendum591 or sub-legis-
lative acts and regulations enacted by the government and other organs of the 
executive power.592 
In practice the Constitutional Court is faced with numerous requests and pro-
posals filed against executive acts with a mere internal legal effect for an ad-
ministrative unit593 or which are not of a generally binding nature.594 While 
they were frequently reviewed during socialist rule, contractual or collective 
agreements with administrative bodies do not fulfill the new requirements for 
judicial review anymore today.595 
Until 2012 the Constitutional Court also reviewed general acts adopted by 
bodies or organizations authorized to carry out public services, and general 
acts of bodies of legal and regional self-administration.596 With the enactment 
of the new Administrative Disputes Act in 2012 the review of these acts was 
explicitly reserved to the jurisdiction of the administrative judiciary.597 As a 
result, the Constitutional Court halted all pending review proceeding against 
                                              
590  Decision U-II-37/2006 et al. of 5 July 2011, n. 15, NN 89/11; ruling U-II-2994/2002 of 
22 February 2006, n. 3, NN 31/06. 
591  Decision U-II-1917/2004 of 9 February 2005, n. 4, NN 26/05 (English translation avail-
able). See also decision U-II-3205/2004 of 2 February 2005, n. 6, NN 22/05. 
592  E.g. decision U-II-2927/2013 of 13 November 2014, NN 139/14; decision U-II-
1118/2013 et al. of 22 May 2013, n. 5, NN 63/13 (English translation available). For more 
references to the case law see KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 46.2. 
593  See for many ruling U-II-2125/2006 of 18 September 2012, n. 5, not published; ruling U-
II-2333/2001 of 25 February 2004, n. 4, NN 27/04 (English translation available). 
594  See for instance ruling U-II-414/2015 of 17 February 2015, n. 5, not published; ruling U-
II-4846/2004 of 22 December 2004, n. 2, NN 5/05. 
595  E.g. ruling U-II-363/2015 of 17 February 2015, n. 3, not published; ruling U-II-
6962/2014 of 2 December 2014, n. 3, not published. 
596  See for many ruling U-II-3449/2009 of 29 June 2010, n. 6, NN 86/10; decision U-II-
2821/2006 of 10 February 2009, n. 3, NN 28/09 (English translation available). 
597  Art. 3 para. 2 Administrative Disputes Act, NN 20/10, 143/12. See hereto ARLOVIĆ, 
Ocjena ustavnosti i zakonitosti drugih propisa, 19 ff., 25. 
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these acts and conferred them to the High Administrative Court.598 With the 
exception of statutes of communities, counties and cities, which are significant 
for local self-governance,599 the Court ever since rejects its competence to re-
view such administrative disputes.600 
ee) Legislative acts without legal validity  
In 2002 the Constitutional Court's review competence was extended to laws 
and other acts of legislation which ceased to be effective at the time of the 
proceeding.601 Ever since, proposals and requests can also be filed against laws 
and regulations that are not in force anymore. This extension is the result of 
the acknowledgement that unconstitutional provisions can have negative im-
pacts even after they ceased to be effective. The Constitutional Court accord-
ingly passes declaratory judgments, which allow the submittal of claims of 
reconsideration or reparation in order to remedy persisting negative conse-
quences.602  
The entitlement of individuals to propose the initiation of review proceedings 
against acts which are no longer effective is restricted. Such submittals must 
be filed within one year after the contested act lost its legal validity.603 Fur-
thermore, the Court requires the existence of reasons justifying an assessment 
of invalid normative acts. It for instance rejected a proposal because a decla-
ration of the unconstitutionality of the invalid provision would neither im-
prove the legal position of the petitioner nor serve a general public interest.604 
On the other hand, the Constitutional Court refuses to review drafts of laws or 
regulations or to conduct preventive review.605 An attempt to introduce its 
competence to review the compatibility of international treaties with the Con-
stitution before their ratification has been made on the occasion of the elabo-
ration of the draft for constitutional amendments in November 2013 but was 
not considered anymore in the proposal. However, the Court derives from its 
                                              
598  Ruling U-II-5157/2005 et al. of 5 March 2012, NN 41/12 (English translation available).  
599  Ruling U-II-5157/2005, n. 3, above at fn. 598.  
600  In place of many see ruling U-II-3236/2015 of 20 October 2015, n. 3, not published; rul-
ing U-II-4547/2013 of 4 November 2014, n. 5, not published. 
601  Art. 129 para. 1 indent 3 Cst. Croatia and art. 56 CCL Croatia. 
602  CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 145; OMEJEC, O potrebnim promjenama, 62 f. 
603  E.g. ruling U-I-2392/2012 of 17 February 2015, n. 5, not published; ruling U-II-526/2008 
of 10 September 2013, n. 3, not published. 
604  Ruling U-I-2581/2014 of 15 October 2014, n. 6, not published. 
605  See already ruling U-I-215/1992 of 26 October 1992, NN 82/92. 
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power to assess invalid provisions its entitlement to review provisions which 
have been published in the Official Gazette but, due to the eight-day waiting 
period after publication, have not come into force yet.606 In turn, it refuses to 
review unpublished legal provisions for not becoming effective, unless the 
failure to publish them violates the principle of publicity.607 
ff) Lack of review competence 
The Constitutional Court is faced with a vast number of proposals and requests 
to review legislative acts and to assess questions for which it has no compe-
tence.  
Frequently, it refuses to review laws with respect to legal gaps and legislative 
omissions, considering the absence of regulations as a political decision and 
not necessarily as issue of constitutionality.608 If, however, it deems that the 
absence or insufficiency of a regulation is constitutionally relevant or «a threat 
to the very existence of a fundamental right guaranteed in the Constitution», 
it acknowledges its competence to review.609 
In consistent practice the Constitutional Court also refuses to review the mu-
tual compatibility of normative acts with the same legal force. It frequently 
rejects proposals to review inconsistencies between formal laws, formal and 
organic laws or between sub-legislative acts.610 It accordingly refuses to assess 
the compatibility of legal provisions with acts of a lower normative value and 
hierarchical position in the legal order.611 
Furthermore, one can find numerous rulings by which the Constitutional Court 
rejects proposals so as to not interfere with the constitutional powers of other 
state organs. It refuses to review allegations against the manner in which laws 
                                              
606  Decision U-I-5654/2011 of 15 February 2012, n. 7, NN 20/12 (English translation avail-
able). 
607  E.g. decision U-II-296/2006 of 27 October 2010, nn. 5 ff., NN 126/10. See also decision 
U-II-994/2002 of 16 January 2003, n. 8, NN 14/03 (English translation available). 
608  See e.g. ruling U-I-1477/2007 et al. of 15 February 2011, n. 10, NN 25/11.  
609  E.g. decision U-I-4892/2004 et al. of 12 March 2008, n. 18, NN 37/08 (English translation 
available); decision U-I-659/1994 of 15 March 2000, n. 19, NN 31/00.  
610  See for many ruling U-I-2134/2015 of 2 June 2015, n. 5, not published; ruling U-I-
7415/2010 of 4 November 2014, n. 11, NN 136/14; ruling U-I-2168/2007 of 
14 June 2011, n. 9, NN 74/11. 
611  Ruling U-I-3227/2008 of 1 March 2011, n. 6, NN 35/11. 
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or regulations are applied onto concrete and individual cases.612 Accordingly, 
it rejects proposals which substantiate alleged unconstitutionalities with vio-
lations by the application or implementation of laws.613 Given that such alle-
gations can only be verified by assessing the application of a contested provi-
sion onto every individual case, the Court invokes the primary responsibility 
of the judiciary.614  
As expression of judicial self-restraint towards the legislative authorities, the 
Constitutional Court rejects to review laws or regulations with respect to their 
expediency and justification. In reference to art. 2 para. 4 indent 1 Constitu-
tion it concedes a wide scope of discretion to the National Assembly in deter-
mining economic, legal and political questions in accordance to the concrete 
economic, financial and social circumstances and within the framework given 
by the Constitution. As political decisions the Court therefore rejects to review 
the expediency and existence of alternative options.615 Its case-law indicates 
that it acknowledges of a broad scope of legislative discretion.616 Furthermore, 
the Constitutional Court frequently rejects proposals for contesting acts with-
out an independent legal nature, such as consolidated wordings or corrections 
of laws.617 By referral to the exclusive competence of legislative authorities, 
the Court also refuses to review the terminology and legal denominations of 
legal institutions and acts,618 terminological inconsistencies between legal 
acts,619 or to assess typographical errors.620 Finally, it refuses to correct, 
                                              
612  E.g. ruling U-I-6264/2014 of 4 March 2015, n. 8, NN 31/15; ruling U-I-4933/2004 et al. 
of 2 February 2010, n. 6, NN 25/10. 
613  See e.g. ruling U-I-1085/2000 et al. of 30 April 2008, n. 9, NN 59/08; ruling U-I-197/1999 
et al. of 23 March 2005, n. 17, NN 47/05 (English translation available).  
614  Ruling U-I-949/1995 of 23 November 2005, n. 7, not published. 
615  E.g. ruling U-I-3006/2010 of 30 April 2014, n. 7, not published; ruling U-I-2534/2008 et 
al. of 31 January 2012, n. 11, NN 17/12. 
616  With respect to legal relations see e.g. decision U-I-722/2009 of 6 April 2011, n. 19, NN 
41/11 (English translation available) and ruling U-I-2767/2007 of 31 March 2009, n. 4, 
NN 51/09 (English translation available). In relation to economic questions and relations 
see e.g. decision U-IP-3820/2009 et al. of 17 November 2009, n. 10, NN 143/09 (English 
translation available) and in relation to social services and help see decision U-I-988/1998 
et al. of 17 March 2010, n. 14.6, NN 40/10 (English translation available). 
617  E.g. ruling U-I-3185/2005 of 20 October 2009, n. 7, NN 135/09; ruling U-I-2597/2003 of 
12 January 2005, nn. 5 f., NN 11/05 (English translation available). 
618  E.g. ruling U-I-189/2005 of 24 July 2015, n. 4, not published; decision U-I-1152/2000 et 
al. of 18 April 2007, n. 25, NN 43/07 (English translation available). 
619  Ruling U-I-1108/1998 of 22 December 2004, n. 3, NN 5/05. 
620  Ruling U-II-1369/2005 of 28 June 2006, n. 4, not published. 
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change or supplement legal provisions in order to remedy alleged violations 
of the Constitution and the laws, or to interpret unclear legislative provi-
sions.621  
While reserving to itself the right to notify the National Assembly about the 
necessity to eliminate established shortcomings in legislation,622 the Constitu-
tional Court does not refrain from abrogating provisions if the listed deficien-
cies amount to violations of fundamental constitutional principles. As a con-
sequence of such constitutionally relevant deficiencies, political issues be-
come constitutional. Such regulations can amount to discriminations623 or re-
strict constitutionally guaranteed rights in an unproportional manner.624 The 
Court for instance considered the terminology of a provision in a curriculum 
as inappropriate because it referred only to the «possibility» instead of the 
«right» to lessons held in minority languages.625  
B. No requirement of a legitimate interest  
After transition the Croatian constitution-makers retained the unrestricted ac-
cess to judicial review proceedings as provided under socialist rule. The enti-
tlement to submit proposals against laws or other regulations is therefore not 
limited to persons with a legal interest in bringing judicial proceedings. Ap-
plicants do not have to demonstrate that the contested law or regulation inter-
feres with their personal rights or legal positions. It is argued that the teleo-
logical interpretation of art. 38 para. 1 CCL impedes the assumption of a legal 
interest as access requirement.626 
The unrestricted entitlement to propose the initiation of review proceedings 
against laws and other regulations allows unlimited access to the Croatian 
Constitutional Court. Proof of this is the broad range of applicants who file 
proposals in practice. The predominant number of proposals received is sub-
                                              
621  For instance ruling U-I-2358/2011 of 5 March 2013, n. 3, NN 32/13; ruling U-I-694/2000 
of 23 January 2002, n. 5, not published. 
622  E.g. ruling U-I-1625/2014 et al. of 18 July 2014, n. 10, NN 100/14; decision U-I-120/2011 
of 29 July 2011, n. 30, NN 93/11. 
623  E.g. decision U-I-4170/2004 of 29 September 2010, nn. 15 ff., NN 123/10; ruling U-I-
402/2003 et al. of 30 April 2008, n. 9, NN 70/08 (English translations available). 
624  E.g. ruling U-I-3789/2003 of 8 December 2010, n. 7.3, NN 142/10. 
625  Decision U-II-993/1997 et al. of 8 November 1999, NN 129/99. 
626  KRAPAC, Pretpostavke za pokretanje i vođenje, 201. 
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mitted by private individuals with Croatian citizenship and of other nationali-
ties.627 A large number is filed by legal persons of private law including private 
businesses, economic enterprises or insurances.628 Besides political parties629 
and trade unions630 the numerous civil organizations belong to the most active 
petitioners against laws and other regulations.631 The Constitutional Court also 
receives several proposals submitted by public law institutions, such as uni-
versities and faculties,632 and by other government units as cities and even 
other states.633  
As a «collecting pool», the Constitutional Court finally treats all submittals as 
popular complaints which do not fulfil the procedural requirements for filing 
requests. Illustrative is the example of a request filed by an individual judge 
of the Commercial Court.634 Although rather improbable in practice, it is even 
possible that supreme political authorities file proposals instead of requests 
against acts of legislation.635 
C. Requirements of form and substance  
a) Form and content of proposals 
Art. 17–19 and art. 39 f. CCL contain requirements as to the form and sub-
stance of proposals.  
                                              
627  E.g. ruling U-I-6738/2010 et al. of 11 June 2013, see above fn. 586; ruling U-II-
1273/2000 of 13 April 2010, NN 59/10. 
628  E.g. ruling U-II-526/2013 of 10 September 2013, not published; decision U-I-2470/2010 
of 9 July 2013, NN 99/13. 
629  E.g. ruling U-I-4365/2008 of 26 March 2013, NN 43/13; ruling U-I-3597/2010 et al. of 
29 July 2011, NN 93/11 (English translation available). 
630  E.g. decision U-I-2036/2012 of 21 December 2015, NN 138/15; decision U-I-283/1997 
of 12 May 1998, NN 69/98 (English translation available). 
631  From the recent case-law see ruling U-I-437/2013 et al. of 4 November 2014, NN 139/14; 
ruling U-I-1350/ 2011 of 4 November 2014, not published; ruling U-I-897/2014 of 4 
March 2014, NN 32/14. 
632  E.g. ruling U-I-133/2002 et al. of 21 March 2007, not published; decision U-I-1190/1999 
et al. of 22 March 2000, not published. 
633  E.g. ruling U-I-8069/2014 of 23 January 2015, NN 14/15; ruling U-I-2921/2003 et al. of 
19 November 2008, NN 137/08 (English translation available).  
634  See e.g. decision U-I-4175/2013 of 27 October 2013, NN 108/13. See also decision U-I-
4633/2010 of 6 March 2012, NN 35/12 (English translation available). 
635  CRNIĆ, Vladavina Ustava, 48. 
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Applications must be filed in written form and submitted to the Constitutional 
Court directly or by mail. Orally communicated proposals, proposals submit-
ted by electronic mail or by written messages sent by facsimile, are not con-
sidered as validly filed.636 Proposals can be submitted in Croatian and Latin 
script or in another language or script acknowledged as official in local units. 
Applicants must supplement their complaints by a copy of the law or regula-
tion whose constitutionality or legality is disputed and by means of evidence 
essential for the decision of the Constitutional Court. Unlike the requirement 
of full identification for the submittal of constitutional complaints and the pos-
sibility under socialist rule to submit initiatives anonymously, proposals must 
merely contain a signature or the seal of the petitioner.  
Requests and proposals submitted must be complete, clear and understanda-
ble. Applicants must precisely designate the disputed legal provision and name 
the exact constitutional or legal norm claimed to be violated. Furthermore, 
they must substantiate and justify alleged inconsistencies with convincing ar-
guments. Its case-law reveals that the Constitutional Court adopts a rigid prac-
tice in acknowledging substantiations as sufficient basis for the acceptance of 
proposals for consideration. Petitioners must provide concrete reasons which 
substantiate the inconsistency of a contested norm with the Constitution or 
laws. The allegations must seem credible to the Court and provide a sufficient 
basis for its decision. In practice petitioners show difficulties in adequately 
substantiating abstract normative incompatibilities and justifying that alleged 
violations of the Constitution or the laws directly arise from the contested le-
gal provision.637  
b) Improvement of insufficient and unclear proposals 
In consistent and rather stringent practice, the Constitutional Court rejects pro-
posals for not complying with the formal requirements or for being unclear or 
incomplete. To prevent excessive formalism, the Court returns inadequate 
submittals to the petitioners and determines a term for the resubmission of 
corrected or supplemented proposals.638 It informs the petitioners about the 
consequences if the return conditions are not complied with.639 The failure to 
return proposals within the ordered term is considered as withdrawal, while 
                                              
636  Art. 92 para. 1 RoP Croatia. 
637  See for many ruling U-I-4097/2004 et al. of 10 November 2004, n. 4, NN 167/04; ruling 
U-I-1582/2004 of 27 October 2004, nn. 3 and 6, not published. 
638  Art. 19 paras. 2–4 CCL Croatia. 
639  See CRNIĆ, Pokretanje postupka, 3. 
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their resubmittal without correction results in their rejection for being inad-
missible.640 Insufficiently substantiated proposals are, on the other hand, dis-
missed as «manifestly unfounded» without any possibility of improvement. 
D. Temporal restrictions 
Proposals to initiate review proceedings against legally valid laws and regula-
tions can be submitted at any time. On the other hand, the principle of legal 
certainty requires a temporal limitation of the right to file requests or proposals 
against legal provisions which ceased to be effective. Invalid provisions can 
merely be contested within one year after losing legal force.641 Failures to 
comply with this term result in the rejection of submittals.642  
E. Cost burden 
As already stated, the submittal of complaints to the Constitutional Court does 
not involve any financial burden for applicants, neither by court fees nor by 
an obligation to be legally represented. A proposal to introduce court fees in 
2002 was rejected by the National Assembly.643 Travel costs, stamp duties, 
fees for optional legal representation and other expenses related to the pro-
ceedings before the Constitutional Court are borne by the petitioners them-
selves based on art. 23 CCL. In contrast to the sanction to reimburse inten-
tionally caused expenses by the unsuccessful submittal of constitutional com-
plaints, no financial deterrence is provided for abusive requests or proposals 
to initiate review proceedings. 
                                              
640  E.g. ruling U-I-7551/2014 of 21 January 2015, n. 8, not published. 
641  Art. 129 para. 1 indent 3 Cst. Croatia and art. 56 para. 1 CCL Croatia. 
642  See e.g. ruling U-II-5111/2012 et al. of 9 April 2014, n. 5, not published; ruling U-I-
2418/2001 of 11 July 2007, n. 10, NN 90/07. 
643  The introduction of court fees was discussed on the occasion of the reform of the 
CCL 2002 in order to improve the national budget. The draft provision was however de-
leted by the National Assembly in order to not restrict the access to wealthy applicants 
only, see statements made in the session of the Assembly published in Report (IHS) 
no. 305 of 27 July 2001, 33 f., 38 and 40. 
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F. Procedural obstacles 
a) Principle of res iudicata 
In accordance with art. 31 para. 1 CCL, decisions of the Constitutional Court 
conclude constitutional litigations by final and generally binding judgments. 
According to the principle of res iudicata, these decisions cannot be reas-
sessed and overturned by any domestic judgment – not even by the Constitu-
tional Court itself. Consequently, normative provisions of which the constitu-
tionality or legality has been established by legally binding decisions cannot 
be contested by a new request or proposal anymore.  
Yet, with the introduction of art. 54 CCL in 1999 the Court was empowered 
to review acts of legislation, which have already been reviewed with respect 
to their constitutionality or legality.644  
While the Venice Commission criticized this reform for being problematic in 
view of the principles of res iudicata and legal certainty,645 the rigid interpre-
tation of this competence by the Constitutional Court mitigates the Commis-
sion's concerns. In principle, the Court still refuses to review the constitution-
ality or legality of already reviewed legal provision with reference to the res 
iudicata principle. It only accepts its power to reassess an already reviewed 
legal provision on the basis of well justified grounds.646 Petitioners must ac-
cordingly provide new reasons which constitute a suitable basis for a change 
of decisions. Another justified ground is given if the Constitutional Court es-
tablishes an essential change of the factual and legal situation.647 Furthermore, 
these justified grounds must be suitable to raise doubts about the constitution-
ality or legality of a contested provision and make a change of the Court’s 
previous decision probable.648 The burden to substantiate a probable change 
                                              
644  For a detailed analysis see KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 36.1. 
645  Venice Commission Document CDL-INF(2001)2, n. 19. 
646  For details to the practice see e.g. CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 133 ff.; OMEJEC, 
Granice ovlasti, 1438 f. 
647  E.g. ruling U-I-4187/2013 of 2 December 2014, n. 11, not published; ruling U-I-
1401/2009 et al. of 9 April 2014, n. 6, not published. 
648  See e.g. decision U-I-1569/2004 et al. of 20 December 2006, n. 4, NN 2/07 (English 
translation available); decision U-I-241/2000 of 10 May 2000, nn. 4 ff., NN 50/00 (Eng-
lish translation available). 
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of opinion lies with the petitioners. Failures to do so result in the dismissal of 
proposals for being unfounded.649 
b) Withdrawal or lapse of procedural requirements 
Art. 61 CCL prescribes that 
«[t]he Constitutional Court may end the proceedings, if the applicant with-
draws the request or the proposal, and shall do so in the cases when the 
requirements for the conduct of proceedings cease to exist.»  
On the one hand, this provision allows the Constitutional Court to terminate 
review proceedings in the event of the withdrawal of a proposal or to continue 
them at its own discretion.650 On the other hand, it obliges the Court to termi-
nate proceedings if contested provisions are amended or cease to exist after 
the submittal of a proposal to initiate review proceedings. The invalidity of 
contested acts of legislation during the preliminary proceedings implies a 
lapse of the procedural requirements and an impediment to the admissibility 
of proposals. This applies to explicit eliminations of contested provisions651 
and to cases where legal provisions cease to be effective implicitly, for in-
stance, because of the elimination of their constitutional or legal basis and the 
lack of relevant transitory provisions,652 or because of their timely limited va-
lidity.653 If however petitioners specifically request the continuation of the pro-
ceedings based on their previous proposals, the Court continues the prelimi-
nary proceedings even after the elimination of a contested provision based on 
art. 56 CCL.654 
                                              
649  In place of many see ruling U-I-6660/2014 of 25 November 2014, n. 3 f., not published; 
ruling U-I-7018/2010 et al. of 15 February 2011, nn. 3 ff., NN 28/11. 
650  E.g. ruling U-I-5081/2013 of 9 April 2014, n. 4, not published; ruling U-I-4028/2004 of 
18 October 2006, n. 5, not published. 
651  E.g. ruling U-I-677/2011 of 27 January 2015, not published; ruling U-I-851/2001 of 
13 October 2004, nn. 5 f., NN 147/04.  
652  E.g. ruling U-I-1441/2001 of 23 October 2003, n. 4, NN 177/03 (English translation avail-
able). 
653  E.g. ruling U-II-3659/2003 of 28 April 2004, nn. 3 f., not published. 
654  For instance ruling U-II-1299/2005 of 3 October 2006, n. 4, NN 114/06. See in this re-
spect also LJUBIĆ, Ustavnopravna priroda prijedloga, fn. 7. 
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G. Examination of the merits 
The analysis of the pertinent case-law reveals that, contrary to the procedural 
regulations, the Constitutional Court normally ascertains the substantiation of 
allegations at the same procedural stage as the procedural requirements and 
decides on the merits of the complaint without first closing the preliminary 
proceedings by ruling.655 If it considers the substantiations as founded, the 
Court concludes the proceedings and invalidades the contested legal provi-
sions by final decision.656 If, on the other hand, it finds that contested provi-
sions are not in breach of the Constitution or the laws or that the allegations 
do not raise doubts regarding their constitutionality or legality, it rejects pro-
posals by rulings rather than by formal decisions as prescribed by art. 27 para. 
2 CCL.657 Therewith, rulings are conceded the same final and legally binding 
effects as formal decisions, despite their procedural nature. 
The case-law reveals that the Constitutional Court schedules separate proceed-
ings in cases where it finds proposals to raise complex or important constitu-
tional questions of a general significance. It acts accordingly if it considers 
that its decisions require a detailed analysis and consultation of expert opin-
ions, statistical data or the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, the ECJ and of courts of 
other states. The Court for instance assessed in two-stage proceedings pro-
posals filed against provisions on temporary salary cuts for public servants,658 
on the control and legislative intervention regarding the use of property 
rights,659 and on a provision alleged to violate the self-governing competence 
of communities and regions with respect to planning and development of 
health facilities.660 
                                              
655  See also ARLOVIĆ, 34; CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 115; IBID., Vladavina Ustava, 
48. 
656  For illustration see decision U-I-4469/2008 et al. of 8 July 2013, nn. 30 f., NN 90/13 
(English translation available); decision U-I-4445/2008 et al. of 4 October 2011,  
NN 123/11 (English translation available). 
657  See for many ruling U-I-3558/2006 et al. of 6 July 2011, n. 12, NN 85/11 (English trans-
lation available); ruling U-I-4398/2008 et al. of 8 December 2008, n. 15,  
NN 142/10 (English translation available). 
658  Ruling U-I-1625/2014 et al. of 18 July 2014, n. 14, see above at fn. 622 and decision U-
I-1625/2014 of 30 March 2015, NN 40/15; ruling U-I-4405/2013 et al. of 18 July 2014, 
n. 22, NN 101/14 and decision U-I-4405/2013 of 31 March 2013, NN 41/15. 
659  Ruling U-I-897/2014 of 4 March 2014, n. 5, see above at fn. 631. 
660  Ruling U-I-4633/2010 of 28 October 2010, n. 5, NN 123/10 and decision U-I-4633/2010 
of 6 March 2012, see above at fn. 634. 
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3. Status of petitioners in review proceedings 
As has been shown, abstract review proceedings are primarily established as 
objective proceedings which serve for the assessment and the enforcement of 
the Constitution and the legal order against the legislative authorities. Never-
theless, the Croatian constitution-makers combined the review proceedings 
with a number of procedural elements which improve the procedural status of 
petitioners in judicial review proceedings. 
A. Obligation to complete proceedings 
Initially, the Constitutional Court was obliged to terminate proceedings if the 
procedural requirements were no longer met.661 Under this regime, amend-
ments of reviewed provisions were a frequent cause for the termination of re-
view proceedings.662 Since the enactment of the new CCL in 2002, cessations 
of the requirements during main proceedings do not have any impact on their 
completion anymore. Once the main review proceedings have been instituted, 
art. 57 para. 1 CCL obliges the Court to complete the assessment on the merits 
of the case and to issue a decision on the constitutionality or legality of a chal-
lenged provision. 
For petitioners who seek protection of their rights, the obligation of the Con-
stitutional Court to adopt a final judgment on their allegations can be of great 
importance.663 To consider are cases where a legal provision, which is con-
tested for being inconsistent with the Constitution, is amended or ceases to be 
valid during the review proceedings. Only on the basis of the declaratory de-
cision of the Court on the incompatibility of the contested provision with the 
Constitution, can the petitioners claim the reconsideration of individual acts 
which have been adopted in application of such a provision and therewith 
achieve protection.664 
B. Temporal limitation of proceedings 
The procedural regulations contain a particular temporal restriction addressed 
to the Constitutional Court itself. Art. 40 para. 2 CCL prescribes that the Court 
                                              
661  Art. 27 para. 1 CCL Croatia, NN 13/91. 
662  CRNIĆ, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, 3. 
663  See Venice Commission Document CDL-INF(2001)002, n. 21. 
664  See below pp. 130 f. 
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must institute proceedings within one year upon receipt of a proposal. Further-
more, art. 33 CCL prescribes a one year term for the adoption of decisions 
upon accepted proposals. These temporal limitations ensure a swift opening 
and rapid conduct of the review proceedings and the treatment of proposals 
within a reasonable time. 
However, these terms are criticized by the Venice Commission and in consti-
tutional doctrine for being unrealistic and inexpedient, particularly with re-
spect to the complexity of abstract review proceedings.665 The fact that the 
Court in practice normally transgresses these terms shows that these critiques 
prove to be true and that the deadlines are nothing more than instructions. 
C. Participatory rights in review proceedings 
a) Applicability of Convention standards for fair proceedings 
As a principle proceedings before the Croatian Constitutional Court are based 
on the inquisitorial model and non-adversarial. Facts of cases are accordingly 
established by the Constitutional Court alone and the assessment and decision-
making is conducted in closed sessions.666 Petitioners and applicants are, on 
the other hand, not vested with procedural rights and guarantees as are enjoyed 
by parties to proceedings. 
With respect to Croatia, the ECtHR confirmed the applicability of the Con-
vention standards for fair proceedings for constitutional complaint proceed-
ings at several instances.667 In judgment Juričić vs. Croatia it for instance es-
tablished a violation of the adversarial principle by the Constitutional Court 
for notifying the complainant about several requested expert opinions only 
after the proceedings had ended.668  
As has been shown, the ECtHR considers these standards to be applicable to 
judicial review proceedings only if a victim status of the applicants is given. 
Applicants must either be directly affected in their rights by a legislative act 
                                              
665  Venice Commission Document CDL(2000)97, n. 4 ; CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 
77 ff.  
666  See ARLOVIĆ, 11 f.; KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 21.1. 
667  See for instance judgments Peruško vs. Croatia, §§ 44–53; Čamovski vs. Croatia, §§ 38–
44; Slaviček vs. Croatia, 20862/02, 2002-VII, §§ 51–58. 
668  Judgment Juričić vs. Croatia, §§ 72–78. 
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or the review proceedings must be in close procedural relation with civil or 
criminal proceedings to which the applicant is participant.669  
b) Participatory rights of petitioners in review proceedings 
Components and rights considered to be structural elements of fair trials can 
be found in the procedural regulations on the review proceedings before the 
Croatian Constitutional Court. Irrespectively of their non-adversarial nature, 
the constitution-makers introduced procedural guarantees which ensure the 
right of petitioners to information and which allow their participation in on-
going proceedings at the discretion of the Court. 
Accordingly, every petitioner has a right to be informed about the acceptance 
or rejection of a proposal and about the course of the proceedings and to re-
ceive and consult all documents relevant for their outcome.670 Besides the dis-
closure of the filings, written opinions of scientific legal advisors other written 
observations of state bodies, this also encompasses the right to transcript and 
to copy the respective documentation. The right of information finally guar-
antees petitioners to receive decisions or rulings, in which the Court explains 
the reasons and demonstrates the legal foundations upon which its decisions 
are based. 
Although a claim right to personal presence and participation in the review 
sessions of the Constitutional Court is not guaranteed, petitioners can be op-
tionally invited to the proceedings. Because these are held as adversary pro-
ceedings, petitioners are allowed to participate and exert influence on the de-
cision-making.671 The Court can invite them to consultative sessions together 
with the legislative authorities concerned, legal scientists and experts. 
Art. 49 para. 1 CCL entitles the Court to do so if it considers such discussions 
necessary for passing a decision on the merits of the case. Petitioners can 
moreover be convoked at public hearings scheduled by the Court based on 
art. 50 para. 3 CCL. As shown above, the ECtHR confirmed that the particular 
nature of proceedings before constitutional courts justifies the exclusion of the 
public if the latter has been included sufficiently before lower judicial in-
stances who established the facts of the cases.672 Yet, the absence of regula-
tions prescribing the mandatory scheduling of public hearings in cases with 
                                              
669  For the relevant case-law of the ECtHR see above Chapter 1, pp. 37 f. 
670  Art. 43 para. 2 CCL Croatia and art. 93 para. 1 RoP Croatia. 
671  See KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 21.1. 
672  E.g. Juričić vs. Croatia, §§ 89 ff. 
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severe impacts on human rights has been criticized by the Venice Commission 
for being inconsistent with the ECHR standards.673 
D. Power to extend the scope of assessment  
In contrast to the Constitutional Court's restricted discretion in examining vi-
olations by individual acts, no such constraint to the scope of substantiations 
is prescribed for the review of laws or other regulations. Here, the Court can 
extend its review and exceed the scope of allegations of proposals or re-
quests.674 Of particular importance is its power to review laws or regulations 
even upon insufficient or unfounded substantiations, if it recognizes their in-
compatibility with the Constitution and laws based on other grounds. In indi-
vidual cases the Constitutional Court therefore reviewed contested provisions 
with respect to completely different or broader reasons than alleged by pro-
posal.675  
Principally, this extension of the review scope is a consequence of the objec-
tive protective purpose of abstract review proceedings which are based on the 
inquisitorial principle. On the other hand, it is also the result of the distinct 
power of the Croatian Constitutional Court to act at its own discretion. From 
the perspective of petitioners, the Court therewith enhances the chances of 
success of their petitions. This power can also be considered to enforce judi-
cial protection of applicants with difficulties to substantiate abstract normative 
inconsistencies. Yet as a rule, the Constitutional Court restricts its assessment 
to the allegations made and reviews contested provisions within the frame-
work of the reasons and arguments presented in the submittal.676 
4. Achievement of individual rights protection 
Besides the enhanced procedural status of petitioners, the Croatian constitu-
tion-makers additionally combined the judicial review proceedings with pro-
cedural means providing them with the possibility to achieve concrete legal 
benefits and the protection of their individual rights and liberties. 
                                              
673  Venice Commission Document CDL-INF(2001)002, n. 18. 
674  See also KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, nn. 20.3, 35.1. 
675  See to this effect ruling U-I-5553/2012 et al. of 4 November 2014, n. 15, NN 139/14; 
decision U-I-988/1998 et al. of 17 March 2010, n. 4, see above at fn. 616. 
676  See OMEJEC, Granice ovlasti, 1438; PINTARIĆ, 406. 
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A. Suspension of applicability of laws 
Already before passing a final decision, the Constitutional Court can tempo-
rarily suspend the execution of individual acts which are adopted on the basis 
of a contested law or act of legislation. By making use of this competence 
pursuant to art. 45 CCL, it eliminates the disadvantages arising from the non-
suspensive effect of submittals. It inhibits the application of potentially un-
constitutional laws already during the review proceedings if this is necessary 
to ensure legal certainty and to prevent the occurrence of grave and irreparable 
consequences.677 
Initially the Constitutional Court restricted itself to ordering the suspension of 
the execution of existing individual acts which were already adopted by the 
administrative and judicial bodies.678 This practice was criticized in legal the-
ory and by the Venice Commission, who suggested the extension of this power 
to the suspension of a law or legal provision, itself.679 The analysis of its newer 
practice shows that the Constitutional Court adopted a broader interpretation. 
It orders the suspension of the execution of all individual acts including those 
already adopted and such intended to be adopted on the basis of a reviewed 
legal provision680 or even of the entire contested law.681 
The possibility to temporarily suspend the applicability of a reviewed law is 
timely restricted to the duration of the main proceedings. The order of suspen-
sion depends on the admissibility of a proposal.682 The fact that the Constitu-
tional Court cannot suspend the applicability of legal provisions already upon 
the receipt of proposals is criticized for hampering the effective protection 
both of the legal order and of the petitioner's rights.683 Over and above, as 
suspension orders can be issued at the longest until the final decisions, they 
                                              
677  See justification in ruling U-I-3861/2013 of 16 July 2013, n. 7, NN 99/13. 
678  E.g. rulings U-II-538/1994 of 7 June 1994 and U-I-756/1996 et al. of 23 January 1997, 
NN 8/97. For a detailed description of the practice see CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog za-
kona, 124 ff. 
679  Venice Commission Document CDL-INF(2001)002, n. 20. 
680  E.g. ruling U-I-3861/2013 of 16 July 2013, n. 7, see above at fn. 677; ruling U-I-
1457/2013 of 11 April 2013, n. 5, NN 49/13. 
681  With respect to the Family Act see ruling U-I-3101/2014 of 12 January 2015, NN 5/15. 
682  E.g. ruling U-I-3117/2003 of 28 June 2006, n. 9, NN 89/06 (English translation available). 
683  For more details see CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 124 ff. 
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are only relevant if the Court decides to schedule separate proceedings for the 
review of contested provisions.684 
The Constitutional Court orders temporary suspensions either on its own ini-
tiative if it considers the requirements to be fulfilled,685 or upon respective 
requests of the petitioners. These requests must be submitted together with the 
proposal to initiate review proceedings. So as to substantiate their request, pe-
titioners must present reasons indicating the occurrence of grave and irrepara-
ble consequences by the execution of the act.686 
The Constitutional Court moreover emphasizes that its orders to temporarily 
suspend the applicability of reviewed legal provisions do not prejudge its final 
decision on their compatibility with the Constitution and the laws.687 Irrespec-
tively of the perspectives of success of proposals, it orders the temporary sus-
pension only if it considers the allegations of negative and irreparable conse-
quences as plausible. Because the CCL does not contain any concretizations 
regarding the nature and degree of such consequences, the Constitutional 
Court developed its own practice in this respect.688 In these decisions there is 
no evidence that the Constitutional Court takes into consideration and weighs 
up these consequences with possible detrimental effects of its orders of sus-
pension and other interests concerned. 
B. Legal effect of decisions 
Another essential factor for the effective protection of the petitioner's rights 
and liberties are the legal effects of the final decisions on the compliance of 
reviewed provisions with the Constitution and the laws. The Constitutional 
Court is accordingly empowered to issue different decisions with different le-
gal impacts.689 If it establishes a violation of the Constitution or the legal order, 
it abrogates reviewed laws or regulations with a mere legal effect for the future 
(ex nunc). Decisions to annul unconstitutional or unlawful regulations and 
                                              
684  E.g. decision U-I-4763/2012 et al. of 18 September 2013, n 4, NN 120/13; ruling U-I-
4763/2012 et al. of 3 April 2013, n. 6, NN 43/13. 
685  E.g. ruling U-I-3861/2013 of 16 July 2013, n. 7, above fn. 677. 
686  See e.g. explanation II of decision U-I-880/1997 et al. of 20 September 2000, NN 95/00. 
687  See SMERDEL, Ustavno uređenje Europske Hrvatske, 438. 
688  See e.g. ruling U-I-897/2014 of 4 March 2014, n. 6, see above at fn. 631; ruling U-I-
3861/2013 of 16 July 2013, n. 7, above fn. 677; ruling U-I-1457/2013 of 11 April 2013, 
n. 4, above fn. 680. 
689  Art. 131 Cst. Croatia and art. 55 CCL Croatia. For a detailed presentation of the relevant 
case law see KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 50. 
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other sub-legislative acts have a retroactive effect and deprive all final indi-
vidual acts adopted thereon from their legal basis (ex tunc). Furthermore, the 
Court can issue declaratory decisions so as to do justice to violations that con-
tinue to exist even after unconstitutional provisions ceased to be effective. 
Decisions to abrogate unconstitutional or unlawful legal provisions become 
legally valid with their publication in the Official Gazette. The provisions be-
come inapplicable to all pending administrative or judicial proceedings which 
have not yet been closed by final decision, while individual acts passed in 
application of it cannot be enforced anymore.690 The petitioners and all other 
persons addressed by the respective provisions are protected from violations 
of their rights which would occur by the application of such provisions.691 
The decision to abrogate unconstitutional regulations or to annul them with a 
retroactive effect is at the Constitutional Court's discretion.692 For petitioners 
seeking protection, this retroactive effect implies both a protection against fu-
ture interferences and the availability of a basis for claims against violations 
already suffered by the application of these provisions. However, the severe 
impact on legal certainty obliges the Constitutional Court to adopt a restraint 
approach in annulling unconstitutional regulations. The pertinent case-law ac-
cordingly indicates a respective reservation of the Court.693 
C. Reparation and compensation for violations suffered 
The Croatian Constitutional Court underlines that also abrogated legal provi-
sions violated the Constitution before their elimination. Accordingly, any per-
son who suffered negative consequences from the application of unconstitu-
tional provisions must be provided with means for legal protection.694 Irre-
spectively thereof whether the Court annuls or abrogates unconstitutional pro-
visions, petitioners are legally entitled to request reparation for violations suf-
fered by the application of such provisions.695 
                                              
690  Art. 55 para. 2 CCL Croatia. See CRNIĆ, Vladavina Ustava, 59. 
691  See CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 142 f.; OMEJEC, Legal effects, 154. 
692  See SMERDEL, Ustavno uređenje Europske Hrvatske, 439. Relativizing, ARLOVIĆ, 39. 
693  With respect to the Court's practice before 2001 see OMEJEC, Legal effects, 163 f. 
694  See decision U-III-86/2001 of 17 September 2003, n. 6, NN 159/03. 
695  Art. 57 para. 2, 58 paras. 1–3 and art. 60 CCL Croatia. 
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a) Request for reconsideration 
Reparation for violations suffered is granted by the right to request the renewal 
of proceedings in which rights violating individual acts have been adopted on 
the basis of unconstitutional or unlawful provision. The reconsideration of 
such acts requires a respective request by the persons concerned. The Court 
accordingly states that «without such an initiative, there is no possibility to 
interfere with the existing legal situation».696 Its final decisions to invalidate 
unconstitutional provisions and decisions, by which it declares the unconsti-
tutionality of provisions before they ceased to be effective, provide legal bases 
for the claim to renew the proceedings before the responsible authorities.697 
In cases where unconstitutional provisions are merely abrogated, only the pe-
titioners who gave the initiative for initiating review proceedings are entitled 
to request the reconsideration of individual acts adopted on the basis of these 
provisions. This entitlement can be seen as a reward for successful petitioners 
given that all other persons upon whom the abrogated provision has been ap-
plied but who remained inactive are excluded from the entitlement. This re-
striction is criticized with respect to an effective protection of constitutional 
rights and liberties.698 Only in exceptional cases, namely if contested legal 
provisions lose legal force already during the review proceedings, or if they 
constitute the legal basis for final sentences for criminal offences or if abro-
gated provisions violate human rights and liberties or discriminate individuals 
or groups, is the entitlement to request the reconsideration of final individual 
acts extended to all persons, whose rights have been violated by decisions or 
individual acts adopted on the basis of abrogated provisions.699 
The entitlement is restricted to persons whose rights and liberties have been 
violated by the application of unconstitutional provisions. The Court accord-
ingly excludes decisions on the formal unconstitutionality or illegality from 
constituting basis for claims of reconsideration.700 
Finally, the right to request the reconsideration of individual acts adopted on 
the basis of unconstitutional provisions is limited in time. Requests can be 
                                              
696  See decision U-III-17/1998 of 6 February 2002, n. 6, NN 34/02. 
697  CRNIĆ, Vladavina Ustava, 60 f.; IBID., Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 145 f., 150.  
698  CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 149; GIUNIO, 3. SMERDEL, Ustavno uređenje Eu-
ropske Hrvatske, 440 suggests that persons affected should be entitled to submit collec-
tive proposals for the initiation of review proceedings. 
699  Art. 57 para. 2 and 58 paras. 1 and 3 CCL Croatia. See ARLOVIĆ, 41. Critical, GIUNIO, 3. 
700  E.g. decision U-II-37/2006 et al. of 5 July 2011, n. 21, NN 89/11.  
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filed within six months from the day of publication of the Constitutional 
Court's decision and irrespectively of the instant the petitioner gains 
knowledge about the decision.701 
b) Request for reconsideration for the failure to apply 
regulations 
The right to request the reconsideration of final decisions is also granted for 
violations resulting from the failure of courts to apply regulations for errone-
ously considering them to be inconsistent with the Constitution and the 
laws.702 This particular entitlement is a consequence of their power to not ap-
ply regulations and other sub-legislative acts that they deem to be unconstitu-
tional or illegal based on art. 37 para. 2 CCL and to base their decisions di-
rectly on the law.703  
If the Constitutional Court finds no such unconstitutionality or illegality, the 
responsible court is considered to have violated the principle of legality and 
to have failed to protect the rights of the parties to the proceedings. While the 
proceedings correspond to the requests for reconsideration of individual acts 
adopted on the basis of unconstitutional laws, the entitlement comprises eve-
rybody whose rights have been violated by the refusal of the court to apply a 
regulation.704 Furthermore, the time limit to file respective requests amounts 
to one year after the publication of the Court's decision. 
c) Subsidiary request for compensation for damage 
If no redress can be achieved anymore by means of reconsideration of indi-
vidual acts, petitioners can request compensation for damages suffered.705 Re-
quests for compensation are submitted to a court of justice.706 Because of its 
subsidiary function as redress, the requirements regarding the entitlement cor-
respond to those for requests of reconsideration. 
 
                                              
701  CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 150 speaks of an «objective term». 
702  Art. 60 CCL Croatia. 
703  See above at Chapter 2, p. 77.  
704  CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 154. 
705  Art. 59 CCL Croatia. 
706  In contrast hereto, the Constitutional Court is responsible to order compensation in rela-
tion to constitutional complaints based on art. 62 para. 3 CCL. 
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II. Slovene petition to initiate review proceedings 
1. Introductory remarks 
Until the enactment of the CCA the right of everyone with a legal interest to 
access the Constitutional Court as guaranteed in art. 162 para. 2 Constitution 
served as basis for the Court for handling submittals filed by individual per-
sons.707 Its practice was implemented with the adoption of the CCA in 1994 
and concretized with the enactment of the new CCA in 2007. As to art. 24 
para. 1 CCA 
«[a]nyone who demonstrates legal interest may lodge a petition that the 
procedure for the review of the constitutionality or legality of regulations 
or general acts issued for the exercise of public authority be initiated.» 
Besides the requests of authorized applicants the submittal of petitions consti-
tutes one of two ways to initiate review proceedings against laws or other acts 
of legislation before the Slovene Constitutional Court. 
The legal term used for the Slovenian popular complaint, pobuda, can be lit-
erally translated as «initiative» or «petition». The terminology and the perti-
nent rules on the procedural effects indicate a non-committal nature. Art. 22 
para. 1 CCA accordingly prescribes that review proceedings are opened with 
the ruling of the Constitutional Court to accept such petitions for considera-
tion, while they are initiated directly with the submittal of a request of author-
ized applicants. In accordance with the Croatian proposal the decision to ini-
tiate the review proceedings is left to the discretion of the Court. Yet, also here 
rulings on the dismissal of petitions must include a statement of reasons just 
as is required for decisions.708 The Court is consequently obliged to assess 
every submittal with respect to the fulfilment of the procedural requirements 
and to decide whether or not to accept it for consideration.709 The formalized 
proceedings, in which such assessments take place, show an equal procedural 
effect of all submittals in practice. Even though petitioners must comply with 
more stringent requirements than qualified applicants the Slovene petition is 
more than a mere non-committal initiative or suggestion. 
                                              
707  MAVČIČ, Slovenian constitutional review, 54 f. 
708  Art. 26 para. 3 CCA Slovenia and art. 66 para. 1 RoP Slovenia. 
709  MAVČIČ, Individual complaint, 19. 
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On the other hand, there is no uniform opinion as to whether the petition con-
stitutes an actio popularis. According to one view, the necessity to demon-
strate a legal interest shows the intention of the constitution-makers to not 
provide for a popular complaint.710 Yet other scholars describe the petition as 
quasi actio popularis or quasi popular complaint, stating that, irrespectively 
of the requirement of a legal interest, the function of the petition corresponds 
to the actio popularis in its original form and the initiative under socialist 
rule.711 This view is shared by the Constitutional Court itself.712 
2. Admissibility requirements 
The initiation of review proceedings requires a ruling of the Constitutional 
Court by which it confirms the acceptance of petitions for consideration. The 
assessment of the fulfilment of the procedural conditions is conducted in pre-
liminary proceedings which serve the preparation of this ruling.713 So as to 
reduce the flood of applications an additional procedural step has been intro-
duced with art. 21a CCA and art. 37 and 38 RoP. In this «pre-procedure»,714 
the Secretary General of the Court preselects received petitions and eliminates 
manifestly inadmissible or evidently unsuccessful submittals and such from 
which «it cannot be expected that an important legal question will be re-
solved». 
Irrespectively of this predefined procedural order, the analysis of its case-law 
reveals a rather inconsistent practice of the Constitutional Court. The Court 
justified this fact by explaining that the different requirements could neither 
be ascertained in a strict order nor isolated from each other.715 In practice it 
principally starts with those deficiencies that are more evident than the others. 
Not least as consequence of this position it assesses both the admissibility and 
                                              
710  E.g. NERAD, Pravni interes, 72; TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 162, n. 20. 
711  MAVČIČ, Slovenian constitutional review, 92. This view can be found in foreign literature 
too, see BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 230; HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/ PACZOLAY, 
n. 76. 
712  See decision U-I-185/2010 and Up-1409/2010 of 2 February 2012, n. 14, Uradni list 
23/12 and OdlUS XIX, 33. 
713  TESTEN, Tehnike ustavnosodnega odločanja, 219. 
714  This terminology is used by the Court itself; see Annual Report 2011, 39.  
715  Ruling U-I-87/1999 of 8 July 1999, n. 10, Uradni list 60/99 and OdlUS VIII, 180 (English 
translation available). 
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the validity of the allegations of unconstitutionality or unlawfulness of a con-
tested provision in one and the same proceedings. 
A. Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court 
Like the Croatian Court also the Slovene Constitutional Court primarily as-
sesses whether it is competent to review contested acts in accordance with 
petitions received. Its powers to review acts of legislation are specified in 
art. 160 para. 1 indents 1 – 5 Constitution. As to art. 21 para. 3 CCA the review 
competence includes the assessment of the procedures in which laws or other 
acts of legislation have been adopted. The extensive scope of legislative acts 
subject to review vests the Constitutional Court with comprehensive powers 
for the enforcement of the hierarchy of the constitutional and legal order in 
Slovenia.716 The case-law and practice developed by the Court with respect to 
its jurisdiction is very comprehensive.  
a) Benchmarks for judicial review 
The Constitution constitutes the primary benchmark for the review of acts of 
legislation. Besides, the constitutional order in Slovenia encompasses all nor-
mative acts and provisions of constitutional relevance, comprising constitu-
tional acts on the implementation and on amendments of the Constitution, fun-
damental Constitutional Charters of importance for the constitutional system 
and the transition of Slovenia,717 and such regulating human rights and minor-
ity rights. On the other hand, the CCA of the Constitutional Court is enacted 
by the National Assembly by simple majority and constitutes a formal law and 
no benchmark for legislative authorities.718 
Laws are benchmarks for regulations and other general acts of authorities of 
the state and local communities. In consistent practice the Constitutional 
Courts defines laws on the basis of formal criteria such as their denomination 
and their enactment in procedures prescribed for legislation.719 As only excep-
tion the Court considers the Standing Orders of the National Assembly and the 
National Council720 as formal law based on purely substantial criteria, because 
                                              
716  TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 2. 
717  E.g. the Basic Constitutional Charter on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Repub-
lic of Slovenia of 25 June 1991, Uradni list 1/9. 
718  Art. 86 in combination with art. 162 para. 1 Cst. Slovenia. 
719  TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 7: NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 8. 
720  TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 8; NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 12. 
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of their external legal effect regulating legislative procedures and the relation 
to other state organs.721 In contrast to Croatia the Slovenian legal order does 
not know any hierarchy between laws, no matter whether they are enacted by 
qualified majority.722 The Court only takes into consideration the higher dem-
ocratic legitimacy in case of an inconsistency between formal laws.723  
International treaties constitute benchmarks for laws and other acts of legisla-
tion. The normative precedence of international law is guaranteed as funda-
mental principle in art. 8 Constitution. Based on the monist system interna-
tional law is self-executing and awarded precedence over all domestic laws.724 
International human rights treaties are even considered to have constitutional 
rank.725 The precedence over domestic laws applies to ratified international 
agreements only, while agreements binding for Slovenia through membership 
in international or supranational organizations, such as secondary EU law, are 
no benchmark for laws.726 On the other hand, Slovenia acknowledges the prec-
edence of general principles of international law over domestic laws and there-
with their validity as benchmarks for judicial review.727 
Finally, regulations serve as benchmarks for the review of general acts enacted 
by non-governmental bodies. 
b) Objects of judicial review 
aa) Constitutional law 
As a rule, the Constitutional Court refuses to review acts of a constitutional 
nature. In reference to the lack of competence it rejects requests and petitions 
                                              
721  See e.g. decision U-I-40/1996 of 3 April 1997, n. 3, Uradni list 24/97 and OdlUS VI, 46 
(English translation available). 
722  KRIVIC, 61 f.; TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 6. 
723  NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 6; TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 6. 
724  See decision U-I-6/1993 of 1 April 1994, n. 5, Uradni list 23/94 and OdlUS III, 3. 
725  See art. 15 para. 1 Cst. Slovenia. In relation to the ECHR see ruling Up-43/1996 of 
30 May 2009, n. 12, OdlUS IX, 141. 
726  Decision U-I-238/2007 of 2 April 2009, n. 60, Uradni list 32/09 and OdlUS XVIII, 13. 
For more details see GRASELI, Komentar Ustave art. 8, nn. 2 and 6. 
727  See e.g. decision U-I-60/2006 et al. of 7 December 2006, n. 56, Uradni list 1/07 and Od-
lUS XV, 84 (English translations available); decision U-I-248/1996 of 30 September 
1998, n. 17, Uradni list 76/98 and OdlUS VII, 176 (English translation available). 
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to review the conformity of the Constitution with ratified international trea-
ties.728 In contrast to its Croatian counterpart the Slovene Court refuses both 
to review the content of constitutional provisions and to assess their adop-
tion.729 This restrictive approach is criticized by scholars who acknowledge a 
supra-constitutional rank of provisions regulating procedures for constitu-
tional amendments.730 The Constitutional Court itself has not (yet) acknowl-
edged such an inner hierarchy of constitutional provisions. 
bb) International treaties 
While the Constitutional Court refuses to review ratified international treaties, 
it derives its competence to review domestic acts of ratification from its power 
to ensure the constitutionality of the internal legal order.731 In accordance with 
its Croatian counterpart the Slovene Court assesses whether these acts of rat-
ification were enacted in accordance with the constitutionally prescribed pro-
ceedings.732 Even though there are indications that it accepts its competence 
to review the substantial compatibility of ratification acts with the Constitu-
tion,733 the Court has not yet explicitly confirmed this.734 
It is important to note at this point that the right of individuals to petition does 
not apply to the power of the Constitutional Court to preliminary review of 
international treaties. Given the political impact, this entitlement is restricted 
to the political organs.735  
cc) Formal laws 
Also the Slovene Constitutional Court is predominantly requested to review 
the constitutionality of laws. As shown, the Court applies formal criteria in 
establishing whether or not a challenged act is to be considered as law.736 
These requirements are fulfilled by the CCA737 and by any other act designated 
                                              
728  Opinion Rm-1/1997 of 5 June 1997, n. 12, see above at fn. 392. 
729  See e.g. ruling U-I-7/2015 of 23 September 2015, n. 2, not published. 
730  TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 11; NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 3. 
731  For more details see ŠKRK, 89 f.; NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 51. 
732  E.g. ruling U-I-128/1998 of 23 September 1998, n. 6, OdlUS VII, 173. 
733  See ruling U-I-128/1998 of 23 September 1998, n. 6, OdlUS VII, 173. 
734  See NERAD, Pravni interes, 59; ŠKRK, 92.  
735  Opinion Rm-1/1997 of 5 June 2007, n. 16, see above at fn. 392. See also NERAD, Komen-
tar Ustave art. 160, n. 49; ŠKRK, 89. 
736  Above pp. 135 f. 
737  E.g. ruling U-I-60/2011 et al. of 14 February 2013, Uradni list 19/13. 
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as law and enacted in proceedings prescribed for legislating. In contrast to its 
Croatian counterpart the Slovene Court refuses to review authoritative inter-
pretations of laws independently from the respective legal norm.738 It only 
does so when it considered interpretations as abusive for entailing hidden 
amendments or supplements and for not having been enacted in the proceed-
ings prescribed for legislation.739 
The Slovene Constitution does not provide for governmental decrees with the 
force of law. Only the President of the Republic is entitled to issue regulations 
with the force of law if the Assembly is not able to convene during states of 
emergency or war.740 Such presidential decrees constitute valid objects of con-
stitutional review. Yet, to the knowledge of the author, the Constitutional Court 
did not have the opportunity yet to decide in this regard.  
dd) Regulations and other general acts 
The Constitutional Court also reviews regulations and other sub-legislative 
acts on the state and the community level, which as to art. 153 para. 3 Consti-
tution must be in conformity with the Constitution and the laws. The Court 
verifies its power to review regulations based on mere substantial features.741 
The provision must be general and abstract and relate to an unspecified circle 
of addressees. Besides, it must be of a normative nature and have an external 
legal impact.742 It is noteworthy that regulations are put on the same level in 
the domestic normative hierarchy no matter whether they are enacted by state 
authorities or organs of local self-government and that they can only be re-
viewed with respect to their compliance with the Constitution, binding inter-
national law and the laws.743 
In its twenty-five years of activity the Court established a comprehensive case-
law in this respect. It considers as regulations general acts which are passed 
                                              
738  E.g. decision U-I-128/2011 of 14 February 2013, n. 8; Uradni list 20/13. 
739  Decision U-I-51/2006 of 15 June 2006, n. 12, Uradni list 66/06 and OdlUS XV, 53; deci-
sion U-I-201/2002 of 17 December 2003, n. 7, Uradni list 133/03 and OdlUS XII, 99. 
740  Art. 92 para. 3 and art. 108 para. 2 Cst. Slovenia. 
741  For a detailed analysis see TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, nn. 14 ff.; NERAD, Komen-
tar Ustave art. 160, nn. 15 ff. 
742  See e.g. ruling U-I-245/2013 of 14 November 2013, n. 2, not published; ruling U-I-
378/1996 of 16 January 1997, n. 2, OdlUS VI, 5. 
743  NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 160, nn. 20 f.; TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 18. 
Chapter 3: Popular complaints in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia 
140 
 
by the National Assembly outside of proceedings for legislating.744 Mainly, 
however, the Court acknowledges as such governmental and administrative 
acts adopted by bodies with executive powers.745 Also resolutions adopted by 
other state organs such as the Bank of Slovenia or the National Electoral Com-
mission are recognized as regulations if they fulfil the established material 
conditions.746  
In practice the Court rejects a considerable number of petitions and requests 
filed against governmental acts for not meeting the established criteria. This 
applies to acts that are of a concrete and individual nature,747 that regulate the 
internal organization or matters748 or lack a normative effect.749 
ee) General acts issued for the exercise of public authority 
The review power of the Slovene Constitutional Court also explicitly com-
prises general acts adopted by non-governmental bodies and persons, who are 
vested with specific public authorities and the competence to issue general 
regulations in relation to their public assignment.750 The addition «for the ex-
ercise of public authority» explicitly excludes private law acts.751  
As to the criteria developed by the Constitutional Court such acts must regu-
late rights and duties of legal subjects in a general manner and have a norma-
tive effect.752 Additionally, they must have obtained legal force by publication 
                                              
744  E.g. decision U-I-34/1993 et al. of 19 October 1994, Uradni list 74/94 and OdlUS III, 115 
(English translation available). 
745  E.g. decision U-I-173/2011 of 23 May 2013, n. 9, Uradni list 49/13. ŠTURM, Komentar 
Ustave art. 153, nn. 9 ff.; TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 17. 
746  E.g. ruling U-I-109/1992 of 11 November 1993, Uradni list 65/93 and OdlUS II, 100 
(English translation available). 
747  See for many ruling U-I-217/2014 of 17 December 2014, n. 6, not published; ruling U-I-
43/2002 of 21 March 2002, n. 13, Uradni list 28/02, 85/02, OdlUS XI, 165. 
748  E.g ruling U-I-213/2014 of 8 January 2015, n. 3, not published; decision U-I-169/2003 of 
19 May 2005, n. 12, Uradni list 54/05 and OdlUS XIV, 28. 
749  E.g. ruling U-I-280/2005 of 18 January 2007, n. 14, Uradni list 10/07 and OdlUS XVI, 7. 
750  Art. 160 para. 1 indent 5 Cst. Slovenia and art. 21 para. 1 indent 5 CCA Slovenia. See e.g. 
ruling U-I-8/2003 of 13 February 2003, n. 3, not published; decision U-I-251/2000 of 23 
May 2002, n. 8, Uradni list 50/02 and OdlUS XI, 86. 
751  MAVČIČ, Zakon o Ustavnem sodišču, 159; TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 19. 
752  See e.g. ruling U-I-230/2011 of 26 June 2012, n. 5, not published; ruling U-I-297/2008 
of 7 April 2011, Uradni list 30/11 and OdlUS XIX, 20. 
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in the Official Gazette.753 Requiring the cumulative fulfilment of these condi-
tions, the Constitutional Court adopts a restrictive practice in accepting its 
competence to review general acts of non-governmental bodies.754 
It is worth noting that the power of the Constitutional Court to review general 
acts of non-governmental bodies or persons also with respect to their compli-
ance with regulations is criticized in legal theory. It is not only considered as 
an interference with the jurisdiction of the judiciary but also as risk of an even 
more excessive workload for the Court.755 Yet, owing to its restrictive ap-
proach, the review of such general acts does not have a great practical signif-
icance.  
ff) Legislative acts without legal force 
With the exception of its power to review international treaties before their 
ratification, the Constitutional Court considers itself competent to review only 
legally valid legislative provisions. However, the CCA allows the review of 
invalid acts in exceptional cases.  
Based on art. 47 CCA the Court reviews acts of legislation which ceased to be 
effective. In contrast to Croatia this review competence is not restricted in 
time. Petitioners must demonstrate a need for legal protection because of the 
persistence of harmful consequences even after a provision lost its legal va-
lidity and their legal interest to achieve legal redress.756 This requires that the 
Court’s decision can effectively lead to the improvement of the petitioner's 
legal position.757 In this respect it is free to determine whether its decision, by 
which it declares the unconstitutionality of a provision during its legal validity, 
has a mere future legal effect as abrogation or whether it is annulled with a 
retrospective effect.758 As a rule, the Constitutional Court declares a reviewed 
provision as annulled if it has already been applied by a final decision.759 This 
                                              
753  E.g. decision U-I-251/2000 of 23 May 2002, n. 4, see above at fn. 750. 
754  NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 22. 
755  See KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, fn. 5; TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 21. 
756  MAVČIČ, Zakon o Ustavnem sodišču, 266. 
757  Decision U-I-296/1996 of 19 March 1998, n. 10, Uradni list 42/98 and OdlUS VII, 53. 
758  The legal effects of its decisions are specified in art. 45 paras. 2 and 3 CCA Slovenia. 
759  See e.g. decision U-I-239/2004 of 19 October 2006, n. 6, Uradni list 112/06 and OdlUS 
XV, 74. 
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provides petitioners with a basis for their request of reconsideration and 
change of the final decision.760 
As its Croatian counterpart also the Slovene Constitutional Court refuses to 
review laws and regulations that have not entered into legal force, for instance, 
because the referendum deadline did not expire yet.761 On the other hand, it 
accepted its competence to review laws and regulations that have been pub-
lished but have not yet entered into legal force.762 Only if it considers the fail-
ure to publish a general act as misuse of legislative powers or as result of a 
wrong interpretation does the Constitutional Court review unpublished gen-
eral acts as well.763 
gg) Lack of review competence 
Also the Slovene Constitutional Court is faced with numerous petitions and 
requests to review acts or to decide on legal issues outside its jurisdiction.  
As a principle it refuses to review legal gaps and legislative omissions by re-
ferral to the responsibility of the judiciary to fill them according to the estab-
lished methods of interpretation. It only reviews omissions based on art. 48 
CCA if it considers them as unconstitutional. This is the case if a regulation is 
necessary in a specific field and the existing loophole cannot be filled by in-
terpretation,764 or if the failure to regulate impedes the realization and exercise 
of human rights and liberties.765  
Besides, the Constitutional Court rejects numerous petitions to review the mu-
tual compatibility of acts of the same hierarchical rank.766 However, also here 
the Court acknowledged that such incompatibilities can amount to violations 
                                              
760  E.g. decision U-I-396/1996 of 7 November 1996, n. 7, Uradni list 66/96 and OdlUS V, 
145. See below pp. 167 ff. 
761  See ruling U-I-55/2015 of 22 June 2015, n. 3, not published. 
762 E.g. ruling U-I-234/1998 of 16 July 1999, OdlUS VII, 154. 
763  See for many decision U-I-357/2007 et al. of 15 May 2008, nn. 19 f., Uradni list 73/01 
and OdlUS XVII, 19. 
764  E.g. decision U-I-50/2011 of 23 June 2011, n. 17, Uradni list 55/11 and OdlUS XIX, 24. 
765  See e.g. decision U-I-345/2002 of 14 November 2002, n. 8, Uradni list 105/02 and OdlUS 
XI, 230 (English translation available). 
766  See for many decision U-I-244/2014 of 10 September 2015, n. 10, Uradni list 69/15; de-
cision U-I-245/2001 of 12 February 2004, n. 7, Uradni list 19/04 and OdlUS XIII, 9. 
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of the rule of law and other constitutional principles.767 It requires that peti-
tioners explicitly outline the inconsistency and substantiate their allegations 
with a violation of the rule of law.768 
The Slovene Constitutional Court rejects to carry out activities that exceed its 
powers to the extent reserved to the jurisdiction of the other state organs. By 
invoking the primary jurisdiction of the judiciary it refuses to review the ap-
plication or implementation of contested laws or regulations and to give con-
sultations with respect to their implementation or interpretation.769 As sign of 
judicial self-restraint towards the legislator, the Constitutional Court moreover 
refuses to assess laws or regulations with respect their expediency or appro-
priateness. It invokes the indispensability of political discretion for finding 
appropriate political solutions on the basis and within the framework of the 
constitutional principles and objectives.770 In order not to interfere with this 
political discretion, it rejects petitions for being filed out of mere dissatisfac-
tion with prescribed rules. It acknowledges a broad scope of political discre-
tion with respect to regulations of economic significance,771 on social rela-
tions772 and to such prescribing procedures for democratic law-making.773 
Only if such provisions undermine the constitutionally guaranteed rights does 
the Court accept its competence to review.774 The same finally applies to defi-
ciencies such as technical or editorial corrections, to typographical errors and 
terminological inconsistencies, which the Court reviews only if it considers 
them to be constitutionally relevant.775  
                                              
767  E.g. decision U-I-227/2000 14 February 2002, n. 19, Uradni list 100/00, 62/01, 23/02 and 
OdlUS XI, 23. For more details, see TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 5. 
768  See e.g. decision U-I-281/2009 of 22 November 2011, n. 19, Uradni list 105/11 and Od-
lUS XIX, 29. 
769  E.g. ruling U-I-59/2014 and Up-1122/2012 of 15 October 2015, n. 7, Uradni list 82/15; 
decision U-I-267/2006 et al. of 15 March 2007, n. 31, Uradni list 29/07 and OdlUS XVI, 
20. 
770  See decision U-I-36/2000 of 11 December 2003, n. 14, Uradni list 133/03 and OdlUS XII, 
98. 
771  E.g. ruling U-I-243/2012 of 18 October 2012, nn. 3 ff., not published. 
772  E.g. decision U-I-36/2000 of 11 December 2003, nn. 14 f., see above at fn. 770. 
773  E.g. ruling U-I-276/2012 and Up-1018/2012 of 7 March 2013, n. 6, not published. 
774  See ruling U-I-276/2012 of 7 March 2013, n. 6, see above at fn. 773. 
775  Decision U-I-175/2003 of 7 April 2005, nn. 7 f., Uradni list 46/05 and OdlUS XIV, 18. 
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B. Requirement of a legitimate interest 
The Slovene right to petition for the initiation of review proceedings differs 
considerably from the initiative provided during socialist rule and from the 
proposals in Croatia and Macedonia. In contrast to these forms of unrestricted 
access the accessibility of the Slovene Constitutional Court to individuals is 
considerably more limited. 
a) Preliminary remarks 
Already from the beginning of its activity in 1991 the Constitutional Court 
refused to take petitions into consideration if applicants failed to demonstrate 
a personal legal interest in bringing proceedings before the Court.776 With 
art.  24 para. 2 CCA the demonstration of a legitimate interest was introduced 
explicitly as a requirement for the right to petition for the initiation of judicial 
review.  
The existence of a legal interest to review a contested act of legislation has the 
legal nature of a procedural condition.777 Further than that, the pertinent case-
law of the Slovene Constitutional Court does not reveal a clear answer as to 
the function of legal interest as mere admissibility requirement for the submit-
tal of complaints or as a requirement for the procedural legitimacy of the ap-
plicant and their status as party to the proceedings.778 The Court’s rigid inter-
pretation of legitimate interest is seen as a trend towards a growing under-
standing of this requirement as prerequisite for procedural legitimacy.779 This 
interpretation is supported by the requirement that the legal interest must not 
only be given at the time of the submittal of the petition but for the entire 
duration of the review proceedings. The Constitutional Court is therefore 
obliged to terminate the proceedings if this interest ceases to exist owing to 
changed legal or factual circumstances before it passes its final decision.780  
As a consequence of the double objective of the legitimate interest as guaran-
tee of access and as procedural requirement, the discretion of the legislator 
                                              
776  Ruling U-I-59/1991 of 27 February 1992, OdlUS I, 12 (English translations available). 
777  E.g. NERAD, Pravni interes, 42 ff.; MAVČIČ, Zakon o Ustavnem sodišču, 174. 
778  See SLADIČ, 55; ZOBEC, 1090. The two functions of legal interest have been explained 
above in Chapter 1, pp. 12 f. 
779  For a profound discussion on the functions of legal interest in Slovenia see ZOBEC, 1088 
ff.; SLADIČ, 19 ff. and esp. 43 ff. 
780  E.g. ruling U-I-97/2008 of 28 January 2009, n. 3, not published; ruling U-I-279/1995 of 
18 January 1996, n. 3, OdlUS V, 7. 
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and the Constitutional Court in implementing and interpreting this legal insti-
tute is considerably restricted. They both face the challenge to find a balanced 
solution of a limited accessibility without thwarting individual access to con-
stitutional adjudication. Accordingly, the requirement of the legitimate interest 
has been concretized and developed continuously since the enactment of the 
Constitution in 1991. Besides the statutory changes, the most significant con-
tribution is to be accorded to the adoption of a rigid interpretation by the Con-
stitutional Court itself.  
b) Legal nature of the interest 
The interest of the petitioner must be of a legal nature. The Constitutional 
Court states that 
 «a legal interest is demonstrated if the impugned legal document affects the 
initiator’s rights, obligations or legal benefits […]».781  
Therewith, the Court excludes petitions filed based on purely personal senti-
ments.782 It also rejects numerous petitions for concerns considered as purely 
political,783 financial,784 or commercial.785 It also rejects several petitions be-
cause the alleged legal interests do not exist anymore at the time of their re-
ceipt.786 
Noteworthy is the principle rejection of petitions filed by state authorities with 
regard to their constitutionally guaranteed competences. While the Constitu-
tional Court considers decisions of the legislator to extend or restrict these 
powers as political,787 it acknowledges a legal interest if contested legal pro-
visions interfere with the constitutionally guaranteed independence of these 
authorities.788 The Court accordingly accepted a petition filed by the Interior 
                                              
781  (Punctuation added). Ruling U-I-24/1993 of 27 May 1993, Uradni list 35/93 and OdlUS 
II, 50 (English translation available). 
782  E.g. ruling U-I-136/1992 of 11 February 1993, OdlUS II, 16 (English translation availa-
ble); ruling U-I-92/2009 of 22 April 2011, n. 7, not published. 
783  E.g. ruling U-I-123/1996 of 20 June 1996, n. 2, OdlUS V, 105. 
784  E.g. ruling U-I-165/2011 of 3 May 2012, n. 4, not published. 
785  E.g. ruling U-I-161/1994 of 13 October 1994, OdlUS III, 110. 
786  See e.g. ruling U-I-85/2011 of 24 January 2014, n. 3, not published; decision U-I-28/2011 
of 24 October 2013, n. 8, Uradni list 98/13. 
787  E.g. ruling U-I-190/1999 of 29 June 2000, n. 3, OdlUS IX, 183. See also MAVČIČ, Zakon 
o Ustavnem sodišču, 178. TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 162, n. 28. 
788  NERAD, Pravni interes, 45, 55. 
Chapter 3: Popular complaints in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia 
146 
 
Minister, who claimed that the prescribed surveillance by the Assembly over 
its activities was incompatible with the principle of separation of powers.789 
c) Personal nature of the interest 
aa) Consistent practice of the Constitutional Court 
Already in its early practice the Constitutional Court emphasized that the legal 
interest of petitioners must be personal. It held that 
«[t]he legal interest must be individual and not a general and abstract in-
terest, in defence of which any individual could appeal. The attribute of 
initiator can thus only be held by a person who successfully demonstrates 
that the impugned legal document defines his own rights, obligations or 
legal benefit.»790  
The Court thus requires petitioners to demonstrate a qualified personal interest 
in comparison to the general legal interest of citizens and the society in the 
compliance of laws with the constitutional order.791 Petitioners who are not 
personally addressed by a challenged law or regulation cannot demonstrate a 
personal legal interest.792 The Constitutional Court even considers general al-
legations of unequal treatment as insufficient.793 Because the personal nature 
excludes submittals of petitions on behalf of third persons, legal representa-
tives must present an explicit authorization to act on behalf of their clients.794  
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court strictly differentiates between the legal 
subjectivity and interests of legal entities and their members and employees. 
Local communities, political parties or societal associations who file petitions 
against laws or acts of legislation must demonstrate that these interfere with 
                                              
789  Decision U-I-383/1998 of 21 September 2000, n. 6, Uradni list 100/00 and OdlUS IX, 
210. See e.g. also ruling U-I-281/2004 of 4 November 2004, n. 4, not published. 
790  (Italics added). Ruling U-I-163/1992 of 18 March 1993, OdlUS II, 29; ruling U-I-
159/1992 of 18 March 1993, OdlUS II, 27 (English translation available). 
791  See for many ruling U-I-155/1994 of 9 November 1994, n. 3, OdlUS III, 121 (English 
translations available).  
792  See for instance ruling U-I-197/2012 of 5 June 2013, n. 2, not published; ruling U-I-
209/2011 of 9 February 2011, n. 5, not published. 
793  Ruling U-I-279/2002 of 19 September 2002, n. 3, OdlUS XI, 183. See NERAD, Pravni 
interes, 47 f. 
794  See for many ruling U-I-130/2015 of 19 November 2015, n. 3, not published. 
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their own legal positions.795 Altruistic petitions filed by associations on behalf 
of their members are only accepted for consideration in two particular cases: 
On the one hand, this applies to petitions filed by associations, which were 
founded exactly with the purpose to protect the rights and interests of their 
members at stake. The mere fact that these associations operate for human 
rights protection in a general interest does not suffice.796 Altruistic petitions 
can moreover be filed by environmental organisations for the protection of the 
environment as public good, if they were founded with the explicit purpose to 
protect the particular environmental matters at stake.797 
bb) Broader understanding in exceptional cases 
In certain cases the Constitutional Court adopts a broader understanding of the 
personal nature and acknowledges that a strict differentiation between per-
sonal and general interests is not feasible. 
Noteworthy in this context is its case-law with respect to petitions filed against 
violations of democratic rights of citizens to participate in the exercise of pub-
lic power and in legislative proceedings. If legislative authorities disregard 
election proceedings or fail to schedule popular votes in accordance with the 
proceedings prescribed for legislating, the Court recognizes a personal interest 
of all voters.798 For the same reasons it also eliminated a decision of the Na-
tional Assembly to schedule a referendum vote during holidays and only three 
weeks before the elections to the EU Parliament.799 
Another example of an exceptionally broader interpretation of the personal 
interest is the Court’s very controversial decision on the reintroduction of a 
                                              
795  E.g. decision U-I-129/2010 of 10 November 2011, n. 4, Uradni list 95/11; ruling U-I-
131/1994 of 16 March 1995, n. 3, OdlUS IV, 28 (English translation available).  
796  See for many ruling U-I-165/2014 of 17 September 2014, n. 3, not published; decision 
U-I-240/2010 of 16 May 2013, n. 6, Uradni list 47/13; decision U-I-296/2002 of 20 No-
vember 2003, n. 6, Uradni list 68/94 and OdlUS XIII, 41 (English translation available); 
decision U-I-246/2002 of 3 April 2004, n. 10, Uradni list 36/03 and OdlUS XII, 24.   
797  See e.g. decision U-I-43/2013 of 9 October 2014, n. 6, Uradni list 35/13, 76/14; ruling U-
I-304/2011 of 10 January 2013, n. 5, not published. 
798  See for many decision U-I-262/1997 of 22 October 1997, n. 4, Uradni list 67/97 and Od-
lUS VI, 134 (English translation available); ruling U-I-45/2009 of 12 March 2009, n. 4, 
Uradni list 22/09 and OdlUS XVIII, 11.  
799  Decision U-I-76/2014 of 17 April 2014, n. 30, Uradni list 26/14, 28/14. 
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«Tito street» in Ljubljana.800 Because of the highly symbolic value of the name 
Tito, standing for a regime of gross human rights violations, the Constitutional 
Court not only acknowledged a personal interest of political prisoners but of 
all citizens with regard to their right to human dignity.801  
Finally, a less rigid interpretation of personal concern can also be found with 
respect to building and zone plans contested for violating the right to a healthy 
living environment.802  
d) Concrete legal interest 
As further criteria the Constitutional Court requires petitioners to demonstrate 
a concrete legal interest in bringing judicial review proceedings. This requires 
the proof of a concretely existing need for protection against present or against 
imminent violations by a legal act.803 Allegations that the contested provision 
might one day negatively interfere with the petitioners' legal status are rejected 
by the Constitutional Court as merely hypothetical or speculative.804 
e) Direct nature of the legal interest 
aa) Immediate legal effect of legal provisions 
In almost every ruling by which the Constitutional Court rejects petitions it 
states that 
«[t]he petitioner does not have a legal interest, if he does not prove that the 
challenged provision directly interferes with his legal position.» 
While the evaluation of a direct legal interest belongs to its main occupations 
in assessing the admissibility of petitions, this requirement has been subject to 
the most comprehensive changes. Given the general and abstract nature of 
                                              
800  Decision U-I-109/2010 of 26 September 2011, Uradni list 78/11 and OdlUS XIX, 26 
(English translation available). Note as well the dissenting opinion to this decision. 
801  Decision U-I-109/2010, nn. 4 and 6 ff., see above at fn. 800. 
802  See e.g. decision U-I-315/1997 of 16 March 2000, n. 23, Uradni list 13/98, 31/00 and 
OdlUS IX, 57; decision U-I-30/1995 of 21 December 1995, n. 9, Uradni list 3/96 and 
OdlUS IV, 126 (English translation available). 
803  See decision U-I-425/2006 of 2 July 2007, Uradni list 55/09 and OdlUS XVIII, 29; deci-
sion U-I-125/1995 of 3 December 1998, Uradni list 1/99 and OdlUS VII, 215 (English 
translation available). 
804  See for many ruling U-I-242/2012 of 10 January 2013, n. 4, not published; ruling U-I-
10/1996 of 27 February 1997, n. 4, OdlUS VI, 28. 
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legislative acts, the Constitutional Court recognizes a direct legal effect for 
individuals only under strict conditions. Accordingly, the proof of an immedi-
ate effect requires that a provision 
«imposes a clear and unambiguous obligation which does not need any 
interpretation and which is not conditional upon the adoption of a further 
regulation or the issuing of an individual act.»805  
This for instance applies to provisions which restrict rights and liberties to an 
extent that undermines their essence.806 Illustrative are several communal de-
crees, which were invalidated by the Constitutional Court for declaring parcels 
in private ownership as public streets.807  
Typically however, legislative provisions leave a margin of appreciation for 
their application onto the concrete actual and legal circumstances of each in-
dividual case. Initially the Constitutional Court acknowledged a direct legal 
interest only if petitioners contested such legislative acts in relation to a con-
crete individual act passed in their application.808 As consequence of the con-
siderable amount of petitions received, the Constitutional Court adopted an 
ever more rigid approach809 and finally changed its practice in 2007. 
bb) Adoption of rigid interpretation 
By a fundamental change of practice in 2007 the Constitutional Court predi-
cated the demonstration of a direct legal interest on the submittal of a consti-
tutional complaint against the individual act passed in application of the con-
tested legal provision.810 Shortly after the Court confirmed this practice by 
invoking its indispensability for the realization of the primary constitutional 
responsibility of the judiciary to protect the Constitution.811 It emphasized that 
the required immediacy of the legal interest would not restrict its accessibility 
                                              
805  SLADIČ, 37 f.; ZOBEC, 1095 f.  
806  SLADIČ, 42 f.; ZOBEC, 1097 f. 
807  E.g. decision U-I-156/2013 of 4 June 2015, Uradni list 43/15; decision U-I-194/2012 of 
24 April 2014, n. 8, Uradni list 33/14. For other illustrative examples see decision U-I-
37/2012 of 8 May 2014, n. 4, Uradni list 36/14; decision U-I-73/2012 of 6 March 2014, 
n. 4, Uradni list 19/14. 
808 See e.g. ruling U-I-8/1994 of 30 June 1994, para. 3, OdlUS III, 78 (English translation 
available). For more details see NERAD, Pravni interes, 48 ff. 
809  Ruling U-I-74/2003 of 23 October 2003, nn. 5 f., Uradni list 108/03 and OdlUS XII, 84. 
Critical to this change of practice NERAD, Pravni interes, 67 f. 
810  Ruling U-I-325/2005 of 27 September 2007, n. 3, Uradni list 91/07 and OdlUS XVI, 72. 
811  This explanation can also be found in the Court's Annual Report of 2007, 24. 
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to individuals but postpone it to the moment when they could not achieve pro-
tection by the courts any more.812 By confirming this new practice in several 
following rulings,813 the Constitutional Court corroborated the definite change 
in interpreting the requirement of direct legal interest. 
As a result of this change of practice petitions filed against laws and other acts 
of legislation and constitutional complaints as remedies against rights violat-
ing individual acts must correlate with each other both in a procedural and in 
a contextual aspect. This is shown by the fact that the Court assesses the ad-
missibility of both remedies in one and the same proceedings and decides on 
their merits as «related matters» by one and the same ruling or decision.814 
Accordingly, the applicant bears the burden of proof that  
«a possible approval of the petition would lead to an improvement of his 
legal position.»815 
cc) Prospect of improvement of the legal position 
So as to substantiate the required prospect of improvement petitioners must 
not only fulfil the admissibility requirements for filing petitions but, addition-
ally, they must meet the requirements for the admissibility of constitutional 
complaints. In practice this has aggravated individual access to the Constitu-
tional Court of Slovenia to a considerable extent.  
A frequent reason for the rejection of petitions is the failure of applicants to 
submit constitutional complaints together with the petitions. Besides, petitions 
are often rejected for being submitted after constitutional complaints have 
been approved by the Constitutional Court or dismissed for being un-
founded.816 Noteworthy are the cases in which petitions are filed against legal 
provisions, for instance on the reduction of state benefits or the raise taxes or 
charges, before these provisions are adopted by individual acts, which can be 
                                              
812  Ruling U-I-330/2005 et al. of 18 October 2007, nn. 5 f., Uradni list 101/07 and OdlUS 
XVI, 79. 
813  E.g. ruling U-I-275/2007 of 22 November 2007, n. 3, Uradni list 110/07 and OdlUS XVI, 
82; ruling U-I-174/2007 of 16 April 2009, n. 2, not published. 
814  See Annual Report 2012, 35. 
815  Ruling U-I-102/2010 and Up-535/2010 of 12 December 2011, n. 3, not published. 
816  See e.g. ruling U-I-124/2013 and Up-404/2013 of 17 April 2015, n. 6, not published; rul-
ing U-I-169/2014 and Up-959/2014 of 22 September 2014, n. 4, not published; decision 
U-I-234/2012 and Up-879/2012 of 24 April 2014, n. 11, Uradni list 35/14. 
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contested by constitutional complaints.817 For not entailing an immediate legal 
effect either, the Constitutional Court moreover rejects numerous petitions 
filed against spacial plans818 and even such which are filed against provisions 
that regulate criminal offences and criminal procedures.819 This rigid interpre-
tation has led to many critics also from among the own ranks of the Court, 
which invoke that petitioners contesting these provisions are forced to first 
breach them and to risk fines and sanctions before being able to demonstrate 
their direct concern.820  
In practice the most frequent reason for rejecting petitions appears to be the 
failure to additionally fulfil the procedural requirements prescribed for sub-
mitting constitutional complaints.  
First and foremost, the circle of applicants entitled to submit constitutional 
complaints is considerably narrower. While entitled to file petitions on behalf 
of the rights of their members or of the environment, such associations cannot 
file constitutional complaints.821  
Another considerable hurdle is posed by the principle of subsidiarity which, 
as a consequence of the correlation between the complaints, applies to peti-
tions as well.822 Frequently, petitions are rejected because the petitioner did 
not exhaust all available legal remedies against the individual act adopted in 
application of a contested legal provision.823 Most importantly however, the 
requirement to exhaust legal remedies in a substantial aspect obliges petition-
ers to object to the constitutionality of a legal provision already before the 
courts of lower instance. This implies that the normative inconsistency which 
                                              
817  See for many ruling U-I-246/2012 of 19 November 2012, n. 4, not published; ruling U-I-
204/2012 of 1 October 2012, n. 3, not published; ruling U-I-160/2011 et al. of 15 May 
2012, n. 3, not published. 
818  E.g. ruling U-I-169/2012 of 13 November 2014, n. 3, not published; ruling U-I-45/2012 
of 21 October 2013, n. 3, not published. 
819  E.g. ruling U-I-98/2013 and Up-1161/2012 of 22 May 2013, n. 4, not published; decision 
U-I-186/2009 and Up-878/2009 of 28 September 2011, Uradni list 85/11 and OdlUS XIX, 
25 (English translation available). 
820  E.g. dissenting opinions of judges MARIJA KRAMBERGER and MIROSLAV MOZETIČ in rul-
ing U-I-54/2006 of 27 May 2009, n. 7, above at fn. 505. See also ZOBEC, 1094 f. 
821  The Court emphasized this in ruling U-I-152/2011 of 24 May 2012, n. 5, not published.  
822  SLADIČ, 51 f. See to this effect also NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 162, n. 39. 
823  See e.g. ruling U-I-70/2015 of 15 June 2015, n. 4, not published; ruling U-I-171/2013 and 
Up-571/2013 of 24 July 2015, n. 4, not published. 
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is alleged by petition before the Constitutional Court has been invoked before 
each single judicial instance they must apply to.824 
As consequence of the time limit for submitting constitutional complaints, pe-
titioners who fail to file a valid complaint during this period, fail to prove their 
direct legal interest. Amounting to an implicit temporal restriction for peti-
tions, legal scholars speak of a «hidden» introduction of a time limit.825 In 
practice numerous petitions are rejected because the constitutional complaints 
have not been submitted timely.826  
Finally, also the mentioned concept of triviality became decisive for the ad-
missibility of petitions.827 Unless they raise important constitutional questions 
which exceed the importance of the concrete case, petitioners cannot demon-
strate their direct concern with respect to provisions constituting the legal ba-
sis for small-claims disputes, for decisions on court fees, trespass to property 
disputes and against decisions issued in misdemeanour proceedings or with 
respect to other interferences that are not considered as intense.828 Conse-
quently, the Court's decision on the triviality of rights violations is indirectly 
decisive for the acknowledgment of a direct legal interest of petitioners. 
f) Need for legal protection 
Besides the heretofore explained demonstration of a personal qualified con-
cern of petitioners, the Constitutional Court assesses whether 
«a possible substantial decision […], by which it would declare the uncon-
stitutionality of the assessed regulation, would affect the legal position of 
the petitioner.»829  
                                              
824  E.g. ruling U-I-59/2014 and Up-1122/2012 of 15 October 2015, n. 19, see above at 
fn. 769; See also decision U-I-275/2010 and Up-1507/2010 of 19 April 2012, n. 17, 
Uradni list 36/12. For more details see SLADIČ, 54 f. 
825  ČEBULJ, Pobuda za ustavnosodno presojo, 1006. 
826  See for many ruling U-I-98/2013 and Up-1161/2012 of 22 May 2013, n. 4, not published; 
ruling U-I-177/2008 and Up-1900/2008 of 10 September 2009, n. 9, not published. 
827  See above at Chapter 2, pp. 96 f. 
828  E.g. ruling U-I-21/2014 and Up-68/2014 of 22 September 2014, nn. 3 f., not published; 
ruling U-I-238/2013 and Up-825/2013 of 3 December 2013, n. 3, not published. 
829  (Punctuation added). See e.g. ruling U-I-115/1999 of 31 January 2002, n. 6, OdlUS XI, 
14. 
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The need for legal protection constitutes an additional prerequisite for the ad-
missibility of petitions.830 Some scholars even require that the decision of the 
Court must be indispensable for the improvement of the legal position of the 
petitioner.831  
Besides its endeavour to fortify its subsidiary protective role this shows the 
efforts of the Constitutional Court to limit its accessibility to individuals to 
cases in which it can offer effective protection of their rights.832 For petition-
ers, however, it therewith established an extra procedural hurdle, obliging 
them to additionally substantiate their petitions with a concrete prospect of 
improvement of their legal positions. 
The Constitutional Court assesses in every individual case whether or not its 
decision on the constitutional complaint could effectively improve the peti-
tioner's legal position.833 If it can merely abrogate an unconstitutional provi-
sion it rejects petitions for the impossibility of an improvement of the legal 
positions of the applicants whose rights have been decided by final act.834 If, 
on the other hand, requirements for an annulment of contested provisions are 
fulfilled it recognizes a prospect of improvement because applicants can claim 
the reconsideration of final individual acts and decisions.835  
At this point it is noteworthy that the restrictive approach of the Slovene Con-
stitutional Court in this respect has led to several decisions which are ques-
tionable with respect to an effective protection of constitutional rights and 
with its role and function as guarantor of the constitutional guarantees. It for 
instance rejected a complaint of an asylum seeker against a final order of ex-
tradition and his petition filed against the respective legal provision with the 
argument that, with his extradition to France, his legal position could not be 
improved anymore by a decision establishing the violation of his rights.836 An-
other illustrative example is the rejection of a constitutional complaint filed 
against a refusal to elect the applicant to judicial service and of his petition 
                                              
830  MAVČIČ, Slovenian constitutional review, 65; NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, n. 37. 
831  See NERAD, Pravni interes, 55; SLADIČ, 28 with respective references. 
832  TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 161, nn. 19 f.  
833  Detailed in NERAD, Pravni interes, 52 ff. 
834  E.g. KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 145; NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, n. 10, with refer-
ences to pertinent decisions. 
835  In ruling U-I-72/2001 of 20 May 2004, n. 6, not published, it however considered the one 
year term for the submittal of reconsideration requests as expired. 
836  Ruling U-I-5/2011 and Up-5/2011 et al. of 15 September 2011, nn. 3 ff., not published. 
See also ruling Up-1840/2007 of 15 January 2009, n. 6, not published. 
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against the provision restricting the eligibility to 70 years of age. The Court 
justified its decision stating that, by reaching the age limit during the proceed-
ings, the applicant lost its eligibility and therewith his prospect of improve-
ment of his legal position.837 Based on similar grounds, the Constitutional 
Court rejected the legal interest of a petitioner who, once he fulfilled the min-
imum age of 40 years, became eligible as candidate and therewith lost his legal 
interest to contest the legally prescribed minimum age.838 
C. Requirements of form and substance  
a) Form and content of petitions 
Petitions must be submitted to the Constitutional Court in written form and 
Slovenian language and filed together with the documents relevant for the 
substantiation of alleged unconstitutionalities.839 Anonymous petitions are not 
taken into consideration. Rather, petitioners must indicate their full name and 
domicile and provide their signature.840 Submittals filed by legal persons must 
additionally present a proof of their legal status.841 With the published tem-
plates for petitions on its website, the Constitutional Court considerably facil-
itated the compliance with these formal criteria.842 
The requirements regarding the content are prescribed by art. 24b CCA and 
the Annex of the Rules of Procedure. The Constitutional Court requires peti-
tions to be comprehensible. Therewith, it explicitly excludes general allega-
tions of unconstitutionality or blanket statements.843 Besides the precise des-
ignation of the contested provisions and the legal or constitutional provisions 
deemed to be violated, petitioners must clearly substantiate the grounds for 
every alleged incompatibility. The fact that the Court rejects a great number 
of petitions which refer to the substantiations of the alleged rights violation in 
                                              
837  Ruling U-I-303/2007 of 20 March 2008, n. 6, not published. 
838  See ruling U-I-37/2004 of 15 April 2004, n. 4, not published. 
839  Art. 22 para. 1 CCA Slovenia and art. 35 paras. 1 and 2 RoP Slovenia. 
840  E.g. ruling U-I-5/2014 of 4 February 2014, n. 2, not published. 
841  See ruling U-I-56/2011 of 20 April 2011, n. 1 f., not published. 
842  The templates are published in Slovene language on <http://www.us-rs.si/vloge/vsebina-
in-obrazci/> (last accessed September 2018). 
843  NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 42. E.g. ruling U-I-108/2014 et al. of 19 September 
2014, nn. 3 f., not published; ruling U-I-143/2012 of 11 April 2013, n. 2, not published. 
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the simultaneously filed constitutional complaints shows the stringent appli-
cation of this requirement in practice.844  
In order to demonstrate their legal interest, petitioners must provide the infor-
mation and documents to show a direct interference of contested provisions 
with their rights and substantiate that their abrogation would lead to the im-
provement of their legal position. A frequent reason of rejection is the failure 
to verify the additional fulfilment of the conditions for the submittal of con-
stitutional complaints. This particularly applies to the failure to prove that al-
leged incompliances of contested provisions have already been asserted before 
the administrative and judicial bodies.845  
The analysis of the pertinent practice shows that the Constitutional Court has 
put very high demands on the substantiation of a legal interest already from 
the beginning. It namely requires that  
«it is obvious that the petitioner's personal or direct interest, which is rec-
ognized and protected as such by law, is concerned».846  
This implies that petitioners make their legitimate interest clearly evident to 
the Constitutional Court.847 
b) Improvement of insufficient and unclear petitions 
If necessary, petitions that are not manifestly inadmissible or evidently unsuc-
cessful can be returned to the applicant for correction on the basis of art. 38a 
para. 2 RoP. The petitioners are informed about the formal deficiencies of their 
submittals and invited to improve or supplement these within a predetermined 
period of time. The failure to comply with these conditions implies that peti-
tions are considered as not being filed and consequently do not produce any 
legal effect. 
                                              
844  E.g. ruling U-I-55/2009 and Up-257/2009 of 24 January 2011, n. 4, Uradni list 14/11. 
845  E.g. ruling U-I-23/2010 of 19 September 2012, n. 3, not published; ruling U-I-6/2007 of 
6 February 2008, n. 2, not published. 
846  (Italics added). See for instance ruling U-I-105/1995 of 10 July 1995, n. 5, OdlUS IV, 70 
(English translations available). 
847  See NERAD, Pravni interes, 43. For MAVČIČ, Zakon o Ustavnem sodišču, 174 a «bigger 
or smaller probability» of a direct interference with their rights suffices. 
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D. Temporal restrictions 
As has been shown, implicit time limits for the submittal of petitions against 
laws and other acts of legislation without immediate legal effect were the re-
sult of the required correlation with constitutional complaints. Accordingly, 
the compliance with the 60 days term prescribed for the filing of constitutional 
complaints became decisive for the admissibility of petitions.848 Besides, one 
can establish another implicit time limit. So as to prove the need for legal pro-
tection petitioners, whose rights are violated by a final individual act or deci-
sion adopted on contested provisions, must be able to file a timely request for 
reconsideration to the responsible authority. They lose prospect of improve-
ment if they fail to file the petition within one year from the adoption of the 
individual act.849 
An explicit time limit of one year has been introduced in 2007 with 
art. 24 para. 3 CCA for petitions filed against regulations and general act with 
an immediate legal effect. The Constitutional Court differentiates two compo-
nents of this time limit. It primarily assesses the compliance with the «objec-
tive time limit» of one year starting with the day of enactment of the contested 
provision and its publication. In case of negative consequences that occur only 
after the enforcement of a contested provision, the Court assesses the compli-
ance with the «subjective time limit» starting on the day a petitioner learns 
about these consequences.850 In the latter case, the petitioners are required to 
demonstrate that they could only learn about the negative consequences after 
the enactment of a regulation. The Constitutional Court rejects numerous pe-
titions stating that by consulting relevant official publications, websites or 
documents of the responsible authorities, the applicants could have recognized 
negative consequences already with the enactment of respective regula-
tions.851 
E. Cost burden 
As has been shown, proceedings before the Slovene Constitutional Court are 
free of charge. They are neither contingent on the payment of court fees nor 
                                              
848  See above p. 150. 
849  To this effect see ruling U-I-72/2001 of 20 May 2004, n. 6, not published. 
850  E.g. ruling U-I-267/2010 of 15 November 2012, n. 4, Uradni list 90/12. 
851  See for many ruling U-I-314/2013 of 7 January 2015, n. 3, not published; ruling U-I-
78/2012 of 18 September 2014, n. 5, not published. 
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on an additional cost burden by compulsory legal representation.852 Yet, based 
on art. 34 para. 1 CCA, the Constitutional Court can impose all expenses and 
costs incurring during the proceedings to one party based on reasonable 
grounds. It accordingly imposed all costs to local communities responsible for 
declaring parcels in private property as public streets after it had already abol-
ished numerous identical decrees for violating the guarantee of ownership.853 
As measures to reduce the number of submittals the Court can impose sanc-
tioning fees for the submittal of frivolous or vexatious applications or for the 
failure of attorneys at law to comply with the formal requirements. To the 
knowledge of the author, the Court did not order any such fees so far. 
F. Requirements regarding the quality of cases 
Even if petitions comply with the above described procedural requirements, 
the Constitutional Court can still dismiss them for being 
«manifestly unfounded or if it cannot be expected that an important legal 
question will be resolved.»854  
a) Manifestly unfounded petitions 
Because of its power to not take into consideration petitions which it considers 
as manifestly unfounded, the Constitutional Court assesses allegations of un-
constitutionality or unlawfulness of contested provisions already at the pre-
liminary stage of the proceedings.  
Prescribed as a requirement for the admissibility of petitions, the Constitu-
tional Court is not obliged to conduct a profound analysis of the foundedness 
of the arguments raised. While the legislator did not concretize the existence 
of a manifest unfoundedness, legal doctrine holds that this is the case if such 
is «practically obvious to every lawyer and beyond.»855 However, the analysis 
of the pertinent case-law reveals no clear differentiation between the rejections 
of petitions for being manifestly unfounded and of their dismissal for being 
unjustified after their assessment on the merits. 
                                              
852  With respect to constitutional complaints see above at Chapter 2, pp. 95 f.  
853  E.g. decision U-I-194/2012 of 24 April 2014, n. 9, see above at fn. 807; decision U-I-
61/2011 of 6 July 2011, n. 8, Uradni list 60/11. See also decision U-I-305/2012 of 10 July 
2014, n. 7, Uradni list 58/14. 
854  Art. 26 para. 2 CCA Slovenia. 
855  KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 97 f. 
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b) Absence of important constitutional questions 
Already with the enactment of the CCA in 1994, the legislator in art. 26 para. 2 
introduced the requirement that petitions must raise important constitutional 
questions. In numerous rulings, the Court invokes the irrelevance of petitions 
for raising mere financial issues,856 or questions of a political nature.857  
In cases where the demonstration of a direct concern requires the submittal of 
a valid constitutional complaint against a decision or act passed in application 
of a contested provision, the Constitutional Court requires that the constitu-
tional question raised by the petition corresponds to the one decisive for the 
admissibility of the constitutional complaint.858 The frequent rejection of pe-
titions because of the irrelevance of the questions raised by constitutional 
complaints indicates the difficulty for petitioners to fulfil this additional crite-
rion.859  
In this context it should be noted that the dismissal of constitutional com-
plaints and of petitions for not raising any important constitutional questions 
is an effective means for the Court to reduce its workload already at the stage 
of preliminary proceedings. On the other hand, it limits its accessibility to in-
dividuals to a considerable extent. In its proposal for constitutional amend-
ments filed in 2009 the Government stated that this does not change the obli-
gation of the Constitutional Court to consider every submittal and to assess 
the admissibility of petitions in each individual case.860 However, several legal 
scholars claim that it opens a substantial scope of discretion to the Court in 
accepting petitions for consideration.861 While it could provide a certain com-
prehensibility of its rulings by a clear statement of reasons, the relevant case-
law reveals that the Court only invokes the irrelevance of constitutional ques-
tions in general without explaining its findings on the basis of the concrete 
facts of each case. 
                                              
856  E.g. ruling U-I-61/2012 of 8 May 2014, n. 2, not published; ruling U-I-227/2011 of 
2 April 2013, n. 2, not published. 
857  E.g. ruling U-I-99/2014 of 8 May 2014, n. 2, not published; ruling U-I-221/2011 of 
17 February 2012, n. 2, not published. 
858  E.g. ruling U-I-49/2015 and Up-238/2015 of 15 October 2015, n. 4, not published. 
859  Instead of many see ruling U-I-26/2013 and Up-107/2013 of 26 June 2013, n. 3, not pub-
lished; ruling U-I-168/2012 and Up-642/2012 of 11 April 2013, n. 3, not published. 
860  See Proposal for constitutional amendments of articles 160, 161 and 162 of 2009, 19. 
861  KAUČIČ/PAVLIN/BARDUTZSKY, 41; MAVČIČ, Zakon o Ustavnem sodišču, 176; TESTEN, 
Tehnike ustavnosodnega odločanja, 222. 
Slovene petition to initiate review proceedings 
159 
 
G. Procedural obstacles 
a) Principle of res iudicata 
Art. 1 para. 3 CCA and art. 41 para. 4 CCA prescribe the finality and binding 
effect of decisions and rulings of the Constitutional Court. Therewith, appeals 
against the Courts' decisions and rulings and the possibility to reopen proceed-
ings to reconsider its judgments are explicitly excluded in accordance to the 
principle of res iudicata. Also the Constitutional Court must adhere to its own 
decisions. It accordingly rejected an appeal for reconsideration filed on the 
basis of an ECtHR judgment which confirmed the violation of the appellant's 
rights to fair trial for not having been invited to participate in constitutional 
complaint proceedings.862 It moreover frequently rejects petitions as mani-
festly unfounded or for the lack of a legal interest because they are filed 
against already reviewed provisions.863  
Yet, the analysis of its case-law reveals that the Slovene Court does not gen-
erally refuse to reconsider its rulings or decisions. It predicates a reassessment 
on the presentation of new reasons which have not been considered in earlier 
judgments or on the assertion of new important constitutional questions.864 In 
practice the failure to assert reasons for reconsideration leads to the rejection 
of a vast number of petitions.865 
b) Withdrawal or lapse of procedural requirements 
Art. 25 para.  4 CCA prescribes the compulsory conclusion of the review pro-
ceedings upon the withdrawal of petitions during the review proceedings. The 
Constitutional Court accordingly emphasizes that  
«the applicant is dominus litis of the process – not only when submitting 
its application, but also thereafter.»866  
                                              
862  Ruling U-I-223/2009 and Up-140/1992 of 14 April 2011, nn. 14 ff., Uradni list 37/11 and 
OdlUS XIX, 21 (English translation available) in relation to jugment Gaspari vs. Slove-
nia, 21055/03, 21 July 2009. 
863  Compare e.g. ruling U-I-57/1996 of 21 January 1999, n. 10, OdlUS VIII, 18 and ruling 
U-I-102/2011 and U-I-110/2011 of 8 March 2012, n. 3, not published. 
864  Detailed in TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 161, nn. 5 f. 
865  See for many ruling U-I-256/2013 and Up-875/2013 et al. of 3 December 2014, n. 6, not 
published; ruling U-I-319/2011 of 24 May 2012, n. 4, not published. 
866  Ruling U-I-169/2008 of 22 October 2009, n. 2, not published. 
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The Court is consequently neither entitled to initiate nor to continue review 
proceedings even if it considers them as necessary for the protection of the 
constitutional order. In contrast to its Croatian counterpart, the withdrawal of 
a petition during the review proceedings therefore constitutes an absolute ob-
stacle for the continuation of the review proceedings. 
Also the admissibility requirements must be fulfilled for the entire duration of 
the proceedings and until the Court’s final decision. The loss of the legal in-
terest of petitioners and consequently of its procedural legitimacy prevents the 
Court from continuing to review contested provisions.867 In several rulings it 
considered the legal interest of petitioners as ceased because of changed cir-
cumstances during the proceedings, such as the expiry of employment or by 
reaching a certain age.868  
However, art. 24b para. 3 CCA obliges the Constitutional Court to summon 
the petitioners so as to allow them to demonstrate the persistence of their in-
terests in the continuation of the review proceedings. It ends the proceedings 
if the petitioners fail to prove their continued legal interest within the prede-
termined period of time. As to art. 47 para. 2 CCA the same applies if con-
tested provisions cease to be effective during the review proceedings.869 In any 
case, the persistence of negative consequences must be proven by presenting 
respective evidences.870 
H. Examination of the merits 
As has already been mentioned, the analysis of the pertinent case-law reveals 
that the Constitutional Court does not differentiate when rejecting manifestly 
unfounded petitions for being inadmissible and their dismissal as result of an 
assessment on the merits. Just as its Croatian counterpart also the Slovene 
Court accordingly assesses the substantiation of allegations at the same pro-
cedural stage as the admissibility requirements and decides on the merits of 
the complaint without first closing the preliminary proceedings by ruling.871 
                                              
867  See e.g. ruling U-I-97/2008 of 28 January 2009, n. 3, not published; ruling U-I-242/2000 
of 10 April 2003, n. 5, OdlUS XII, 34. 
868  See for many ruling U-I-303/2007 of 20 March 2008, n. 6, not published; ruling U-I-
37/2004 of 15 April 2004, n. 4, not published. See also SLADIČ, 51. 
869  Decision U-I-25/2014 and Up-1303/2011 of 21 March 2014, n. 8, Uradni list 25/14. See 
also decision U-I-58/2012 of 2 October 2013, n. 6, Uradni list 30/12. 
870  E.g. ruling U-I-9/2012 of 24 September 2013, n. 3, not published. 
871  For more details in this respect see KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 96 ff. 
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If, in these cases, the Court considers the substantiations as founded, it con-
cludes the proceedings and invalidates the contested legal provisions by final 
decision. If, on the other hand, it finds that contested provisions are not in 
breach of the Constitution or the laws or that the allegations do not raise doubts 
regarding their constitutionality or legality, it rejects petitions by rulings rather 
than by formal decisions. As a consequence, rulings are conceded the same 
final and legally binding effects as formal decisions.  
This practice is considered as problematic as it prevents the holding of adver-
sary proceedings and the possibility of petitioners to make use of their partic-
ipatory rights as prescribed only for main procedures.872  
3. Status of petitioners in review proceedings 
Also in Slovenia the judicial review proceedings are combined with several 
procedural elements that guarantee and improve the status of petitioners in the 
proceedings.  
A. Participatory rights of petitioners 
a) Applicability of Convention standards for fair proceedings 
The ECtHR confirmed the applicability of the Convention guarantees for con-
stitutional complaint proceedings before the Slovenian Constitutional Court at 
several instances.873  
The criteria established by the ECtHR for the applicability of standards of fair 
trial, namely a victim status or a close interrelation with civil and criminal law 
proceedings, seem to apply to judicial review proceedings initiated upon peti-
tions of individuals as well. This seems, at least implicitly, to be confirmed by 
judgment Kurić and others vs. Slovenia, where the ECtHR stated that the com-
plainants were not required to file an additional petition to the Constitutional 
Court after the failure of the legislator to comply with its judgment on the 
«Erasure-Laws» initiated upon petitions of the persons concerned.874 
                                              
872  KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 135; TESTEN, Tehnike ustavnosodnega odločanja, 221 f. 
873  See e.g. judgments Suhadolc vs. Slovenia, 57655/08, 17 May 2011 and Gaspari vs. Slo-
venia, above at fn. 862. 
874  See Kurić and others vs. Slovenia, 26828/08, 26 June 2012, §§ 305–307. 
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Several factors indicate a subjective and adversary nature of the judicial re-
view proceedings in Slovenia.875 Firstly, this seems to hold true with respect 
to the function of the legal interest as requirement for the procedural legiti-
macy of petitioners. Secondly, the subjective nature of review proceedings is 
indicated by the dominus litis position of applicants, namely the dependence 
of review proceedings on the filing and withdrawal of valid requests or peti-
tions and on the persisting entitlement of applicants. 
b) Participatory rights of petitioners 
As structural elements for fair trials participatory rights of petitioners can be 
found in judicial review proceedings before the Slovene Constitutional Court 
as well. Petitioners have accordingly been endowed with a mandatory right to 
information and inspection. They are entitled to receive information about the 
Court's rulings with respect to the acceptance of their petitions for considera-
tion and about the reasons for their rejection. During the proceedings petition-
ers are moreover entitled to request information about the status of ongoing 
proceedings and to consult and copy documents, opinions, observations and 
all other files relevant for the decision of the Constitutional Court.876 The right 
to information is finally ensured by the obligation of the Court to notify the 
petitioners about the outcome of the proceedings. 
Under certain conditions petitioners are also entitled to participate in the re-
view proceedings. As to art. 35 para. 1 CCA it is principally at the Court Pres-
ident's discretion whether or not to schedule public hearings. The discretion is 
however limited by art. 38 para. 1 CCA as to which the President must present 
justified reasons if he or she decides to exclude the public from hearings pur-
suant. Petitioners are invited to attend these hearings and to issue statements 
that substantiate alleged interferences of contested provisions with their rights 
and interests. Yet, their absence in scheduled public hearings does not prevent 
the Court from passing its final decision.877  
In accordance with the case-law of the ECtHR the lack of a claimable right to 
participate or to be heard is consistent with the Convention because of the 
particular nature of proceedings before constitutional courts.878 In order not to 
                                              
875  See also KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 135, 139; MAVČIČ, Zakon o Ustavnem sodišču, 198.  
876  Art. 4 para. 1 CCA Slovenia and art. 24 and 26 RoP Slovenia.  
877  Art. 36 para. 2 CCA Slovenia and art. 51 ff. RoP Slovenia. 
878  See above at Chapter 1, pp. 40 f. 
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violate the standards of fair trial the Constitutional Court must however al-
ways take into account the circumstances of each concrete case and schedule 
public hearings if petitioners were not granted opportunity to participate and 
to be heard in proceedings before lower instances. 
B. Limited power to extend the scope of assessment 
As a rule, the scope of review of the Slovene Constitutional Court is prede-
fined by the received requests and petitions. This is not least a consequence of 
the dominus litis position of applicants and the lack of competence of the 
Court to initiate and to continue review proceedings at its own discretion. In 
consistent practice it therefore confines its review to the provisions contested 
by the petitions and assesses only the inconsistencies alleged.879  
Yet, also the Slovene Court can, to a certain extent, extend the chances of suc-
cess of petitions. Pursuant to art. 30 CCA it is empowered to review other 
provisions  
«that are mutually related or if such [extension] is necessary to resolve the 
case.» (Insertion added) 
By its «competence by connectivity»880 the Constitutional Court for instance 
extends its assessment to provisions that constitute an integral whole with the 
contested norms.881 Based on its «competence by necessity» the Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of provisions defining and regulating the financ-
ing of public universities before assessing a contested governmental decree 
which restricted study places of extraordinary students.882 In another case it 
acknowledged a necessity to extend its review in order to prevent further 
claims for reconsideration and the application of respective provisions in re-
newed criminal proceedings.883  
On the other hand, the Constitutional Court as a principle refuses to review a 
contested provision for other reasons of unconstitutionality than those alleged 
                                              
879  NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 42. 
880 E.g. KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 158 f.; MAVČIČ, Zakon o Ustavnem sodišču, 197. 
881  E.g. decision U-I-211/2011 of 24 May 2012, n. 7, Uradni list 43/12; decision U-I-
135/2000 of 9 October 2002, nn. 17 and 23, Uradni list 50/02 and OdlUS XI, 211. 
882  Decision U-I-156/2008 of 14 April 2011, n. 21, Uradni list 34/11. 
883  Decision U-I-289/1995 of 4 December 1997, n. 14, Uradni list 5/98 and OdlUS VI, 165 
(English translation available). 
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by the applicant.884 Yet, in individual decisions, it extended its review to as-
pects relating to the principles of equality and the rule of law.885 
4. Achievement of subjective rights protection 
The analysis of the particular procedural arrangements of judicial review pro-
ceedings in Slovenia reveals features that support the qualification of petitions 
as legal remedies for subjective protection. As consequence of the required 
personal and direct concern their personal legal position is improved either 
directly by the elimination of unconstitutional or unlawful provisions or indi-
rectly by a subsequent abolition of individual acts passed in application of 
such provisions. The procedural instruments which provide petitioners with 
such personal benefits are presented in the following. 
A. Suspension of applicability of laws 
On the basis of art. 161 para. 1 Constitution and art. 39 CCA the Constitu-
tional Court orders the temporary suspension of the applicability of a reviewed 
law or regulation if it considers this necessary to prevent harmful conse-
quences which result from the lack of a suspensive effect of proceedings 
opened.886 What is more, the Slovene Court is vested with a certain legislative 
authority to temporarily regulate legal questions in order to prevent legal loop-
holes for the duration of the temporary suspension. At several instances it ac-
cordingly ordered the temporary application of analogous legal norms until 
passing its final decision on the constitutionality or lawfulness of contested 
provisions.887  
The preventive suspension of applicability of reviewed legal provisions can 
be ordered only for the duration of the review proceedings, starting with the 
acceptance of a petition for consideration and ending with the adoption of a 
                                              
884  E.g. decision U-I-141/2001 of 20 May 2004, n. 8, Uradni list 62/04 and OdlUS XIII, 35. 
885  E.g. decision U-I-135/2000 of 9 October 2002, nn. 30 and 40, Uradni list 50/02, 93/02 
and OdlUS XI, 211. 
886  For a detailed description of this power see e.g. MAVČIČ, Slovenian constitutional review, 
51 ff.; TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 161, nn. 37 ff. 
887  See e.g. ruling U-I-67/2013 of 18 April 2013, n. 5, Uradni list 39/13, 17/14; ruling U-I-
339/1998 of 14 October 1998, n. 4, Uradni list 72/98, 11/99 and OdlUS VIII, 13. 
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final decision on the compatibility of the reviewed provisions with the Con-
stitution or the laws.888 During the review proceedings the order of suspension 
can be revoked at any time for becoming groundless due to changed circum-
stances.889 As a rule, the Constitutional Court orders suspensions on request 
of petitioners. These must substantiate the existence of a concrete threat of 
harmful consequences and the necessity of preventive measures.890 Whether 
or not a petition has a prospect of success is irrelevant for the Court's deci-
sion.891  
When ordering the suspension of applicability the Constitutional Court takes 
into account possible disadvantages for the legal order, the legal positions of 
other persons or for the general public.892 Its decisions thus always comprise 
a balancing of interests.893 Considering their application as more harmful for 
the petitioners, the Constitutional Court for instance ordered the temporary 
suspension of provisions prescribing the disclosure of sensitive personal data 
of patients in psychiatric clinics,894 provisions that entailed harmful financial 
disadvantages895 or provisions on the holding of popular votes.896 It also or-
dered the temporary suspension of numerous building and zone plans, whose 
enforcement entailed serious encroachments onto the landscape.897 On the 
other hand, the Court refused to order the temporary suspension of a provision 
on the transfer of local autonomy, because this would have amounted to a legal 
gap in the regulation of divisions of competences between the state and local 
entities.898  
                                              
888  TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 161, n. 40. 
889  E.g. ruling U-I-220/2003 of 24 November 2003, n. 7, Uradni list 117/03 et al. and OdlUS 
XIII, 61. 
890  E.g. ruling U-I-251/2000 of 19 October 2000, nn. 2 f., Uradni list 50/02 and OdlUS XI, 
86.  
891  KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 162; NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, n. 65. 
892  See e.g. ruling U-I-151/2011 of 14 September 2011, n. 3, Uradni list 74/11; ruling U-I-
65/2011 of 21 April 2011, n. 4, Uradni list 36/11. 
893  TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 161, n. 38; NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, n. 65. 
894  Ruling U-I-70/2012 of 24 May 2012, nn. 2 ff., not published. 
895  E.g. ruling U-I-196/2014 of 9 October 2014, n.  8, Uradni list 74/14 and 90/15. 
896  Ruling U-I-76/2014 of 17 April 2014, n. 5, see above at fn. 799. 
897  Out of many see ruling U-I-86/2013 of 25 April 2013, nn. 9 f., not published.  
898  See ruling U-I-285/1994 of 22 December 1994, OdlUS IV, 30. 
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B. Legal effect of decisions  
The significance of the legal effects of its decisions for the legal protection of 
petitioners is acknowledged by the Constitutional Court itself. In order to find 
the most efficient protection the Court developed a particular technique of de-
cision-making, extending the types of decisions prescribed in art. 161 para. 1 
Constitution and art. 43 ff. CCA. This activist and creative approach of the 
Court has found great attention in Slovene doctrine.899 The new techniques of 
decision-making can be considered to allow an even more efficient protection 
of petitioners against legislative authorities in each individual case and ac-
cording to concrete legal and actual circumstances. 
a) Abrogation, annulment and declaratory decisions 
The Constitutional Court can sanction inconsistencies with the Constitution or 
the legal order by invalidating acts of legislation. With a mere future legal 
effect (ex nunc) abrogations of unconstitutional provisions become effective 
on the day following their publication in the Official Gazette or in case of their 
suspended enforcement, the latest one year thereafter. This enables successful 
petitioners to anticipate the adoption of final decisions on the basis on these 
provisions. Annulments, on the other hand, which deprive final decisions and 
individual acts passed in application of a contested provision from their legal 
bases with a retrospective effect (ex tunc), can be ordered only if indispensable 
to remedy harmful consequences. Annulments consequently remain the ex-
ception in the Court's practice.900 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court is entitled to declare violations of the 
Constitution or the laws by binding decisions obliging the legislator to remedy 
inconsistencies within a predetermined period of time. Such declaratory judg-
ments are passed with respect to legal provisions that ceased to be effective 
but still have negative consequences or in relation to legal gaps or legislative 
                                              
899  For a detailed description of the technics see KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 147 ff.; NERAD, 
Komentar Ustave art. 161, nn. 1 ff.; TESTEN, Tehnike ustavnosodnega odločanja, 213 ff.  
900  E.g. decision U-I-288/2011 of 15 December 2011, n. 5, Uradni list 109/11; decision U-I-
395/1996 of 3 April 1997, n. 7, Uradni list 23/97 and OdlUS VI, 45 (English translation 
available).  
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omissions.901 Besides, declaratory decisions can be passed if decisions to ab-
rogate or to annul legal provisions are impracticable or impossible.902 The 
Court for example adopted declaratory decisions when it considered invalida-
tions of provisions as detrimental to the comprehensibility of an act in its en-
tirety,903 for entailing even more harmful consequences for constitutional guar-
antees,904 or for resulting in further discriminations.905  
b) Interpretative decisions 
As possibly most activist approach of the Constitutional Court in finding so-
lutions for an efficient enforcement of the Constitution, it recognizes its com-
petence to issue authoritative and binding interpretations.906 Therewith, it en-
titled itself to specify the interpretation and application of legal provisions 
compliant with the Constitution and the laws.907 The Constitutional Court jus-
tifies its interpretative power with the removal of inconsistencies and uncer-
tainties in this respect908 and with the argument a maiore ad minus invoking 
the considerably stronger encroachment of decisions to invalidate acts of leg-
islation upon the legislative power.909  
It is noteworthy that, although the interpretative competence is criticized for 
interfering with the legislative and the judicial authorities,910 it meets with 
widespread approval.911 Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court shows a re-
strained approach in interpreting legislative acts. With reference to the primary 
responsibility of the courts it explicitly refuses to give an «advisory opinion» 
                                              
901  E.g. decision U-I-134/2010 of 24 October 2013, n. 33, Uradni list 92/13; decision U-I-
147/2012 of 29 May 2013, n. 30, Uradni list 52/13. 
902  For more details see e.g. NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, nn. 45 f. 
903  Decision U-I-249/2010 of 15 March 2012, n. 33, Uradni list 27/12 and OdlUS XIX, 34. 
904  E.g. decision U-I-67/2009 and Up-316/2009 of 24 March 2011, n. 20, Uradni list 28/11 
and OdlUS XIX, 19 (English translation available).  
905  Decision U-I-146/2012 of 17 December 2013, nn. 100 f., Uradni list 107/13 and OdlXX, 
10 (English tralsation available). 
906  A detailed study with respect to the constitutional foundations of the interpretative power 
is provided by KRISTAN, Razlagalne odločbe, 11 ff.  
907  MAVČIČ, Zakon o ustavnem sodišču, 246 f.; NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, n. 21. 
908  See e.g. decision U-I-108/1991 of 13 July 1993, Uradni list 42/92 et al. and OdlUS II, 67 
(English translation available). 
909  E.g. TESTEN, Interpretacija u odlukama, 267 f. 
910  E.g. GRAD, 7; MAVČIČ, Zakon o Ustavnem sodišču, 246 f. 
911  KRISTAN, Razlagalne odločbe, 24 ff., 41; MAVČIČ, Slovenian constitutional review, 22 f.; 
TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 161, n. 32; NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, nn. 21 ff. 
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on correct interpretations and predicates its competence on the exhaustion of 
all available remedies before the judiciary.912  
c) Determination of authority and manner of implementation 
As a particularity art. 40 para. 2 CCA empowers the Slovene Constitutional 
Court to determine the authority and the manner of implementation of its de-
cisions. While considerably intensifying the protection of the constitutional 
order, this power is very controversial both among legal scholars and in poli-
tics.913 A respective attempt at reform in 1998 failed due to broad resistance 
against a restriction of the Court's powers.914  
A closer look at its jurisdiction reveals that the Constitutional Court deter-
mines the manner of implementation of its decisions if it considers such a 
measure as indispensable for the effective protection of constitutional rights. 
It frequently uses this competence to bridge periods of legal uncertainty after 
the invalidation of unconstitutional provisions to the adoption of a new regu-
lation. These orders range from temporary measures to be taken,915 the tem-
porarily continued legal validity of abrogated provisions,916 up to the tempo-
rary determination of concrete legal solutions.917 
Noteworthy is the Court's practice of the so-called «intensification of sanc-
tions» for repeated review with which the Court itself regulates the rights and 
duties of persons concerned, if the legislative authorities fail to implement its 
judgments.918 Illustrative is its decisions in relation to the community «Anka-
ran». After the legislator failed to adhere to the Court’s decision to enact nec-
                                              
912  See ruling U-I-96/2010 of 5 May 2010, n. 3, Uradni list 40/10. 
913  KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 157; MAVČIČ, Slovenian constitutional review, 77; TESTEN, 
Tehnike ustavnosodnega odločanja, 242. 
914  See e.g. TESTEN, Tehnike ustavnosodnega odločanja, fn. 61. 
915  E.g. decision U-I-60/2003 of 4 December 2003, n. 25, Uradni list 131/03 and OdlUS XII, 
93 (English translation available). 
916  Decision U-I-249/2010 of 15 March 2012, n. 34, Uradni list 27/12 and OdlUS XIX, 34. 
917  E.g. decision U-I-94/2013 of 2 October 2014, n. 17, Uradni list 74/14; ruling U-I-67/2014 
of 18 April 2013, n. 5, Uradni list 39/13, 17/14. 
918  See NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, n. 62; National Report of the Slovenian Constitu-
tional Court prepared for the XVth Congress of the Conference of European Constitutional 
Courts in Bucharest, 6 f., 14 f. on <http://confeuconstco.org/reports/rep-
xv/SLOVENIA%20eng.pdf> (last accessed September 2018). 
Slovene petition to initiate review proceedings 
169 
 
essary regulations for the founding of the community of Ankaran, the Consti-
tutional Court ordered the establishment of the community and the scheduling 
of a popular vote itself.919 
The Court itself invokes the merely temporary and therefore limited impact of 
such decisions.920 Yet, opinions remain divided. While certain scholars regard 
it as unnecessary additional power and excessive interference with the legis-
lative power,921 others consider it as efficient means to enforce the constitu-
tional guarantees against the legislator.922 
C. Reparation and compensation for violations suffered 
Following the legal tradition under socialist rule, petitioners can achieve re-
dress against violations suffered directly or indirectly by unconstitutional leg-
islative acts. Based on art. 46 CCA 
«[a]ny person who suffers harmful consequences due to a regulation or 
general act issued for the exercise of public authority which has been an-
nulled is entitled to request that such consequences be remedied.»  
The authorities who adopted state acts that caused harmful consequences are 
responsible to remedy negative consequences. Depending on whether these 
arise directly based on an annulled provision or through its application by a 
concrete individual act, the law differentiates between two ways to achieve 
redress. 
a) Request for reparation  
Petitioners whose rights are violated by final individual acts and decisions can 
file requests for reconsideration on the basis of the decision of the Constitu-
tional Court to annul the legal basis upon which they have been adopted. The 
                                              
919  Decision U-I-114/2011 of 9 June 2011, Uradni list 47/11 and OdlUS XIX, 23. See also 
decision U-I-114/1995 of 7 December 1995, Uradni list 8/96 and OdlUS IV, 120 (English 
translation available). 
920  See e.g. decision U-I-80/2009 and Up-3871/2009 of 1 October 2009, n. 31, Uradni list 
88/09 and OdlUS XVIII, 42 (English translation available). 
921  See KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 163 ff. See also CERAR, 382; GRAD, 7; TESTEN, Tehnike 
ustavnosodnega odločanja, 240 f. 
922  E.g. NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, nn. 2 and 59. 
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requests are addressed directly to the administrative or judicial authority re-
sponsible for passing the act in first instance.923  
Based on art. 46 para. 3 CCA redress can also be sought from the legislative 
powers responsible for the enactment of a regulation that directly interferes 
with rights and liberties and which is annulled by the Constitutional Court.924 
Given that the Court has no power to annul formal laws adopted by the Na-
tional Assembly, requests for redress can only be filed to other legislative au-
thorities. While these are obliged to enact a new regulation which is consistent 
with the Constitution and the laws, the question arises in what form legislative 
authorities can offer redress for direct violations of individual rights? As pos-
sible answers, the Court considered the enactment of a new regulation order-
ing the indemnification in form of a restitutio ad integrum, or remedy in form 
of a payment of compensation.925 
The right to request redress for violations suffered on the basis of annulled 
regulations is not restricted to successful petitioners who gave the impetus for 
the annulment. Rather, the legislator entitled any person harmed on the basis 
of such provisions to request reparation against responsible authorities. The 
entitlement is predicated on the substantiation that violations have occurred 
either directly on the basis of the annulled regulation or indirectly by an indi-
vidual act passed in its application.926  
Whether the requirements for the opening of proceedings are given is estab-
lished independently from the findings of the Constitutional Court and in ac-
cordance with the pertinent procedural rules. The Administrative Court for in-
stance accepted a complaint filed by a group of inhabitants, whose request for 
redress for negative consequences by the issuance of a building permit for 
apartment houses was rejected by the responsible building authority. The 
Court found that the inhabitants clearly substantiated the existence of harmful 
consequences and were therefore entitled to a redress by the building author-
ity.927  
                                              
923  NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, n. 28. See e.g. Supreme Court's decision no. X Ips 
571/2006 of 11 September 2008 and decision no. X Ips 1226/2006 of 14 November 2007. 
924  E.g. KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 153. 
925  See decision U-I-25/1994 of 2 June 1994, Uradni list 35/94 and OdlUS III, 61 (English 
translation available). 
926  See e.g. ruling of the Supreme Court Up 183/2003 of 5 June 2003, no. 1. 
927  Decision of the Supreme Court U-III-122/2010 of 19 May 2011.  
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Pursuant to art. 46 para. 2 CCA requests for reparation can be filed during 
three months from the day of publication of the Constitutional Court’s deci-
sion to annul reviewed provisions, under the condition that the petition that 
triggered the annulment was filed within one year from the adoption of the 
respective individual act. These time limits are considered as means to «stim-
ulate» persons concerned to file petitions.928 However, their application onto 
cases where claims for redress are filed directly to legislative authorities must 
be considered as editorial mistake, given the absence of an individual act. The 
Constitutional Court itself refers to the analogous application of the objective 
term of one year for filing petitions against regulations with an immediate le-
gal effect.929 The application of the subjective term, which starts to run with 
the knowledge of the petitioner about harmful consequences, is seen as other 
possible solution.930 As to a third view, finally, only the three months term 
starting with the annulment of the provision should be decisive for the admis-
sibility of requests for redress.931  
b) Subsidiary request for compensation for damage 
If violations or negative consequences cannot be remedied anymore by means 
of redress against the responsible authority the persons concerned are entitled 
to file a subsidiary claim for compensation before the judiciary. For the lack 
of further concretization, it must be assumed that the impossibility to remedy 
negative consequences must be attributable to reasons for which applicants 
have no responsibility.932 
c) Practicability 
Considering the rigid interpretation of direct legal interest as admissibility re-
quirement for petitions, the practical expediency of this means of redress be-
comes questionable.933 By submitting valid constitutional complaints, peti-
tioners who contest acts of legislation without immediate legal effect can im-
prove their legal position by a mere invalidation of the contested provision. It 
is therefore unlikely that the Constitutional Court orders its annulment and 
therewith provides a legal basis for claims of redress. Given that formal laws 
                                              
928  For details see NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, nn. 28 f. 
929  See ruling U-I-184/1999 of 24 October 2002, nn. 9 f., OdlUS XI, 223. 
930  NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, n. 31. 
931  See to that effect MAVČIČ, Zakon o Ustavnem sodišču, 261. 
932  See NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, nn. 32 f. with references to pertinent decisions. 
933  In detail also NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 161, nn. 29 f. 
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cannot be annulled requests for redress can, furthermore, neither be filed to 
legislative authorities responsible for the enactment of formal laws with an 
immediate legal effect on the rights and obligations of individuals. The prac-
tical applicability of the right to reparation is thus only conceivable in relation 
to regulations and other sub-legislative acts which directly violate the rights 
and freedoms and entail immediate negative consequences for the applicants.  
 
III. Initiative for judicial review in Macedonia 
1. Introductory remarks 
As has been shown the Macedonian Constitution contains only very few pro-
visions on constitutional adjudication. While art. 50 provides a general guar-
antee of individual access to the Constitutional Court for the protection of 
constitutional rights and liberties, neither the Constitution nor any law list the 
applicants authorized to request the initiation of proceedings. Instead, the Con-
stitutional Court regulated its accessibility at its own discretion. In art. 12 RoP, 
it accordingly determined that  
«[a]nyone can submit a petition for initiating proceedings on the assess-
ment of the constitutionality of law or the constitutionality and legality of 
a regulation or other common act.» 
The Macedonian term inicijativa can be translated as «initiative» or «peti-
tion». Even though this designation indicates a non-committal nature, the 
binding effect of this popular complaint is controversial also in Macedonia. 
As to art. 11 RoP review proceedings are initiated only upon formal rulings of 
the Constitutional Court. Some scholars therefore reject a binding effect of 
initiatives.934 Yet, and in reference to what has been said with regard to the 
popular complaints in Croatia and Slovenia, the formalized procedure pre-
scribed for the assessment of the admissibility of initiatives is indicative of a 
committal effect. Art. 78 RoP obliges the Macedonian Constitutional Court to 
assess the admissibility of every submittal and to deliver rulings on their ac-
ceptance or rejection to the petitioners. Another indication for a binding effect 
                                              
934  E.g. TRAJKOVSKA-HRISTOVSKA, Access to Constitutional Justice, 11 f.; ČOBANOV, 143, 
184, 201. 
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is the absence of a procedural distinction between initiatives filed by individ-
uals and such submitted by state organs. 
The analysis of the pertinent literature and practice reveals a widespread view 
considering the right of initiative as actio popularis. This opinion can be found 
in foreign doctrine,935 and among domestic scholars936 and is shared by the 
Constitutional Court itself.937 Eventually, even those denying a binding nature 
admit that the initiative must at least be recognized as de facto actio popu-
laris.938  
2. Admissibility requirements  
In the absence of respective legal provisions the Constitutional Court by its 
regulatory autonomy regulated the admissibility requirements and the pro-
ceedings in which they are ascertained itself. In a first step, the Court Secretary 
filters out manifestly inadmissible initiatives which do not comply with the 
formal requirements.939 The assessment of the admissibility of initiatives is 
conducted in preliminary proceedings, regulated by art. 17 ff. RoP. On this 
occasion corresponding initiatives are merged to one and the same submission 
according to art. 21 RoP. 
The analysis of the case-law reveals that the Constitutional Court only initiates 
review proceedings upon the existence of reasonable doubts about the consti-
tutionality or lawfulness of contested provisions. To this end, also the Mace-
donian Court assesses the content and allegations of initiatives already in the 
preliminary proceedings. If it does not consider them to put into doubt the 
compliance of a contested provision with the Constitution and the laws it rules 
that the allegations are unfounded. 
                                              
935  BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 230; HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 74. 
936  E.g. SHASIVARI, 58. 
937  See National Report of the Macedonian Constitutional Court prepared for the XVth Con-
gress of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts, 4. The Report is retrievable 
over <http://www.confeuconstco.org/reports/rep-xv/MACEDONIA%20eng.pdf> (last 
accessed September 2018). 
938  ČOBANOV, 202, 204 f.; TRAJKOVSKA-HRISTOVSKA, Access to Constitutional Justice, 11 f. 
939  For a detaild analysis of the preparatory proceedings see ČOBANOV, 190. 
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A. Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court 
In accordance to its counterparts in Croatia and Slovenia also the Macedonian 
Constitutional Court assesses in the first place whether or not it is competent 
to review contested state acts. Pursuant to art. 110 indents 1 and 2 Constitution  
«[t]he Court decides on the conformity of laws with the Constitution [and] 
on the conformity of collective agreements and other regulations with the 
Constitution and the laws.» (Insertion added)  
As a consequence of this general wording and the absence of legal concreti-
zations the Court is granted wide discretion in interpreting this constitutional 
provision. In its twenty-five years of activity it developed a comprehensive 
practice with respect to the benchmarks and the acts of legislation subject to 
its review power.  
a) Benchmarks for judicial review 
The Constitution constitutes the primary benchmark for judicial review.940 The 
body of constitutional law also encompasses other acts enacted in proceedings 
prescribed for constitution-making. Besides constitutional amendments this 
comprises constitutional acts enacted for the implementation of the Constitu-
tion.  
Formal laws which are enacted by the National Assembly in legislative pro-
ceedings or adopted by referendum constitute benchmarks for the review of 
regulations and other acts of a sub-legislative nature. A qualified two-thirds 
majority is required for the adoption of «systemic laws» such as the Civil Pro-
cedures Act,941 the laws regulating the organization and work of administrative 
state bodies and the judiciary and the law on local self-government.942 Despite 
the different quorums for adoption, neither the case-law of the Constitutional 
Court nor the constitutional provisions indicate a superior hierarchical rank of 
systemic laws to formal laws.  
Based on art. 118 the Constitution, which determines ratified international 
treaties as part of the domestic legal order and art. 8 para. 1 indent 11, which 
                                              
940  In the beginning, the Court clarified at several instances that the Constitution of 1991, 
and not its predecessor of 1974, constituted the benchmark for judicial review. See e.g. 
ruling U.br.164/1994 of 14 October 1994, n. 3. 
941  See for instance ruling U.br.91/2012 of 6 March 2013, n. 6. 
942  Art. 74, 95 para. 3, 98 para. 4 and 114 para. 5 Cst. Macedonia. 
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lists generally accepted norms of international law as fundamental principles 
of Macedonian constitutional law, international law is generally recognized as 
benchmark for the legislative authorities.943 Nevertheless, the Constitutional 
Court refuses to review domestic laws with respect to their compatibility with 
international law for the lack of an explicit reference to international law as 
standard for judicial review the Constitution.944 Consequently, it rejects a con-
siderable number of initiatives requesting the review of contested provisions 
with regard to their compliance with international human rights standards.945 
The same applies to the ECHR, which Macedonia ratified in 1997 and to its 
protocols.946 Instead, the Constitutional Court refers to international guaran-
tees, comprising the European acquis communautaire, the ECHR and interna-
tional human rights charters as standards for interpretation of the constitution-
ally guaranteed rights and liberties.947  
b) Objects of judicial review 
aa) Constitutional law 
By referring to the political will of people the Constitutional Court refuses to 
review the Constitution and other constitutional acts with respect to their con-
tent.948 At the same time, there are no indications that it acknowledges its 
power to review the formal constitutionality of constitutional acts, namely the 
compliance of their enactment or changes with the proceedings prescribed for 
constitutional amendments. This question, i.e. whether constitutional law also 
comprises provisions with a supra-constitutional value, is controversial in 
                                              
943  KLIMOVSKI/DESKOSKA/KARAKAMIŠEVA, 577; SPIROVSKI, passim; TRENESKA-DESKOSKA, 
Constitutional Court, 15 f. 
944  National Report of the Macedonian Constitutional Court prepared for the XIVth Congress 
of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts, 17 f. The Report is retrievable over 
<http://www.confeuconstco.org/reports/rep-xiv/report_Macedonia_en.pdf> (last ac-
cessed September 20188). 
945  See e.g. rulings U.br.52/2011 and U.br.76/2011 of 25 January 2012, n. 12. See also two 
rulings by which the Court rejected initiatives of asylum seekers against the Asylum Act: 
U.br.159/2004 of 19 January 2005 (English translation available) and ruling U.br.2/2004 
of 16 February 2005 (English translation available). 
946  E.g. ruling U.br.137/2013 of 8 October 2014, n. 5; ruling U.br.25/2013 of 25 September 
2013, n. 6. For more details in this respect see SPIROVSKI, 9 ff. 
947  E.g. SPIROVSKI, 4 f.; Illustrative are e.g. decision U.br.107/2010 of 16 February 2011, n. 4 
(English translation available); decision U.br.139/2010 of 15 December 2010, n. 6 (Eng-
lish translation available). 
948  E.g. ruling U.br.188/2001 of 24 October 2001, n. 3. 
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Macedonian doctrine.949 The Constitutional Court’s refusal to review the mu-
tual compatibility of two constitutional provisions however indicates that it 
does not recognize the existence of such supra-constitutional norms.950 
bb) International treaties 
Considering decisions to ratify international treaties as political, the Constitu-
tional Court initially refused to review both the constitutionality of interna-
tional treaties and of laws of ratification.951 After accepting to review the law 
ratifying the bilateral agreement with the Greek Republic,952 the Constitu-
tional Court returned to its initial position only a few years later. By reference 
to the political significance, it rejected a number of initiatives that contested 
agreements with the EU in view of a future accession of Macedonia.953  
At this point it must be noted that the Constitutional Court’s position is valued 
differently. Only a minority approves of its rejection to review laws of ratifi-
cation based on the supreme normative position of international treaties in the 
domestic legal order.954 A majority of scholars advocates for such a compe-
tence, not only as a necessity to detect and to eliminate treaties which are in-
consistent with the constitutional order, but also as a logical consequence of 
their inclusion into the domestic legal system.955 A third opinion calls for the 
adoption of constitutional changes to explicitly empower the Court to review 
ratified international treaties with respect to their compliance with the Consti-
tution.956 
cc) Formal laws 
Also the Macedonian Constitutional Court is requested by the majority of in-
itiatives to review formal laws which are adopted by referendum or by the 
National Assembly in proceedings prescribed for legislation. With regard to 
                                              
949  For more details see MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 234 ff.  
950  E.g. ruling U.br.222/1995 of 28 June 1995, n. 3. 
951  With respect to the Framework Agreement of Ohrid signed on 13 August 2001 to over-
come the ethnic conflict with the Albanian minority see ruling U.br.190/2001 of 31 Oc-
tober 2001, n. 4. 
952  Decision U.br.140/2001 of 4 December 2002, n. 6. 
953  Ruling U.br.213/2005 of 12 April 2006, n. 4; ruling U.br.5/2005 of 16 November 2005, 
n. 4. See SKARIĆ, 700; SPIROVSKI, 3. 
954  E.g. SKARIĆ, 694. 
955  See to this effect ČOBANOV, 207; MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 248. 
956  KRAČINSKI, 483 ff.; TRAJKOVSKA-HRISTOVSKA, Access to Constitutional Justice, 11 f. 
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so-called authentic interpretations of legal provisions the Constitutional Court 
adopts a restrained approach. Considering them as integral components of leg-
islation and as exclusive authority of the legislator, it refuses to review their 
compliance with the Constitution.957 At the same time it emphasizes that it 
would review such interpretations with respect to possible violations of the 
procedural rules for legislating, if it established a transgression of the substan-
tial content of a legal provision.958  
An exceptional power to enact decrees with the force of law during states of 
war or emergency is conceded to the Government by art. 126 Constitution. To 
the knowledge of the author the Constitutional Court has not yet had the op-
portunity to express itself on its competence to review the constitutionality of 
emergency decrees. Their qualification as formal laws in doctrine could how-
ever be indicative in this respect.959 
dd) Collective agreements and other regulations 
The Constitutional Court defines collective agreements by reference to the 
legislation on labour relations.960 In contrast to the comprehensive scope of 
collective agreements reviewed under socialist rule, it only reviews collective 
agreements concluded in the public sector.961 Requiring that agreements reg-
ulate working relations with a generally binding and normative effect for all 
employees, it refuses to review agreements on concrete legal relations or ques-
tions between contracting parties.962 In practice, collective agreements are fre-
quently contested for violating the minimum standards of employee rights pre-
scribed by the Labour Relations Act.963 
In the Court's words, regulations  
                                              
957  Ruling U.br.49/2013 of 10 July 2013, n. 5; ruling U.br.87/2012 of 3 October 2012, n. 4. 
958  See to that effect ruling U.br.158/2011 of 31 October 2012, n. 7. 
959  See e.g. KLIMOVSKI/DESKOSKA/KARAKAMIŠEVA, 506 f.; SKARIĆ, 694 f. 
960  Art. 206 Labour Relations Act of 27 December 1993, Služben vesnik 80/93-2007. 
961  For more details in this regard see ČOBANOV, 404 ff. 
962  E.g. ruling U.br.211/2011 of 15 February 2012, n. 3; ruling U.br.142/2004 of 8 December 
2004, n. 4. 
963  See for many decision U.br.73/2014 of 8 October 2014, n. 6; ruling U.br.34/2012 of 11 
September 2013, n. 6; decision U.br.214/2011 of 4 April 2012, n. 5. 
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«contain general rules of behaviour, regulate legal relations and establish 
general rights and obligations of an indeterminable circle of legal sub-
jects.»964  
This definition comprises a broad scope of acts, including all decisions and 
general acts but formal laws adopted by the National Assembly and acts of a 
general nature and decrees for the enforcement of laws adopted by the gov-
ernmental and the executive bodies.965 In practice however, the Court rejects 
numerous initiatives to review governmental decisions which regulate con-
crete legal questions and relations or that have a mere internal legal effect for 
administrative institutions.966 As regulations the Court also reviews general 
normative acts adopted by bodies of local self-government.967 Furthermore, 
the Constitutional Court reviews general acts issued by public institutions or 
enterprises authorized by law to adopt regulations within their field of activity.  
The broad scope of acts considered as regulations even comprises general acts 
adopted by non-governmental organizations with an external and normative 
effect. The Court accordingly reviewed a decision of the Lawyers Association 
of the Republic of Macedonia on tariffs for rewards and compensation for the 
work of attorneys at law and general acts enacted by pensioners' associa-
tions.968  
The analysis reveals that the Constitutional Court at several instances refused 
to review acts that evidently fulfil the criteria established for regulations. Par-
ticularly noteworthy in this respect is its principle refusal to review parliamen-
tary decisions in relation to elections or public votes. The Court for instance 
rejected initiatives filed against decisions of the National Assembly to sched-
ule presidential and parliamentary elections, considering them to lack a gen-
eral nature.969 Based on similar grounds it refused to review a decision by 
which the Assembly rejected a referendum request submitted by over 200,000 
                                              
964  Ruling U.br.104/2013 of 26 November 2013, n. 4; ruling U.br.47/2013 of 9 May 2013, 
n. 4; ruling U.br.190/2012 of 19 December 2012, n. 4. 
965  E.g. ruling U.br.168/2011 of 6 February 2013, n. 4; decision U.br.224/2011 of 14 Novem-
ber 2012, n. 6.  
966  Out of many see ruling U.br.38/2015 of 21 October 2015, n. 4; ruling U.br.44/2013 of 25 
February 2015, n. 4; ruling U.br.132/2014 of 17 December 2014, n. 4. 
967  See e.g. ruling U.br.40/2013 of 24 April 2013, n. 4. 
968  Decision U.br.171/2011 of 11 April 2012, n. 6; ruling U.br.224/2001 of 27 March 2002, 
n. 5. 
969  Ruling U.br.156/1994 of 28 September 1994, n. 4. It repeated this standpoint in ruling 
U.br.86/2006 of 10 May 2006, n. 5. 
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citizens on the holding of early parliamentary elections.970 Among legal schol-
ars these rulings are strongly criticized for the weakness of argumentation and 
for the far-reaching encroachment upon the democratic rights of citizens and 
democratic rule.971 Not least because of these decisions, the Macedonian Con-
stitutional Court faces blames for the misuse of its wide discretion and for the 
political implication of its rulings indicating close ties with the governing ma-
jority.972  
ee) Urban and spatial plans  
Urban and spatial plans of the state and on the communal level are of a con-
siderable relevance in the practice of the Macedonian Constitutional Court. In 
art. 8 indent 10 the Constitution awards a fundamental constitutional value 
and role to a proper urban and rural planning for the promotion of human en-
vironment, ecological protection and development. While the Law on Spatial 
and Urban Planning entitles the Assembly and the communities to enact spa-
tial and urban plans,973 the Constitutional Court acknowledges such acts as 
regulations because they regulate the use of land in a general and abstract 
manner.974  
Yet, it only accepts to review their formal compliance with the Constitution 
and the laws.975 Only if planning acts are contested for not having been enacted 
or amended in accordance to the pertinent procedural rules does the Court 
acknowledges their compatibleness with human environment and ecological 
development to be refuted. It accordingly reviews and annuls urban and spatial 
plans that have been passed by the responsible organs without including citi-
zens concerned or without consultation of experts or special authorities for the 
protection of respective natural resources.976 On the other hand, the Constitu-
                                              
970  Ruling U.br.150/1996 of 11 December 1996, n. 6. See also ruling U.br.167/2004 of 
20 October 2004, n. 4. 
971  ČOBANOV, 225. See with details also MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 274 ff.; SKARIĆ, 708 f. 
972  See ČOBANOV, 224 f.; KRČINSKI, 480. Detailed in MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 449 ff.; TRENESKA-
DESKOSKA, Constitutional Court, 14. 
973  Art. 22 Law on Spatial and Urban Planning of 16 June 2008, Služben vesnik 53/11.  
974  See e.g. ruling U.br.104/2013 of 26 November 2013, n. 4. 
975  E.g. ruling U.br.171/2014 of 24 June 2015, n. 4; ruling U.br.73/2013 of 9 July 2014, n. 5. 
976  See for many decision U.br.3/2013 of 25 November 2014, n. 7; decision U.br.192/2004 
of 2 March 2005, n. 6 (English translation available). 
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tional Court for instance rejects numerous initiatives against planned construc-
tions or for an insufficient amount of parking spaces for being filed out of 
mere dissatisfaction.977 
ff) Lack of review competence  
In contrast to its Croatian and Slovenian counterparts, the Macedonian Con-
stitutional Court refuses to review legal provisions that are not legally valid. 
By invoking the lack of a respective competence and the absence of grounds 
to review acts that are not part of the legal order anymore, it also refuses to 
review provisions that ceased to be effective.978 The same applies to legal 
drafts and published laws or regulations which have not yet entered into legal 
force.979  
The Constitutional Court moreover refuses to review laws or regulations with 
respect to legislative omissions and legal gaps.980 It accordingly rejects nu-
merous initiatives contesting laws or regulations for not regulating a certain 
issue, either by referral to the lack of jurisdiction981 or for the existence of a 
procedural hurdle.982 Although it accepts its competence in as far as legal gaps 
are inconsistent with constitutional rights and liberties,983 it rejected an initia-
tive against a provision of the Family Act for restricting the recognition of 
close relationships to relations between different sexes, while excluding same-
sex couples.984  
As its counterparts in Croatia and Slovenia the Macedonian Court refuses to 
review the mutual compatibility of acts and provisions of the same hierar-
                                              
977  E.g. ruling U.br.17/2013 of 11 September 2013, n. 4; ruling U.br.139/2012 of 26 Decem-
ber 2012, n. 4. 
978  See e.g. ruling U.br.59/2013 of 18 March 2015, n. 4; ruling U.br.68/2014 of 5 November 
2014, n. 4. For a detailed analysis of the practice see ČOBANOV, 255 ff., 342. 
979  ČOBANOV, 188. 
980  National Report of the Republic of Macedonian Constitutional Court for the XIVth Con-
gress of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts, above at fn. 944, 13 f. 
981  E.g. ruling U.br.79/2015 of 9 December 2015, n.  6. 
982  E.g. ruling U.br.57/2015 of 18 November 2015, n. 5. 
983  E.g. decision U.br.49/2006 of 13 December 2006, n. 5; decision U.br.172/2005 of 24 May 
2006, n. 5. 
984  Ruling U.br.71/2012 of 28 November 2012, n. 4. 
Initiative for judicial review in Macedonia 
181 
 
chical level. Consequently, it frequently rejects initiatives to review the com-
pliance between laws or regulations,985 and to assess internal inconsistencies 
within acts of legislation.986  
Furthermore, it shows reluctance to encroach upon the competences of the 
other state powers and upon the legislative function in particular. Just as the 
Croatian and Slovenian Courts, the Constitutional Court refuses to review the 
expediency or justification of acts of legislation, considering such questions 
as political and reserved to the legislative authorities. At the same time, it 
acknowledges a wide political discretion in certain fields of economic and so-
cial life in accordance to given economic circumstances and social needs as 
well. In particular, it recognizes a wide political discretion in regulating finan-
cial and economic relations,987 in relation to social policy and the definition of 
social rights,988 with respect to the political and judicial system,989 and in sev-
eral other political fields comprising energy or educational policy.990 Only if 
the legislative authorities exceed their discretionary power does the Constitu-
tional Court acknowledge its competence to review and to abrogate respective 
provisions for violating the Constitution.991 
In delimiting its powers from the judiciary the Constitutional Court finally 
refuses to review the application or implementation of contested laws or reg-
ulations in judicial review proceedings,992 or to interpret legal provisions in 
order to ensure their uniform application and execution.993 
                                              
985  E.g. ruling U-I-94/2014 of 21 January 2015, n. 4; ruling U.br.128/2013 of 17 December 
2014, n. 4. 
986  E.g. ruling U.br.143/2011 of 7 November 2012, n. 7; ruling U.br.160/2011 of 8 February 
2012, n. 6. 
987  Ruling U.br.107/2012 of 28 November 2012, n. 4; ruling U.br.103/2000 of 15 November 
2000, n. 5. 
988  E.g. ruling U.br.38/2012 of 13 June 2012, n. 4. 
989  Out of many see ruling U.br.162/2014 of 18 March 2015, n. 4; ruling U.br.91/2014 of 17 
December 2014, n. 4; ruling U.br.66/2012 of 26 June 2013, n. 5. 
990  E.g. ruling U.br.140/2013 of 3 June 2015, n. 4; ruling U.br.161/2012 of 23 January 2013, 
n. 4; ruling U.br.188/2012 of 9 January 2013, n. 4. 
991  E.g. decision U.br.199/2008 of 18 March 2009, n. 5 (English translation available). 
992  See e.g. ruling U.br.55/2015 of 24 June 2015, n. 4; ruling U.br.35/2014 of 21 January 
2015; ruling U.br.102/2014 of 19 November 2014, n. 4. 
993  E.g. ruling U.br.94/2012 of 12 September 2012, n. 4. For more details with respect to 
interpretations of laws see e.g. SHASIVARI, 56.  
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B. No requirement of a legitimate interest 
With art. 12 RoP the Constitutional Court introduced the accessibility of judi-
cial review proceedings to every individual and legal subject.  
There are no constitutional or legal provisions predicating the entitlement to 
file initiatives on the demonstration of a legal interest. The analysis of the per-
tinent case-law reveals that neither the Court introduced a respective admissi-
bility requirement through interpretation. Applicants must therefore neither 
demonstrate a personal concern nor substantiate a direct interference of con-
tested provisions with their rights or legal position. 
Just as its Croatian counterpart also the Macedonian Constitutional Court is 
accessible to an unrestricted circle of applicants. By far the most initiatives in 
practice are submitted by individuals. Besides, numerous initiatives are sub-
mitted by citizen associations and other informal groups such as groups of 
inhabitants of a community or a group of employees in a detention centre,994 
by economic enterprises and associations of economic interest,995 by social 
organizations such as pensioner associations, trade unions, consumer organi-
zations, sport clubs,996 or religious associations,997 and by political parties.998 
Frequently, initiatives are also filed by non-governmental organizations999 and 
by members of minority groups.1000 
For lack of a specific authorization of state organs or other public bodies as 
qualified applicants, finally also the state authorities comprising the legisla-
tive, executive and judicial branch and other public bodies are entitled to re-
quest the initiation of judicial review proceedings against laws and other acts 
of legislation on the basis of art. 12 RoP. 
                                              
994  E.g. ruling U.br.179/2012 of 4 June 2013; ruling U.br.146/2011 of 22 February 2012. 
995  E.g. ruling U.br.50/2013 of 19 February 2014; ruling U.br.65/2013 of 6 November 2013. 
996  E.g. ruling U.br.84/2014 of 10 December 2014; ruling U.br.197/2012 of 11 September 
2013; decision U.br.200/2008 of 13 May 2009 (English translation available). 
997  Ruling U.br.24/2012 of 20 November 2012. 
998  E.g. ruling U.br.61/2011 of 18 May 2011; decision U.br.133/2005 of 6 June 2007 (English 
translations available). 
999  E.g. ruling U.br.92/2013 of 8 October 2014; ruling U.br.71/2012 of 28 November 2012. 
1000  Decision U.br.84/2009 of 10 February 2010 (English translation available). 
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C. Requirements of form and substance 
a) Form and content of initiatives 
The Constitutional Court itself emphasizes that initiatives must be filed in 
compliance with the requirements prescribed by art. 15 f. RoP regarding form, 
content and quality.1001 In contrast to its counterparts it did not publish any 
template for initiatives on its website. Initiatives must be submitted in written 
form and in two copies. In accordance with art. 7 Constitution, they can be 
filed in the official Macedonian language and Cyrillic script, or in a minority 
language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population of a respective local 
community. Applicants must indicate their name and title while anonymously 
filed initiatives are considered as not submitted. The initiatives must clearly 
indicate the legal provisions alleged to be unconstitutional or unlawful and 
name the constitutional or legal provisions deemed to be violated.1002 
The analysis of its practice reveals that the Constitutional Court only accepts 
initiatives for consideration if the allegations raise reasonable doubts about the 
compliance of contested provisions with the Constitution and the laws. Appli-
cants must consequently provide sufficient and suitable arguments that put 
into question the legitimacy of these acts.1003 Mere referrals to a detrimental 
effect for their rights1004 or personal dissatisfactions with legal rules do not 
suffice to raise reasonable doubts.1005 In consistent practice the Constitutional 
Court rejects imprecise or ambiguous initiatives by referring to the existence 
of a procedural obstacle.1006 
b) Improvement of insufficient and unclear initiatives 
Based on art. 16 para. 1 RoP the Constitutional Court can invite applicants to 
correct and supplement insufficient or incomplete initiatives. If the Secretary 
of the Court establishes formal defects, it will return the initiatives and deter-
mine a term shorter than thirty days for the necessary corrections and supple-
ments. As a result of the failure to comply with the time limit or to conduct 
                                              
1001  Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia, 22 f. 
1002  See ruling U.br.30/2015 of 13 May 2015, n. 7; ruling U.br.3/2014 of 10 December 2014, 
n. 6. 
1003  E.g. ruling U.br.127/2014 of 3 June 2015, n. 5; ruling U.br.179/2012 of 4 June 2013, n. 4. 
Similarly also ruling U.br.1/2008 of 17 September 2008, n. 4. 
1004  Ruling U.br.47/2012 of 26 September 2012, n. 4. 
1005  Ruling U.br.38/2012 of 13 June 2012, n. 4. 
1006  E.g. ruling U.br.161/2013 of 5 March 2014, n. 4. 
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the requested corrections and changes the initiative is considered not to have 
been filed.  
D. No temporal restrictions 
In accordance with the unrestricted nature of actio popularis, the right to sub-
mit initiatives is not limited in time. Accordingly, initiatives can be filed at any 
time against laws and regulations that are valid and in legal force. 
E. Cost burden  
Just as in Croatia and Slovenia the proceedings before the Macedonian Con-
stitutional Court are free of charge. The admissibility of initiatives does not 
depend on the payment of court fees nor does their submittal imply an addi-
tional cost burden by attorneys' fees as consequence of a required mandatory 
legal representation.  
Pursuant to art. 46 para. 1 RoP applicants bear their own costs and expenses 
arising from the submittal of initiatives or from their participation in the re-
view proceedings. Finally, there are no legal bases empowering the Constitu-
tional Court to sanction abusive initiatives or to order penalty fees for negli-
gent legal representatives who fail to comply with the prescribed formal re-
quirements when submitting initiatives. 
F. Procedural obstacles 
a) Principle of res iudicata 
In art. 112 para. 3 the Constitution prescribes the finality of decisions of the 
Constitutional Court. The generally binding nature applies to the state organs, 
to all legal subjects and to the Constitutional Court itself. It is prevented from 
reassessing already reviewed acts of legislation and to decide anew on their 
compliance with the Constitution and the laws.1007 The Court therefore rejects 
initiatives which contest legal provisions for inconsistencies with the Consti-
tution or the laws that have been dismissed as unfounded in earlier deci-
sions.1008 
                                              
1007  E.g. SKARIĆ, 705. 
1008  See e.g. ruling U.br.78/2015 of 14 October 2015, n. 4; ruling U.br.128/2014 of 12 No-
vember 2014, n. 4. 
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Yet, just as the Constitutional Courts of Croatia and Slovenia, also the Mace-
donian Court acknowledges that the correctness of earlier decisions and rul-
ings can be put into doubt if an alleged unconstitutionality or unlawfulness is 
substantiated by new arguments or statements or because of changed legal or 
factual circumstances. In practice however, it rejects numerous initiatives for 
the failure to provide new reasons that would justify a change of position,1009 
or for the failure to put into question the correctness of its earlier decisions.1010  
b) Withdrawal or lapse of procedural requirements 
As to art. 47 indents 1 and 2 RoP the withdrawal of initiatives or the fact that 
contested provisions cease to be effective lead to the closure of the review 
proceedings. In such cases the Constitutional Court invokes that there is no 
ground to assess contested acts of legislation anymore. The loss of legal va-
lidity of contested provisions constitutes a frequent reason for the closure of 
proceedings in practice.1011 
Yet, the Rules entitle the Constitutional Court to proceed with the proceedings 
under certain conditions. On the basis of art. 43 RoP it can continue even after 
the withdrawal of initiatives, if it acknowledges a «wider constitutional im-
portance» of the question at stake. Similarly art. 47 indent 1 RoP allows it to 
continue with the review proceedings also if contested provisions lose their 
legal validity if 
 «there exists [a] basis for the assessment of their constitutionality or legal-
ity during the period in which they were in force.» (Insertion added)  
Therewith, the Constitutional Court left it at its own discretion to decide in 
every individual case whether or not to close the review proceedings in case 
of the lapse of procedural requirements.  
Finally, art. 47 indents 3 – 5 list further reasons for the closure of review pro-
ceedings before the adoption of a final decision. Accordingly, the Court can 
do so if it establishes that its decision to initiate proceedings was based on an 
improper assessment of facts or if its doubts about the compliance of contested 
                                              
1009  Out of many see ruling U.br.140/2014 of 18 February 2015, n. 6; ruling U.br.30/2013 of 
10 July 2013, n. 5; ruling U.br.33/2013 of 24 April 2013, n. 6. 
1010  E.g. ruling U.br.45/2013 of 25 December 2013, n. 6; ruling U.br.197/2012 of 11 Septem-
ber 2013, n. 4. 
1011  E.g. ruling U.br.105/2012 of 8 October 2014, n. 4; ruling U.br.15/2014 of 2 April 2014, 
n. 4; ruling U.br.121/2012 of 11 September 2013, n. 4. 
Chapter 3: Popular complaints in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia 
186 
 
provisions with the Constitution or the laws are removed, e.g. after holding 
public hearings. It for instance closed review proceedings after the responsible 
authority submitted evidence about an announcement for public consultation 
on the draft of a contested urban plan which allayed the Court's doubts on the 
compliance of the adoption with the procedural rules for enactment.1012 
c) Other procedural hurdles 
Finally, the open wording of art. 28 indent 3 RoP, which allows the rejection 
of initiatives «if there are other procedural obstacles to deciding», leaves a 
very wide discretion to the Constitutional Court.1013 The pertinent jurisdiction 
reveals that this provision serves as a kind of reservoir for the rejections of 
initiatives for a varied number of reasons. For the existence of a procedural 
hurdle it for instance rejects initiatives for having been filed against better 
knowledge of the applicant.1014  
The Court moreover refers to the existence of a procedural obstacle if it is 
requested to review its own Rules of Procedures. It rejects respective initia-
tives by stating that it cannot review these Rules while being their creator.1015 
By invoking the existence of a procedural hurdle it moreover rejects initiatives 
against its regulatory autonomy in determining its organization and proceed-
ings.1016 These decisions are illustrative for the institutional problematic of the 
Constitutional Court’s regulatory power: its Rules of Procedure are com-
pletely excluded from any review with respect to their compliance with the 
Constitution.  
G. Examination of the merits 
As has been shown, the Constitutional Court principally initiates review pro-
ceedings upon the existence of reasonable doubts about the constitutionality 
or lawfulness of contested provisions. To this end and just like the Courts of 
                                              
1012  Ruling U.br.58/2011 of 11 January 2012, n. 4. 
1013  ČOBANOV, 187. 
1014  In ruling U.br.129/2013 of 26 February 2014, n. 4,. See also ruling U.br.115/2013 of 25 
September 2013, n. 5; ruling U.br.135/2012 of 29 May 2013, n. 4. 
1015  See ruling U.br.131/1997 of 17 September 1997, n. 4; ruling U.br.215/1993 of 8 February 
1995, n. 4. 
1016  Ruling U.br.77/2014 of 9 July 2014, n. 4; ruling U.br.252/1995 of 13 September 1995, 
n. 5. 
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Croatia and Slovenia also the Macedonian Court assesses the content and al-
legations of initiatives already in the preliminary proceedings. If it does not 
consider these to put into doubt the compliance of a contested provision with 
the Constitution and the laws it rules that the allegations are unfounded. Its 
rulings to not initiate review proceedings consequently entail a final legal 
force with respect to the claimed normative inconsistency.1017 The same ap-
plies to rulings on the acceptance of initiatives for consideration with which 
the Court in principle anticipates its final decision on the unconstitutionality 
or unlawfulness of contested laws and regulations. 
3. Status of petitioners in review proceedings 
Despite the principally objective and non-adversarial nature of judicial review 
proceedings, also the Macedonian Constitutional Court introduced procedural 
elements that improve the procedural status of the petitioners. 
A. Participatory rights of petitioners  
a) Applicability of Convention standards for fair proceedings 
In principle the ECtHR considers the standards for fair trial as guaranteed in 
art. 6 para. 1 ECHR applicable to proceedings before the Macedonian Consti-
tutional Court, under the condition that these proceedings are relevant for the 
applicants civil rights and obligations or their criminal responsibility.  
Illustrative is its decision Mickovski vs. Macedonia. The ECtHR did not con-
sider as applicable the right to access to court, even though the Constitutional 
Court rejected the constitutional complaint of the applicant for late submittal, 
after he had unsuccessfully tried to submit his complaint to the Court during 
the summer period.1018 It decided accordingly, because the issue at stake, 
namely the discharge of the applicant from his office as public servant, did not 
concern his civil rights and obligations. 
                                              
1017  See hereto Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia, 20. See also explanation 
b. of the Constitutional Court to the types of legal effect of decisions published on its 
website <http://ustavensud.mk/?page_id=5207&lang=en> (last accessed September 
2018). 
1018  Decision of 10 November 2005 as to the admissibility of application, Mickovski vs. Mac-
edonia, 68329/01 (dec.). 
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Illustrative for the ECtHR’s position on the applicability of the standards for 
fair trial to judicial review proceedings before the Macedonian Constitutional 
Court is its decision Trajkoski and others vs. Macedonia.1019. The complain-
ants alleged that with its politically motivated ruling, by which it rejected their 
initiatives against the communal urban plan, the Constitutional Court violated 
their right to an independent and impartial court. The ECtHR rejected the ap-
plication as inadmissible on the grounds that these proceedings were not de-
cisive for the civil rights and obligations of the complainants. 
b) Participatory rights of petitioners 
With its regulatory autonomy the Macedonian Constitutional Court introduced 
particular procedural means to improve the procedural status of petitioners in 
judicial review proceedings. Just as in Croatia and Slovenia these include a 
number of rights to information and to participation, allowing petitioners to 
exert influence on the decision-making of the Court. 
Rights to information of the petitioners principally include their information 
about the status of their submittals and of the outcome of the proceedings. For 
the entire duration of the proceedings, petitioners are entitled to inspect the 
documentation and information relevant for the Court’s decision on the basis 
of art. 22 RoP. Their information is finally guaranteed by the obligation of the 
Constitutional Court to publish and to deliver its decisions to the applicants 
pursuant to art. 78 RoP. 
Possibilities of participation are provided at all stages of proceedings. So as to 
explain their allegations petitioners can be invited to consultative interviews 
already during the preliminary proceedings pursuant to art. 18 para. 4 RoP. If 
necessary to clarify the factual and legal status the Constitutional Court can 
invite petitioners on the basis of art. 29 RoP to so-called preparatory meetings 
at each stage of the proceedings. It can moreover decide to schedule public 
hearings as to art. 33 ff. RoP and therewith allow petitioners to explain and 
justify their allegations or to present their opinions on positions.1020 
However, the decision to allow the participation of petitioners is left to the 
discretion of the Constitutional Court.1021 In accordance with the constitu-
                                              
1019  Decision of 1 December 2005 as to the admissibility of application, Trajkoski and others 
vs. Macedonia, 13191/02 (dec.). 
1020  ČOBANOV, 193 f. 
1021  ČOBANOV, 195 f. 
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tional proceedings in Croatia and Slovenia petitioners cannot claim to partic-
ipate in the review proceedings that were initiated upon their petition. Never-
theless, the Macedonian Court is – just as its counterparts – obliged to allow 
participation if the criteria for application of the Convention standards for fair 
trial are fulfilled. In practice the scheduling of public proceedings is not only 
common to constitutional complaint proceedings,1022 but is ordered in the ma-
jority of judicial review proceedings as well.1023  
B. Temporal limitations of proceedings 
Art. 18 para. 3 RoP obliges the Constitutional Court to initiate the preceding 
procedure within ten days from the receipt of initiatives. For initiatives relat-
ing to the protection of human rights and liberties this term is shortened to 
three days. Another temporal limitation is provided for the duration of the pre-
ceding proceedings. Within three months from the receipt of a case the judge, 
who is responsible for the case, is obliged based on art. 23 para. 1 RoP to refer 
to the plenum of the Constitutional Court either by submitting a report on his 
or her findings or by informing the Court about the course of the proceedings. 
This term is shortened to thirty days if petitioners seek protection of human 
rights and liberties.  
On the one hand, these acceleration measures serve the procedural economy 
and prevent an ever growing backlog of applications. For the petitioners, on 
the other hand, they have an important impact as they prevent them from suf-
fering disadvantages by the inactivity of the Constitutional Court.1024 How-
ever, the rulings and decisions of the Court do not reveal whether these tem-
poral limitations have an actual significance in practice. 
C. Power to extend the scope of review 
In accordance with its Croatian counterpart the review competence of the 
Macedonian Court is not limited to the allegations raised by the petitioners.1025 
As a consequence of its power to initiate and to continue review proceedings 
at its own discretion it is explicitly entitled on the basis of art. 14 para. 2 and 
                                              
1022  TRENESKA-DESKOSKA, Constitutional Court, 27. 
1023  SKARIĆ, 712. See also ČOBANOV, 194 ff. with further details. 
1024  See ČOBANOV, 190. 
1025  See to that effect also ČOBANOV, 185. 
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art. 43 para. 2 RoP to extend its assessment and to review other acts and pro-
visions.  
In practice however, the Constitutional Court restricts its review to the allega-
tions raised by the petitioners. This complies with its above mentioned re-
straint to initiate review proceedings at its own discretion.1026 Only in individ-
ual cases, where it considers the unconstitutionality of a provision as violation 
of fundamental values, does the Court extend the scope of its review. It for 
instance annulled a legal provision which was contested for the lack of a re-
spective constitutional basis because it considered it as a violation of the rule 
of law.1027 
4. Achievement of subjective rights protection 
Based on its regulatory autonomy the Macedonian Constitutional Court com-
bined the review proceedings with procedural instruments, which allow peti-
tioners to improve their own legal positions and to enforce their own rights 
and liberties against state authorities. By filing initiatives petitioners can pre-
vent the implementation of unconstitutional laws or acts of legislation and ob-
tain remedy or compensation for violations, which they have already suffered 
because such provisions have been applied by the judicial or administrative 
authorities. 
A. Suspension of applicability of laws 
In order to prevent the occurrence of harmful consequences before the con-
clusion of the review proceedings art. 27 para. 1 RoP empowers the Macedo-
nian Constitutional Court to suspend the execution of certain individual acts 
or activities that have been adopted on the basis of a reviewed legal provision. 
In accordance with the wording it can order the non-execution of specific acts 
or activities. By ordering the general non-execution the Court nevertheless 
grants its rulings a further reaching protective effect which amounts to the 
temporary non-applicability of the contested legal provision.1028 
                                              
1026  See above at Chapter 2, pp. 74 f. 
1027  Ruling U.br.152/2013 of 8 October 2014, n. 5. 
1028  E.g. ruling U.br.166/2014 of 1 April 2015, n. 7; ruling U.br.244/2008 of 18 February 
2009, n. 6. 
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Its power to temporarily suspend the applicability of reviewed laws is timely 
restricted to the duration of the review proceedings. It is contingent on the 
admissibility of an initiative and ordered together with the ruling to initiate 
review proceedings.1029 With its final decision the Court either restores the 
applicability of the reviewed provisions or invalidates it for being unconstitu-
tional. 
In principle the Constitutional Court orders preliminary suspensions upon re-
spective requests but is entitled to do so at its own discretion.1030 It passes a 
respective order only if it has reasonable doubts about the constitutionality or 
legality of a contested provision.1031 It emphasizes that the lack of grounds for 
initiating review proceedings entails that the conditions to order preliminary 
measures are not fulfilled either.1032 This indicates that the prospect of success 
of initiatives constitutes a prerequisite for the ordering of this precautionary 
measure. 
In addition, the Court requires that the execution of acts passed on the basis of 
contested provisions leads to harmful consequences that are difficult to rem-
edy.1033 It for instance recognized such a possibility in relation to contested 
spatial and urban plans. Worth mentioning is its order to temporarily suspend 
the enforcement of acts passed in application of the detailed urban plan of the 
Capital Skopje, which was contested for interfering with the territorial author-
ity of the neighbouring community of Gazi Baba.1034 Another noteworthy ex-
ample is the Court's ruling to suspend the execution of decisions adopted in 
application of the lustration measures, which excluded persons suspected for 
having cooperated with the former socialist security service from public of-
fices, unless they submitted a confirmation proving the opposite.1035  
                                              
1029  See SKARIĆ, 713. 
1030  See also ČOBANOV, 328 f. 
1031  E.g. ruling U.br.149/2013 of 9 April 2014, nn. 5 f.; ruling U.br.166/2012 of 20 February 
2013, n. 11. 
1032  Illustrative is ruling U.br.180/1992 of 4 September 1992, n. 5 and from the newer practice 
ruling U.br. 23/2015 of 4 November 2015, n. 5. 
1033  E.g. ruling U.br.66/2014 of 25 November 2014, n. 5; ruling U.br.135/1999 of 3 November 
1999, n. 7. 
1034  Ruling U.br.124/2009 of 24 March 2010, n. 8. See also ruling U.br.67/2014 of 17 Decem-
ber 2014, n. 7; ruling U.br.106/2013 of 18 June 2014, n. 6. 
1035  Ruling U.br.52/2011 of 25 January 2012, n. 7, above at fn. 945. The Court abrogated the 
provisions for violating human dignity by decisions U.br.52/2011 and U.br.76/2011 of 28 
March 2012, n. 9. 
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Although the Constitutional Court itself emphasizes the necessity of a restric-
tive approach in ordering preliminary suspensions,1036 the case-law reveals 
that it does not balance possible detrimental effects of such orders with legal 
certainty. In its justifications the Court only refers to the possibility of the oc-
currence of harmful consequences, without however defining these conse-
quences in more detail or balancing them with other interests affected. 
B. Legal effect of decisions 
As has been shown, the legal effects of decisions to eliminate unconstitutional 
or unlawful acts of legislation from the normative order are essential for peti-
tioners who seek protection of their personal rights against the legislative au-
thorities.1037  
The Macedonian Constitutional Court sanctions legislative inconsistencies by 
abrogating or by annulling unconstitutional or unlawful legislative acts. Alt-
hough neither the Constitution nor the RoP explicitly provide decisions on the 
declaration of unconstitutionality, the Constitutional Court does not categori-
cally exclude its power to adopt declaratory decisions.1038 
Abrogated unconstitutional laws or legal provisions lose their legal validity 
and cannot be implemented nor executed anymore (ex nunc).1039 Therewith 
successful petitioners prevent the adoption of final decisions or acts which 
directly interfere with their rights or legal position. So as to deprive rights 
violating final and enforceable individual acts from their legal basis, the Con-
stitutional Court is empowered to annul unconstitutional acts of legislation 
with a retroactive effect (ex tunc).1040 By doing so it provides legal ground for 
petitioners to request the reconsideration or change of these acts with the re-
sponsible authorities within a particular period of time.1041 
The decision whether to abrogate or to annul unconstitutional or unlawful le-
gal provisions is at the discretion of the Constitutional Court. In contrast to its 
Croatian and Slovenian counterparts the Macedonian Court is even empow-
ered to annul formal laws if, as to art. 73 RoP, the consequences and violations 
                                              
1036  Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia, 20. 
1037  For a detailed presentation of the legal effects of the decisions, see ČOBANOV, 349 ff. 
1038  Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia, 18. 
1039  Art. 80 and 81 para. 3 RoP Macedonia. 
1040  Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia, 19. See also KALKAŠLIEVA, 87 f.; 
MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 280 f.; SKARIĆ, 704. 
1041  See KALKAŠLIEVA, 87 f. 
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are considered to be serious. The Court takes into account all circumstances 
important for the protection of the constitutional order, the degree of violation 
and the effect for rights protection, without putting into question legal cer-
tainty and other important issues for decision-making. The Court for instance 
annulled laws and regulations for not having been passed in accordance to the 
proceedings prescribed for legislating.1042 It moreover annulled provisions be-
cause of serious substantial deficiencies, for instance for violating the princi-
ple of non-retroactivity,1043 of university autonomy,1044 of legality,1045 and of 
free market economy.1046 In practice, however, the Court predominantly abro-
gates unconstitutional laws or unconstitutional and unlawful regulations, 
while annulments remain the exception.1047 
C. Reparation and compensation for violations suffered 
Just as its counterparts in Croatia and Slovenia also the Macedonian Consti-
tutional Court reintroduced the right of redress against violations suffered by 
the application of unconstitutional or unlawful provisions. With this additional 
remedy, petitioners whose rights have been violated by final decisions or in-
dividual acts adopted on the basis of such provisions, can either request the 
revocation of these acts with the responsible authority or a compensation for 
damages. 
a) Request for revocation 
As to art. 81 para. 1 RoP  
«[a]nyone whose rights have been infringed by a final or legally binding 
individual act adopted on the basis of a law, regulation or other common 
act which has been revoked by a judgment of the Constitutional Court has 
the right to request the competent organ to revoke that individual act […].» 
(Punctuation added) 
                                              
1042  E.g. decision U.br.124/2009 of 1 February 2012, n. 7; decision U.br.241/2007 of 11 June 
2008, n. 5. 
1043  E.g. decision U.br.159/2011 of 28 March 2012, n. 6. 
1044  Decision U.br.42/2012 of 9 May 2013, n. 5; decision U.br.221/2011 of 11 April 2012, 
n. 6. 
1045  Decision U.br.152/2013 of 8 October 2014, n. 4. 
1046  Decision U.br.217/2001 of 17 July 2002, n. 7. 
1047  ČOBANOV, 346 f.; SKARIĆ, 706 established that five percent of all decisions to invalidate 
reviewed acts between 1991 and 2003 were annulments. 
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A revocation of final decisions or acts which have been adopted in application 
of unconstitutional legal procedures requires the submittal of a respective re-
quest to the responsible authority. In accordance with Slovenia but in contrast 
to Croatia, the right to file such requests to Macedonian authorities only arises 
on the basis of decisions on annulments of unconstitutional laws and other 
legal provisions.1048  
The right of revocation is not limited to the applicants upon whose initiatives 
provisions have been annulled. It rather comprises every individual or legal 
person who suffered violations from the application of unconstitutional or un-
lawful legal provisions. However, the admissibility of such requests requires 
a proof of a personal concern and legal interest before the responsible author-
ity.1049 Furthermore, this claim right is limited in time. Requests for revocation 
can be submitted within six months starting from the day of publication of the 
Constitutional Court's decision to annul the legal basis.  
In practice, however, this right does not have a considerable impact because 
of the Court’s restrained approach to annul unconstitutional legal provisions.  
b) Subsidiary request for compensation for damage 
Finally, also the Macedonian Constitutional Court introduced a subsidiary 
remedy for cases where the negative consequences cannot be remedied by 
revocation of final individual acts. Art. 81 para. 2 RoP accordingly determines 
that reparation of persons concerned can be granted by a compensation for 
damage or by other means. In contrast to requests for revocation, which are to 
be filed with the responsible authority that adopted an unconstitutional provi-
sion and therewith directly violated the applicant's rights, the Constitutional 
Court reserves the competence to order the compensation for damages to it-
self.1050 
 
                                              
1048  National Report of the Macedonian Constitutional Court prepared for the XVth Congress 
of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts, p. 14 see above at fn. 937. 
1049  See the Court's explanations <http://ustavensud.mk/?page_id=5207&lang=en> (last ac-
cessed September 2018). 
1050  SKARIĆ, 704. 
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IV. Comparative conclusion 
As remedies entitling individual persons to request the Constitutional Courts 
to review the compatibility of acts of legislation with the Constitution, popular 
complaints continue to exist in the three states considered. This part of the 
study shows the procedural particularities of the three complaints as provided 
in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia and of the procedural status of petitioners 
in the judicial review proceedings. Besides several resemblances between the 
three systems, the Slovene right to petition differs from the other two com-
plaints both in a procedural aspect as well as with respect to its function.  
1. Common features of the popular complaints 
The analysis reveals close resemblances between the procedural arrangements 
of the three popular complaints considered. Irrespectively of the insinuated 
non-committal nature as «proposal», «petition» or «initiative», these com-
plaints are in fact established as a much stronger procedural remedies. The 
Constitutional Courts are obliged to assess and evaluate every proposal and 
argument raised individually and in formalized preliminary proceedings and 
to justify rejections in form of formal rulings. Therewith, the popular com-
plaints obtain the same binding effect as legal remedies.  
With a few exceptions comprising the competence to review decisions of the 
National Assemblies on the scheduling of votes and elections or to review le-
gal provisions which ceased to be effective, the jurisdiction of the Croatian, 
the Slovenian and Macedonian Constitutional Courts to review normative acts 
is comparable.  
In place of the informal submittals provided under socialist rule, the admissi-
bility of popular complaints requires the fulfilment of conditions regarding 
form, language and content. All three Courts refuse to consider anonymously 
filed proposals. Moreover, they lay down relatively high requirements as to 
the substantiation of complaints. General allegations of normative inconsist-
encies do not suffice. Rather, the Courts require applicants to explain alleged 
inconsistencies by explicitly naming the relevant provisions and describing 
the discrepancies in a comprehensible and complete manner. Only if they suc-
ceed in raising reasonable doubts about the constitutionality or lawfulness will 
the Constitutional Courts review contested provisions. While applicants are 
given the possibility to correct and supplement incomplete and formally defi-
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cient complaints, inadequately substantiated submittals are rejected as inad-
missible. As a rule, the principle of res iudicata and the subsequent withdrawal 
of proposals or lapse of procedural requirements constitute procedural obsta-
cles in all three states considered and entitle the Constitutional Courts to reject 
applications or to close already initiated review proceedings. 
A resemblance can also be established with respect to the judicial review pro-
ceedings and the procedural status awarded to applicants in the three states 
considered. While these proceedings were established with the primary pur-
pose to enforce the objective constitutional order against the legislative au-
thorities, they are combined with several procedural elements that allow ap-
plicants to protect and improve their own subjective rights and status. This is 
not only a consequence of the common tradition and continued practice of 
constitutional adjudication under socialist rule. It is moreover the consequence 
of the adoption of international standards through the ratification of conven-
tions and the acquisition of membership in international organizations. The 
right of applicants to be informed and to participate in review proceedings 
corresponds to the ECHR standards for fair trials, which require an enhanced 
procedural status of applicants if the criteria of victimhood are fulfilled or if 
the review proceedings are decisive for the applicants' civil rights or criminal 
responsibilities. 
Similarities also exist with respect to the procedural arrangements combining 
judicial review proceedings with means that allow applicants to achieve con-
crete personal legal benefits. Noteworthy is their right to prevent imminent 
violations of own personal rights by reaching the temporary suspension of the 
applicability of decisions and concrete acts adopted on the basis of contested 
laws. The same applies to the right to request reconsideration of decisions and 
individual acts adopted on the basis of annulled laws, which provides appli-
cants with a redress for already suffered violations. 
These procedural particularities indicate that the popular complaints in Croa-
tia, Slovenia and Macedonia are not only established as means to enforce the 
constitutional order and guarantees as public goods against the legislative au-
thorities. These remedies moreover allow individuals to directly access the 
Constitutional Courts to achieve protection against violations of their subjec-
tive rights as consequence of unconstitutional or unlawful laws or regulations.  
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2. Distinctive features of the Slovene right to petition 
The analysis also reveals distinct features of the three popular complaints. Be-
sides the restrictions mentioned, the entitlement to request the initiation of re-
view proceedings against acts of legislation before the Croatian and Macedo-
nian Constitutional Courts is not subject to any further limitation. The access 
of individuals is consequently neither limited in time, nor by cost burden, nor 
by requirements regarding the relevance of the questions raised. Most im-
portantly, the entitlement is not contingent on the demonstration of a legiti-
mate interest in bringing review proceedings. The procedural hurdles for the 
submittal of popular complaints against acts of legislation are thus very low. 
In accordance to the original actio popularis, these remedies therefore allow 
a practically unrestricted access of individuals to the Constitutional Courts. 
The only requirement interpreted rigorously by the Courts is the obligation of 
applicants to substantiate the existence of a normative inconsistency. 
In Slovenia, on the other hand, the rigid procedural treatment of individual 
access to the Constitutional Court became apparent already from the outset. 
Complaints and petitions must meet qualitative requirements and must be filed 
within explicit and implicit temporal limits. Most importantly however, appli-
cants must demonstrate a legal interest in challenging a law or other act of 
legislation. While the Court required a legal interest already during the first 
years of its activity, it adopted an ever more strict interpretation in the follow-
ing years. With its change of practice in 2007 it considerably limited its acces-
sibility by demanding a direct interference of contested legal provisions with 
the personal rights of the petitioners. Applicants who fail to demonstrate such 
an immediate effect succeed in proving their direct concern only by addition-
ally filing a valid constitutional complaint against an individual act or decision 
adopted on the basis of contested provisions.  
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Chapter 4: Significance of popular complaints 
from a practical point of view 
Unlike constitutional complaints, which are generally considered as important 
remedies of human rights protection, the right of individuals to contest laws 
or other acts of legislation is much less appreciated and common. This is all 
the more true if the right to file complaints does not require a personal concern 
and legal interest of applicants.  
While the preceding Chapter showed the procedural particularities of the pop-
ular complaints in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia, the following analyses 
their significance in practice. So as to reveal the practical significance of pop-
ular complaints as means of direct individual access, the available statistical 
information on the practice of the Constitutional Courts from 2002 until 2015 
will be analysed in part I. Their practical significance is analysed in compari-
son with requests filed by authorized applicants. Whether they serve as means 
for subjective rights protection from the perspective of the applicants is shown 
by the comparison of the respective data with the numbers relating to consti-
tutional complaints. The analysis of the success rate allows the drawing of 
conclusions on the difficulty for individuals to fulfil the procedural require-
ments and on the practice of the Constitutional Courts in handling popular 
complaints.  
In part II an overview of the case-law of the last twenty-five years reveals to 
what extent these remedies have contributed to the enforcement of the Con-
stitutions in the three states and to the consolidation of human rights, consti-
tutionalism and the rule of law. 
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I. Evaluation of statistical data 
1. Right of proposal in Croatia 
The statistical information about the work of the Croatian Constitutional Court 
from 1990 until today can be found on its website1051 and is relevant for the 
compilation below. The available information only comprises the kind and 
number of applications filed during the respective period and the amount of 
cases decided by the Constitutional Court. As consequence of the limited data 
available, the table is incomplete. 
 
 
 
  
Total sub-
mittals 
Constitutional 
Complaints 
Judicial review proceedings 
Total appli-
cations 
Proposals submitted 
by individuals and 
legal persons  
Thereof 
% of pro-
posals 
Success 
rate % 
2002 3,310 2,584 236       
2003 4,254 3,373 255       
2004 5,170 3,602 535       
2005 5,232 3,148 476       
2006 4,296 3,764 402       
2007 4,847 4,173 389       
2008 5,768 5,219 254       
2009 6,041 5,202 315       
2010 7,453 5,626 1,629       
2011 6,374 5,597 512       
2012 6,560 5,980 236      
2013 6,324 5,627 386       
2014 8,195 5,138 2,813    
2015 5,138 4,595 365    
       
 
A. Workload resulting from individual access in general 
a) Constitutional complaints 
As shown the entitlement to file constitutional complaints has been gradually 
restricted by legal changes of the CCL and by the adoption of a more restric-
tive interpretation by the Constitutional Court itself. Nonetheless, the statistics 
                                              
1051  The statistics are published in English on the website of the Croatian Constitutional Court 
<https://www.usud.hr/en/statistics> (last accessed September 2018). 
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reveal that the Court suffers from an immense amount of submitted constitu-
tional complaints. Ever since 2008 it receives approximately 5,000 constitu-
tional complaints annually. In 2012 their amount even exceeded the number 
of 6,000. The considerable predominance of these complaints, ranging be-
tween 80 and 90 percent of all submittals received annually by the Court, re-
veals that constitutional complaints are the main reason for its chronic over-
load. 
b) Submittals for judicial review 
The number of proposals filed for the initiation of judicial review proceedings 
is considerably lower. The table shows that since 2002, the number of requests 
submitted per year ranges steadily between 200 and 560 and amounts to less 
than ten percent of the Court's workload. The two upswings of submittals re-
ceived in 2010 and in 2014 were a consequence of the adoption of two legis-
lative acts to overcome critical financial situations. The enactment of the Law 
on the Reduction of Pension Payments in 2010 led to the submittal of over 
1,000 proposals.1052 Altogether 1,146 proposals have been filed in 2014 
against the Law on the Denial of the Right to Salary Increase based on Actual 
Years of Service, and 1,122 against the respective Decree prolonging the legal 
validity of this Law for three months.1053 
B. Relation to requests filed by authorized applicants  
The available data regarding the submittals to initiate judicial review proceed-
ings do not reveal the amount of proposals filed by individuals. Respective 
indications can be found elsewhere. In his speech on the occasion of the cele-
bration of the fifteenth anniversary of the Croatian Constitutional Court, For-
mer Court President PETAR KLARIĆ speaks of even 99 percent of proceedings 
instituted upon proposals filed by individuals, while in only one percent of 
cases the applicants were state organs and other authorized bodies.1054 The 
                                              
1052  In ruling U-I-3610/2010 of 15 December 2010, NN 4/11, the Constitutional Court rejected 
the proposals for the lack of competence to decide on the expediency of laws.  
1053  These numbers have been provided by the Constitutional Court on request. See the rele-
vant ruling U-I-1625/2014 et al. of 18 July 2014, n. 13, and decision U-I-1625/2014 of 
30 March 2013, see above at fn. 658. 
1054  Page 5 of the President's speech, published in English on the website of the Constitutional 
Court  <www.usud.hr> (last accessed September 2015). 
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high percentage of proposals filed has been confirmed by the former President 
of the Constitutional Court JASNA OMEJEC.1055 
This indicates a considerably higher activity of individuals and other legal 
persons in contesting laws and other general acts than of state organs and the 
ombudsperson as authorized applicants. Despite their power to submit binding 
requests to the Constitutional Court and their constitutional obligation to pro-
tect the constitutional order, these qualified applicants still show much more 
restraint in requesting the review of laws and other general acts. 
C. Proposals as remedies for subjective rights protection 
a) Clear prevalence of constitutional complaints  
In comparison with the number of constitutional complaints considerably less 
submittals are filed for the initiation of initiate judicial review proceedings, 
from which the vast majority is submitted by individual persons. Not even 
amounting to ten percent of the entirety of submittals received, this shows that 
the right of proposal is exercised to a much lower extent by individuals than 
the constitutional complaint. This clear divergence is somewhat surprising, 
since – although differing with respect to the objects of appeal – principally 
the same protection can be achieved by both legal remedies. By submitting 
constitutional complaints against decisions or other concrete state acts, appli-
cants can achieve the abrogation of contested individual acts and of their legal 
bases by incidental review proceedings. Alternatively, individuals can cause 
the abolition of contested legal provisions by proposing the initiation of re-
view proceedings and thereafter claim the reconsideration of individual acts 
that have been adopted in application of abrogated provisions.  
In contrast to constitutional complaints, the right to file proposals is practically 
unrestricted. So far, not even the measures undertaken in restricting the access 
by constitutional complaint eased the Constitutional Court's workload. De-
spite the enhancement of the procedural hurdles for their admissibility, consti-
tutional complaints still clearly constitute the primary legal remedy for the 
protection of rights and liberties.  
                                              
1055  OMEJEC, O potrebnim promjenama, 87. 
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b) Reasons for the prevalence of constitutional complaints  
The merely secondary practical significance of proposals as remedies for the 
protection of rights and liberties is apparent. It shows that individuals princi-
pally contest individual acts that are addressed to them and directly interfere 
with their legal position. This can be explained with the higher awareness of 
a personal concern than with respect to laws and other acts of legislation which 
regulate rights and obligations in an abstract and general way. Moreover, the 
constitutional complaint is embedded in the general consciousness as classic 
legal remedy for the protection of the constitutionally guaranteed rights and 
liberties also in Croatia.  
Finally, the enormous amount of constitutional complaints received year per 
year is also a result of the still persisting widespread perception of the Consti-
tutional Court as instance of appeal against unfavourable court decisions.1056 
This perception is attributed to persisting general procedural and institutional 
deficiencies such as the threshold for the value of claims before the Supreme 
Court, which causes the submittal of numerous appeals with a low value in 
dispute to the Constitutional Court.1057 But also the Court itself is made re-
sponsible in this respect.1058 It is criticized for reinforcing the wrong percep-
tion of its function by its incoherent practice regarding the admissibility of 
constitutional complaints and its failure to restrict itself to the assessment of 
the constitutionality of contested state acts. Finally, the overburdening is also 
attributed to persisting ambiguities with respect to the procedural arrange-
ments before the Constitutional Court. As has been shown above – instead of 
limiting its assessments to the admissibility of complaints – the Court fre-
quently decides on their merits already in the preliminary proceedings.1059 
                                              
1056  Detailed discussions on this and other reasons can be found in OMEJEC, O potrebnim 
promjenama, 106 ff.; KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 52.2. 
1057  KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 52.2. 
1058  OMEJEC, O potrebnim promjenama, 44 f.; KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, 
n. 52.3 
1059  KRAPAC, Pretpostavke za pokretanje i vođenje, 183. Compare in this regard BELAJEC, 
111 f., KRAPAC, Pretpostavke za pokretanje i vođenje, 184 and CRNIĆ, Komentar 
Ustavnog zakona, 286. 
Evaluation of statistical data 
203 
 
D. Success rate of proposals 
a) Low success rate  
The statistical data published on the website of the Constitutional Court does 
not disclose the success rate of applications and the consequent invalidation 
of unconstitutional laws and regulations. Also here respective references can 
be found in other sources. In his solemn speech former President of the Con-
stitutional Court PETAR KLARIĆ stated a continuing decrease of successful re-
view applications from initially ten to 3.3 percent in the period between 2001–
2005. According to available information provided by the Constitutional 
Court it abrogated or annulled contested laws in merely eight percent of cases 
and contested regulations in eight percent of cases during the entire period of 
its activity from 1990 until 2012.1060 This information clearly demonstrates the 
low success rate of applications filed to the Constitutional Court and accord-
ingly shows that submitted proposals fail to a wide extent. 
b) Reasons for the low success rate of proposals 
The case-law shows that the vast majority of proposals fails for not fulfilling 
the admissibility requirements and for being unfounded. 
Considering the low procedural hurdles for admissibility this finding sur-
prises. During the initial period after transition the low success rate was ex-
plained with the lack of experience and knowledge about the jurisdiction and 
requirements for accessing the Constitutional Court.1061 The analysis of the 
recent case-law reveals an even lower success rate twenty-five years later. A 
great number of proposals is still rejected as inadmissible for being filed 
against acts without a general and abstract nature. This confirms a still persist-
ing ignorance about the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction.1062 This can be re-
garded as inattentiveness of petitioners or as a lack of legal certainty about the 
Court's function and powers, which – as shown – is attributed to deficiencies 
of procedural regulations and to a certain extent also to the inconsistent prac-
tice of the Court.  
                                              
1060  The respective data has been provided by Secretary General of the Constitutional Court 
TEODOR ANTIĆ. 
1061  CRNIĆ, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, 1. 
1062  See to this effect CRNIĆ, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, 1; OMEJEC, Granice ovlasti 
Ustavnog suda, 1453 f. 
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Besides, the amount of rulings dismissing proposals as unfounded is consid-
erable as well. Certainly a large number of proposals are dismissed as attempts 
to achieve the elimination of possibly detrimental regulations. Also notable 
are dismissals of proposals for the failure of applicants to provide sufficient 
reasons to put into doubt and to demonstrate the incompatibility of contested 
legal provisions with the Constitution. This can be attributed to the difficulty 
to substantiate alleged normative and abstract inconsistencies. On the other 
hand, the pertinent case-law indicates that the Constitutional Court puts high 
demands as to the substantiation of alleged normative inconsistencies. In con-
sistent practice it emphasizes the discretionary power of legislative authorities 
in legislating and in regulating political fields and presumes the constitution-
ality of laws and of governmental acts.1063 This presumption is refuted only if 
provisions «cannot be interpreted in a constitutional way, or if they cannot be 
interpreted at all […]».1064 The high requirements to the substantiation of pro-
posals can be seen as consequence of this presumption and the wider discre-
tionary power conceded to the legislative authorities.  
They can also be seen as result of a self-restraint of the Constitutional Court 
towards the legislative power. In contrast to its initial practice, which is de-
scribed as activist,1065 its approach today is considered as predominantly self-
restrained.1066 While a thorough analysis of its practice and its approach ex-
ceeds the scope of this study, it is noteworthy, that there is principle unanimity 
in Croatian constitutional doctrine about the necessity of a «moderate judicial 
activism» by the Constitutional Court for the consolidation of the human 
rights and the rule of law.1067  
  
                                              
1063  See for instance, ruling U-II-4490/2007 of 9 November 2010, n. 9, not published; ruling 
U-I-2744/2003 of 8 February 2006, n. 11, NN 20/06. 
1064  See decision U-II-993/1997 et al. of 8 November 1999, NN 129/99. 
1065  E.g. SOKOL, Ustavna interpretacija, 20. For detailed assessment of the Court's practice 
until 2001 see CRNIĆ, Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske, 131 ff. 
1066  For detailed discussions see BAČIĆ PETAR, 421 ff.; OMEJEC, Granice ovlasti Ustavnog 
suda, 1447 ff.; SMERDEL/SOKOL, 201; SOKOL, Ustavni sud, 1165. SMERDEL, Ustavno 
uređenje Europske Hrvatske, 451 ff. and GARDAŠEVIĆ, 85 ff., esp. 103 however recognize 
a certain judicial activism of the Constitutional Court. 
1067  See BAČIĆ PETAR, 421 and 424; SMERDEL/SOKOL, 201 f.; SOKOL, Ustavni sud, 1165 ff. 
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2. Right to petition in Slovenia  
The following statistical information is compiled from the data published in 
the Annual Reports of the Slovene Constitutional Court. The reports starting 
from the year 2000 can be retrieved from its website in Slovenian while from 
2010 onwards they are published in English as well.1068 
 
  
Total sub-
missions 
Constitutional 
Complaints 
Judicial review proceedings 
Total appli-
cations1 
Petitions submit-
ted by individuals 
and legal persons  
Share of 
petitions 
in %2 
Suc-
cess 
rate in 
%3 
2002 1,213 767 430 411 95.6 23.9 
2003 1,072 798 257 248 96.7 16.3 
2004 1,271 883 373 355 95.2 27.7 
2005 1,877 1,310 347 312 90 20.2 
2006 3,053 2,546 474 423 89.3 19 
2007 4,354 3,937 367 336 91.6 14 
2008 3,562 3,132 323 299 92.6 10 
2009 1,845 1,495 308 281 91.2 10.4 
2010 1,880 1,582 287 235 81.9 >6 
20114 1,869 1,358 323 283 87.6 15.8 
2012 1,731 1,203 324 270 83.3 8.9 
2013 1,509 1,031 328 247 75.3 7.4 
2014 1,392 1,003 255 202 79.2 10 
2015 1,348 1,003 212 151 71.2 8.1 
       
 
1 The total number of applications filed for judicial review comprises applications, which were joined based 
on art. 48 RoP because they related to identical issues. 
2 The percentage indicating the share of petitions from the number of applications for judicial review is 
derived from the Annual Reports, which contain data on the percentage of requests submitted by the state 
organs and other qualified applicants.  
3 Because of the Court's competence to abrogate provisions of several laws or regulations and to, at the 
same time, dismiss or reject single applications by one and the same decision, it is difficult to precisely 
determine the success rate in relation to the petitions filed. The available data on the success rate hence 
relates to the entirety of requests and petitions resolved in the relevant year. 
4 A special register (R-I) has been introduced in 2011 with art. 37 para. 3 RoP for all inadmissible or man-
ifestly ill-founded applications. While in the table the total number of submittals received comprises these 
applications as well, they are not considered in the number of submitted constitutional complaints and 
applications for judicial review proceedings. 
                                              
1068  The English Reports can be retrieved from <http://www.us-rs.si/en/press/annual-reports> 
(last accessed September 2018). 
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A. Workload resulting from individual access in general 
a) Constitutional complaints 
Since its reintroduction in 1991 the constitutional complaint constitutes the 
access right with the highest practical importance for the Constitutional Court. 
Ever since the procedural requirements have been considerably restricted by 
legal amendments and by the adoption of a more restrictive interpretation by 
the Court itself. These measures aimed at the achievement of a clear distinc-
tion from the jurisdiction of the judiciary and at the reduction of the consider-
able number of complaints. While steadily increasing since 2000, the number 
of complaints submitted annually permanently exceeds the one thousand mark 
since 2005. The peak was reached in 2007 with a total of 3,937 constitutional 
complaints filed.  
The Court itself explained this increase with the large number of complaints 
submitted in misdemeanour proceedings, of which a considerable part consti-
tuted so-called «standardized applications» (tipizirani vlogi). Such complaints 
contained only general allegations or differed from already dismissed com-
plaints only with respect to the applicant's names or contested state acts. Be-
cause the complainants acted against their better knowledge about the inad-
missibility or the lack of prospect of success, these complaints were consid-
ered as abusive.1069 Not least in response to that did the legislator with the 
enactment of the CCA 2007 exclude disputes in misdemeanour cases from the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court and introduced sanctioning fees for 
misuses of access rights.1070 These measures showed their effect in 2009, when 
the number of annually submitted complaints decreased to around 1,500.1071 
Henceforth, the recent years show a slight further decline from 1,203 com-
plaints received in 2012, to 1,031 in 2013 and to 1,003 received in 2014 and 
in 2015. 
Nevertheless, the total number of constitutional complaints remains very high. 
Since 2000 their average share in relation to the total of submittals filed to the 
                                              
1069  See Annual Report 2007, 8. 
1070  The Court accordinlgy imposed 26 sanctions onto complainants in the year 2013, see 
Annual Report 2013, 42. See for instance ruling Up-1182/2012 of 24 April 2013, n. 4, not 
published; ruling Up-448/2012 of 21 June 2012, n. 6, Uradni list 57/12. 
1071  Annual Report 2009, 18 f. 
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Constitutional Court remains above 75 percent.1072 This shows that this access 
right constitutes its main work burden, irrespectively of the high access re-
quirements.  
b) Submittals for judicial review 
The table reveals that since 2002 over 62 percent of applications received an-
nually by Constitutional Court have been constitutional complaints. As shown 
above, the peak was reached in 2007, when their share amounted to even 90 
percent of all applications. These numbers illustrate that the workload of the 
Constitutional Court in reviewing laws and other general acts, which ranges 
consistently between around 10 and 30 percent or between 202 and 423 sub-
mittals per year, is much lower.  
B. Relation to requests filed by authorized applicants 
The table shows that the vast majority of applications filed against acts of leg-
islation are submitted by individuals and other legal persons. The state organs 
and the other authorized applicants are considerably more reserved in request-
ing the initiation of review proceedings against legislative acts. This restraint 
is frequently criticized by the Constitutional Court in its Annual Reports.1073 
This particularly applies to the failure of courts to request the initiation of 
concrete review proceedings against applicable laws or regulations, which in-
duces the Court to regularly emphasize their primary responsibility in protect-
ing the Constitution and the constitutional rights and liberties. Not least be-
cause of the more restrictive interpretation of the direct legal interest adopted 
in 2007, one can observe a slight shift of the numbers of petitions and of re-
quests.1074 The Constitutional Court itself acknowledges that the current trend, 
showing a slow decrease of its workload, is to be attributed to these changes 
as well.1075 
                                              
1072  See the statistical data in the individual Annual Reports for the years 2000–2013. 
1073  E.g. Annual Report 2008, 18. 
1074  The Constitutional Court established that from 324 applications to initiate review pro-
ceedings received in 2012, 54 requests were filed by qualified applicants, whereof 26 by 
courts, see Annual Report 2012, 38. The statistical data in its Annual Report 2014 show 
a reduction of requests filed. From 53 requests received in total, 16 were filed by courts. 
In 2015 finally, 61 from 212 submittals were filed by state organs, whereof 38 by courts. 
1075  Detailed to the numeric developments in Annual Report 2013, 41 ff.  
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C. Petitions as remedies for rights protection 
a) Clear prevalence of constitutional complaints 
The practical importance of constitutional complaints has grown steadily since 
the enactment of the CCA in 1994. The comparatively few petitions filed show 
that this legal remedy has lost its initially prevalent significance as remedy for 
rights protection. Rather, individuals and legal persons seek protection of their 
rights and liberties before the Constitutional Court by filing constitutional 
complaints.  
The increase of access requirements in 2007 brought a considerable decline in 
the number of new applications in general.1076 These reforms showed their 
most obvious effect in 2009, when the number of constitutional complaints 
submitted was reduced for even 48.2 percent.1077 At the same time, they did 
not essentially impact the amount of petitions submitted for constitutional re-
view which ranges steadily between 202 and 423 already since 1991. As con-
sequence of the adoption of the rigid interpretation of the directness of the 
legal interest of petitioners, constitutional complaints became even more sig-
nificant for human rights protection. This trend has been confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court, who established that it increasingly receives «joined 
cases» where petitions are filed in connection with constitutional complaints 
and decided by a single decision.1078 
b) Reasons for the secondary significance of petitions 
The decline in the number of constitutional complaints did not change the pre-
dominance of this legal remedy for the protection of the constitutional rights 
and liberties. In accordance with what has been said with respect to Croatia, 
this prevalence can be explained therewith that individuals primarily contest 
state acts of an individual and concrete nature. Besides a higher awareness of 
impairment, this can be considered as consequence of their primary incentive 
to protect their personal legal position against direct violations. Just as in other 
                                              
1076  Annual Report 2007, 15; Annual Report 2009, 18. 
1077  KAUČIČ/PAVLIN/BARDUTZSKY, 361. 
1078  For the year 2012, from 270 petitions, 118 constituted related issues. For the year 2013, 
149 of the 247 petitions were filed together with constitutional complaints, in 2014 it 
received 73 related issues from 202 petitions filed in total and in 2015 even 110 of the 
151 petitions were filed together with constitutional complaints. See Annual Report 2015, 
10; Annual Report 2014, 9; Annual Report 2013, 41 ff.; Annual Report 2012, 37. 
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states with a concentrated constitutional judiciary, the high number of consti-
tutional complaints shows that they are perceived as primary remedies for the 
protection of personal rights and liberties in Slovenia as well. Also here, fi-
nally, the prevalence of constitutional complaints is attributed to the still per-
sisting perception of the Court as instance of appeal and of these complaints 
as remedies for the assessment of the legality of individual state acts.1079 
The figures in the table reveal a steady decrease in the number of petitions 
filed as consequence of the more rigid interpretation of a direct concern of 
petitioners. Not least the introduced requirement of a procedural and contex-
tual correlation with constitutional complaints can be seen as cause for the 
lower practical significance of petitions as remedies for subjective rights pro-
tection. The obligation to demonstrate a direct legal interest in the abrogation 
of a contested law or regulation and the need for legal protection constitute 
considerable hurdles for petitioners. While it is difficult to prove a direct im-
pairment by a general regulation, it appears to be the more simple way to 
achieve protection by directly filing constitutional complaints instead of hav-
ing to fulfil both requirements for the admissibility of petitions and for com-
plaints.  
D. Success rate of petitions to initiate judicial review 
a) Declining success rate  
The table above shows that applications for judicial review only succeed in 
the minority of cases. Pursuant to the available data the success rate of requests 
and petitions used to be higher than it is in recent years. Accordingly, it ranged 
between 19 percent in 2006, and 27.7 percent in 2004. As a consequence of 
the increased demands for demonstrating a direct legal interest the Constitu-
tional Court in 2008 rejected even 360 petitions for not meeting the new re-
quirements.1080 Thereafter, one can establish a decline of successful peti-
tions.1081 In recent years the percentage of successful applications accordingly 
ranges around 10 percent, with a short increase in 2011, where the Court ab-
rogated numerous local regulations on the categorization of local roads for 
violating the right to ownership.1082 Not considered in the already low amount 
                                              
1079  TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 160, n. 36. 
1080  Annual Report 2008, 22 f. 
1081  See Annual Report 2007, 18 and Annual Report 2008, 22. 
1082  Annual Report 2011, 63 and table 12. 
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of successful petitions indicated in the table are the applications registered in 
the general register R-I for being inadmissible or manifestly unfounded. Also 
the Constitutional Court itself observes that the success rate of petitions is 
continuously low.1083 At the same time it however establishes a slow increase 
of the overall success of submittals on the initiation of review proceedings, 
attributed to the growing number of requests filed by qualified applicants.1084  
b) Reasons for the low success rate 
The case-law shows that most petitions are rejected for being inadmissible, 
while the rate of dismissals is considerably lower.1085 Among the main reasons 
for their inadmissibility, one can find the lack of jurisdiction of the Constitu-
tional Court and the failure of petitioners to comply with the requirements 
regarding the form and content and pertinent time limits. A considerable num-
ber of petitions are moreover rejected for not meeting the qualitative require-
ments prescribed. 
The decrease in the success rate of petitions starting from 2008 indicates that 
the adoption of the rigid interpretation of the direct legal interest of petitioners 
in 2007 became the highest hurdle for the admissibility of petitions.1086 The 
analysis of the recent practice reveals that petitioners fail to demonstrate their 
direct concern and prospect of improving their personal legal position. Very 
often, they fail to substantiate a direct impairment of their rights and liberties. 
Many petitioners fail to demonstrate their indirect legal interest for not con-
currently submitting a procedurally or contextually correlated and valid con-
stitutional complaint. This complex system of combined and intertwined ad-
missibility requirements can be regarded as essential cause for the amount of 
rejections of petitions by the Constitutional Court. 
At the same time, the number of petitions dismissed for being unfounded is 
essentially lower. In contrast to Croatia, the amount of petitions filed in dis-
satisfaction with laws or regulations considered as detrimental to personal le-
gal positions is lower because of the restriction of the access to persons with 
a legal interest. Yet, the question of the approach of the Constitutional Court 
in relation to the legislative power arises also in Slovenia. While a detailed 
                                              
1083  E.g. Annual Report 2015, 12. 
1084  Annual Report 2013, 44 f. 
1085  The data for the years 2009–2014 can be found in table 12 of the Annual Report 2014, 
55. Accordingly also RIBIČIČ, Strengthening constitutional democracy, 10. 
1086  See also TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 162, n. 21. 
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analysis of the pertinent case-law in this respect exceeds the objective and the 
scope of this study, it is notable that also the Slovene Court is perceived to, 
initially, have followed a more activist approach in reviewing acts of legisla-
tion and in intervening into the political processes for the consolidation of the 
rule of law and the new constitutional principles.1087 Today however, also the 
Slovene Court's approach towards the legislative authorities is perceived as 
generally self-restrained, while in individual cases, the Court is still acclaimed 
for its activist approach in enforcing human rights and liberties and other con-
stitutional guarantees.1088 
  
                                              
1087  CERAR, 383 f., 386; LUKŠIČ, 765 f.; RIBIČIČ, Constitutional Democracy, 291 ff.  
1088  MAVČIČ, Slovenian constitutional review, 59 f. RIBIČIČ, Constitutional Democracy, 301 f., 
however, criticizes that the Court is too restraint in reviewing legislative acts while fol-
lowing a stringent approach in accepting petitions and in allowing access to constitutional 
judiciary. See in this regard also n. 43 of dissenting opinion of judge CIRIL RIBIČIČ to 
ruling U-I-303/2007 of 20 March 2008, see above at fn. 837. 
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3. Initiative for judicial review in Macedonia 
The following statistical information is compiled from the data published in 
the Annual Reports of the Macedonian Constitutional Court, which can be re-
trieved from its website in Macedonian language.1089 
 
  
Total sub-
missions 
Constitu-
tional Com-
plaints 
Judicial review proceedings 
Total initia-
tives1 
Thereof initiatives 
submitted by indi-
viduals2  
Share of 
initiatives 
in % 
Suc-
cess 
rate %3 
2002 205 14 191 140 73.3 28.3 
2003 208 10 198 157 79.3 18.3 
2004 412 18 391 313 79.4 10.9 
2005 238 9 229 188 82.1 13.9 
2006 240 6 234 189 80.8 27.5 
2007 270 7 263 189 71.8 23.7 
2008 263 5 257 209 81 27 
2009 290 15 273 228 83.5 16.1 
2010 230 9 220 185 84.1 18.2 
2011 236 23 213 180 84.5 10.3 
2012 205 25 179 141 78.8 11.2 
2013 170 22 147 116 78.9 7.5 
2014 173 13 159 130 81.8 7 
2015 128 13 115 105 91.3 8 
       
 
1 The total sum is calculated from the available data which indicates the total number of initiatives by 
individuals (the Annual Reports refer to «citizens»), to which the quoted number of other applicants is 
added and the number of constitutional complaints and of applications regarding other competences sub-
tracted.  
2 As shown, the procedural rules only provide one way of petitioning the initiation of review proceedings. 
Consequently, the state organs and other public bodies are equally entitled for the submittal of initiatives 
as individuals and legal persons. This column merely considers initiatives submitted by individuals.  
3 The success rate must be considered in relation to the total cases resolved by the Constitutional Court in 
the respective year and not in relation to the submittals received. Until 2008 the indicated success rate 
relates to the entirety of proceedings conducted, comprising constitutional complaints, constitutional re-
view and other proceedings. Available data refer specifically to the success rate of initiatives for the 
initiation of constitutional review proceedings only as of 2009. 
 
                                              
1089  The numbers and statistics are retrieved from the Annual Reports published since 2002 
in Macedonian language on <http://ustavensud.mk/?page_id=4643> (last accessed Sep-
tember 2018). 
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A. Workload resulting from individual access 
a) Constitutional complaints 
In comparison to Croatia and Slovenia, the number of constitutional com-
plaints submitted to the Macedonian Constitutional Court has been low ever 
since the reintroduction of these remedies in 1991. While until 2010 it ranged 
between eighteen and merely five complaints submitted per year, in 2011 it 
surpassed the mark of twenty, only to fall back again to thirteen in 2014. It is 
striking that also its practical significance as means of individual access is 
considerably lower and amounts to merely ten percent of all submittals annu-
ally filed since 2011. Over and above, in its twenty-five years of activity the 
Court only considered one single complaint as founded. In that case, the Court 
abrogated a decision of the Electoral Commission for violating the complain-
ant's right to political activity because it did not take into consideration that he 
had been released from his conviction of possessing illegal weapons and ex-
plosives by the Amnesty Act.1090 All other constitutional complaints submitted 
during this period were rejected for the lack of jurisdiction or another proce-
dural hurdle, or they were dismissed for being unfounded. It is therefore not 
surprising that in legal doctrine one can find designations of the Macedonian 
complaint as a mere «substitute» for constitutional complaints,1091 or refer-
ences to a merely «subsidiary significance» in Macedonian constitutional ad-
judication.1092  
Different reasons can be found explaining the small practical significance of 
constitutional complaints. The Constitutional Court itself regards it as conse-
quence of the restricted scope of rights protected.1093 Other opinions consider 
it as result of the unclear distinction between the jurisdiction of the Constitu-
tional Court and the judiciary.1094 Also the existence of other remedies that 
allow less constrained individual access to the Constitutional Court is named 
as cause.1095 Eventually, another reason appears to be the fact that the entitle-
ment to file constitutional complaints is reserved to natural persons.  
                                              
1090  In decision U.br.84/2009 of 10 February 2010 (English translation available). 
1091  SKARIĆ, 710. 
1092  ČOBANOV, 292. 
1093  Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia, 48. 
1094  MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 255 f.; SKARIĆ, 697, 707 f. 
1095  ČOBANOV, 291 f. 
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b) Submittals for judicial review 
Also the data regarding the workload from judicial review proceedings reveal 
an essentially different picture than in Croatia and Slovenia. The Macedonian 
Court receives considerably more initiatives to initiate review proceedings 
against acts of legislation than constitutional complaints against individual 
acts. Since 2002 and until 2011, the amount of initiatives ranges above 90 
percent of the entirety of submissions filed and even surpassed 97 percent in 
the period between 2006 and 2008. This steadiness is not least a consequence 
of the lack of reforms conducted over the years with respect to its accessibility 
and the Court's practice in interpreting admissibility requirements.  
B. Relation to initiatives filed by other applicants 
It has been shown that the Macedonian state organs and other public institu-
tions are not vested with a qualified entitlement to request the review of acts 
of legislation. In its Annual Reports the Court provides specific numbers of 
initiatives filed by individuals and by state organs and other legal subjects. 
The available information reveals that with between 70 and 85 percent indi-
viduals are by far the most active applicants followed by legal persons, such 
as economic enterprises and citizen associations.1096 This shows that also in 
Macedonia, state organs and local governments remain passive in this regard. 
This predominance of individuals as applicants has already been established 
for the time before the period considered in this study.1097 
C. Initiatives as remedies for subjective rights protection 
a) Clear prevalence of initiatives  
In contrast to the amount of initiatives filed by individuals, the number of con-
stitutional complaints submitted is considerably lower. Expressed as percent-
age, in more than 90 percent individuals accessed the Court by submitting 
initiatives against laws and other general acts. Besides, the number of consti-
tutional complaints filed is remarkably lower than the amount of complaints 
filed in the same period in Croatia and Slovenia. This clearly shows that the 
Macedonian constitutional complaint plays a merely secondary role as access 
right and as legal remedy for the protection of the constitutionally guaranteed 
                                              
1096  See also SHASIVARI, 62 who in this respect speaks of «citizen activism». 
1097  For the data covering the period between 1993 and 2005 see Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Macedonia, 48 f. 
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rights and liberties. Consequently, the Court is predominantly accessed by way 
of initiatives and provides protection against laws and other general acts. The 
tendency of a slight increase of constitutional complaints as of 2011 has been 
disrupted again in the last years. Nevertheless, in contrast to their range be-
tween two and nine percent in the initial years, the number of complaints re-
ceived by the Court today amounts to about ten percent of all applications filed 
by individuals.1098 
b) Reasons for the prevalence of initiatives in practice 
As shown, the low number of constitutional complaints filed by individuals 
can be explained with the restricted entitlement and the limited scope of rights 
protected by this legal remedy. By submitting initiatives, on the other hand, 
individuals are not only granted unrestricted access to the Constitutional 
Court, but they can also achieve protection of all rights and liberties and con-
stitutional guarantees. Accordingly it appears to be easier for individuals to 
obtain protection by filing initiatives. 
Overall, the statistical data reveal a slight and gradual decline of the number 
of initiatives received by the Constitutional Court. Whether this indicates a 
slow reversal of the practical significance of popular and constitutional com-
plaints in Macedonia, is to be proven in the following years. So far, these de-
velopments cannot be attributed to legal reforms or to changes of practice of 
the Constitutional Court in accepting initiatives or complaints for considera-
tion. In view of the situations in Croatia and Slovenia, a possible cause could 
be the growing perception of the Macedonian Constitutional Court as court of 
appeal as well. The amount of rejections of complaints for merely alleging 
discrimination in order to achieve the abrogation of adverse court decisions or 
administrative acts seems to support such an argument. However, the envis-
aged extension of the protective scope of constitutional complaints is a strong 
indicator for a future change of their practical significance in Macedonia. 
                                              
1098  This increase has been recognized by the Constitutional Court see Annual Report 2012, 
11. 
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D. Success rate of initiatives on constitutional review 
a) Declining success rate 
The available information on the success rate of initiatives filed to the Consti-
tutional Court indicates a similar development as established in Slovenia. In 
the period between 1991 and 1995, the amount of applications which resulted 
in the invalidation of contested laws and acts of legislation surpassed 20 per-
cent.1099 This success rate can be considered as high. Pursuant to newer 
sources it continued to be this high until 2008, with a peak of 28.3 percent 
reached in 2002 and slight decreases in 2004 and 2005. Since 2009, however, 
the available data show a downward trend to a success rate which today ranges 
below ten percent. 
b) Reasons for the low success of initiatives 
According to the data in the Annual Reports the low success rate can be at-
tributed to rejections of inadmissible initiatives and to their dismissals for be-
ing unfounded. While until 2007 the Constitutional Court rejected and dis-
missed initiatives to a similar extent, the available information shows that, 
starting from the year 2008, the amount of dismissals of unfounded initiatives 
is at least twice as high as the number of rejections of inadmissible initiatives.  
Initiatives are often rejected for not being filed in accordance to formal de-
mands or for the existence of procedural hurdles. The most frequent reason 
for their inadmissibility is the lack of competence of the Constitutional Court. 
This indicates a lack of legal certainty about its jurisdiction and powers. Legal 
doctrine attributes this uncertainty to the Court's failure to establish a con-
sistent practice in its twenty-five years of activity.1100 Other scholars invoke 
the inadequacy of the decisions and rulings, which often only contain literal 
renditions of applicable provisions instead of founded arguments and concreti-
zations.1101 
The large number of dismissal of unfounded initiatives can be seen as a con-
sequence inherent to an unrestricted right of appeal of individuals. Accord-
ingly, the Constitutional Court receives numerous initiatives filed with the ob-
                                              
1099  For the statistical data for the period between 1991 and 1995 see ČOBANOV, fn. 1641. 
1100  ČOBANOV, 215 f.; TRAJKOVSKA-HRISTOVSKA, Access to Constitutional Justice, 11 f. 
1101  TRENESKA-DESKOSKA, Constitutional Court, 30. 
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jective to achieve the invalidation of potentially adverse legal provisions. Be-
sides, many initiatives fail because they do not succeed in sufficiently sub-
stantiating an alleged inconsistency of a contested legal provision with the 
Constitution and the laws. As said above, this can be reasoned with the diffi-
culty to explain and to demonstrate inconsistencies between provisions of a 
general and abstract nature.  
It can also be seen as a consequence of high demands posed to the substantia-
tion of initiatives and the insufficiency of general allegations. The analysis of 
the pertinent case-law accordingly reveals that the Macedonian Constitutional 
Court frequently invokes political discretion when dismissing allegations of a 
normative inconsistency as unfounded. Eventually, this is a consequence of its 
reserved approach towards the legislative authorities. While its strong institu-
tional position granted by the regulatory autonomy fuelled fears of a judicial 
activism and interferences into the political sphere, these fears at last proved 
to be unfounded. The Court's practice indicates a restrained approach in ac-
cepting to review the constitutionality of acts of the legislator.1102 Indicative 
are its restraint in initiating review proceedings at its own discretion and its 
refusal to review legal loopholes or to assess parliamentary decisions on pop-
ular votes and elections. This restraint is criticized among constitutional schol-
ars, for one thing as a lack of boldness of the Court in using its strength and in 
providing effective protection of the constitutional guarantees1103 or as a way 
to prevent having to decide on delicate political issues.1104 Finally, its approach 
is not last deemed to be a consequence of the lack of independence of the 
Constitutional Court from the governing majority in the Assembly as electoral 
body of the judges.1105  
 
II. Enforcement of constitutional guarantees 
Despite the established low success rate in relation to the amount of com-
plaints filed, the analysis of the practice of the Constitutional Courts during 
                                              
1102  Detailed in TRAJKOVSKA-HRISTOVSKA, Access to Constitutional Justice, 10 ff. See also 
ČOBANOV, 183; MUKOSKA-ČINGO, 227; TRENESKA-DESKOSKA, Constitutional Court, 20. 
1103  TRAJKOVSKA-HRISTOVSKA, Control of Constitutionality, 12. 
1104  TRAJKOVSKA-HRISTOVSKA, Access to Constitutional Justice, 11 f. 
1105  Discussion with Professor TRENESKA-DESKOSKA of 4 April 2014. 
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their twenty-five years of activity reveals that not a few laws, legislative acts 
and provisions have in fact been reviewed in proceedings, which were initi-
ated by individual persons. During this period, popular complaints in Croatia, 
Slovenia and Macedonia consequently led to the invalidation of several acts 
of legislation and legal provisions that were inconsistent with the newly en-
acted Constitutions. Not only could this be achieved by successful complaints 
upon which contested provisions were abrogated or annulled. In several in-
stances already the mere rulings to accept popular complaints for considera-
tion induced the legislators to eliminate deficiencies of contested provisions. 
Whether the substantiations of the applicants or the extended scope of review 
by the Court were decisive for the abrogation of contested provisions is finally 
irrelevant for the influence of popular complaints on the enforcement of the 
Constitutions against the legislative authorities. 
The following analysis shows the impact of popular complaints on the en-
forcement of the Constitutions against the legislative authorities during the 
past twenty-five years. It reveals that, overall and despite their low success 
rate in relation to the number of complaints filed, these remedies can be con-
sidered to have contributed and to still contribute to the protection and ad-
vancement of fundamental constitutional guarantees comprising fundamental 
rights (1), the rule of law (2) and democratic proceedings to a significant ex-
tent (3). 
1. Protection and promotion of human rights 
A. Principle of proportionality 
The principle of proportionality, which protects individuals from excessive 
interferences into their legal positions, belongs to the fundamental constitu-
tional criteria in all three states.1106 Ever since their transformation the Consti-
tutional Courts of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia abrogated numerous legal 
acts for disproportionally restricting rights and liberties. Thereby, popular 
complaints played and still play an important role in detecting such violations 
by the legislators.  
                                              
1106  While explicitly prescribed in art. 16 para. 2 Croatian Constitution, both the Slovene and 
the Macedonian Constitutional Courts derive it from the principle of the rule of law. 
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While the Croatian Constitutional Court's practice considerably influenced the 
principle of proportionality as prescribed by the Constitution today,1107 it fre-
quently eliminates legal provisions for disproportionally restricting human 
rights and liberties upon proposals filed by individuals and legal persons. In 
several recent decisions it abrogated provisions containing disproportional ad-
ministrative sanctions. These, for instance, prescribed the permanent loss of 
the right of political parties to financial support for their failure to publish 
financial statements within a predetermined period,1108 the permanent loss of 
voting rights of majority shareholders for late applications of acquisitions,1109 
or the permanent loss of driver's licences upon repeated road accidents.1110 
Also in the recent practice of the Slovene Constitutional Court petitions filed 
by individuals led to the invalidation of several legal provisions for containing 
disproportional restrictions. The Court for instance abrogated a provision in 
the Media Law that determined a term for the right to reply without taking into 
account the moment in which persons concerned become aware of possible 
interferences with their rights.1111 It moreover abrogated a provision that al-
lowed the confiscation of private vehicles used for criminal offences without 
taking into account the actual ownership.1112  
Also the Macedonian Constitutional Court eliminated several legal provisions 
for disproportionally limiting human rights after having received initiatives 
filed by individuals. It abrogated a provision allowing the confiscation of pass-
ports of citizens who have been forcibly returned from other countries after 
violating rules for entry and residence.1113 For excessively interfering with the 
economic freedom of entrepreneurs it moreover abrogated provisions obliging 
wine makers to annually submit notarially certified confirmations on the ful-
filment of their financial obligations,1114 which prohibited the sale of alcohol 
                                              
1107  See GARDAŠEVIĆ, 93 ff. 
1108  Decision U-I-2986/2013 of 20 December 2013, n. 14, NN 2/14. 
1109  Decision U-I-2470/2010 of 9 July 2013, n. 9, see above fn. 628 and decision U-I-
4469/2008 et al. of 8 July 2013, n. 24, see above at fn. 656. 
1110  Decision U-I-1162/2008 of 28 July 2011, n. 7, NN 77/11. 
1111  Decision U-I-95/2009 and Up-419/2009 of 21 October 2010, n. 13, Uradni list 90/10 and 
OdlUS XIX, 8. 
1112  Decision U-I-186/2009 of 28 September 2011, n. 25, see above at fn. 819. See also deci-
sion U-I-37/2012 of 8 May 2014, n. 19, see above at fn. 807. 
1113  Decision U.br.189/2012 of 25 June 2014, n. 6. 
1114  Decision U.br.104/2011 of 16 May 2012, n. 5. 
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in gas stations at night,1115 or the sale of tobacco products within a radius of 
50 meters from schools and sport facilities.1116 
B. Principle of equality and prohibition of discrimination 
The three Constitutions moreover prescribe the principle of equality and pro-
hibition of discrimination as fundamental constitutional values.1117 While all 
three Constitutional Courts abrogated several legal provisions for violating 
these principles, a significant share of decisions were passed upon popular 
complaints filed by individuals and legal persons.  
Upon the receipt of proposals to initiate judicial review proceedings, the Cro-
atian Constitutional Court for instance abrogated provisions providing more 
favourable conditions for certain persons when applying for jobs in public ad-
ministration,1118 or which only obliged persons entitled to future dividend pay-
ments to pay an income tax.1119 For violating the principle of equality it abro-
gated provisions prescribing more favourable conditions for the access to ed-
ucation for children of war veterans.1120 Proposals of individuals also led to 
the invalidation of legal provisions on unequal treatment and discrimination 
of national minorities.1121 Proposals finally induced the Constitutional Court 
to notify the National Assembly about systematic or habitual cases of inequal-
ity or discrimination in legislation. Such discriminations were for instance es-
tablished with respect to extramarital partners in legislation on social secu-
rity.1122 
Despite the rigid requirements to demonstrate a legal interest also the Slovene 
Constitutional Court invalidated several provisions for violating the principles 
of equality and prohibition of discrimination upon petitions filed by individu-
als. It for instance ordered the legislator to reassess pensions for having vio-
lated the principle of equality1123 and abrogated provisions in the Electoral Act 
                                              
1115  Decision U.br.179/2008 of 8 April 2009, n. 5. 
1116  Decision U.br.39/2006 of 6 June 2007, n. 5. 
1117  Art. 14 and 15 Cst. Croatia; art. 14 Cst. Slovenia; art. 9 Cst. Macedonia. 
1118  Decision U-I-2036/2012 of 21 December 2015, n. 16, see above at fn. 630. 
1119  Decision U-I-4763/2012 of 18 September 2012, n. 8, see above at fn. 684. 
1120  Decision U-I-4585/2005 of 20 December 2006, n. 6, NN 2/07. 
1121  Decision U-I-3597/2010 et al. of 29 July 2011, n. 56, see above at fn. 629; decision U-I-
3786/2010 et al. of 29 July 2011, n. 28, NN 93/11. 
1122  See notification U-X-1457/2007 of 18 April 2007, NN 43/07.  
1123  Decision U-I-239/2014 and Up-1168/2012 of 26 March 2015, Uradni list 30/15. 
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for not prescribing the accessibility of all polling stations for disabled per-
sons.1124 Petitioners also succeeded in demonstrating a discriminatory treat-
ment of same-sex couples in inheritance claims.1125 Prominent are the deci-
sions passed by the Constitutional Court with respect to so-called «erased» 
persons. After having received numerous petitions by persons concerned, the 
Court established a discrimination of nationals of other former Yugoslav Re-
publics, who lost their residence permits and were now ordered to leave the 
country unless they applied for new permits. Their residency rights were re-
moved and their documents and property were taken away after Slovenia 
gained independence.1126 Upon the failure of the legislator to introduce the 
possibility for these persons to restore their unlawfully deprived status, the 
Court itself ordered the restoration of their status as permanent residents.1127 
Finally, also initiatives filed to the Macedonian Constitutional Court by indi-
viduals and legal persons led to the abrogation of several acts of legislation 
for violating the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination. 
The Court for instance abrogated a provision in the Restitution Act which ex-
cluded the right to compensation for expropriated owners, whose property was 
declared as cultural or historic object or as a natural rarity.1128 It also abrogated 
provisions excluding employees, who terminated their working contracts on 
their own initiative, from the status of unemployed persons,1129 and a provision 
in employment law for violating gender equality because it allowed male 
workers who reached the ordinary retirement age of 64 to request the prolon-
gation of their employment until 67 while granting the same to women only 
up to 65 years of age.1130 Finally, it were petitions which caused the Court to 
review and abrogate provisions for violating gender equality,1131 or which 
                                              
1124  Decision U-I-156/2011 and Up-861/2011 of 10 April 2014, nn. 21 ff., Uradni list 35/14. 
1125  Decision U-I-425/2006 of 2 July 2009, n. 14, Uradni list 55/09 and OdlUS XVIII, 29. 
1126  Decision U-I-284/1994 of 4 February 1999, nn. 17 f., Uradni list 14/99 and OdlUS VIII, 
22. 
1127  Decision U-I-246/2002 of 3 April 2003, nn. 30 and 34, see above at fn. 796. In n. 46 of 
decision U-II-1/2010 of 6 October 2010, Uradni list 50/10 and OdlUS XIX, 11, the Court 
excluded the possibility to subject the Act prescribing the restoration of the residence 
permits to a national referendum. 
1128  Decision U.br.205/2012 of 25 September 2013, n. 5. 
1129  Decision U.br.160/2011 of 29 June 2011, n. 6. 
1130  Ruling U.br.114/2014 of 1 April 2015, n. 6. 
1131  Decision U.br.83/2010 of 15 September 2010, n. 5; decision U.br.161/2005 of 21 Decem-
ber 2005, n. 5. 
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privileged officials of the Ministry of Interior with respect to retirement and 
severance in comparison to other officials and citizens.1132  
C. Enforcement of individual human rights and liberties 
In all three states popular complaints added to the strengthening of the human 
rights standards by causing the enforcement of individual human rights and 
liberties against the legislative authorities. 
The list of decisions by which the Croatian Constitutional Court abrogated 
legal provisions for violating constitutionally guaranteed human rights and 
liberties upon the receipt of proposals is comprehensive. The Court for in-
stance abrogated provisions for violating the freedom of assembly by prohib-
iting public gatherings within a 100 meter radius from governmental build-
ings,1133 or by explicitly determining locations for public assemblies.1134 Pro-
posals moreover caused the Court to eliminate numerous provisions that vio-
lated the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of ownership. This applied to 
provisions empowering local authorities to offer unused agricultural land in 
private ownership for rent,1135 or which prescribed the transfer of possession 
of cars to the owner of car parks as a guarantee for the payment of parking 
fees.1136 Individuals and legal persons also contributed in several instances to 
the enforcement of economic liberties and social rights against the legislative 
authorities. They notably caused the abrogation of the general prohibition of 
Sunday work,1137 of provisions violating the principle of equal treatment of 
competitors,1138 or which limited payments of social contributions in an un-
constitutional manner and in violation of social standards of international 
law.1139 Proposals finally caused the Constitutional Court to notify the Na-
tional Assembly about general deficiencies in legislative practice with respect 
to constitutionally guaranteed rights and liberties. It accordingly notified the 
                                              
1132  Decision U.br.58/2010 of 29 September 2010, n. 5. 
1133  Decision U-I-295/2006 of 6 July 2011, NN 82/11, n. 25. 
1134  Decision U-II-242/1998 of 14 April 1999, NN 38/99. 
1135  Decision U-I-763/2009 et al. of 30 March 2011, nn. 30 ff., NN 82/11 (English translation 
available). 
1136  Decision U-II-269/2007 of 5 May 2009, n. 7, NN 61/09. 
1137  Decision U-I-642/2009 et al. of 19 June 2009, n. 11, NN 76/09; decision U-I-3842/2003 
of 28 April 2004, n. 16, NN 55/04. 
1138  Decision U-I-1108/2002 of 16 May 2007, n. 8, NN 55/07. 
1139  E.g. decision U-I-4170/2004 of 29 September 2010, n. 6, see above at fn. 623; decision 
U-I-3851/2004 of 12 March 2008, n. 11, NN 37/08. 
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Assembly about the necessity to adapt the demarcation of electoral districts to 
the present demographic and social situations in order to guarantee the equal-
ity of voting rights in future popular votes and elections,1140 and about the 
general lack of remedies for violations of the right to trial within reasonable 
time.1141 
The same significance for the protection of the constitutionally guaranteed 
rights and liberties can be established in Slovenia. Upon initiatives of individ-
uals, the Constitutional Court abrogated provisions of the Civil Procedures 
Act for violating the constitutional guarantee for fair trial by empowering 
courts of first instance to reject complaints without considering the merits of 
the case.1142 It recently confirmed the responsibility of the legislator to protect 
the family life for refugees1143 and abrogated procedural provisions in the In-
ternational Protection Act that violated the principle of non-refoulement and 
the right to fair judicial protection for not enabling applicants to justify the 
continuance of international protection.1144 Other noteworthy examples are the 
abrogation of numerous communal regulations which violated the constitu-
tionally guaranteed ownership by categorizing communal roads on private 
property as public ownership,1145 or which allowed the confiscation of private 
vehicles used for criminal offences irrespectively of the actual ownership.1146 
Also the landmark decision on the inconsistency of the introduction of a Tito-
street in the Capital Ljubljana with human dignity, in which the Court empha-
sized the constitutional position of individuals as subjects and not as objects, 
was caused by petitions submitted by individuals.1147  
Finally, also several initiatives filed by individuals induced the Macedonian 
Constitutional Court to eliminate acts of legislation for violating human rights 
and liberties. The Court for instance abrogated legal provisions that were in-
consistent with the right to privacy and to private life because they allowed 
the secret interception of electronic communication by the authorities,1148 or 
                                              
1140  Notification U-X-6472/2010 of 8 December 2010, n. 9, NN 142/10. 
1141  Notification U-X-835/2005 of 24 February 2005, n. 3, not published. 
1142  Decision U-I-48/2011 and Up-274/2011 of 16 January 2014, n. 18, Uradni list 10/14.  
1143  Decision U-I-309/2013 and Up-981/2013 of 14 January 2015, nn. 9 ff., Uradni list 6/15.  
1144  Decision U-I-189/2014 and Up-663/2014 of 15 October 2015, nn. 46 f., Uradni list 82/15.  
1145  Out of many see decision U-I-305/2012 of 10 July 2014, n. 6, see above at fn. 853; deci-
sion U-I-194/2012 of 24 April 2014, n. 8, see above at fn. 807.  
1146  Decision U-I-186/2009 of 28 September 2011, n. 25, see above at fn. 819. 
1147  Decision U-I-109/2010 of 26 September 2011, n. 19, see above at fn. 800. 
1148  Decision U.br.139/2010 of 15 December 2010, n. 6. 
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the publication of personal data of persons able to provide information about 
possible crimes and misdemeanours.1149 Also violations of the secrecy of the 
ballot1150 and right to public assembly could be eliminated in this manner,1151 
as well as unconstitutional limitations of the constitutionally guaranteed free-
dom of ownership. The Court namely abrogated provisions which empowered 
authorities to assume ownership of illegally constructed buildings,1152 or 
which prescribed the transfer of possession on real-estates before the conclu-
sion of expropriation proceedings.1153 Besides, also fundamental procedural 
rights and guarantees, such as the presumption of innocence,1154 or the right to 
judicial protection could be enforced against the legislator based on initiatives 
filed with the Constitutional Court.1155 Initiatives finally led to the abrogation 
of provisions for violating the right to physical and moral integrity and human 
dignity by predicating the election of judicial officials on the ethical and moral 
values that candidates were obliged to disclose.1156 
2. Enforcement of the rule of law  
A. Principle of legal certainty  
The principle of legal certainty, which guarantees the clarity, definiteness, 
consistency, predictability and publicity of laws and other general acts, is 
acknowledged as precondition of the rule of law in all three states consid-
ered.1157 The case-law of the Constitutional Courts reveals that individuals 
                                              
1149  Decision U.br.211/2006 of 5 November 2008, n. 5. 
1150  Decision U.br.93/2014 of 11 February 2015, n. 5. 
1151  E.g. decision U.br.31/2006 of 1 November 2006, n. 7. 
1152  Decision U.br.262/2009 of 2 February 2011, n. 5. 
1153  See e.g. decision U.br.43/2013 of 4 December 2013, n. 5; decision U.br.125/2012 of 10 
July 2013, n. 6. 
1154  E.g. decision U.br.125/2014 of 10 July 2015, n. 5; decision U.br.55/2014 of 27 May 2015, 
n. 6; decision U.br.141/2012 of 10 July 2013, n. 5; decision U.br.206/2011 of 14 Novem-
ber 2012, n. 5. 
1155  E.g. decision U.br.51/2010 of 15 December 2010, n. 5. 
1156  Decision U.br.156/2012 of 29 February 2012, n. 6; decision U.br.12/2011 of 29 February 
2012, n. 5. 
1157  See e.g. decision U-I-659/1994 et al. of 15 March 2000, nn. 10 f., see above at fn. 609, of 
the Croatian Constitutional Court. The Macedonian Court accentuated the same principle 
in decision U.br.104/2012 of 16 January 2013, n. 6. 
Enforcement of constitutional guarantees 
225 
 
played an essential role for the enforcement of this principle against the legis-
lative authorities as well. 
During the past twenty-five years the Croatian Court received a great number 
of proposals which, either explicitly or implicitly, contested laws or regula-
tions for being inconsistent with legal certainty. It consequently eliminated 
numerous legislative acts for instance for the lack of transitional regula-
tions1158 or provisions which contained indefinite legal terms or general com-
petences of the state authorities. It emphasized that the failure of the legislator 
to specify these provisions allowed an arbitrary implementation by the respon-
sible authorities and was therefore inconsistent with the precept of predicta-
bility of the legal consequences.1159 The number of proposals moreover en-
couraged the Constitutional Court to notify the National Assembly about gen-
eral shortcomings or systematic and continuous deficiencies in Croatian leg-
islation. Illustrative are its notifications about the unconstitutional yet perma-
nent practice of the legislator to denominate legal acts in a misleading manner 
with respect to their actual nature. This applies to the described falsa nomina-
tio practice, by which the Assembly designates formal laws as «constitutional 
acts»,1160 and to its practice to denominate acts amending the Constitution as 
mere «modifications», rather than as constitutional acts on the amendment of 
the Constitution.1161  
Also in Macedonia individuals play a significant role in detecting acts of leg-
islation that are inconsistent with the principle of legal certainty. The Consti-
tutional Court consequently abrogated numerous provisions for containing un-
specified and unclear terms, for instance in determining wage calculations for 
public officials1162 or the level of procedural fees1163 or for introducing general 
competences of state authorities without any further concretization.1164 Initia-
tives submitted by individuals moreover enabled the Constitutional Court to 
detect general deficiencies or inconsistencies in the Macedonian legal order. 
As a result, it for instance invalidated legal provision that referred to invalid 
                                              
1158  E.g. decision U-I-7431/2014 of 13 May 2015, n. 28, NN 60/15. 
1159  Decision U-I-1988/2011 et al. of 19 June 2012, n. 9, NN 80/12; decision U-I-722/2009 of 
6 April 2011, nn. 6 ff., see above at fn. 616. 
1160  Notification U-X-838/2012 of 15 February 2012, n. 5, NN 20/12. 
1161  Notification U-X-5076/2013 of 15 October 2013, nn. 4 f., NN 20/12. 
1162  E.g. ruling U.br.33/2015 of 23 December 2015, n. 5. 
1163  E.g. decision U.br.127/2014 of 30 September 2015, n. 5. 
1164  See for many decision U.br.63/2013 of 8 October 2014, n. 6; decision U.br.141/2012 of 
10 July 2013, n. 5; ruling U.br.71/2011 of 20 March 2013, n. 6. 
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legal provisions,1165 or established a general defect in legislation because of 
the separation of regulations on legal issues into different laws.1166 
With respect to the role of individuals for the enforcement of the principle of 
legal certainty, the analysis of the jurisdiction of the Slovene Constitutional 
Court reveals a different picture. As a consequence of the required personal 
and direct concern and legal interest, such violations can only be alleged in 
connection with interferences with the applicant's own rights and freedoms. 
To the knowledge of the author, the Constitutional Court has not accepted such 
petitions for consideration so far. 
B. Constitutionally prescribed legislative process 
In the three states considered the procedures for legislation are prescribed by 
Constitution.1167 Essential requirements for the legal validity of laws are their 
publication in the Official Gazettes, the prescribed period between their pub-
lication and their entering into legal force (vacatio legis) and the prohibition 
of retroactivity interdicting the retrospective effect onto legal relations con-
cluded prior to their enactment. The Courts’ case-law shows that popular com-
plaints also play a significant role in the detection of violations of these con-
stitutional rules. 
Following the receipt of proposals the Croatian Constitutional Court elimi-
nated several laws whose transitional provisions prescribed their entry into 
force prior to or together with their publication.1168 The frequency of such de-
cisions caused the Court to reprimand the legislative authorities for the con-
tinued violation of the constitutional rules.1169 After receiving numerous pro-
posals, the Court moreover notified the National Assembly about the uncon-
stitutional practice to delay the legal validity of laws.1170 The Constitutional 
                                              
1165  Decision U.br.148/2012 of 23 January 2013, n. 4; decision U.br.212/2010 of 30 March 
2011, n. 5. 
1166  Decision U.br.55/2012 of 24 April 2013, n. 5; decision U.br.166/2012 of 24 April 2013, 
n. 7. 
1167  Art. 82 ff. Cst. Croatia; art. 89 ff. Cst. Slovenia; art. 69 ff. Cst. Macedonia. 
1168  E.g. decision U-II-1303/2005 of 1 March 2011, n. 5; NN 30/11; decision U-II-3982/2006 
of 16 February 2010, n. 3, NN 31/10.  
1169  Decision U-I-3845/2006 of 23 January 2013, n. 13, NN 12/13. 
1170  Notification U-X-80/2005 of 1 June 2006, nn. 3 f., not published. 
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Court also eliminated several laws and regulations for violating the principle 
of non-retroactivity.1171  
A similar significance of individuals and legal persons for the detection of 
legislative acts that violate the principle of non-retroactivity can be established 
in Macedonia. Just as its Croatian counterpart, also the Macedonian Constitu-
tional Court for instance eliminated several laws and legal provisions with a 
retrospective effect following the submittal of initiatives.1172 
Although also the Slovene Constitutional Court frequently establishes viola-
tions of the principle of non-retroactivity, individuals and legal persons play 
an insignificant role in the detection of such violations. Before its change of 
practice regarding the required direct concern in 2007, petitioners frequently 
succeeded in demonstrating a personal concern by alleging retroactive effects 
of laws.1173 After the change of practice, however, petitions lost their signifi-
cance for the enforcement of the principle of non-retroactivity. As a conse-
quence of the obligation to demonstrate a direct interference of a retroactive 
effect of legal provisions with the personal legal positions, petitions are fre-
quently rejected as inadmissible.1174 Ever since, the Constitutional Court 
acknowledged a direct concern of petitioners and abrogated provisions for vi-
olating the principle of non-retroactivity in only two cases.1175 
C. Other guarantees of the rule of law 
In all three states considered popular complaints moreover played a significant 
role in enforcing other fundamental elements or principles of the rule of law 
against the legislative authorities.  
Following the receipt of proposals, the Croatian Constitutional Court elimi-
nated several acts of legislation for violating the principles of constitutionality 
and legality. It accordingly abrogated not less than 150 articles of the new 
                                              
1171  See for many decision U-I-396/2008 of 29 May 2012, n. 3, NN 66/12; decision U-I-
1925/2008 of 29 May 2012, n. 4, NN 66/12. 
1172  See, e.g., decision U.br.104/2012 of 16 January 2013, n. 5; decision U.br.104/2011 of 16 
May 2012, n. 6; decision U.br.118/2011 of 8 February 2012, n. 5. 
1173  E.g. decision U-I-178/2000 of 20 March 2003, n. 5, Uradni list 33/03 and OdlUS XII, 18; 
decision U-I-17/1997 of 23 March 2000, n. 3, Uradni list 35/00 and OdlUS XI, 68. 
1174  Out of many see ruling U-I-98/2007 of 12 June 2008, Uradni list 65/08 and OdlUS XVII, 
42. 
1175  Decision U-I-196/2014 of 5 November 2015, nn. 16, 17 and 34, Uradni list 74/14, 90/15; 
decision U-I-185/2010 of 2 February 2012, see above at fn. 712. 
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Criminal Procedures Act,1176 and a provision introducing an amount in dispute 
for the right to request revisions before the Supreme Court, which was incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court’s role to ensure the uniform and equal appli-
cation of laws.1177 Individuals moreover caused the Constitutional Court to 
abrogate several regulations violating the principle of legality, such as com-
munal regulations introducing contractual penalties for violations of the park-
ing rules,1178 to municipal provisions prescribing the compulsory euthanasia 
of lost pets after five days instead of the thirty day term prescribed by the 
Veterinary Act,1179 or to a spatial plan for not having been enacted in the pro-
cedure prescribed by the Law on Spatial Planning.1180 
Also in Macedonia individuals and legal persons play a significant role for the 
consolidation of the principle of the rule of law. Upon the receipt of initiatives, 
the Constitutional Court eliminated regulations for violating the separation of 
powers principle,1181 the principle of legality,1182 and the supremacy of the 
Constitution.1183 It for instance decided that the legislator violated the princi-
ple of constitutionality by only prescribing laws as basis for decision-making 
of public officials.1184 Noteworthy is the contribution of individuals to the 
elimination of the Lustration Laws. Upon the receipt of initiatives the Consti-
tutional Court established violations of fundamental values including democ-
racy, human dignity and the rule of law by the extended time-span for inves-
tigations about the collaboration of public officials with the former Socialist 
secret service to the period after the enactment of the new Constitution in 
1991.1185 After the amendment of the Lustration Law in 2011, the Court was 
petitioned again to review the compliance of this new act with the Constitu-
tion. It established that the extension of the circle of persons subject to lustra-
tion processes to retired state officials and to civil persons violated their moral 
                                              
1176  Decision U-I-448/2009 et al. of 19 July 2012, NN 91/12. 
1177  Decision U-I-1569/2004 et al. of 20 December 2006, n. 11 f., see above at fn. 648. 
1178  Decision U-II-355/2007 et al. of 10 December 2008, n. 11, NN 148/08 (English transla-
tion available). 
1179  Decision U-II-3570/2005 of 30 October 2007, n. 7, NN 122/07. 
1180  Decision U-II-57/2006 of 25 January 2011, n. 10, NN 18/11. 
1181  Decision U.br.66/2014 of 28 January 2015, n. 7. 
1182  See e.g. decision U.br.158/2012 of 6 March 2013, n. 4; decision U.br.214/2011 of 4 April 
2012, n. 5. 
1183  E.g. decision U.br.184/2011 of 15 February 2012, n. 6; decision U.br.202/2008 of 15 April 
2009, n. 5. 
1184  Ruling U.br.4/2015 of 23 December 2015, n. 4. 
1185  Decision U.br.42/2008 and U.br.77/2008 of 24 March 2010, n. 6. 
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integrity and legal equality,1186 and that the new temporal limits for lustration 
processes contradicted to the principles of legal certainty and predictability 
for the wide circle of persons affected.1187  
Because of the required demonstration of a personal and direct legal interest 
and concern, the Slovene petition is considerably less significant for the en-
forcement of the rule of law. However, as shown, the Constitutional Court 
acknowledges that the protection exceeds the personal interest of applicants 
in such cases, where it has difficulties to differentiate between a public and a 
personal interest of petitioners. Because of the symbolic value of the name 
Tito, the Constitutional Court accordingly accepted to review all petitions filed 
against the communal decision to reintroduce a Tito-street in the Capital of 
Ljubljana.1188 In a recent decision, the Court moreover abrogated a communal 
spatial plan for not ensuring public participation in the adoption of new con-
structional interventions.1189 
3. Enforcement of democratic rights 
Ever since their transition, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia commit to popu-
lar sovereignty and democratic rule as fundamental governmental principles. 
The legislative proceedings determined by the Constitutions guarantee the 
democratic nature of the decision-making processes. The analysis of the case-
law reveals that individuals played a significant role also with respect to the 
detection of acts of legislation which violate the constitutionally guaranteed 
democratic rights. 
To this day, the Croatian Constitutional Court receives numerous proposals to 
review laws for having been enacted in disregard of the rules for legislation. 
This particularly applies to laws passed by simple instead of prescribed two-
thirds majorities.1190 The frequency of proposals caused the Constitutional 
Court to notify the National Assembly about its continuing practice to adopt 
                                              
1186  Rulings U.br.52/2011 and U.br.76/2011 of 25 January 2012, nn. 7 ff. 
1187  Decisions U.br.52/2011 and U.br.76/2011 of 28 March 2012, n. 6. 
1188  See above at Chapter 3, p. 146. 
1189  Decision U-I-7/2013 and Up-29/2013 of 5 November 2015, n. 13, Uradni list 89/15. 
1190  See e.g. decision U-I-5654/2011 of 15 February 2012, nn. 9 ff., see above at fn. 606; de-
cision U-I-292/2011 of 23 March 2011, nn. 6 ff., NN 37/11; decision U-I-2696/2003 of 
16 January 2008, nn. 6 f., NN 14/08. 
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laws in emergency proceedings.1191 On this occasion, the Court also repri-
manded the Assembly for regularly enacting laws in emergency proceedings 
and for therewith disrupting the very essence of the Croatian Republic as par-
liamentary democracy. Upon the receipt of proposals the Constitutional Court 
moreover frequently abrogates acts of legislation adopted without the involve-
ment of the interested public in consultative sessions or popular consultations. 
The failure of the Minister of Education to prior consultation of parents and 
parents' associations before adopting the curriculum which included sexual 
education found great attention in the media.1192 For the failure of communal 
councils to include the interested public in procedures of enactment, the Court 
moreover abrogated numerous construction plans.1193 It also abrogated provi-
sions obliging political parties to collect «signatures of support» for violating 
the principle of multiparty systems1194 and a decision of the National Assem-
bly for violating the constitutionally prescribed guarantee of public proceed-
ings by excluding the public from its sessions.1195 A recent example finally 
shows that proposals even contribute to the enforcement of the democratic 
nature of constitution-making. Following a proposal of an individual filed on 
the occasion of the current reform proceedings, the Constitutional Court noti-
fied the Assembly about the inconsistency of its decision with standards of a 
democratic and pluralist society by scheduling a public debate before the elab-
oration of a concrete draft and for the duration of merely six days.1196  
Individuals also significantly contribute to the enforcement of democratic leg-
islative proceedings in Macedonia. Notable is the comprehensive number of 
initiatives which induced the invalidation of local urban and spatial plans for 
having been enacted without an adequate information and consultation of the 
people concerned.1197 Initiatives also facilitated the detection of several regu-
lations and other sub-legislative acts adopted in the absence of sufficient legal 
bases in formal laws.1198 For not having been enacted as formal laws, the Con-
stitutional Court for instance abrogated contested regulations on the rights and 
                                              
1191  Notification U-X-99/2013 of 23 January 2013, nn. 6, 16 ff., NN 12/13. 
1192  Decision U-II-1118/2013 of 22 May 2013, n. 12, see above at fn. 592. 
1193  E.g. decision U-II-1693/2003 of 22 March 2006, n. 4, NN 43/06; decision U-II-753/2005 
of 13 July 2005, n. 7, NN 88/05. 
1194  Decision U-I-1397/2015 of 24 September 2015, nn. 86 f., NN 104/15 
1195  Decision U-II-1744/2001 of 11 February 2004, n. 6, NN 21/04. 
1196  Notification U-X-5730/2013 of 16 November 2013, nn. 5 ff., NN 144/13. 
1197  See above at Chapter 3, p. 178. 
1198  E.g. decision U.br.124/2011 of 18 September 2012, n. 8; decision U.br.171/2011 of 11 
April 2012, n. 6; decision U.br.218/2010 of 9 September 2011, n. 5. 
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duties of holders of the domain «.mk»,1199 and regulations adopted by the Ju-
dicial Council regulating the criminal responsibility of judges and disciplinary 
sanctions.1200 It moreover annulled legal provisions for having been adopted 
by a simple instead of the required two-thirds majority.1201 Initiatives of indi-
viduals finally played a significant role in enforcing democratic standards by 
inducing the abrogation of provisions in the Rules of Procedures of the Na-
tional Assembly that excluded deputies, who were not members of parliamen-
tary groups, from participating in discussions on draft laws in general ses-
sions.1202 
The Slovene petition, on the other hand, is of a much smaller practical signif-
icance for the enforcement of the democratic legislative proceedings. This is 
the inevitable consequence of the requirement to demonstrate a direct legal 
interest and the prospect of improvement of the personal status by the abroga-
tion of contested legal provisions. However, after initially denying that disre-
gards of the rules for legislating violate personal legal positions of individuals, 
the Constitutional Court acknowledges a personal concern of all eligible vot-
ers whenever an effective exercise of the right to participate in public decision-
making is limited to an unconstitutional extent.1203 Upon the receipt of peti-
tions, the Constitutional Court accordingly eliminated several acts of legisla-
tion enacted in violation of the democratic legislative proceedings. Illustrative 
is its invalidation of a law that was promulgated and published before the ex-
piry of the term for announcing the collection of signatures for a referen-
dum,1204 or of provisions facilitating the misuse of personal data of persons 
who signed referendum requests for preventing the effective exercise of their 
right to democratic participation.1205 
 
                                              
1199  Decision U.br.72/2010 of 22 December 2010, n. 5. 
1200  Decision U.br.56/2010 of 15 September 2010, n. 5. 
1201  Decision U.br.139/2010 of 15 December 2010, n. 7. 
1202  E.g. decision U.br.259/2008 of 27 January 2010, n. 5. 
1203  See above at Chapter 3, p. 146.  
1204  Decision U-I-104/2001 of 18 June 2001, nn. 30 and 42, Uradni list 45/01, 52/01 and Od-
lUS X, 123.  
1205  Decision U-I-217/2002 of 17 February 2005, nn. 10 and 20 ff., Uradni list 24/05 and Od-
lUS XIV, 6. For other examples, see also decision U-I-67/2009 and Up-316/09 of 24 
March 2011, n. 24, Uradni list 28/11 and OdlUS XIX, 19 (English translation available); 
Decision U-I-76/2014 of 17 April 2014, n. 30, see above at fn. 799. 
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III. Comparative conclusion 
In this Chapter the three popular complaints in Croatia, Slovenia and Mace-
donia are analysed with respect to their relevance in practice. The first part 
investigates the significance of these remedies in the practice of the three Con-
stitutional Courts and in relation to their activity. The second part establishes 
the practical relevance which the popular complaints played and still play for 
the consolidation of the new constitutional values and principles since the 
transition of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia. 
1. Significance in the practice of the Courts 
The practical analysis reveals that both judicial review proceedings in general 
and popular complaints in particular play a secondary role for the activity of 
the Constitutional Courts in Croatia and in Slovenia. Their main workload is 
clearly caused by the large amount of constitutional complaints filed. This 
shows that the principal function of both these Courts in practice is the pro-
tection of the constitutional rights and liberties of applicants. The higher prac-
tical relevance of constitutional complaints in comparison to the number of 
popular complaints shows that individuals predominantly seek protection of 
their rights before the Constitutional Court by means of constitutional com-
plaints. 
Popular complaints are only of a secondary significance as remedies for hu-
man rights protection. In general, this can be attributed to the higher awareness 
of interference by acts with an individual and concrete nature. Besides, the 
persisting perception of the Constitutional Courts as courts of appeal against 
unfavourable court decisions can be regarded as major cause for the predom-
inance of constitutional complaints in practice. An additional reason in Slove-
nia in particular is the gradual increase of admissibility hurdles for the sub-
mittal of petitions. The high demands as to the immediacy of legal interest as 
admissibility requirement entailed a steady reduction of the number of peti-
tions filed and, moreover, induced a further decline of their success rate and 
the amount of admissible petitions.  
A different picture is shown with respect to the practical relevance of the right 
of initiative in Macedonia. The Constitutional Court’s main occupation is 
caused by initiatives filed against laws and other acts of legislation. Constitu-
tional complaints filed against individual state acts, on the other hand, play a 
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merely secondary role. The same applies to the practical relevance of consti-
tutional complaints as remedies for human rights protection. Predominantly, 
individuals seek protection of their rights and liberties before the Constitu-
tional Court by filing popular complaints. A probable reason is the limited 
protective scope of constitutional complaints under current law. While it com-
prises only a small number of constitutional rights, legal persons are com-
pletely excluded from the circle of entitled applicants. This is also reflected 
by the fact that during its almost twenty-five years long activity, the Court 
abrogated a contested individual state act only in one single case. The broader 
protection and the higher chances of success make initiatives more attractive 
as means to achieve the enforcement of personal rights and liberties by the 
Constitutional Court. Whether and to what extent the future extension of the 
protective scope of constitutional complaints will enhance the practical sig-
nificance of these remedies remains to be seen. 
Common to all three states considered is the fact that individual persons are 
by far the most active applicants in requesting the initiation of judicial review 
proceedings against laws and other acts of legislation. An essential factor for 
this predominance of individuals as applicants is the direct or indirect prospect 
of achieving an improvement of their personal legal position or protection of 
their own rights and liberties by the invalidation of a contested legal provision. 
On the other hand, it can be seen as consequence of a certain restraint of state 
authorities and other authorized applicants towards the political authorities 
and the legislator. 
The practical analysis further reveals a rather low success rate of popular com-
plaints in all three states considered and a high number of rejections and dis-
missals. Numerous complaints are rejected for the failure to comply with the 
admissibility requirements such as the jurisdiction of the Constitutional 
Courts, the formal conditions, and – in Slovenia – the demonstration of a direct 
and personal legal interest in the initiation of review proceedings. The Consti-
tutional Courts moreover reject a great number of complaints for not calling 
into question the compatibility of contested provisions with the Constitutions 
and the laws. Naturally, the low success rate can be attributed to a great extent 
to the frequent use of these remedies against detrimental or unpopular legal 
solutions – a risk inherent to unrestricted access of individuals to justice. It 
can also be explained with the complexity to substantiate inconsistencies of 
normative acts in an abstract manner and without any reference to concrete 
legal cases. Finally, it has been shown that the frequent referrals to the lack of 
competence to review legislative acts and dismissals of complaints for being 
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unfounded are indicative of a certain judicial self-restraint of the Constitu-
tional Courts towards the legislative authorities. 
At this point it is worth to mention the considerably smaller overall workload 
of the Macedonian Constitutional Court in comparison to its counterparts in 
Croatia and Slovenia. The number of submittals filed on an annual basis 
amounts merely to about ten percent in relation to submittals received by the 
Slovenian Constitutional Court and to even less than three percent of the over-
all number of submittals filed to the Constitutional Court of Croatia. The fact 
that its workload appears negligible and is declining even further has been 
established by the Constitutional Court itself.1206 Without trying to find an ex-
planation, the author just refers to critics and reports invoking insufficient 
transparency in relation to the work of the Macedonian Constitutional Court 
and a lack of independence from the political authorities.1207  
2. Enforcement of the constitutional guarantees 
Despite the rather low success rate of popular complaints in Croatia, Slovenia 
and Macedonia, it must be acknowledged that these means of direct individual 
access have had and still have an impact for the enforcement of the constitu-
tional guarantees. The exemplary presentation of decisions from the case-law 
shows that, in the twenty-five years of activity, the three Constitutional Courts 
invalidated a vast number of laws and other acts of legislation for violating 
fundamental rights and democratic guarantees and for being inconsistent with 
the principles of the rule of law after having received complaints filed by in-
dividuals. Consequently it can be said that by means of popular complaints, 
individual and legal persons have contributed to the consolidation of constitu-
tional guarantees to a significant extent. The more recent decisions of the Con-
stitutional Courts reveal that individuals have an impact in this respect even 
today. Even if this holds less true for general constitutional guarantees, the 
Slovene petition still significantly enforces human rights and liberties in Slo-
venia as well. 
                                              
1206  See Annual Report 2013, 10 f. 
1207  Discussion with Professor Treneska-Deskoska on 4 April 2014. See also Progress Report 
of the European Commission on Macedonia, pp. 5 f., retrievable over 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-the-former-
yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-progress-report_en.pdf> and Annual Human Rights Re-
port on Macedonia 2014, pp. 14 f., retrievable over <www.mhc.org.mk/reports/336#> 
(both links last accessed September 2018). 
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On the basis of these findings, the following and final Chapter will deal with 
the question whether the popular complaints can be considered as instruments 
of an institutional significance for the consolidation of the Constitutions and 
the therein guaranteed values and rights in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia. 
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Chapter 5: Institutional significance of popular 
complaints 
In literature one can find different views with respect to the expediency and 
necessity of providing unlimited individual access to constitutional courts. 
These reflect general opinions about the significance of popular complaints as 
components of constitutional adjudication from an institutional point of view. 
This Chapter aims at establishing the actual and concrete institutional signifi-
cance of popular complaints for the constitutionality in Croatia, Slovenia and 
Macedonia. After presenting the main arguments for and against such reme-
dies as means of direct individual access to constitutional courts (I), the sig-
nificance of popular complaints will be established in view of the concrete 
circumstances given in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia (II). At last, previous 
and current attempts at reform provide an indication on the future prospects 
of these individual access rights in the three states considered (III).  
 
I. Arguments against and for popular complaints 
1. Arguments against providing popular complaints  
Among the reasons put forward by opponents of an unlimited individual ac-
cess to constitutional courts, one can find concerns regarding democratic le-
gitimacy. The legitimacy of an unrestricted entitlement to request the review 
of laws is questioned because it allows virtually every individual person to 
attack acts of legislation at any time. Such an enhancement of the number of 
potential veto players is deemed to result in the permanent challenging of de-
cisions and acts of the democratically legitimated legislative authorities.1208 
Furthermore, a broad accessibility is seen as cause for an increased and more 
                                              
1208  See VAN DIJK, 229. 
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active involvement of the constitutional courts in political processes.1209 Ac-
cordingly, popular complaints are considered to entail a counter-democratic 
effect.1210 
A problem that has been thoroughly discussed in relation to the Bavarian pop-
ular complaint relates to the classic liberal concept of constitutional states. The 
idea that individual persons assume the function and role as guardians of the 
constitutional order in a general interest is inconsistent with the division of 
roles between the state and citizens according to this concept. Designations as 
«radical break with the subjective-legal tradition» or «part of the Bavarian 
curiosity cabinet» indicate a critical attitude in this regard.1211 This relates to 
the conflict between the right to submit complaints without any proven indi-
vidual interest and the classic perception of granting individuals access to 
courts. Accordingly, legal remedies serve as instruments for the defence of 
individual rights, the personal sphere and self-development against acts of 
state authorities.1212  
Also the Venice Commission in consistent practice advises against introducing 
an actio popularis as means allowing direct individual access to constitutional 
courts.1213 On the one hand, the Commission argues that popular complaints 
would not constitute an effective domestic filter for cases reaching the EC-
tHR.1214 Yet, it appears that the Commission primarily bases its position on 
purely practical considerations. In its Opinion on the Constitutional Law on 
the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic, it 
clearly emphasized that  
«[t]he right of appeal should be limited to those persons whose rights have 
been affected. Otherwise the Chamber might be seriously overburdened 
with appeals by individuals who complain about any legal act they come 
to know of.»1215 
                                              
1209  KNEIP, 96; SADURSKI, 8. With respect to administrative judiciary see ERASS, 1370 f. 
1210  KNEIP, 98. 
1211  MASING, 119 f.; BOHN, 77 ff. See also JELLINEK, 72; NEUGÄRTNER, 5 f., 35. 
1212  See MASING, 56. 
1213  E.g. Venice Commission Documents CDL-AD(2014)026, n. 87 and CDL-AD(2008)030, 
n. 51.  
1214  See HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 84. 
1215  Venice Commission Documents CDL-AD(2011)018, n. 27 and CDL-AD(2014)020,  
n. 10. 
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As arguments against unlimited individual access the Commission accord-
ingly invokes the risk of abusive submittals and an unmanageable amount of 
applications. As inevitable consequence it refers to the congestion of the 
courts and an ever growing backlog of unresolved cases. This finally results 
in an overburdening of constitutional courts to the detriment of their effective-
ness and functioning. In this regard the Commission frequently refers to the 
example of the Croatian proposal.1216 For the same reasons, the Venice Com-
mission endorsed the abolition of the actio popularis in Hungary.1217 In this 
respect it emphasized at several instances that popular complaints in matters 
of constitutionality neither constitute a European standard nor that their abo-
lition would infringe European constitutional heritage.  
This risk of overburdening of constitutional courts as inevitable consequence 
of unlimited individual access was already recognized by KELSEN.1218 VAN 
DIJK finally refers to the great cost burden which results for states from allow-
ing unlimited access to the judiciary.1219  
2. Arguments in favour of popular complaints 
Even though he rejected unlimited individual access for practical reasons, al-
ready KELSEN acknowledged that the introduction of popular complaints in 
judicial review proceedings constitutes the «broadest guarantee of a compre-
hensive constitutional review».1220 This statement indicates his recognition of 
the institutional significance of popular complaints for the enforcement and 
consolidation of the constitutional order.  
Even opponents of popular complaints and the Venice Commission 
acknowledge their positive effects in states of transition from authoritarian to 
democratic rule and constitutionalism.1221 New constitutions are subject to the 
discretion of the new political powers and exposed to arbitrariness and manip-
ulations especially in the beginning phases. At this stage, the general aware-
ness in politics and in society about the supremacy and significance of the new 
                                              
1216  E.g. Venice Commission Document CDL-AD(2008)030, n. 51. 
1217  Venice Commission Document CDL-AD(2011)001 n. 64. 
1218  KELSEN, Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 74. See also BRUNNER, Festschrift Stern, 1057. 
1219  See VAN DIJK, 233 f. 
1220  KELSEN, Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 74. 
1221  E.g. BRUNNER, Grundrechtsschutz, 1056; HARUTYUNYAN/NUSSBERGER/PACZOLAY, n. 74. 
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constitutional guarantees is still insufficient.1222 In light of these circumstances 
an unlimited accessibility of constitutional courts to individuals is acknowl-
edged to reinforce the new constitutions and to consolidate the rule of law. 
The extension of the supervision over acts of legislation to the level of society 
and the individual person not only facilitates the tracing and elimination of 
unconstitutional laws and general acts from the legal order.1223 It is moreover 
considered to foster the general awareness of society and in politics about the 
constitution, the fundamental principles and values and the constitutionally 
guaranteed rights. The important progresses achieved by means of the mean-
while abolished Hungarian actio popularis are frequently referred to in this 
context.1224 
But also because of their legal effect, popular complaints can be considered to 
play a significant institutional role. While they can be introduced both as rem-
edies for the enforcement of the objective constitutional order and for individ-
ual rights protection, in practice these means are predominantly filed by indi-
viduals who seek improvement of their own legal status or protection of their 
subjective rights. Yet, irrespectively of the motives, the overall protective ef-
fect of popular complaints is very strong.1225 As remedies for the initiation of 
judicial review proceedings they enforce the constitutional order in an abstract 
way and with a legal effect which exceeds the subjective interests of the ap-
plicants (erga omnes effect). 
The replacement of the Hungarian actio popularis by a normative constitu-
tional complaint in 2011 is considered to have reduced this strong protective 
effect. Studies on the effects of the restriction of individual access found that 
the main activity of the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been shifted from 
abstract to concrete judicial review. As a consequence, its function has 
changed from a guardian of the constitutionality of legislation to a guardian 
of individual rights and liberties.1226 A reduction of protection is moreover rec-
ognized due to the simple fact that the requirement of a proven individual in-
terest in bringing proceedings impedes the possibility of filing class actions, 
for instance by NGO’s on behalf of vulnerable groups.1227 
                                              
1222  SMERDEL, Kraj tranzicije, 1 ff. with further details to the transition of Croatia. 
1223  E.g. ACHOUR, 397; VAN DIJK, 234. 
1224  See e.g. SADURSKI, 6; SOMODY/VISSY, 98. 
1225  With respect to judicial review proceedings in general see SOMODY/VISSY, 97. 
1226  See KELEMEN, 64, 75 f.; SOMODY/VISSY, 106. 
1227  HALMAI, 5; SOMODY/VISSY, 98. 
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Although less relevant for this study, also other arguments in favour of intro-
ducing popular complaints to constitutional courts shall be mentioned at this 
point. Unrestricted individual access to contest laws is supported by certain 
scholars as logical consequence of the democratic principle and as a way to 
compensate deficiencies in democratic systems.1228 Invoking the contempo-
rary understanding that individual and public interests cannot be strictly dif-
ferentiated anymore in administrative law, ERRASS advocates for the introduc-
tion of popular complaints to administrative judiciary in Switzerland.1229 
This shows a widespread agreement about the significance of unlimited indi-
vidual access to constitutional courts and a broad contestability of laws and 
other general acts of legislation during transition processes. When exactly 
such processes are completed, must be established for each individual state 
separately. An institutional significance of popular complaints must conse-
quently be acknowledged also in states where the principles of constitutional-
ity and the rule of law are not yet consolidated to a sufficient extent. These 
states can therefore be considered to still be in the process of transition.1230 
3. Popular complaints and the rule of law 
There is general consent that the existence of an independent institution em-
powered to monitor the compliance of acts of legislation with the constitu-
tional order constitutes an essential element of the rule of law. The ECtHR 
considers as basic prerequisite of the rule of law that individual persons are 
entitled to access courts and to achieve judicial protection. Without specifying 
the mechanisms and institutions by which the signatory states must ensure the 
protection of the rights guaranteed by the ECHR, it requires that remedies are 
effective and accessible and that the proceedings comply with the Convention 
standards for fair trials.1231 This holds true for means of judicial protection 
against state actions that directly interfere with the rights of the applicants. 
Only a few scholars consider the unrestricted right of individuals to request 
the review of laws and other legislative acts as indispensable element of the 
rule of law. Their arguments are in principle based on the above prescribed 
                                              
1228  ACHOUR, 397; ERRASS, 1368. 
1229  See the scientific article of ERRASS, 1351 ff., esp. 1372. The correlation between public 
and individual interests has been described above at Chapter 1, pp. 32 f. 
1230  Accordingly also BRUNNER, Zugang des Einzelnen, 235. 
1231  See above at Chapter 1, pp. 34 ff. 
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perception of the adherence to the constitutional order as common good and 
as a personal interest of the applicant as a member of this society. For OTTO 
PFERSMANN the unlimited access of individuals is a fundamental right of 
every addressee of a legislative act and a prerequisite for the rule of law.1232 
Slovenian scholar ANDREJ KRISTAN considers the right of individuals to ac-
cess to constitutional courts without any restriction as one of three dimensions 
of the rule of law and attempts to limit accessibility, as a restriction of this 
principle. Based on these findings the author criticizes the continuing attempts 
to restrict the respective access right in Slovenia.1233  
The Venice Commission, on the other hand, does not consider these com-
plaints as necessary component of the rule of law. With respect to the abolition 
of the Hungarian actio popularis it stated that 
«[t]he abolition of popular complaints is not problematic from the view-
point of the rule of law.»1234 
The small practical significance of popular complaints on the European con-
tinent shows that an unrestricted entitlement to request the review of laws can 
be considered as feature, but not as necessity of the rule of law. In most states 
the entitlement is reserved to authorized state organs or requires a proven in-
dividual interest. This finally reflects the predominantly negative attitude to-
wards this remedy in European doctrine and practice, where the disadvantages 
of an unrestricted accessibility are considered to prevail. 
 
II. In relation to the states considered 
The completed accession of Slovenia and Croatia to the EU and the ongoing 
accession negotiations with Macedonia are indicative for the progress of these 
states in consolidating democratic rule and the rule of law. In order to establish 
the actual institutional significance of the popular complaints the following 
                                              
1232  PFERSMANN, Prolégomènes, 76 f. In his report to the French Conseil constitutionnel, 
PFERSMANN, Le recours direct, 1 ff., however recommends the introduction of a subsidi-
ary individual complaint against direct impairments by laws. 
1233  KRISTAN, Tri razsežnosti pravne države, 81 f., 87 ff.  
1234  See reference in KELEMEN, 76. 
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will put these remedies in context of the existing political and legal circum-
stances in the three states considered. This allows a conclusion on their rele-
vance as instruments of constitutional adjudication for the enforcement of the 
constitutional values and rules. The study does not intend to provide a detailed 
analysis or portrayal of the political circumstances in these states. Rather, ref-
erences will be confined to particular aspects in view of which both the review 
competence of the Constitutional Courts and their accessibility to individuals 
gain importance. 
1. Right of proposal in Croatia 
A. Insufficient constitutional awareness 
The political elites in Croatia are regularly criticized for their «volunta-
rism»1235 or for the general lack of constitutional awareness.1236 This critique 
is caused by the frequency of abuses of legislative power for the sole purpose 
to consolidate political programs. Breaches of constitutional rules can still be 
established in several instances of recent legislation. Illustrative for a political 
act that is manifestly inconsistent with the constitutional values and interna-
tional obligations of Croatia is the Law on Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters with EU Member States in June 2013, internationally known as Lex 
Perković. This law has been regarded as means of the Socialist Government 
to avoid the obligation to surrender former members of the Socialist Secret 
Service to Germany for the murder of a dissident in Bavaria back in 1983. The 
restriction was abolished and the accused persons extradited to Germany in 
2014 only after the EU threatened to impose sanctions on Croatia for breach-
ing is obligations as EU member state under the European Arrest Warrant. 
Furthermore, the Croatian political powers are regularly criticized for their 
indifference and inability to comply with the constitutionally prescribed pro-
ceedings for legislating. Although it denied that Government acted in a man-
ner of unlimited political power, the Constitutional Court raised concerns 
about its rushed action, by which it prolonged the legal validity of the law 
                                              
1235  E.g. MATIJEVIĆ, 93 f.  
1236  See e.g. SMERDEL, Kriza Ustavnog suda, 4 f.  
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restricting rights to salary increases per decree on the last day of its legal va-
lidity.1237 The parallel legal validity of two Family Laws as result of incon-
sistent transitional and final provisions,1238 and the systematic numerical 
changes on the occasion of amendments of laws or even the Constitution1239 
are only a few illustrative examples. Finally, the recent impossibility of reach-
ing an interparty agreement for the necessary two-third majority for electing 
ten Constitutional Court judges is considered as a sign of a growing reluctance 
of politics to submit to constitutional adjudication.1240 
This frequency of constitutional breaches by the Croatian political powers is 
mainly attributed to the five decades of socialist rule.1241 It is reflected by the 
regular abuses of the constitution-making power by the political elites for 
short-term political goals.1242 The political elites are criticized for considering 
the Constitution as  
«purely theoretic, symbolically important, yet unpractical and at times 
even dangerous concept.»1243  
Illustrative are the rushed through reforms aimed at a rapid accession to the 
EU, which have been implemented without assessing their compliance with 
the objectives and values determined by the Constitution.1244  
Such an insufficient constitutional awareness can be established also in rela-
tion to the still prevailing passivity of other state powers in requesting the 
Constitutional Court to review the compatibility of acts of the legislative 
power with the Constitution. On the one hand, this restraint is seen as conse-
quence of an insufficient independence from the governing political pow-
ers.1245 The fact that the enforcement of judicial independence from undue po-
litical influence constituted an issue for comprehensive judicial reforms up 
until very recently might explain the restraint of courts in contesting laws and 
                                              
1237  Decision U-I-1625/2014 of 30 March 2015, n. 45, see above at fn. 658. 
1238  See notification U-X-3239/2014 of 3 July 2014, NN 83/14.  
1239  See above at Chapter 2, fn. 342. A detailed analysis is provided by RAČAN, 17. See also 
MATIJEVIĆ, 93 f.; SMERDEL, Kraj tranzicije, 7. 
1240  E.g. SMERDEL, Kriza Ustavnog suda, 6 ff. 
1241  SMERDEL, Kraj tranzicije, 3 ff., 7, who provides a more detailed analysis of this reason. 
1242  See for intsance SMERDEL, Konstitucionalizam, 101 ff., 104 f.; SMERDEL, Parlamentarni 
sustav, 99. 
1243  SMERDEL, Kraj tranzicije, 6. 
1244  SMERDEL, Ustavno uređenje Europske Hrvatske, 599 ff.  
1245  This was particularly apparent in Croatia during the presidency of Franjo Tudjman in the 
beginning years after transition, see for instance PEŠUT, 36 f. 
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regulations before the Constitutional Court. On the other hand, the insufficient 
activity of courts in contesting the constitutionality of laws is seen as a conse-
quence of the absence of an explicit obligation to request the review of acts of 
legislation in connection with pending proceedings.1246 
B. Institutional significance 
Despite the low success rate of proposals filed for the initiation of review pro-
ceedings against laws and other general acts, this legal remedy caused the re-
moval of several unconstitutional and unlawful legal provisions during the last 
twenty-five years. In combination with the Constitutional Court's competence 
to notify the National Assembly about established inadequacies in legislation, 
proposals moreover disclosed several serial, systematic or habitual breaches 
of the Constitution. Even proposals that were rejected for being inadmissible 
caused the Constitutional Court to issue such notifications.1247 
Since its reintroduction, the proposal therefore contributed to a significant ex-
tent to the enforcement of the constitutional guarantees against the legislative 
authorities. Without having to proof an individual legal interest, individuals 
frequently contest laws and other acts of legislation for not complying with 
fundamental constitutional principles and values to which Croatia committed 
after its transition. The Croatian proposal thus essentially contributed to the 
consolidation of the principle of constitutionalism, the rule of law and demo-
cratic rule. Moreover, it can be considered to have added and to still add to the 
protection of fundamental rights offered by the constitutional complaint.1248 In 
view of the considerably higher amount of constitutional complaints filed, its 
role as remedy for individual rights protection is however only subsidiary. 
It has been shown that popular complaints are by far not the main cause for 
the overload of the Croatian Constitutional Court. Yet, it is evident that the 
unrestricted right of individuals to file proposals increases its workload to a 
significant extent. As risk inherent to unlimited individual access, it facilitates 
misuses and the submittal of a great number of proposals against unpopular 
legal solutions and out of discontent with politics. Illustrative is the submittal 
of more than 35,000 proposals against the introduction of a special crisis tax 
in 2009,1249 or the receipt of more than 1,000 proposals in 2010 filed against 
                                              
1246  OMEJEC, O potrebnim promjenama, 98 f. 
1247  E.g. notification U-X-99/2013 of 23 January 2013, n. 6, see above at fn. 1191. 
1248  See to this effect also SMERDEL/SOKOL, 172. 
1249  See ruling U-IP-3820/2009 et al. of 17 November 2009, see above at fn. 616. 
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the reduction of pension payments in order to overcome the financial crisis.1250 
The lack of a requirement of a proven individual interest moreover entailed 
that the Constitutional Court received more than 700 proposals filed by one 
individual citizen, who considers himself a guardian of the Constitution 
against the legislative authorities.1251 However, the fact that a great number of 
his proposals lead to the elimination of unconstitutional legal provisions 
shows that individual citizens like him take over the role to foster and enforce 
the constitutional order in place of the state authorities pursuant to the separa-
tion of powers doctrine. 
The persistent disregard of the Constitution by the political authorities shows 
that constitutional awareness is still insufficient in Croatia. This also applies 
to the other state organs and especially to those authorized to request the Con-
stitutional Court to initiate judicial review proceedings against unconstitu-
tional acts of legislation. In view of these circumstances, the proposal right 
must be acknowledged to significantly contribute to the enforcement of the 
constitutional principles and guarantees against the legislative authorities and 
for the consolidation of the Constitution of Croatia to this day. 
2. The Slovene petition 
A. Insufficient implementation of the Court’s decisions 
The Slovene political powers face less criticism for conscious and notorious 
violations of the principle of constitutionalism. Yet, also here political elites 
are blamed for disregarding the authority and supremacy of the Constitution. 
Such critiques are raised by the Constitutional Court itself. The Court fre-
quently criticizes the legislating bodies for their negligence in implementing 
its decisions.1252 In its Annual Report for the year 2015 it criticized the legis-
lator for still not having fully executed its decisions of 1998 and its instruction 
to mention Roma representatives as members of municipal councils.1253 The 
Court emphasizes that with this negligence the legislative powers violate the 
                                              
1250  See ruling U-I-3610/2010 of 15 December 2010, see above at fn. 1052.  
1251  See also LJUBIĆ, Ustavnopravna priroda prijedloga, 8; OMEJEC, O potrebnim promje-
nama, 88.  
1252  The Court repeatedly issues this blame in its Annual Reports. See e.g. Annual Report 
2015, 37 ff.; Annual Report 2014, 38 f.; Annual Report 2012, 56 ff. 
1253  See Annual Report 2015, 37 and decision U-I-301/1998 of 17 September 1998, Uradni 
list 67/98 and OdlUS VII, 157.  
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principle of constitutionality, the rule of law and the separation of powers and 
are therefore responsible for the high number of applications and for its work-
load.1254 The fact that the Constitutional Court repeats this deficiency in each 
of its Annual Reports shows that this problem persists to this day. Furthermore, 
the Slovene legislator has been blamed at several instances for abusing its leg-
islative competences to evade judicial review. In relation to its decision on the 
«erased persons» and the community Ankaran, the Court criticized the legis-
lative authorities for their endeavours to reaffirm their politics by enacting 
constitutional laws after it declared respective laws as unconstitutional.1255  
At the same time, also here the state authorities show restraint in using their 
power as authorized applicants to request the review of acts of legislation by 
the Constitutional Court. This restraint is attributed to the insufficient inde-
pendence from the governing political power,1256 and the absence of an explicit 
legal obligation to request the review of acts of legislation.1257 Yet another rea-
son named is a general lack of interest of state organs in requesting the review 
of legislative acts.1258 Although in recent years a steady rise of requests filed 
by courts can be established, individuals remain the main applicants before 
the Constitutional Court.1259 
B. Institutional significance 
The Slovene petition gains institutional significance in light of these circum-
stances. Also here, individuals and legal persons caused the elimination of a 
significant number of unconstitutional laws and other acts of legislation. In 
the wake of the continued restriction of individual access, abusive submittals 
could be prevented and the overall number of petitions filed was reduced. 
As a consequence of the required legal interest submittals on behalf of third 
persons and for the enforcement of general constitutional guarantees are ex-
cluded. Unless they succeed in proving a direct personal concern, petitions by 
which applicants contest acts of legislation for violating the principle of the 
                                              
1254  See for instance its explanations in Annual Report 2002, 12.  
1255  For more details see RIBIČIČ, Moč in nemoč ustavnega zakona, 8 ff. 
1256  See NERAD, Komentar Ustave art. 162, n. 10, with respect to the Government. 
1257  KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 105. 
1258  POLAK REMŠKAR, 11. 
1259  See foreword of the President of the Constitutional Court to the Annual Report 2013, 5 f. 
and in more details Annual Report 2013, 41 ff. 
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rule of law or of other constitutional guarantees will be rejected as inadmissi-
ble. Only in a few cases, namely with respect to human dignity, democratic 
participation and the right to a healthy environment, does the Court apply a 
wider understanding of the required legal interest. 
The actual institutional and protective function of petitions is controversial in 
Slovene constitutional doctrine and practice. Based on the rigid procedural 
requirements several scholars endorse a subjective protective function of this 
access right.1260 The Constitutional Court, on the other hand, denies such a 
limited function. In reference to the will of the constitution-makers, it empha-
sizes that petitions also protect other constitutional guarantees and principles 
and that not even their procedural dependence from valid constitutional com-
plaints prevents petitioners from alleging violations of other constitutional 
guarantees and principles.1261 To the knowledge of the author, the Constitu-
tional Court recognized a legal interest in relation to the violation of such con-
stitutional guarantees only with respect to the principle of non-retroactivity. It 
justified its finding by emphasizing that also invalidations of provisions for 
violating the principle of non-retroactivity can be directly decisive for the suc-
cess of a constitutional complaint.1262 Furthermore, there is a widespread opin-
ion that neither the constitution-makers by prescribing a legitimate interest as 
access requirement nor the Constitutional Court with the adoption of a rigid 
interpretation, aimed at introducing a normative constitutional complaint fol-
lowing the German model. The legitimate interest is rather seen as a «correc-
tive» for the negative aspects of unrestricted accessibility and therefore as 
means to prevent an excessive use or misuse of the access right.1263 
In the mentioned decision however, the Constitutional Court accepted the pe-
tition for consideration because the petitioner in his constitutional complaint 
alleged the violation of his right to legal equality by the retroactive application 
of the contested law.1264 This shows that in any case applicants cannot demon-
strate a direct legal interest without being personally affected in their own 
rights. This provides ground for the assumption that the Slovene petition was 
                                              
1260  E.g. KAUČIČ/PAVLIN/BARDUTZKY, 41 f.; OMEJEC, O potrebnim promjenama, 58; ZOBEC, 
1093, 1099 f. 
1261  Decision U-I-185/2010 and Up-1409/2010 of 2 February 2012, nn. 14 f., above at fn. 712. 
1262  Decision U-I-185/2010 and Up-1409/2010 of 2 February 2012, n. 15, above at fn. 712. 
1263  KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 119; LUKŠIČ, 734; MAVČIČ, Komentar Ustave art. 24, 175 f.; 
NERAD, Pravni interes, 43; ŠINKOVEC/TRATAR, 174. 
1264  Ruling Up-1409/2010 of 21 December 2010, nn. 3 ff., Uradni list 2/12 and OdlUS XIX, 
33. 
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transformed into a legal remedy for the protection of the subjective rights of 
petitioners against legislative powers.1265 This seems to be confirmed by the 
required necessity of review proceedings for the improvement of the personal 
legal position. Other indications to this effect are the absence of power of the 
Constitutional Court to initiate review proceedings at its own discretion and 
the rigid interpretation of the dominus litis position of applicants, as to which 
review proceedings start and end with the legitimate interest and the validity 
of their petitions. Another indication is the beginning of the time limits for 
filing petitions corresponding to the moment of interference with the legal po-
sitions or the knowledge of a petitioner about an interference.  
Nevertheless, reference to the Slovene petition as mere instrument for indi-
vidual rights protection does not do justice to its particular nature. On the one 
hand, the legal effect of the Constitutional Court’s decision to invalidate a 
legal provision for violating constitutional rights exceeds the subjective inter-
est of the applicants. What is more, the circle of applicants entitled to file pe-
titions against laws and acts of legislation with an immediate legal effect com-
prises also state organs violated in their constitutional position and organiza-
tions, who advocate for the protection of the rights of their members or the 
environment as public good. This shows that the protective function of peti-
tions as remedies does exceed human rights protection.  
Due to the fact that petitions are predominantly filed by individuals, their prac-
tical significance today is however almost exclusively limited to the enforce-
ment of fundamental rights. In comparison to the constitutional complaint, the 
relevance of petitions as means of individual rights protection remains subsid-
iary. This is shown by the considerably larger amount of constitutional com-
plaints received on an annual basis. Over and above, petitions filed by indi-
vidual persons lose their independent function for being increasingly submit-
ted in connection with constitutional complaints. 
Finally, the role of individuals as guardians of the Constitution applies to a 
significantly smaller extent to the Slovene petition than to its counterpart in 
Croatia. Just as has been established in Hungary, also here the Constitutional 
Court’s principal practical role seems to have shifted from a guardian of the 
objective constitutional order to a guardian of constitutional rights of appli-
cants. On the other hand, the institutional significance of the right of petition 
as remedy for constitutional consolidation can also be considered as smaller 
in view of the less pronounced disregard of the Constitution by the Slovene 
                                              
1265  See to this effect also ZOBEC, 1089, 1092 f. 
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legislative authorities. This finally holds true in light of the – albeit slowly – 
increasing activity of authorized state organs to request the review of laws and 
other acts of legislation before the Constitutional Court. 
C. Debate on the effect of restricting individual access 
Previous attempts and the current attempts to additionally limit individual ac-
cess to the Slovene Constitutional Court by vesting it with a discretionary 
power in accepting complaints for consideration are accompanied by political 
and legal discourses about effects on the rule of law and democracy. In order 
to understand the perception of the right of petition among Slovene scholars 
and in politics, the main arguments raised for and against further restrictions 
are described in the following. 
a) Reinforcement of the rule of law and democratic rule 
aa) Increase of efficiency and authority of the Constitutional Court 
The most perceptible impact of access restrictions is the reduction of applica-
tions filed and, as a result, the decrease in workload. In view of that, even legal 
scholars who oppose to a restriction of individual access consider the adoption 
of a more strict interpretation of the access requirements as justified.1266 The 
reduction of workload also constitutes the main aim of the Court's claims for 
a discretionary power to accept appeals for consideration.1267 The smaller pro-
spect of success is expected to reduce the number of applications filed. In turn, 
the reduced workload enhances the efficiency of the Court and allows the 
shortening of the duration of proceedings, ensuring judicial protection in due 
time.1268  
Proponents of a discretionary power moreover argue that discretionary deci-
sions allow a positive selection of cases, facilitating the focus on applications 
which raise questions of fundamental importance for the constitutional order 
and the protection of the human rights.1269 This allows the Court to liberate 
                                              
1266  E.g. MAVČIČ, Individual complaint, 10; NERAD, Pravni interes, 72. 
1267  See Annual Report 2009, 2.  
1268  Annual Report 2009, 2; KRISTAN, Tri razsežnosti, 66 f. See also statement of deputy 
CVETKA ZALOKAR ORAŽEM in National Assembly session of 27 October 2010.  
1269  E.g. KAUČIČ/PAVLIN/BARDUTZKY, 43; KRIVIC, Upanje in skepsa, 69; RIBIČIČ, Strengthen-
ing constitutional democracy, 11 f.  
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itself from its reputation as instance of appeal and as «litter basket for practi-
cally everything»1270, while reinforcing its authority as supreme guardian of 
the Constitution.  
bb) Responsibility of the judiciary to protect the Constitution  
As shown, the Constitutional Court emphasizes that its change of practice in 
2007 implemented the primary responsibility of the judiciary to protect the 
Constitution and fundamental rights.1271 This measure is supported by several 
scholars.1272 The possibility of the Court to base its decisions on the assess-
ments and interpretations of the lower courts is moreover considered to im-
prove the quality of its judgments and of judicial protection in general.1273 
The introduction of a discretionary power of the Constitutional Court is sup-
ported on the basis of similar considerations. The lower prospect of success is 
deemed to entail a stimulating effect for applicants to seek protection against 
unconstitutional acts of legislation already before the courts.1274 Furthermore, 
a discretionary power of the Court is regarded as indispensable for the reali-
zation of its role as supreme guardian of the Constitution, allowing the focus 
on the protection of fundamental constitutional guarantees, while leaving ap-
plications of a merely minor importance to the judiciary.1275  
cc) Realization of the separation of powers and of democratic rule 
Other arguments in favour of restricting the right of individuals to file petitions 
relate to the institutional strength of the Constitutional Court. Decisive for the 
Court's strong position are its comprehensive scope of powers and its broad 
accessibility. These factors are considered to lead to an over dimensioned po-
sition which conflicts with the separation of powers and with democratic rule. 
A restriction of its accessibility is considered as indispensable measure in this 
                                              
1270  Statement of deputy CVETKA ZALOKAR ORAŽEM in National Assembly session of 
17 March 2011.  
1271  See above pp. 148 f.  
1272  See e.g. ČEBULJ, Zahteva in pobuda za začetek ustavnosodne presoje, 1481 ff.; GRAD, 
7 ff.; RIBIČIČ, Razmerje med ustavno pritožbo in pobudo, 1490 ff. 
1273  ČEBULJ, Pravni interes, 95; IBID., Pobuda za ustavnosodno presojo, 1011. 
1274  KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, fn. 30, 118 f. See to that effect also TESTEN, Zaprta ali le 
podoljšana pot, 1477, particularly fn. 26. 
1275  KAUČIČ/PAVLIN/BARDUTZKY, 43. 
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regard.1276 A rigid practice in accepting petitions for consideration is also en-
dorsed from the aspect of democracy. Already in 1995 concerns were raised 
that low requirements for the acknowledgment of a legal interest implied the 
risk of a more activist approach of the Constitutional Court in reviewing acts 
of the legislative authorities. A broad accessibility of individuals was there-
with considered as menace for popular sovereignty and as detrimental to the 
principle of democracy.1277 
dd) No decrease of standards of judicial protection  
Finally, proponents of restrictions of individual access deny that these prevent 
individuals from directly accessing the Constitutional Court. Following the 
arguments of the Court they merely defer the right of direct access to the mo-
ment when no effective protection can be expected from the judiciary any-
more. Rather than preventing its openness, the change of practice ensures the 
subsidiarity of the Court's protective function.1278 Given the primary respon-
sibility of the judiciary to protect rights and liberties, the restriction of the 
entitlement to petition is not considered to decrease the standards of protec-
tion.1279 
b) Weakening of the rule of law and democratic rule 
aa) Limiting standards of human rights protection 
Already during the first years after transition the Constitutional Court’s undif-
ferentiated and rigid practice with respect to a required legal interest of appli-
cants was criticized as incompatible with its role as guardian of human rights. 
After rejecting petitions against prescribed interceptions of conversations for 
the purpose of criminal investigations for the lack of a personal legal interest, 
the hypothetical question was raised whether  
                                              
1276  See ČEBULJ, Pravni interes, 99.  
1277  This tension between constitutional review and democratic rule is explained in detail in 
BUGARIČ, 43–66 see references in KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 120; CERAR, 337 f. 
1278  KAUČIČ/PAVLIN/BARDUTZKY, 45; RIBIČIČ, Razmerje med ustavno pritožbo in pobudo, 
1490.  
1279  See to that effect TESTEN, Zaprta ali le podaljšana pot, 1477. Critical with respect to this 
view KRISTAN, Tri razsežnosti, 67.  
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«only those [would] be able to submit a petition against the constitutional-
ity of the reintroduction of capital punishment against who such a process 
has already been initiated?»1280  
The Constitutional Court was moreover criticized for disregarding its respon-
sibility to provide judicial protection by not taking into consideration the par-
ticularities of individual cases. Illustrative is the mentioned rejection of a pe-
tition and a constitutional complaint for the sole reason that the applicant 
reached the prescribed maximum age for election. The Constitutional Court 
was criticized from its own ranks because 
«[i]t is unacceptable to believe that when a petitioner cannot achieve full 
satisfaction, he is neither justified to achieve partial [satisfaction].»1281 
A weakening of the standards of human rights protection is also considered as 
inevitable consequence of the introduction of a discretionary power of the 
Constitutional Court.1282 Opponents invoke the general failure of the judiciary 
to consider and apply the constitutional guarantees in decision-making.1283 
This negligence is attributed to the reluctance or missing expertise and expe-
rience of judges with regard to constitutional law.1284 For persons whose rights 
have been violated by a state act, the right of the Court to freely select the 
cases entails a risk that judicial protection is not ensured before the Constitu-
tional Court either.1285 
                                              
1280  (Insertion added). KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 122 f. See also the dissenting opinion of 
judge MATEVŽ KRIVIC to ruling U-I-89/1995 of 5 October 1995, OdlUS IV, 95.  
1281  (Insertion added). Dissenting opinion of judge CIRIL RIBIČIČ to ruling U-I-303/2007 of 20 
March 2008, nn. 5 ff., see above at fn. 837. As the applicant presumed that his candidacy 
was rejected based on lustration measures, a declaratory decision of the Court on the vi-
olation of his right to stand for election would have – at least partially – improved his 
legal position in form of satisfaction.  
1282  BOŠNJAK, 6 f. See also the arguments raised by deputies FRANCE CUKJATI and BRANKO 
GRIMS in the session of the National Assembly of 27 October 2010.  
1283  See e.g. the arguments of deputy BRANKO GRIMS in the session of the National Assembly 
held on 27 October 2010. Compare also BOŠNJAK, 8 f.  
1284  See BOŠNJAK, 8 f. 
1285  Detailed to the consequences of a discretionary power of the Court in BOŠNJAK, 6 ff. 
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bb) Weakening of constitutionalism and the rule of law 
In contrast to the advocates of limited individual access, the opponents con-
sider restrictions of the right of petition to weaken the rule of law by constrain-
ing the monitoring power of the Constitutional Court.1286 The endeavours to 
reduce the workload of the Constitutional Court by restricting its accessibility 
are consequently considered to be more harmful to the rule of law than the 
long duration of the proceedings.1287  
Besides, the Constitutional Court is blamed for having reduced legal certainty 
with its change of practice in 2007. Critiques challenge the unclear and incon-
sistent application of the criteria for a proven legal interest.1288 On the other 
hand, the Court's new practice is criticized for not leaving any room to con-
sider the particularities of each individual case and for leading to situations 
which not only reduce legal certainty but which even harm the confidence and 
trust in the rule of law.1289 
Finally, the requirement of a proven legal interest as a means to reduce the 
Constitutional Court’s workload is considered as harmful for the authority of 
the Court.1290 Not only for legal scholars, but also for the judges themselves, 
the Constitutional Court therewith risks damaging its own reputation as guard-
ian of the Constitution and the fundamental rights.1291 Similar concerns are 
also raised in relation to the proposed introduction of a discretionary power of 
the Court in accepting applications for consideration.1292  
cc) Weakening of democratic standards and popular sovereignty 
Opponents of further restrictions of the right of petition moreover invoke det-
rimental effects for democratic rule in Slovenia.1293 The right to petition is 
understood as means of democratic supervision over the adherence of the leg-
islative authorities to the Constitution as expression of the will of the popular 
                                              
1286  KRISTAN, Tri razsežnosti, 69 f., 81 ff., 87. 
1287  KRISTAN, Tri razsežnosti, 88. 
1288  E.g. TESTEN, Komentar Ustave art. 162, n. 21; SLADIČ, fn. 10; ZOBEC, 1096 ff. 
1289  ZOBEC, 1094 f. 
1290  E.g. SLADIČ, 21 f.; NERAD, Pravni interes, 72 f. 
1291  See CIRIL RIBIČIČ in dissenting opinion to ruling U-I-303/2007 of 20 March 2008, nn. 1 f., 
see above at fn. 837. 
1292  BOŠNJAK, 6 f.; MAVČIČ, Slovene constitutional review, 88.  
1293  KRISTAN, Tri razsežnosti, 69; MAVČIČ, Individual complaint, 23 f. 
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sovereign. A broad democratic supervision requires a broad access of individ-
uals. Thus, restrictions of the right of individuals to petition weaken demo-
cratic supervision over the legislator and of democratic rule as a whole. The 
introduction of a discretionary power is therefore considered to inevitably lead 
to a deterioration of democratic standards in Slovenia.1294 
3. The Macedonian right of initiative 
A. Absence of political pluralism 
Critiques for the inability or reluctance of political authorities to act in com-
pliance with and within the frames determined by the Constitution can be 
found in Macedonia as well. These are triggered by the frequent adoption of 
laws and other acts of legislation which violate the constitutional guarantees 
either by content or by the proceedings in which they were enacted. The po-
litical powers are held responsible for the persistent inability to fulfil the fun-
damental elements of the rule of law.1295 Only one recent and illustrative ex-
ample is the adoption of the Media Act, which enabled censorship and the 
extension of government control and therewith considerably curbed the free-
dom of media and of speech.1296 
The frequent violations of fundamental constitutional principles are also at-
tributed to the dominance of the Government over the Macedonian National 
Assembly and the judiciary.1297 Given that governmental proposals are 
adopted by the governing majority without any critical appraisal or real polit-
ical debate, the political decision-making is in fact exclusively conducted by 
the governing powers. This dominance is reinforced by the frequent boycotts 
of the political opposition to attend the Assembly sessions. In 2008 such a 
boycott enabled the governing coalition to adopt not less than 168 laws in 
                                              
1294  Argument of deputy FRANCE CUKJATI in the session of the National Assembly held on 17 
March 2011. 
1295  A detailed analysis in this respect is provided by TRENESKA-DESKOSKA, Constitutional-
ism, 18. Instead of the rule of law, the author speaks of the «rule of man» in Macedonia. 
1296  See article published on <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonian-
journalists-shun-minister-over-media-law> (last accessed September 2018).  
1297  See Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) Country report for Macedonia 2016, p. 10 
f. available on <http://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports 
/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Macedonia.pdf> (last accessed September 2018). 
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emergency proceedings during one single month.1298 Rather than an expres-
sion of democratic rule and popular sovereignty, the Macedonian National As-
sembly is considered to have become a «cemetery of democracy».1299  
This dominance of the Government is also considered as major reason for the 
reluctance of the other state authorities to contest acts of legislation before the 
Constitutional Court.1300  
B. Institutional significance 
Just as its counterparts in Croatia and Slovenia also the Macedonian initiative 
contributed to the elimination of unconstitutional laws and other acts of legis-
lation to a considerable extent. During the last twenty-five years initiatives 
filed by individuals and legal persons played the most significant role in the 
enforcement of the constitutional standards against the legislative authorities. 
Just as the Croatian proposal the initiative was re-established with the primary 
function to enable individuals to contribute to the enforcement of the consti-
tutional guarantees and values. The analysis of the jurisdiction reveals that 
initiatives are predominantly filed for the own benefit and for the protection 
of the personal rights. In contrast to its Croatian counterpart however, the ini-
tiative plays a primary role as legal remedy for individual rights protection. 
The protection offered by initiatives is considerably more extensive than the 
one offered by constitutional complaints. According to one view, this access 
right only offers an indirect or «concurrent» protection of the subjective rights 
of the applicants.1301 Following another opinion, initiatives are considered as 
remedies for subjective rights protection and «compensatory legal means» for 
the limited protection offered by constitutional complaints. This view is shared 
by the Constitutional Court who stated that  
«through the traditional form of actio popularis, this [abstract review] be-
comes a matter of public interest, although these initiatives contain the real 
individual interest of the citizens or other subjects. Thus, the abstract con-
trol is a means of realization of a direct protection of human freedoms and 
                                              
1298  The majority of these acts are still valid today, see KRČINSKI, fn. 2. Although these acts 
were contested by an initiative for violating the legislative procedures, the Constitutional 
Court stopped the review proceedings after the petitioner deceased. 
1299  TRENESKA-DESKOSKA, Parliament, 18. 
1300  Discussion with Professor TRENESKA-DESKOSKA on 4 April 2014. With respect to the lack 
of judicial independence, see TRENESKA-DESKOSKA, Judicial Independence, 13 ff.  
1301  E.g. KALKAŠLIEVA, 80; SKARIĆ, 410. 
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rights, which compensate the limited competence of the Court in direct re-
alization of this protection.»1302 
This is a consequence of the extensive protective effect of initiatives, which – 
in contrast to constitutional complaints – not only serve the protection of all 
fundamental rights but also enforce these rights against the legislative author-
ities as institutions guaranteed by constitutional law in a public interest.1303 
This view seems to be confirmed by the notable difference in the amount of 
initiatives and constitutional complaints filed. The statistical data show that 
the latter – in contrast to the Croatian and Slovenian complaints – only play 
an insignificant role for individual rights protection. 
Irrespectively of the primary motivation to file initiatives, individuals and le-
gal persons contributed to the protection and enforcement of fundamental 
rights against the legislative authorities. Moreover, initiatives effectuated the 
elimination of several provisions for violating fundamental values of the rule 
of law, other constitutional provisions or democratic standards guaranteed by 
the Constitution. Consequently, these remedies significantly contribute to the 
consolidation of these principles and values in Macedonia as well.  
At the same time and just as in Croatia, the detrimental effects of unrestricted 
individual access prove to be true in Macedonia as well. Although the Mace-
donian Court can hardly be considered as overburdened, a significant number 
of initiatives is filed out of discontent and with the aim to achieve the elimi-
nation of legal solutions deemed to be unfavourable or adverse to the own 
legal position. Besides, individual citizens are encouraged to assume the self-
declared role of guardians of the Constitution also here. Just as in Croatia one 
certain petitioner files initiatives for the initiation of review proceedings on a 
regular basis.1304 The fact that not a few of his initiatives caused the elimina-
tion of unconstitutional or unlawful acts of legislation speaks for the positive 
effect of unrestricted individual access on the enforcement of the Constitution 
also in Macedonia.  
The institutional significance of the initiative finally becomes evident in light 
of the persistent disregard of the Constitution by the political powers and the 
restraint of the state powers to contest laws and other acts of legislation. The 
                                              
1302  (Insertions and Italics added). Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia, 46 f. 
This opinion is shared by ČOBANOV, fn. 908; IVANOVSKI/JANJIĆ-TODOROVA, 7. 
1303  See IVANOVSKI/JANJIĆ-TODOROVA, 8 f.  
1304  See ČOBANOV, fn. 1194. 
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statistical data reveal that, just as in Croatia and Slovenia, individuals and le-
gal persons are by far the most active applicants in contesting laws and other 
general acts of the legislative authorities. The significance of unlimited indi-
vidual access is invoked also in view of the lack of boldness of the Constitu-
tional Court to use its own extensive competences to ensure the enforcement 
of the Constitution against the legislative authorities. In view of these circum-
stances, a broad accessibility of the Constitutional Court must be considered 
as desirable.1305 The institutional significance of the initiative finally seems to 
be acknowledged by the Constitutional Court itself. In relation to initiatives 
filed by individuals and legal persons, it accordingly states that constitutional 
review is the 
«real indicator of enforcement of the Constitution in the judicial prac-
tice».1306 
 
III. Future prospects of the popular complaints 
1. Right of proposal in Croatia 
A. Unsuccessful attempt at restriction in 2001 
An attempt to limit individual access to the Croatian Constitutional Court by 
means of the proposal was made on the occasion of the reform of the consti-
tutional judiciary in 2001. The proposal aimed at restricting the right to pro-
pose the review of acts of legislation by introducing the requirement of a 
proven individual interest. With the Slovene right to petition in mind, the pro-
ponents suggested that applicants demonstrate a direct interference of con-
tested provisions with their legal position when submitting proposals.1307 The 
idea to introduce a new procedural requirement did, however, not find any 
support in the Assembly and was deleted from the final proposal on the 
amendment of the CCL.1308 
                                              
1305  See discussion with Professor TRENESKA-DESKOSKA on 4 April 2014. 
1306  See the Report of the Constitutional Court for the XIInd Conference on European Consti-
tutional Courts, see above at fn. 554, 4 f. 
1307  E.g. CRNIĆ, Pokretanje postupka, 3. 
1308  See Report of the Croatian National Assembly (IHS) no. 312 of 16 November 2001, 38. 
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Therewith, the responsible commission showed that it was not willing to re-
strict the accessibility of the Constitutional Court to individuals and other legal 
subjects. It stated that the introduction of legal interest as procedural require-
ment would  
«curtail the level of the constitutional rights of the applicants reached so 
far.»1309  
It further held that this new requirement would be incompatible with the con-
stitutionally guaranteed right to file petitions and complaints to state organs 
and to receive a reply. Finally, the commission argued that it would be incom-
patible with the nature of proposals and their primary objective to request the 
review of laws and not to protect rights and liberties. The suggestion to intro-
duce legal interest as admissibility requirement for proposals was also rejected 
by several deputies in the National Assembly.1310  
As other proposal to limit individual access and to improve the national 
budget, the introduction of court fees was discussed on the occasion of the 
said reform as well. Yet, also this proposal was deleted by the National As-
sembly in order to not restrict the access to wealthy applicants only.1311 
B. Existing demands to restrict the right of proposal  
The available statistical data reveal that the Croatian Constitutional Court is 
heavily overburdened. The reason is not only the excessive number of appli-
cations received year after year, but also the consequential backlog of unre-
solved cases.1312 Amongst legal scholars one can observe a general consensus 
on the necessity of comprehensive constitutional and legal reforms. The Con-
stitutional Court itself regularly invokes the indispensability of reforms so as 
to reduce its workload and to improve its efficiency.1313 Suggestions on how 
to avert an excessive number of new applications in the future are made by the 
                                              
1309  See explanation of the National Assembly on the proposal to enact the constitutional act 
to amend the CCL no. 291 of 11 June 2001. A reference to the respective decision can be 
found in KRAPAC, Pretpostavke za pokretanje i vođenje, 200. 
1310  The statements made in the session of the Assembly are published in Report IHS no. 305 
of 26 July 2001, 34 and 38. 
1311  See also Report HIS no. 305 of 26 July 2001, 33 f., 38 and 40. 
1312  E.g. OMEJEC, O potrebnim promjenama, 45. 
1313  See e.g. Strategic plan for the period 2014–2016, 4, available in Croatian language on the 
Court’s website <http://www.usud.hr> (last accessed September 2016). 
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judges of the Constitutional Court themselves. These comprise the introduc-
tion of its power to reject obviously unfounded applications.1314 Yet, the key 
demand remains the introduction of the legal interest as procedural require-
ment for individual access.1315 The above mentioned rejection of the National 
Assembly to introduce this procedural requirement has been criticized by the 
Court members.1316 These consider its refusal to adopt an unpopular measure 
such as the restriction of existing rights as politically motivated.1317  
A comprehensive reform of the access system is consequently considered as 
only solution. In principle, suggestions aim at restricting the right to request 
the initiation of judicial review proceedings to state organs, while replacing 
the entitlement of individuals to file proposals with a «multi-functional» con-
stitutional complaint along the lines of the German normative constitutional 
complaint or the Slovene petition.1318 This measure is considered to reduce the 
number of applications received annually, especially because individuals 
would first have to exhaust all available legal remedies before accessing the 
Constitutional Court.1319 These proposals correspond to the transformed Hun-
garian normative constitutional complaint. 
C. Outlook on the future of the right of proposal 
Constitutional reforms conducted so far did not include any changes to the 
accessibility of the Constitutional Court. In fact, such changes have not even 
been discussed on the occasion of these reforms. Neither today there seem to 
be any concrete efforts on the part of the political power to overcome the in-
stitutional problem related to the overburdening of the Constitutional Court. 
As already indicated, new proceedings of constitutional reform have been in-
itiated recently upon a respective proposal filed in July 2013 by a group of 
representatives in the National Assembly.1320 Yet, the only suggestion relating 
                                              
1314  LJUBIĆ, Karakter prijedloga, 811. 
1315  Judge DAVOR KRAPAC expressed this view in KRAPAC, Pretpostavke za pokretanje i 
vođenje, 200 f., 204 and KRAPAC, Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom, n. 26.2. 
1316  KRAPAC, Pretpostavke za pokretanje i vođenje, 200 and fn. 78.  
1317  Discussion with Secretary General of the Croatian Constitutional Court TEODOR ANTIĆ 
of 4 July 2013. 
1318  For a detailed presentation of this proposal of the Court see OMEJEC, O potrebnim promje-
nama, 124 and figure no. 5. 
1319  See OMEJEC, O potrebnim promjenama, 114 ff. 
1320  The decision of the National Assembly to initiate proceedings for constitutional review 
was passed on 25 October 2013, NN 131/13 and the decision of the Assembly on the 
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to constitutional judiciary discussed concerns the Court's competence to con-
firm the constitutionality of referendum questions. 
There are no signs that the right of proposal as means of individual access to 
the Croatian Constitutional Court will be restricted or abrogated in the near 
future. The recent reform proceedings show that the chronic overburdening of 
the Constitutional Court does not belong to the issues on the current political 
agenda. Mostly, this agenda seems to be fully dominated by the attempts to 
form and maintain a governing coalition. Therefore, it seems rather improba-
ble that suggestions to restrict the Court's accessibility will be made on the 
part of the political actors any time soon. Rather, such a request has to come 
from the Constitutional Court itself. But again, a respective request is likely 
to have difficulties to reach the two-thirds majority necessary for constitu-
tional amendments. Restrictions of rights constitute unpopular political 
measures. Secondly, an adoption of such a proposal in the near future seems 
unlikely because of the strong contrasting political positions within the Croa-
tian National Assembly. In relation to the current constitutional reform pro-
ceedings, heavy political polemics and mutual accusations arose in connection 
with about every single proposal discussed. Despite a speedy initiation, the 
process of constitutional reform has therefore not advanced any further since 
December 2013.  
This raises the question whether the Constitutional Court itself could restrict 
the right to propose the initiation of judicial review proceedings by adopting 
a more strict interpretation of the admissibility criteria? As shown, the Court 
has taken such an action by increasing the demands for substantiation for fil-
ing constitutional complaints.1321 Yet, the explicit wording of art. 38 para. 1 
CCL, which guarantees the right to propose the initiation of review proceed-
ings against laws and other general acts to every individual or legal person, 
prevents the Constitutional Court from limiting its accessibility on its own 
initiative. The adoption of a more rigid interpretation of the entitlement to file 
proposals is therefore rather improbable without respective constitutional re-
forms.  
In the light of the above, it can be concluded that individual access granted by 
the right of proposal in accordance to the existing law in Croatia will not be 
restricted in the near future. 
                                              
Adoption of the Draft Changes to the Constitution on 13 December 2013, NN 150/13, see 
above at fn. 345. 
1321  See above at Chapter 2, pp. 87 f. 
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2. Right of petition in Slovenia  
A. The petition as subject-matter of several reforms 
During the past twenty-five years the right of individuals to petition for the 
initiation of review proceedings against laws and other general acts has been 
subject to continuous limitations. After the restriction by the constitution-mak-
ers in 1991, demands for further restrictions were raised in 2000. These have 
been complied with in 2007 with the adoption of the new CCA and, particu-
larly, with the change of practice by the Constitutional Court itself. Despite 
the slight decline in the amount of petitions following these reforms, demands 
for further restrictions of individual access continue to persist in legal doctrine, 
practice and in politics. There is widespread agreement that the previous 
measures did not suffice and that the possibilities to unburden the Court by 
means of legal changes and a more rigid interpretation are exhausted. Com-
prehensive reforms of the competences and the accessibility of the Constitu-
tional Court are generally considered as only remaining measures.1322 
Different proposals on how to reduce the workload of the Court can be found. 
The Constitutional Court suggested the reduction of its powers already in 
2000. It suggested the transfer of those powers to the administrative courts 
that are inherent to the judiciary, namely the competence to resolve jurisdic-
tional disputes and to review the legality of governmental and other sub-leg-
islative acts.1323 So as to reduce the number of applications filed, other reform 
proposals suggest the introduction of mandatory legal representation,1324 or 
the imposition of court fees.1325 Another suggestion, finally, includes the elim-
ination of the Court's obligation to justify every decision to accept or to reject 
petitions.1326  
Yet, additional restrictions of individual access to the Constitutional Court are 
at the core of the debates on further reforms. The parallel ways of access by 
means of constitutional complaints and petitions is seen as main cause for its 
overload. The Constitutional Court itself considers the parallel existence of 
                                              
1322  E.g. ČEBULJ, Pobuda za ustavnosodno presojo, 1006; RIBIČIČ, Razmerje med ustavno 
pritožbo in pobudo, 1488 f. See also Constitutional Court in Annual Report 2008, 29 ff. 
1323  Annual Report 2000, 12; Annual Report 2005, 17. 
1324  RIBIČIČ, Razmerje med ustavno pritožbo in pobudo, 1493. 
1325  MAVČIČ, Zakon o Ustavnem sodišču, 298; RIBIČIČ, Razmerje med ustavno pritožbo in 
pobudo, 1493. 
1326  POLAK REMŠKAR, 12. 
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these access rights as unnecessary and as detrimental.1327 Unlike the constitu-
tional complaint, the petition encounters scepticism already for a long time. 
While its initial value is undisputed, it is claimed that its institutional signifi-
cance has been superseded with the introduction of the constitutional com-
plaint.1328  
a) Proposals to restrict individual access 
Among the proposals on how to reduce the workload of the Constitutional 
Court are suggestions to eliminate the right of petitions. The Constitutional 
Court itself questioned the need of such an entitlement of individuals in addi-
tion to the broad circle of qualified applicants and in view of the possibility to 
incidental judicial review in connection with constitutional complaints.1329 
The elimination of petitions finds supporters among legal scholars as well.1330 
More frequent are proposals to vest the Constitutional Court with a discretion-
ary power in accepting applications for consideration. The practice of the US 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari and to freely select which applications to 
assess on the merits serves as role model for these proposals.1331 The power of 
the Constitutional Court to decide only on applications that raise questions of 
real constitutional importance would reduce its workload to a considerable 
extent. Also the Constitutional Court itself criticized its obligation to assess 
every single submittal in order not to violate the applicants' rights.1332 On the 
occasion of the constitutional reform proceedings initiated in 2009 it therefore 
submitted a motion to introduce its discretionary power in accepting applica-
tions for consideration.1333 This motion found support among political powers 
and several legal scholars.1334  
                                              
1327  Annual Report 2006, 3. 
1328  See KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 69 f., 103 and 118 f.  
1329  Annual Report 2005, 18.  
1330  GRAD, 9; ČEBULJ, Zahteva in pobuda za začetek ustavnosodne presoje, 1482. 
1331  See above p. 14. Detailed explanations are provided by KRIVIC, Ustavno sodišče, 122 ff.  
1332  Annual Report 2001, 11.  
1333  Annual Report 2009, 2. 
1334  E.g. KAUČIČ/PAVLIN/BARDUTZKY, 38 f., 41 f.; RIBIČIČ, Strengthening constitutional de-
mocracy, 11 f.; TESTEN, Zaprta ali le podoljšana pot, 1477.  
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b) Governmental proposal for constitutional reform 
The calls of the Constitutional Court for reforms were included into the legis-
lative program of the Slovene Government for the year 2009. An essential im-
pulse for the beginning of concrete discourses was given by the speech of for-
mer President of the Republic Danilo Türk held before Parliament.1335 
Therein, he emphasized the indispensability of reforms for the reduction of 
the workload of the Constitutional Court and for an efficient protection of the 
Constitution and the fundamental rights. Only a few months later, the Govern-
ment submitted a proposal to initiate proceedings for constitutional reform in 
relation to art. 160, 161, and 162.1336 The Government suggested a restriction 
of the circle of applicants authorized to request the initiation of review pro-
ceedings and the exhaustive enumeration of the Court's competences. Its most 
radical proposal related to the Court's accessibility. Following the motion of 
the Constitutional Court, the Government proposed the introduction of the 
Court's competence to freely select which applications to accept for consider-
ation. 
The governmental proposal was supported and complemented by the expert 
group convened by the Constitutional Commission. The expert group pro-
posed the definition of two criteria as basis for the Court's discretion in order 
to ensure the predictability and to prevent arbitrary decisions.1337 Firstly, the 
Court should always take into account the significance of the constitutional 
issue at stake. Secondly, it should always consider the severity of the conse-
quences for the applicant.  
In spite of the widespread approval about the indispensability of comprehen-
sive reforms the governmental proposal was not adopted. First, it did not reach 
the approval of two-thirds of the Commission in the sessions held in October 
2010 and on 17 March 2011. For the same reason, the proposal was rejected 
by the National Assembly on 16 June 2011. Thereafter, the governmental pro-
posal was removed from the agenda. The records of the proceedings reveal 
                                              
1335  Former President Türk held his speech on the 38th session of the National Assembly on 
24 April 2008. 
1336  Proposal of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia of 21 July 2009 for the initiation 
of proceedings for the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia and 
draft of the constitutional law, EVA 2009-2011-0037.  
1337  See explanations of expert group member IGOR KAVČIČ to the opinion of the expert group 
of 18 October 2010, which was discussed in the session of the National Assembly of 27 
October 2010.  
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that the proposed discretionary power of the Constitutional Court was a key 
issue in the political debates and the main reason for the failure of the pro-
posal. This is indicative of a prevalent reservation against further restrictions 
of individual access.1338  
B. Outlook on the future of the petition in Slovenia 
In contrast to its Croatian counterpart, the Slovene Court has proven an activist 
approach in increasing the demands for its accessibility to individuals within 
the frame given by the Constitution and the CCA. As shown, it considerably 
restricted the right of individuals to file petitions with the adoption of a rigid 
interpretation of the legal interest already before the enactment of the CCA in 
1994 and with its change of practice in 2007. This change of practice was a 
reaction to the failure of the Government to respond to its motions on the oc-
casion of the enactment of the new CCA.1339 Besides the restrictions achieved, 
the impulse to further restrict individual access by introducing a discretionary 
power has always been given by the Court itself. Its motions were adopted in 
the governmental programs and proposals for reform of the system of consti-
tutional adjudication. 
However, it must be taken into account that the governmental proposal for 
constitutional reform of 2009 failed for not reaching the required two-thirds 
majority. The arguments expressed by the opponents to the proposal and in 
legal doctrine reveal a reservation against further restrictions of individual ac-
cess and the right to petition. Concerns about a possible deterioration of the 
standards of the rule of law, democratic rule and human rights protection seem 
to prevail. Against these backgrounds it is difficult to predict the future of the 
right of petition against laws and regulations. An indication for future re-
strictions could be the continuous demands of the Constitutional Court to al-
leviate its chronic overburdening and the fact that the two-thirds majority was 
only missed for seven votes. It has even been claimed that, in case of the fail-
ure of further reform attempts, the Constitutional Court should introduce its 
discretionary power itself by a change of practice.1340 Such a far-reaching step 
is however rather improbable without an amendment of art. 162 para. 2 Con-
stitution which guarantees the right of everyone with a legal interest to access 
the Constitutional Court. 
                                              
1338  See also KAUČIČ/PAVLIN/BARDUTZKY, 46. 
1339  See ČEBULJ, Pobuda za ustavnosodno presojo, 1006 f. 
1340  RIBIČIČ, Strengthening constitutional democracy, fn. 31. 
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3. Right to submit initiatives in Macedonia 
A. No previous attempts at restricting individual access 
As shown, the Macedonian Constitution has been revised in seven reforms 
and by 32 amendments since its enactment in 1991. Yet, none of these changes 
related to the jurisdiction or the accessibility of the Constitutional Court. Only 
the reform in the wake of the ratification of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, 
which ended the violent inter-ethnical conflict in 2001 affected constitutional 
judiciary to a limited extent, by introducing a quorum for approval of elections 
of Constitutional Court judges by deputies representing ethnic minorities.1341 
A later attempt of the Government to revise the normative basis for constitu-
tional adjudication on the occasion of the comprehensive judicial reform in 
2005 in relation to the accession negotiations with the EU was not included 
into the draft amendment adopted on 7 December 2005.1342 Since the enact-
ment of the Constitution in 1991 the broad accessibility of the Macedonian 
Constitutional Court has consequently never been challenged or changed – 
neither by constitutional reform nor by amendment of the Rules of Procedure 
by the Court itself.  
B. No existing demands to restrict individual access 
As has been shown, the regulatory autonomy of the Constitutional Court with 
regard to its organization and proceedings constitutes a focal point of legal 
discourses already for several years.1343 
In contrast, there are hardly any demands in Macedonia to restrict the acces-
sibility of the Constitutional Court and to limit the access of individuals and 
legal persons. Critics against the practically unlimited entitlement to file initi-
atives are only raised by individual scholars. Proposing the introduction of a 
legal interest as procedural requirement,1344 these efforts comply with the sug-
gestions made by the Constitutional Court of Croatia. Unrestricted access of 
                                              
1341  Constitutional amendment XV of 16 November 2001, Služben vesnik 91/01. 
1342  Decision of the National Assembly of 7 December 2005 on the proclamation of the 
amendments XX–XXX, Služben vesnik 107/05. The governmental proposal to adopt a 
respective law was criticized by the Venice Commission for merely relating to the deci-
sion-making power, but not to the proceedings of the Constitutional Court, see Venice 
Commission Document CDL(2005)66, n. 66. 
1343  See above at Chapter 2, pp. 68 f. 
1344  ČOBANOV, 50, 237 f. 
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individuals is regarded as inconsistent with the objective of individual access 
to protect fundamental rights. In view of the power of the Constitutional Court 
to initiate such proceedings at its own discretion and in view of the circle of 
other applicants authorized to file respective requests, the initiative is consid-
ered as superfluous and as cause for the workload of the Constitutional 
Court.1345  
However, there is no political or legal discourse on the necessity to restrict the 
Constitutional Court's accessibility in general or to individuals and legal per-
son at all. The workload resulting from the approximately 200 applications 
received per year shows that the Macedonian Court does not nearly suffer 
from a comparable overload as its counterparts in Croatia and Slovenia. Con-
sequently, there also appears to be no need for measures to decrease its work-
load or to limit its accessibility.  
C. Outlook on the future of the Macedonian initiative 
a) No subject in current constitutional reform proceedings 
In June 2014 the Macedonian Government submitted a proposal for constitu-
tional reform to the National Assembly.1346 The eight amendments suggested 
therein aim at the fulfilment of the admission requirements for the aspired ac-
cess to the EU and become legally effective in 2017. Besides the improvement 
of the financial system and the strengthening of the independence of the judi-
ciary, two proposals suggest the extension of the powers of the Constitutional 
Court. One of them relates to the introduction of a complaint against decisions 
of the Judicial Council in relation to the election of candidates.  
More relevant for the present study is the proposal to extend the Court's pow-
ers in protecting fundamental rights. In reference to the restricted scope of 
protection offered by constitutional complaints, the Government proposes the 
introduction of a complaint that strengthens the standard of human rights and 
liberties. The protection should not only entitle applicants to contest all indi-
vidual acts and actions of bearers of state and of local authorities. It should 
moreover be extended to constitutional rights and liberties which cannot be 
protected by constitutional complaints under the existing law. In addition to 
                                              
1345  ČOBANOV, 50. The author even suggests the abolition of the initiative as means of indi-
vidual access to the Constitutional Court. 
1346  The proposal was presented by the Minister of Justice in the session of the National As-
sembly on 16 July 2014. 
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those rights already protected under the valid Constitution, the Government 
specifically enumerates political rights, the right to life, the right to liberty, the 
prohibition of torture, the presumption of innocence and the right to fair 
trial.1347 In its opinion on the proposed amendments to the Macedonian Con-
stitution, the Venice Commission endorses the extension of the scope of pro-
tection.1348 It however criticizes the explicit enumeration of the protected 
rights and liberties in the governmental proposal and the failure to list other 
fundamental rights such as the guarantee of ownership or the right to strike.1349 
All deputies attending the debate held in the National Assembly advocated for 
the extension of the Constitutional Court's power in protecting human rights 
and liberties.1350 In the subsequent vote, the governmental proposal reached 
the required two-thirds majority of the National Assembly. It was adopted de-
spite objections of Albanian deputies for not containing any proposal to im-
prove the minority rights of ethnic Albanians and despite the absence of the 
Albanian opposition party who since the early elections held in April 2014 
boycotts the Assembly, accusing it of electoral fraud.1351 Although the Gov-
ernment maintained the exhaustively enumerated list of rights and liberties 
protected by means of the constitutional complaint, in the draft amendments 
elaborated thereupon, it extended it in accordance to the opinion of the Venice 
Commission. Following the recommendations of the Commission, it further-
more included into its proposal the amendment of the Constitution and the 
adoption of a law by a two-thirds majority on the mode of operation and pro-
cedures of the Constitutional Court. The elaborated draft amendments were 
finally confirmed by the National Assembly in its session held on 23 January 
2015.  
b) Outlook 
Besides these recent endeavours to extend the protection of human rights and 
liberties, no demands with respect to a restriction of the broad accessibility of 
                                              
1347  See page 3 of the Minutes of the session of the National Assembly of 16 July 2014. 
1348  Opinion on the Seven Amendments to the Constitution of the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Venice Commission Document CDL-AD(2014)026, nn. 78 ff.  
1349  Venice Commission Document CDL-AD(2014)026, n. 83. 
1350  See hereto the different votes made during the session held by the National Assembly on 
16 July 2014. 
1351  See e.g. article of 17 July 2014, retrievable on <http://www.balkaninsight.com/ 
en/article/macedonia-gives-nod-to-constitutional-changes> (last accessed September 
2018). 
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the Macedonian Constitutional Court are made. Accordingly, it can be con-
cluded that the right of individuals to file initiatives against acts of legislation 
has been and is principally undisputed in Macedonia. Therewith the situation 
in Macedonia considerably differs from Croatia and, in particular, from Slo-
venia. Not even the Macedonian Constitutional Court has shown any endeav-
our to restrict the practically unrestricted individual access by making use of 
its regulatory autonomy or by requesting respective constitutional reforms.  
It is probable that the primary role of initiatives as means of direct individual 
access to the Constitutional Court changes as consequence of the adoption of 
the constitutional amendments by the National Assembly. In the long run, the 
extension of the protection by means of constitutional complaints could in-
duce a considerable increase in the number of applications filed, which, fi-
nally, leads to demands to limit the Court's accessibility to individuals. As can 
be observed in Croatia and Slovenia, not the constitutional complaints, which 
cause the major workload, but the popular complaints became the focal point 
of proposals for reform to restrict individual access to the Constitutional 
Court. Whether this prediction will effectively come true with respect to the 
Macedonian initiative will however only become evident once the respective 
constitutional amendment enter into force in 2017. 
 
IV. Comparative conclusion 
This Chapter aims at establishing the institutional significance of popular 
complaints as means of individual access to constitutional courts and as rem-
edies against laws and other acts of legislation. Despite diverging opinions in 
doctrine and practice, the question can be answered only by taking into con-
sideration the particularities and concrete circumstances in each individual 
state. The study takes as connecting factors persistent deficiencies in imple-
menting the Constitutions both by political authorities and by other state au-
thorities. These are not only indicative of the status of transformation but even-
tually also for determining the institutional significance of the complaints pro-
vided in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia.  
A comparable answer can be given with respect to Croatia and Macedonia, 
where the entitlement of individuals to file popular complaints is not restricted 
by the requirement of a proven individual interest. The amount of complaints 
rejected for being inadmissible or dismissed for being unfounded confirms the 
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invoked risks of misuses and of a great number of submittals out of mere dis-
satisfaction with political decisions.  
However, the main argument of the Venice Commission that unrestricted in-
dividual access inevitably leads to a congestion of constitutional courts cannot 
be fully confirmed. On the one hand, the practical analysis shows that popular 
complaints are by far not the main reasons for the workload of the two Courts. 
As consequence of its perception as court of appeal, the Croatian Constitu-
tional Court suffers much more from the amount of constitutional complaints. 
And the relevant data in Macedonia reveals that popular complaints cannot be 
considered as cause for overloading the Constitutional Court either. Over and 
above, it is probable that the initiative will lose practical significance after the 
extension of protection by constitutional complaints. On the other hand, the 
fact that certain individuals are prompted to take the self-declared role as 
guardian of the constitution cannot per se be considered as a negative factor 
of unrestricted individual access. The examples given in both states show that 
appeals of these persons have in fact resulted in the invalidation of not a few 
unconstitutional laws and other acts of legislation.  
Fundamental deficiencies in implementing the Constitutions exist in Croatia 
and in Macedonia both on the part of the political authorities and on the part 
of other state organs authorized to request the initiation of review proceedings. 
These deficiencies indicate that the process of transition from the formerly 
authoritarian systems to constitutional democracies has not yet been com-
pleted. In light of the generally acknowledged positive effects of unrestricted 
individual access to constitutional courts in periods of transition it can there-
fore be concluded that both the right of individuals to propose the initiation of 
review proceedings in Croatia and the right of submitting initiatives for judi-
cial review in Macedonia still play a significant role for the consolidation of 
the new constitutional values. In response to the question raised in this Chap-
ter, these means of direct individual access to the Constitutional Courts con-
stitute essential features of constitutional adjudication from an institutional 
point of view. 
A somewhat different conclusion must be drawn with respect to the right of 
individuals to file petitions against laws and other acts of legislation to the 
Constitutional Court of Slovenia. The continued endeavours to restrict indi-
vidual access show that the concerns of the Venice Commission with respect 
to unlimited individual access are shared. Today access is limited to individu-
als who are directly affected by unconstitutional laws and who can demon-
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strate a prospect of improvement of their rights by the invalidation of the con-
tested act of legislation. From the perspective of individuals, the formerly un-
restricted access right under socialist rule has de facto been converted to an-
other remedy for individual rights protection before the Constitutional Court. 
With regard to constitutional complaints, petitions are only of a subsidiary 
relevance in practice. 
Consequently, individuals in Slovenia play a less essential role as guardians 
of the Constitution as has been established with respect to Croatia and Mace-
donia. Also in light of the more advanced progress of Slovenia in transition, 
the petition must be considered to be of smaller institutional significance. Over 
and above, it seems that the significance of this means of direct individual 
access is diminishing both from a practical and an institutional point of view. 
While on an annual basis the Constitutional Court receives a considerably 
larger amount of constitutional complaints, it has been shown that petitions 
lose their independent function for being more and more submitted in connec-
tion with constitutional complaints.  
It remains to be seen whether direct individual access to the Slovene Consti-
tutional Court will be additionally restricted by introducing a discretionary 
power of the Court in taking submittals into consideration. The recent unsuc-
cessful attempt at introducing this additional access hurdle shows that con-
cerns about the effect of such a restriction on the rule of law and the standards 
of human rights protection prevail in politics.  
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Concluding observations 
After the dissolution of the SFRY the newly independent states Croatia, Slo-
venia and Macedonia re-established their Constitutional Courts and re-intro-
duced popular complaints as means of direct individual access to these Courts. 
Due to their particular nature, such popular complaints fundamentally differ 
from other legal remedies in public and constitutional law proceedings. As 
remedies for the initiation of judicial review proceedings they serve the en-
forcement of the abstract constitutional order against the legislative authori-
ties. As individual access rights they, at the same time, entail features of legal 
remedies for the protection of subjective rights. Therewith, these three states 
distinguish themselves from most other European states with concentrated 
constitutional adjudication, where, as a consequence of their original function 
to enforce the constitutional order against the legislator in an objective sense, 
the entitlement to request the initiation of judicial review proceedings is prin-
cipally restricted to state organs. 
In light of that the study analyses the popular complaints in Croatia, Slovenia 
and Macedonia from a procedural point of view and in a practical aspect. 
These findings allow the drawing of conclusions about the significance of 
these means of direct individual access for the systems of constitutional adju-
dication in the three states and as instruments for the enforcement of the Con-
stitutions against the political authorities.  
The procedural analysis shows several resemblances: All three states allow the 
filing of popular complaints against a comprehensive scope of legislative acts. 
Applicants filing popular complaints must fulfil a number of requirements as 
to the form and content of complaints. Complaints are only accepted for con-
sideration if they are substantiated to such an extent that raises doubts with 
respect to the compatibility of a challenged law with the Constitutions. Re-
semblances also exist with respect to the arrangement of the judicial review 
proceedings. Applicants are vested with information rights and can be invited 
to participate and to therewith influence the decision-making of the Constitu-
tional Courts. This inclusion of applicants in accordance to the Convention 
standards for fair trials shows a broader understanding of the nature of judicial 
review proceedings. In all three states finally, applicants can achieve concrete 
personal benefits from the review and the invalidation of unconstitutional 
laws.  
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As most essential difference the right to file petitions against acts of legislation 
to the Slovene Constitutional Court is additionally restricted by the require-
ment of a proven legal interest. Applicants must demonstrate an immediate 
legal impact of a contested law or legal provision on their legal status or rights. 
Additionally, they must show that the invalidation of the contested provision 
improves their personal legal positions. In most cases they only succeed in 
doing so by additionally submitting a valid constitutional complaint against 
individual acts passed in application of the contested law.  
On the basis of the concrete procedural arrangements, it can be stated that the 
popular complaints in Croatia and Macedonia serve both as remedies for sub-
jective rights protection and as instruments for the enforcement of the abstract 
constitutional order against the legislative authorities. The protective function 
of the Slovene petition is less clear. From the perspective of individuals, the 
requirements as to their legal interest de facto restricted the function to the 
protection of their subjective rights.  
The analysis of the popular complaints from a practical point of view reveals 
their significance in relation to constitutional complaints in practice. In Croa-
tia and Slovenia popular complaints only play a secondary role as remedies 
for individual rights protection, whereas constitutional complaints are of a far 
greater importance. In contrast, the initiative in Macedonia is of a considerably 
greater practical relevance as remedy for subjective rights protection. The lim-
ited protective effect of constitutional complaints must be seen as reason for 
this reverse picture. Whether and to what extent the ongoing reform will en-
hance the practical significance of constitutional complaints to the detriment 
of popular complaints remains to be seen. The analysis from a practical point 
of view further reveals that, in relation to requests submitted by the authorized 
applicants, individuals and legal persons are by far more active as applicants 
requesting the Constitutional Courts to review laws and other acts of legisla-
tion.  
In all three states, popular complaints have a generally low success rate before 
the Constitutional Courts. Failures to comply with the procedural require-
ments and to call into question the compatibility of contested legal provisions 
with the Constitutions are frequent reasons for their rejection and dismissal. 
To a great extent this can be attributed to the frequent use of these remedies 
against unpopular legal solutions. But also the difficulty to substantiate incon-
sistencies between normative acts in an abstract manner can be seen as reason. 
The high requirements for substantiation are also indicative of a restraining 
approach of the Constitutional Courts. At the same time however, the analysis 
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of the case-law reveals that not a few laws and acts of legislation have in fact 
been reviewed and abrogated on the basis of popular complaints during the 
twenty-five years since transition. This shows that, despite their low success 
rate in relation to their amount filed, the popular complaints in Croatia, Slo-
venia and Macedonia have added and still add to the enforcement of human 
rights and constitutional guarantees such as the rule of law and democratic 
rule to a significant extent.  
Irrespective of whether the proposals, petitions or initiatives are filed for the 
protection of the personal rights of applicants or against violations of other 
constitutional guarantees, the far-reaching protective effect of these remedies 
must be emphasized. Successful complaints cause the invalidation of uncon-
stitutional laws and legal provisions and therewith enforce the respective 
rights, guarantees or principles as constitutional institutions. The protective 
effect consequently exceeds the subjective interests of applicants and enforces 
the Constitutions in a general interest of society. 
As has been shown, there is general agreement that broad individual access to 
constitutional adjudication entails a positive and promoting effect for the con-
solidation of constitutions in states of transition. A high activity of individuals 
in requesting the constitutional courts to review laws and other acts of legis-
lation with respect to their compatibility with the constitutions is essential in 
view of the absence of an active and efficient mutual control between the state 
powers. Yet, the attitude towards granting individuals unrestricted access to 
constitutional courts prevails in Europe. This attitude is predominantly based 
on practical considerations comprising the risk of abusive submittals and a 
high cost burden as consequence of unrestricted individual access. Besides, 
the Venice Commission regularly advises against the introduction of popular 
complaints by referral to the overburdening of the Croatian Constitutional 
Court. 
However, in consideration of the actual and concrete circumstances in the 
three states considered, these doubts and reservations appear unfounded and 
unjustified. Firstly, by receiving about 200 complaints on an annual basis, the 
Macedonian Court cannot really be considered as overburdened. In Croatia 
and Slovenia, on the other hand, the main reason for the congestion of the 
Constitutional Courts is the amount of constitutional complaints while popular 
complaints only constitute a small fraction of the submittals received. Sec-
ondly, it has been shown that in all three states the political powers regularly 
neglect the Constitutions when legislating. Laws are enacted in disregard of 
constitutional standards and guarantees or of the prescribed procedures for 
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legislating. Constitutional and legal reforms are initiated for political purposes 
and constitutional powers abused to circumvent judicial review. The amount 
of decisions by which the Constitutional Courts invalidate laws and other acts 
of legislation indicates a persisting lack of awareness and consolidation of the 
Constitutions. What is more, the analysis reveals that, rather than using their 
powers to checks and balances, the state organs authorized and the judiciary 
in particular show restraint with the use of their power to request the Consti-
tutional Courts to review laws and other acts of the legislative authorities. 
In light of these circumstances, the institutional significance of remedies al-
lowing individuals to access the Constitutional Courts in order to achieve the 
initiation of review proceedings increases considerably. Given the insufficient 
constitutional awareness among political authorities, this is all the more true 
with respect to Macedonia and Croatia, where individuals can file popular 
complaints without a proven individual interest. 
Because of the chronic overload of their Courts, the negative attitude towards 
popular complaints has, to a certain extent, found proponents in Croatia, Slo-
venia and Macedonia as well. For the time being, however, Croatia and Mac-
edonia seem to adhere to their popular complaints and Slovenia to hesitate to 
limit individual access even further. On the one hand, these states have a tra-
dition of unlimited individual access to constitutional adjudication already for 
more than fifty years. To a certain extent, a lack of courage or political strategy 
to not restrict any rights of individuals can be seen as other reason. Finally, it 
seems to be the acknowledgment of the institutional significance of popular 
complaints for the consolidation of the Constitutions which keeps these three 
states from restricting individual access by means of popular complaints. At 
this place, it can be referred to the concerns raised by a number of scholars in 
the wake of the replacement of the Hungarian actio popularis by a normative 
constitutional complaint in 2011. The therewith caused shift from the Court’s 
main activity from abstract to concrete judicial review is considered to have 
reduced the strong protection offered by the Constitutional Court. Alarming is 
the fact that this reform was accompanied by several other measures which 
aimed at reducing the Constitutional Court’s competences and constitutional 
adjudication as a whole.  
To conclude it can be stated that the transition to constitutionalism, to the rule 
of law and to democratic rule in Croatia and Macedonia, and to a certain extent 
also in Slovenia, is not yet concluded and still continues today. In view of that, 
the popular complaints can be regarded as institutional premises for the further 
enforcement of the Constitutions and human rights in these states. As the first 
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President of the Croatian Constitutional Court, JADRANKO CRNIĆ declared, 
with the entitlement to access the Constitutional Court by constitutional com-
plaint and by proposal, individuals were intended to assume the role of guar-
antors of the Constitution.1352 In light of the above, it can be concluded that 
this statement has not lost its validity even twenty-five years after transition 
of these states from socialist rule.  
 
                                              
1352  CRNIĆ, Komentar Ustavnog zakona, 26; IBID., Pokretanje postupka, 3. 
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